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consciousness, that it was known or perceived before: without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this confcioufnefs of its having been in the mind before being that which diftinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception; or elfe, having been an actual perception, is fo in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a confcioufnefs, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not fo, I appeal to every one's obfervation: and then I defire on inftance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impreffion of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known; without which conscioufnefs of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without that confcioufnefs is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be faid to be in the mind before that appearance: for what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if he had never been there. Suppofe a child had the ufe of his eyes, till he knows and diftinguishes colours; but then cataracts fhut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark, and in that time perfectly lofes all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the cafe of a blind man I once talked with, who loft his fight by the fmall-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I afk, whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And I think no-body will fay, that either of them had in his mind any idea of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, de novo, by his restored sight conveyed

conveyed to his mind, and that without any conscioufnefs of a former acquaintance: and thefe now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this cafe all thefe ideas of colours, which when out of view can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are faid to be in the mind. The ufe I make of this, is, that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or else no-where in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impreffion from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, i, e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a conftant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly knew and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impreffion from fenfation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who when he came to the ufe of reafon, or at any other time, remembered any one of them; and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will fay, there are ideas in the mind, that are not in the memory: I defire him to explain himself, and make what he fays intelligible,

§. 21. Befides what I have already faid, there is another reafon why I doubt that neither thefe nor any other principles are innate. I that am fully perfuaded, that the infinitely wife God made all things in perfect wifdom, cannot fatisfy myself why he

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Principles not innate, because of little ufe or little certain

fhould

fhould be fuppofed to print upon the minds of men fome univerfal principles; whereof thofe that are pretended innate, and concern fpeculation, are of no great ufe; and those that concern practice, not felf-evident, and neither of them diftinguishable from fome other truths not allowed to be innate. For to what purpose fhould characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be diftinguished from them? If any one thinks there are fuch innate ideas and propofitions, which by their clearnefs and usefulness are diftinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us which they are, and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be fo or no; fince if there be fuch innate ideas and impreffions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of thefe fuppofed innate maxims I have spoken already; of their usefulnefs I fhall have occafion to speak more hereafter.

Difference of men's difcoveries depends upon the different application

of their facul

ties.

§. 22. To conclude: fome ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men's understandings; fome forts of truth refult from any ideas, as foon as the mind puts them into propofitions; other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be difcovered and affented to. Some of the first fort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate; but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and fciences, though fome of them indeed offer themfelves to our faculties more readily than others, and therefore are more generally received: though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed: God having fitted men with faculties and means to difcover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is from the different ufe they put their faculties to; whilft fome (and those the most) taking things

upon

upon truft, mifemploy their power of affent, by lazily enflaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others in doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to fwallow. Others, employing their thoughts only about fome few things, grow acquainted fufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loofe in the fearch of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth as certain as any thing can be, and I think more evident than many of those propofitions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never fet their thoughts on work about fuch angles and he that certainly knows this propofition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propofitions, in mathematicks itself, which are as clear and evident as this; becaufe, in his fearch of thofe mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts fhort, and went not so far. The fame may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a deity: for though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that fhall content himself with things as he finds them, in this world, as they minifter to his pleasures and paffions, and not make inquiry a little farther into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention; may live long without any notion of fuch a being. And if any person hath by talk put fuch a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon truft, without examining the demonstration; and may yield his affent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it: which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the by, to show how much our knowledge depends upon the right ufe of

thofe

those powers nature hath bestowed upon us, and how little upon fuch innate principles, as are in vain supposed to be in all mankind for their direction; which all men could not but know, if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose: and which fince all men do not know, nor can diftinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no fuch.

Men muft think and know for themselves.

§. 23. What cenfure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men, who will be apt to call it, pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell; I perfuade myself at least, that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations furer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the enfuing difcourfe: truth has been my only aim, and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or no. Not that I want a due respect to other men's opinions; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth: and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to fay, that perhaps we shall make greater progrefs in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we fought it in the fountain, in the confideration of things themfelves, and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men's to find it: for I think we may as rationally hope to fee with other men's eyes, as to know by other men's understandings. So much as we ourselves confider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we poffefs of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men's opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was fcience, is in us but opiniatrety; whilft we give up our affent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. Ariftotle was certainly a knowing man, but no-body ever thought him fo because he blindly embraced, or confidently vented, the opinions of another. And if

the

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