...feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." So deep-seated is Mill's horror of substance that he prefers to take up the paradox, which he calls,...

...J. Ward, in his article Psychology in the Encyclopaedia Brilannica, speaking of the hypothesis that "a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series," says (p. 89): " Paradox is too mild a word for it, even contradiction will hardly suffice." Whereupon,...

...of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. ' The truth is that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton...

...possibilities of feeling," even though the author is not unaware of the difficulty involved in the question how a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series. Mathematical principles, like all others, have an experiential origin — the peculiar certitude ascribed...

...has been the feeling of others beside Mill: "Accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. ... I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory...

...has been the feeling of others beside Mill: "Accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. ... I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory...

...of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the parodox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." * In view of this insurmountable difficulty, it would have been creditable in Mill to have abandoned...

...of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the parodox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series."1 In view of this insurmountable difficulty, it would have been creditable in Mill to have...

...or possibilities of them,"3 in order to escape " the paradox, that something which, ex liypothcsi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series."3 This is the ground of Mill's belief in a self. " In so far," he says, "as reference to an...

...Ward, in his article Psychology in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, speaking of the hypothesis that ' a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series,' says (p. 39) : ' Paradox is too mild a word for it, even contradiction will hardly suffice.' Whereupon,...