proceedings shall be other than summary.

House of Commons, Feb. 5.The chancellor of the exchequer, taving moved, that the orders of has majesty in council respecting neutral trade be referred to the committee of ways and means,

Lord H. Petty said, that as doubts were entertained of the legality of those orders, it was the duty of ministers to have those doubts removed by showing to the house in the first place their necessty, and then by applying for an indemnity bill against the unconstitutional exercise of them. Lord Petty contended that the orders in council violated both the law of nations and the municipal law of this country, and farther, that to euforce them was a measure of great impolicy.

The boasting decree of Buonaparte, declaring England and its ports to be in a state of blockade, had never been acted upon; nor, as had been declared by the French minister of marine decrees to general Armstrong, the American envoy, was it ever intended to be acted on, with regard to neutrals. It was part of a liberty of the subject that he should have free access to strangers. The orders in council were a violation of Magna Charta.

Mr. Perceval in reply, maintained that the late orders in councd were founded on the same priuciple as the order of the 7th of January 1807, issued by the late ministers, with this difference only, that they were more efficient. The noble lord wished now to discuss the legality of these orders in council, and to reserve the question of policy to another stage of the business.

But as the legality of the measure was in the opinion of the noble lord, as far from being defensible as the policy-the policy might as well be discussed first, and the legality afterwards. The measures now in force were suggested by the propriety of retaliating the aggressions of the enemy. All trade in English goods was prohibited, and all such goods, wherever found, were declared lawful prize. Lord Petty had said, that this was of no moment, as the internal exe-cution of the decree in France was all that was intended. It was rather singular, however, that the first news of the publication of the decree at Berlin was accompanied with an account of its having been most rigorously enforced at Hamburgh. Was this confining the operation of the decree to French territory? In what manner did Buonaparte himself explain the decree in answer to the remonstrance from the merchants of Hamburgh, who stated, that a great deal of the goods seized actually belonged to them, and that the measures he was pursuing were pregnant with greater ruin to himself than to his enemy? "To destroy the commerce of the vile English," said he, “in every possible, way is my object. I have it in my power; and wish to ruin Hamburgh: for that would promote the destruction of English commerce."

The sanctity of every neutralflag was, forsooth, to be most ceremoniously respected at sea: while every principle and every right of neutral territory was to be invaded and violated by land!

Mr. Perceval, on the contrary, maintained, that we had a complete right to retaliate on the enemy his

own

and contended that this was a breach of the law of nations; and that neutrals, by thus admitting that France had to legislate for them, made themselves instruments of France against us. If France could continue to enjoy all the advantages of commerce through neutral trade, whilst we were suffering every injury that can result from her decrees, she would have no motive for peace; and this country would soon be reduced to the alternative of either submitting to peace upon any terms, or of continuing the war to an endless period. But he thought Europe might be made to feel that a maritime power is much less dependant upon Europe, than the continent is upon the maritime power. He would not suffer his country to perish, merely because the measures which were necessary for its preservation might press upon neutral commerce, which Buonaparte had before violated.

There was no contract without a reciprocal obligation; and, if neutrals did not oblige the other party to adhere to the law of nations, they could not complain of us for not adhering to it. Upon these grounds he saw no reason to question the propriety of those orders of council, which would impeach the order of January 1807, issued by an administration, which certainly claimed to possess a great proportion of the wisdom, consideration, and learning of the nation.

Mr. Windham admitted that the master of the rolls was right in the position, that if neutrals acquiesced in restrictions imposed by a belligerent, the other belligerent would be warranted in considering such neutrals as a party to those restrictions. Even then,

however, it would become a ques tion on the score of policy, how far neutrals, so acting, should be identified with the enemy, or treated hostilely. A good deal was to be said on this head, particularly respecting America. Mr. Windham proceeded to make several animadversions on what he conceived had been expressed by the master of the rolls. But here it would be nugastory to enter at all into these, as that honourable gentleman had declared, that he had not uttered a syllable that could justify the right honourable gentleman in imputing to him the doctrines which he was said to have laid down; and that no such ideas had ever entered his mind. Mr. Windham concluded with declaring, that the measure before the house required much reconsideration; and the question of the legality or illegality of the orders in council, should be decided upon before they entered on a discussion in a committee, of the measures by which it was proposed that they should be followed up.

"

Sir Arthur Pigott said, that the right of retaliation was an incidental right, growing out of an injury previously received. If that injury, the injury of blockade, had not been actually suffered, it was impossible that we could, according to any law either of nations or of reason, or even according to the obvious meaning of the word, retaliate, by blockading the enemy's ports. And if not done as a measure of retaliation, the act was committed in violation of all law whatever. But it was said, that a similar measure had been adopted by the late administration. That, if it had been so, would not have been any justification. But the contrary,

in fact, was seen by the explanation given by lord Howick, to Mr. Rist, the Danish minister. “It is not our intention that our orders should affect the general trade of neutrals; but only to prevent the coasting trade of France and her dependencies from being carried on by neutrals, as that species of trade was such as properly belonged to France herself, and to which neutrals were to be considered as lending themselves unfairly.."

The question, that the orders in council be referred to a committee of ways and means being put, was carried without a division. The chancellor of the exchequer then stated, that it was his intention to propose to the house, on a future day, that a certain amount of duty be laid on almost every article of commerce to be exported from this country, except the produce of Great Britain, and her colonies. For the present, he stated merely his general object. A resolution expressive of general approbation, was then passed, pro forma.

The question of both the legality and the policy of the orders in council was brought into discussion in the house of peers, on the 15th of February, by lord Auckland; who, in calling their lordships' attention to this subject, wished them to bear in mind five points. He mast suppose, in the first place, that ministers, previously to their Issuing these orders, had satisfied themselves with respect to their le gality, both as relating to the law of nations, and statute law; secondly, that there was a justifiable ground for issuing these orders; thirdly, that it was expedient to apply that ground; fourthly, that the manner and time of issuing them were pre

cisely those which were proper: the fifth point was of a more trifling nature; but one on which their lordships might have a great deal of trouble; he meant the intelligibility of the orders. The injustice and illegality of the orders, his lordship maintained on nearly the same grounds that were taken by opposition in the house of commons. He concluded by moving, that the house should resolve itself into a committee, to consider of the orders of council. The same arguments, also, though placed in a variety of' lights, were made use of by the lords who followed lord Auckland on the same side of the question.

Lord Erskine admitted, that the violent decree of the French government, gave us a right to retaliate; but to retaliate on the enemy, not on neutrals. We had no more right, he maintained, to alter the law of nations, on our own authority for our own convenience, than a judge here had to alter the law of the land without the authority

parliament. But after all, what was the value of this decree which Buonaparte, intoxicated with his victories, had issued? What was the use to talk of blockading Britain, when he had scarcely a ship on the ocean to enforce his orders? He might as well have talked of blockading the moon.

Lord King contended, that France" had not put her decrees in execution, and that we had no proof that neutrals would submit to them.—As to the argument that we had a right to hurt our enemy, though a neutral might be injured consequently, he denied that we ought to do a great injury to a neutral, in order to hurt our enemy a little. With regard to the policy of the

measure

measure, Buonaparte could never have put his decrees in execution, if we had not assisted him by stopping our own goods while finding their way to the continental markets. Commerce was much more necessary to us than to France; and therefore it was folly in us to act upon these orders, which only secured the attainment of the objects of France.

Lord Grenville said, if a neutral power granted certain advantages to the enemy, then we had an undoubted right to insist on being admitted to the same advantages; or, if a neutral power acquiesced from weakness, in the demands of the enemy, all that we could in justice require, was, that in consequence of this demand, the enemy should not be placed in a better situation in regard to her than we were. But we had no right, be'cause the enemy violated the rights of one neutral, to violate the rights of all neutrals; for if this principle were once admitted, it would lead to an extension of hostilities over the whole civilized world. The foundation of the orders in council was stated in the preamble to be, that neutral states had not obtained the revocation of the French decree; a circumstance which he considered as of no importance whatever; for if it was not executed, it was the same thing as if it had never been published. It could not be asserted that America had acquiesced in this decree. Having then mentioned several facts in proof of this, he said, that if any thing, after all the circumstances which he had enumerated, was necessary to evince the determination of America not to submit to an invasion of her rights on the part of

France, the embargo lately laid on her shipping, not after receiving the British orders in council, but after the receipt of advices from France, would be amply sufficient for that purpose. The old arguments which were used in favour of the dispensing power of raising ship money, &c. were, like the present measure, justified on the plea of necessity. He had always thought, however, that our ancestors had set these questions, and all of a similar nature, to rest, at the time of the revolution. Lord G. contended, that in many instances the orders were unintelligible. He would undertake to prove, that in four clauses of the same paragraph, they contained four direct contradictions. Lord G. proceeded to shew the extreme inpolicy of the orders. They tended to effect a fundamental change in the whole commercial relations of the country, both with belligerent and commercial powers. They tended to subject this country to a loss in the same proportion that they distressed the enemy. This principle of forcing trade into our markets, would have disgraced the darkest ages of monopoly. The orders were calculated to defeat their own object. No ship would submit to the ignominy of touching and paying tribute at a British port, merely for the purpose of exposing itself to capture and confiscation by the French.

Lord Auckland was replied to, and the orders in council defended, by the earl of Bathurst. The order of the 7th of January, 1807, he observed, did distinctly assert the right of his majesty to adopt farther measures of retaliation, if France did not, in the mean time, recede from the violent pretensions on

which the decree of the 21st November 1806, was founded. France had not receded; but on the contrary, the head of the French goverument had ordered a more rigorous execution of the decree; and, therefore, the British order of November 11, 1807, and the subsequent orders, became necessary. It was found expedient to regulate that trade, which could not be prohibited. With this view the orders in council were issued; which were, in fact, a compromise between belligerent rights and commercial interests. In making the enemy, however, feel his own acts of violence, every possible attention had been paid to the commercial interests of the country. Lord Auckland had expressed his wonder, that neutrals were allowed to trade with the enemy's colonies, whereas an opposite policy would have tended to relieve our own West India planters and merchants, from that pressure which affected them, in consequence of the superabundance of the produce beyond the demand.

To this remark, lord Bathurst replied, that this, in fact, was intended as a boon to the Americans, and must be to them of great value ; because, when intelligence arrived in America, of the intention of the French government rigorously to execute the decree, and the embargo was in consequence resorted to, the general impression there was, that we would resort to measures of retaliation, which would amount to a prohibition of their trade with those colonies. It was intended, that all American domestic produce should be allowed to pass through this country with out the payment of any duty, except the article of cotton. As it VOL. L.

was found that the surplus produce of our own colonies, beyond our own cousumption, was not above a third of what was wanted for the supply of the continent, it was thought expedient to admit of the trade with the enemy's colonies: with the intention, however, that the produce of such colonies should, in the circuitous trade through this country, be subjected to a duty, sufficiently high, to prevent its having advantages over our own colonial produce; and also for embarrassing the commerce of the enemy.

The legality and justice of the orders in council, was also maintained by the lord chancellor and lord Hawkesbury. From the preamble to the French decree of November 21, the chancellor contended, that Buonaparte must have meant not only to exclude British produce and manufactures from his ports, but also to prevent all trade whatever in British commodities. Whoever traded with Great Britain, was to be considered as an enemy to France: which was a flagrant violation of the rights of neutrals and the law of nations.

Lord Hawkesbury predicted, from the orders of council, a great many commercial advantages. With regard to the point of legality, he insisted chiefly on the old argu mentum ad hominem taken from the order of council, Jan. 7.

The earl of Lauderdale wished the orders to be considered, not on their comparative, but their own positive merits. He believed that they had been infiuitely mischievous. They injured neutrals much more than the enemy; and were, in his opinion, tantamount to a declaration of war against America. [G]

Lord