...all-important cardinal proposition the missing of which had made the history of philosophy one such wide waste of occasionally illuminated confusion ? It was this...treatise, entitled respectively " Epistemology, or Theory of Knowing," " Agnoiology, or the Theory of Ignorance," and "Ontology, or the Theory of Being,"...

...consciousness itself, are intransferable.1 1 The starting-point of Professor Ferrier's system is, that "along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must,...of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself. " (Instiiutes, Prop. L) The student of Sir \V. Hamilton's writings will at once perceive the bearing...

...all-important cardinal proposition the missing of which had made the history of philosophy one such wide waste of occasionally illuminated confusion ? It was this...intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition pf its " knowledgeY"Tiave~ some cognisance of "itself." Starting from this proposition, — and proceeding...

...thus begins his Institutes of of Metaphysic : " The Primary Law or Condition of all Knowledge. — Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must,...the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of itself."1 Here Ferrier errs on the side of the too much. He denies that reflective consciousness...

...the initial principle of Professor Ferrier's Metaphysical System, the doctrine is thus enunciated : ' Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its influence of the earlier Scottish on the earlier French School ia well known. Scotland and Germany...

...attaining the subjectobject cognition." Bain substitutes for Terrier's postulate the following : " Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must,...condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of a quality in contrast with what is known ; " or, " whenever intelligence is concerned with anything...

...Mr. Bain contends for when he says, ' Whenever intelligence is concerned with any thing as an object, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of a Subject ' ; and concerning which Lotze affirms, ' Every the simplest sensation bears testimony to...

...knows," says Terrier, whose statement may here be accepted in place of any more elaborate treatment, " it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself." To the speculative inquirer, endeavouring to reconstruct that which is immediately given in experience,...

...viewed by the light of those that follow, its meaning becomes clear: — ' Along with -whatever our intelligence knows, it must as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of self.' This he conceives the most fundamental expression of the fact that our knowledge...

...attaining the subject-object cognition." Bain substitutes for Terrier's postulate the following : " Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must,...condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of a quality in contrast with what is known ; " or, " whenever intelligence is concerned with anything...