conduct to his own conscience. The war was in its principles just, and was founded in good policy. The measures, though they had failed, were wisely planned, and must have succeeded, if they had been properly executed.

The Earl of Effingham begged to know if there were any proofs wanting, to shew the total incapacity of ministers. Every measure they planned contained the fullest evidence of their insufficiency. He would not undertake to say who were the proper persons to succeed them. One rule however, for chusing ministers, he must adopt, which was, that they would be such men as were most likely to disclaim all subserviency, dependence and obedience to an invisible power. This invisible power was the great grievance to be provided against. This unconstitutional subserviency was the grand root of all the evils which have poured in upon us, since the commencement of the present reign. Whoever resisted this secret, concealed impulse, how ever able, was proscribed; whoever paid the desired obedience to it, however weak, ignorant, or incapable, was patronized and supported. To drag this secret, undermining power into the face of day, ought to be the first great object. As long as that power was able to influence, and shift the responsibility annexed to the direction of the national councils, a change of men would avail nothing; the same influence would continue to produce similar measures. To destroy that influence, it would be first necessary to identify and detect it. This could never be the case, while the distinctions of an ostensive and efficient cabinet were preserved. He had heard a great deal of an efficient cabinet at the commencement of the present war. He had heard a noble and learned lord (Mansfield) acknowledge that he was once a member of that efficient cabinet, but had declined it for some years before. He had heard the same noble lord say, that we had passed the Rubicon, and could not retreat. He feared doctrines of this kind did not originate in their proper place; he presumed that they came to ministers but at second hand; he was, therefore, for tracing the effect to its true cause. The only expiation ministers could make to their country for the ruin they had brought upon it, was to disclose the authors of those measures; instead of sheltering themselves behind the name of the King at one time, and the parliament at another. This last part of the subject brought into his

memory another ground of exculpation, urged by ministers, who had repeatedly said they were not responsible, because the measures pursued were the measures of parliament. He looked upon himself specially bound never to permit this doctrine to pass unnoticed; he pledged himself that he would never endure such a ministerial apology to pass, without properly animadverting upon its fallacy. Parliament had been deluded, deceived, abused, and misled. Ministers had misinformed parliament all along; they had misrepresented the force we had to contend with: they had acted in like manner respecting our state of ability and preparation; they assured us, that France was not only pacific, but friendly, but even though she were not sincere, that we were prepared for the worst; and above all, they told us that America was both weak and disunited, and that all we had to do, was to send a sufficient force to protect and put arms in the hands of the friends of government; consequently, let the fault originate where it may, in a junto, an efficient cabinet or private advice; none of those descriptions of men could shelter themselves behind parliament. They were measures recommended to parliament, and adopted by it, upon assurances repeatedly given; if the facts contained in these assurances were false or ill-founded, those, and those only who gave them, or instructed ministers to give them, were responsible to parliament, and the people at large.

Lord Ravensworth said the situation of the nation was to the last degree melancholy and alarming, and that whichever way we turned, almost insurmountable difficulties presented themselves. In such a critical moment of national calamity, there was but one measure left to save us, which was, that of removing those ministers who had been sufficiently convicted of every species of ignorance and violence.

The Marquis of Rockingham asked, shall we attack France, and thereby draw on us the whole strength of the House of Bourbon united with America against us? Shall we desert our attempt on America, and leave the united states at full liberty to join with our foreign foes? Shall we leave our West-India islands and our northern fisheries to fall a prey to some one or all of these powers? Or shall we, by protecting those places, leave the coasts of these kingdoms open to a foreign invasion? If any one of those places were left unpro tected and defenceless, the consequences

would be dreadful; and still no noble lord present, in or out of administration, would, he hoped, venture to say, that we were at present in a state of strength and preparation to attend to those several objects. Was it a fair way of judging what we were equal to, by what we had already done? If that was to be the test, surely our situation was truly deplorable. What had we done, after three years exertion of our whole strength both by sea and land? We had been defeated, or baffed, which to us was equivalent to defeat. We had lost one army, and perhaps, in a few months might lose the other. But who had been our adversaries? A people who had been represented as poltroons and cowards.

After reminding the King's servants of what he called thefr invincible obstinacy, in adhering to measures, the evil consequences of which had been so often foretold, he animadverted on what had, in his opinion, been so improperly called the Conciliatory Bills. The very day the motion was made by a noble lord in the other House, for leave to bring in the Bills, the noble duke near him (Grafton) reminded administration, that an hon. member in the same House (Mr. Fox) informed the minister, that this treaty had been signed the 6th of the same month; and asked, if any one of the ministers had heard any thing of such a treaty? On which the noble viscount, who now moved the Address, said he had not. Taking this answer either way, he contended, that ministers were equally to blame. If they knew the report to be true, what a farce was it to hold out terms to America, already united to France by treaty! If they did not know of it, was it not the most unequivocal proof of their total incapacity? America would laugh at the folly and flimsy cunning which dictated those Bills. The truth was, France and the colonies were in alliance. Nothing we could now do would be sufficient to break it, unless we declared America independent, and unless we held out advantages in commerce which would render our offers acceptable; and such too as she could not obtain from any other nation. A declaration of this kind might not, perhaps, repair our injured honour, but it would secure much more substantial benefits.

He observed, that in the midst of the most glorious successes this or any other country ever experienced, when we had the two most powerful monarchies in Europe to contend with, nay, indeed, almost

all Europe; and when our success and territorial acquisitions increased in proportion to the number of our foes, and the formidableness of the resistance we met; in the very zenith of our naval glory and military victories, the main argument for making a peace was, the low price of our stocks, and the inability and ruinous expence of prosecuting a war carried on in so extensive a manner. What is the case now? Without an ally, baffled and defeated by a part of our own subjects; half exhausted, we are going to enter into a war with the same great powers, and that for an object impossible to be attained by the force of arms. Here his lordship computed the several sums borrowed for the three last years of the late war, which he said, were 12, 18, and 12 millions. The first of those years we borrowed at 4, the next at 41⁄2, and the last at 5 per cent.; whereas now before the battle is begun, and when we want to borrow only six millions, we are obliged to pay upwards of 5 per cent. This, he said, must shew all the living friends of the late peace the madness of going to war. The marquis ascribed every one of the disagreeable circumstances which pressed upon this country, to the ignorance, wilful inattention, or shameful servility to the instructions of those who dare not avow themselves of the ministry. France, whatever ministers pretended, or might still continue to pretend, acted her part without disguise, and it was evident that in her present notification she laughed at the British ministry.

The Duke of Richmond said he was astonished at the silence of ministers, one of whom had moved an Address, the consequences of which might involve the nation in ruin; yet had declined to offer a single reason in its support. It imported nothing less than a declaration of war on our part; before their lordships, therefore, acceded to so hazardous a proposition, he thought it behoved ministers to inform the parliament and people, how far we were prepared for such an event; to acquaint their lordships with the state of our finances, the strength of our armies and fleets, the general resources in men and money, the number of our allies, and their ability to assist us. It was not because France had acted treacherously or un fairly; it was not because she had insulted us, and treated us with derision and contempt, that we should rush headlong on certain ruin; we should first look to the object, to attain which, we were about

to plunge ourselves into a war with the united power of the House of Bourbon, aided by a third part of our own subjects; and follow it by another consideration, the possible consequences of miscarrying in the attempt, and bringing certain destruction on our own heads. What, then, was the object? Most certainly the recovery of America. Would any one lord in administration rise and say, that there was the most distant prospect of recalling America from her engagements with France? In a choice of difficulties, what then was to be done? For his part, he would, instead of sending out commissioners to no purpose, arm them with powers to declare America independent, if they chose it. This would be the only means to avoid a war, in the first instance, with France; and the best method to secure the friendship and commerce of our colonies. For to him two things appeared equally certain, which were, that all we could ever expect from America was a friendly alliance, founded in reciprocal commercial advantages; and that, if we declared war, which the present Address imported, America would find herself bound by every tie and motive of honour, interest, and sound policy, faithfully to adhere to her engagements with France, as being the cause of that war. His grace condemned the language held by some lords, in throwing the blame upon the generals and commanders in America. But such language was used sparingly there, in comparison to the pains taken to circulate such opinions without doors. He said general Howe was a great and able officer; that the fault was not in the execution, but the plans; and that he had performed every service he was sent upon.

He took up the Message from the table; and after saying he should consider it as the work of the minister, he read it, and objected very forcibly to the warmth of the expressions, declaring, that in his opinion France had done nothing wrong in coming into such a treaty as she had made with America. That she had patiently waited from the 5th of July, 1776, to the 6th of February, 1778, almost two years, before she would come into any sort of compact with America. That now she had found it convenient and right to do it, she had done it without excluding Great Britain from a share of the American commerce, and in such a manner that it was not a necessary consequence for a war to ensue, unless Great Britain provoked one.

The notification of this treaty, made by the French ambassador, also had not one angry word in it; there was no necessity for us, therefore, to commence a war; the nation was in circumstances every way unfit for such an undertaking, and if peace could be preserved without injury to the honour of Great Britain, it was an act of madness to go to war. Had he been to advise his Majesty, he certainly would have advised him merely to state the fact to parliament, and not by any means to have done it in the language of passion. As the matter stood, he thought the wisest way would be not to echo back the message, but in the Address merely to say, that their lordships were on all occasions ready to support the honour and dignity of the crown.

The Bishop of Oxford (Dr. Robert Lowth), after apologizing for a man of his profession taking part in a debate in which war was the subject, observed, that in another House of Parliament, his brethren had been said to have been clothed in blood; in answer to which remark, he should content himself with declaring, that the speaker of it was not eloquent in so saying. His lordship spoke to the origin of the American war, and said, though representation and taxation had been denied to be correlative terms, he had, after mature thinking, found out a proposition that was correlative, and that was taxation and protection; the former not to be paid as the price of the latter, but to be agreed to as the means of enabling this country to afford the latter.

The Earl of Coventry replied to the right rev. prelate, by reminding him of a portion of Scripture, which recommends to a prince before he goes to war, to consider well both his own strength and that of his adversary; and if, by a comparison, he should find the scale preponderate against him, then to do every thing in his power to conciliate, and promote peace with the enemy. He begged that his lordship would make the application.

The Bishop of Oxford rose again, and thanked the noble earl for reminding him of the resources of the kingdom, which he declared he had in his head when he rose to speak, but from the suddenness of his speech they had escaped him in the course of it. Great Britain, he trusted, was not without resources; he was sure, if the extravagances of all ranks of people were retrenched, enough might be saved to carry on the war; enough to build a fleet large