...have said of making the unmeaning and even contradictory assertion] that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton...

...feelings, or possibilities of them; or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." — In our present state of existence, it is probable that the mind is not wholly independent of the...

...feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.' — Exam. 3d ed. p. 242. Which alternative is commonly accepted, there can be no doubt. But if it be...

...any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." In respect to the belief in the real existence of the external world, he concedes that it cannot be...

...feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." (p. 248.) This peculiar difficulty, however, is constructed by Mill himself when he makes the above...

...feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hyjwttiesi, is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." In respeot to the belief in the real existence of the external world, he concedes that it cannot be...

...feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypotl1esi is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.' Mr. Mill consoles himself by a general reference to the ultimate inexplicability of everything. But...

...feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, exhypothesi, **й ia but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." In respect to the belief in the real existence of the external -world, he eoncedes that it cannot be...

...feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which «j Itypotkesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a scries." Nothing can be more frank and honest; only, instead of saying with Mill that we are here "...

...possibilities of them, or else of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is bnt a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.' In respect to the belief iu the real existence of the external world, he concedes that it cannot be...