on foot; and in May the last $50,000,000 of the indemnity was handed over, the Japanese troops evacuated Wei-hai-wei, and, on July 1, by a convention between China and Great Britain, that port, together with the adjacent waters, was leased to the latter for so long a period as Russia shall retain Port Arthur.

Russia's negotiations at Pekin go a long way to explain the somewhat mysterious cessation of her activity in the Korean Peninsula in March, 1898. With the acquisition of Port Arthur as a naval base, there was no immediate need for her to push her interests aggressively in what Tokyo journals insist upon calling the Japanese sphere of influence. Although her diplomats in Seoul and Pekin ventured to carry things with a high handseemingly even to the verge of recklessness-yet the great Northern Power was far from eager for war. Her ends could be compassed by surer and less costly means than that. What she needed before all things was time to strengthen her naval and military position in the Far East. At that time it is doubtful whether she had as many as 75,000 troops in the whole of eastern Siberia, and a concentration of 60,000 of these would have been very difficult. Granted the command of the sea, Japan could have thrown double that number against Vladivostok. It is true that the struggle for the command of the sea would have been a more equal one, although it must be remembered that while Japan had ample docking facilities for the speedy repair of her ships damaged in action, Russia in that respect was seriously handicapped before her acquisition of Port Arthur. Once seated there, the task of most immediate importance to Russia was to make her position there an impregnable one. For the last two years, a great deal of energy has been devoted to this purpose. Much money has already been spent on the strengthening of the fortress, and in the naval budget for next year a further sum of $2,000,000 is to be expended on the fortifications of Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Into the former, stores and munitions have been pouring in a continuous stream; it is now strongly garrisoned; and the next assailant that ventures to attack the place will find it a good deal more than difficult to emulate the Japanese feat of November 21, 1894. In all likelihood Port Arthur is destined to become the most important of all the naval stations of Russia. The station on the Moorman coast in Lapland will never probably be of very much value, while in the Baltic and the Black Sea alike the Russian

fleets are seriously shut in and hampered. From Port Arthur alone is there free and ready egress to the open ocean at all seasons of the year. This circumstance in itself makes it easy to understand why Russia proposes to add so greatly to the strength of her Pacific fleet. At present, vis-à-vis to Japan, that fleet is decidedly weak. Her three battleships would be no match for the "Fuji," the "Yashima" and the "Shikishima." The "Petropavlovsk," of 10,960 tons, and the "Navarin," of 10,200 tons, steam only sixteen knots against the eighteen or nineteen knots of the Japanese line-of-battle ships, while the "Lissoi Veliky," of 8,880 tons, is no faster. As regards first-class cruisers, the Japanese "Tokiwa" and "Asama" are fully a match for the "Rossia" and the "Rurik," and the "Azuma" and "Yakumo" (sister ships to the "Asama"), expected here by the end of June, will go a long way toward offsetting the much older, slower and smaller "Vladimir Monomakh," "Dmitri Donskoi," "Pamiat Azova" and "Admiral Nakhimoff." As regards second-class cruisers and smaller ships, the superiority of Japan is simply overwhelming, as indicated by the comparative total tonnages already given. But, if the report be true that Russia is to send several of the eight battleships and six first-class cruisers now in hand to the Far East, the disparity will cease to be on her side.

Russia is not waiting for the completion of her great railway to reduce her military inferiority in the East. In 1898 and the four preceding years, 58,000 troops were despatched to that quarter by the vessels of the volunteer fleet, while only 20,000 returned, and lately the rate of despatch has been greatly increased. At present, a trustworthy authority puts the number of Russian troops of all arms in eastern Siberia and Manchuria at nearly 110,000 men. In addition, there is a large immigration of settlers and of laborers for the construction of the railways in Manchuria. These are being pushed on vigorously; Port Arthur is already connected with Mukden, and altogether over 500 miles of track have been completed. It is only the heavy tunnelling through the Chingan and Klite Amon ranges that will defer the opening of the whole system till 1902. Thus, if all this be taken into account, it will readily appear that Russia, in temporarily effacing herself in Korea and so avoiding friction with Japan there, was the very reverse of ill-advised. Of late, however, signs of renewed activity in the Peninsula on her part have not been wanting alto

gether. Several of her subjects have applied for seemingly harmless concessions; and, in view of the opening of the new port of Masampo-one of the finest harbors in the world-a large extent of ground was purchased there by Russians, on behalf of the Russian Government, it is believed. Thereupon, some Japanese subjects quietly bought the foreshore of these lots, and, in spite of Russian representations to the Korean Government, these Japanese purchasers have got their title-deeds. There was a good deal of excitement over the incident, but a war over the Masampo foreshore question is not a very likely contingency. Another possible indication of renewed Russian activity in Korea is the appointment of M. Pavloff as representative at Seoul. It was M. Pavloff that negotiated the Port Arthur lease-convention, and it was he who carried things with such a high hand at Pekin in the matter of railway concessions. He is seemingly an able and a resolute man, strongly bent upon a vigorous forward policy. At the same time, there are rumors of an attempt on the part of Korea to obtain a loan of yen 5,000,000 or yen 7,000,000 from Russia on the pledge of her northern provinces, but these rumors may be like a good many others that we hear-unfounded.

One thing, however, is certain, and that is that the present Japanese Cabinet, while by no means eager for war, will not tamely submit to any infraction of the terms of the Nissi-Rosen Protocol. That document is Japan's charter for the peaceful, economic and industrial conquest of Korea which she evidently contemplates. The energy with which she has been pushing this purpose and the development of her commercial interests'in the little Empire have of late been very remarkable, and stand forth in marked contrast to the apathy with which she has regarded most of the commercial advantages in China acquired by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. So long as she remains free to develop her legitimate interests in Korea, so long as the Nissi-Rosen Protocol is observed, Japan will be satisfied. The average Japanese is, indeed, very prone to be swayed by emotion, even by that spurious emotion called sentimentality. But hitherto the foreign policy of the nation has been conducted by the cold clear light of reason, and the statesmen at the head of affairs will not be likely to engage in armed strife without the amplest justification for so doing.

JAMES MURDOCH.

THE POWERS AND THE PARTITION OF CHINA.

BY THE REV. GILBERT REID, D. D., PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHINA, PEKING.

THE unusual attention given to Chinese affairs for two years past has been largely due to affairs in China which are foreign as well as Chinese. The scramble of European Powers has shifted from Constantinople to Peking, and into this scramble Japan and the United States have entered. The destiny of China seems to depend upon action taken in London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris and Tokyo. The future of Europe and America, and the question of the new "balance of power," depends on action taken in Peking. After all, in an unexpected way, one-fourth of the human race as concentrated in China must be reckoned with in making the map of the world.

The attitude of the great Powers to China is only partially indicated through the voice of the people, the press and public debate, and has scarcely been enunciated through the Governments. China is thus in the dark as to what others want or intend to do, and we are all more or less puzzled in proportion to our degree of solicitude for her welfare.

For two years the writer, in a campaign for the International Institute of China, has been brought in contact with influential and thinking men in as many as ten countries, and especially with those most deeply interested in, or responsible for, the character of the relations which the West will hold with the Far East. Necessarily, it is in many cases impossible to give an authorized statement of acting ministers, but we can give impressions and our grounds for certain beliefs, which may help to explain the real situation.

I. GREAT BRITAIN.-Every British Government, until the present, has been in favor of maintaining the integrity of China.

Parties have been agreed on this matter. So long as Great Britain was the predominant Power in China, this policy was unmodified. With the growing advance of other Powers, and especially with the increasing influence of Russia at the capital of China, the present Salisbury Government drifted into a policy of passivity. Instead of insisting on maintaining the integrity of China, it excused itself from that task, and insisted on maintaining British interests, whatever became of China. The strong position sustained in the speeches of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in the early part of 1898 for the "open door," was relinquished for the new theory of "spheres of interest," as enunciated by the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, and as illustrated by the agreement made with Russia concerning spheres of railway and mining concessions. All the time, however, the Government has declared that the open door is not closed, and plainly shows a desire to have China kept intact. The "open door" policy, or that of "equality of opportunity," is, no doubt, the preference of the British people. The burdens of a world-wide empire drive out ambition for further territory and political responsibilities in China.

At the same time, there has been a strong, active, persistent agitation for "spheres of influence," or more particularly for a British sphere of influence in the Yang-tse Valley. Not merely statesmen of the Opposition, but men on the same side of the House with the Government, have advocated these ideas. Several times the defense of the "open door" has been left to members of the Cabinet. The claim has been that there is no longer an open door, that the Government has weakened, that British interests are imperilled, that British influence has declined, and that the only hope for Great Britain is to "ear-mark" the Yang-tse Valley. The undercurrent is suspicion of Russia and the conviction that Russia has already practically taken possession of Manchuria, while Germany holds sway in Shantung. Very few openly declare for the partition of China, but their arguments, if carried out, would drift that way. In any case, China's wishes or rights are utterly ignored. This agitation, and its support by the London press, has tended to weaken British reputation in China.

Lord Charles Beresford came back from his commercial investigations in China with two propositions for maintaining the open door-the one military, namely, drilling Chinese troops for the defense of the Yang-tse Valley; and the other political, namely, a