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in part mistaken, can be wished than has been given already in the Guardian of January 18th.

There were years in Dean Alford's earlier life during which his opinions seemed to lean in an opposite direction to that which they took finally. Nurtured in the Evangelical school, he was yet always keenly alive to beauty and its legitimate use as an accessory to devotion. He had a poet's love of the ancient order of things; a devout man's veneration for the holy men of the early and the mediæval Church ; a Christian's large sympathy with heroic goodness, even when found associated with error. These feelings attracted him, as they attracted many of his generation, to the great Oxford religious movement of 1833. But they never made him for one moment forgetful of the great truths of personal religion which he had learnt from his father. While looked coldly upon by his neighbours of the Evangelical school, he was yet preaching the Gospel which they preached with a force and simplicity which they might well have wished to emulate. The progress of the leaders of the Oxford movement towards Romanism gradually disenchanted him. Some painful experience of what he regarded as disingenuous attempts made by Roman Catholics to ensnare him, alienated him still more completely from everything which belonged to Rome. His visits to Rome itself in later years completed the revulsion. Meanwhile his days and nights spent in contemplation of the truth as taught by the Apostles, rooted him firmly in the conviction that the so-called “Church-system " lacked the sanction of their authority, and had no claim on the allegiance of those who wished to sit at the feet of the one Divine Teacher. He believed that it was not embodied in the formularies, or made the foundation of the polity of the Reformed Church of England. We are not concerned to vindicate his conclusion; but to show how he was in fact led to it. So believing, he came naturally to the conclusion that the difference between English Churchmen and those Nonconformists who held fast the substance of the faith, was not vital, and ought not to make mutual recognition and fellowship impossible. The same large and kindly sympathy which in early days had led him another way, now drew him toward those whom he regarded as separated from himself rather by the accidents of a political position than by any essential difference of religious principle or practice.

How far he judged rightly is a question for other times. I have wished only that some record should remain of the history of a life lived with singular simplicity and nobleness of aim. To us it seems that such a man so placed could be ill spared by the Church, which he loved and served faithfully, or by that English and American Christendom which he held even dearer. He who knows all has seen otherwise. May others work in the same spirit in which he served his generation, and enter into the same rest when their life's work is done.


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THE duel between Celt and Teuton has been fought out by this

time probably to an end. The Celt lies prostrate. Whatever Queen's Speeches may say, France for the time is no longer one of the Great Powers of Europe. Fifty odd years ago she was vanquished by the European Powers collectively, of which for then a quarter of a century she had been the dictator or the nightmare, and was reduced to limits within which she was deemed to be a terror to Europe no more. Now, she is vanquished by one European nation alone, and is, or is to be, further reduced to limits within which she is no longer to be a terror to that one nation. Europe stands by, pities, muses, feeds, whispers, mostly a parte, counsels of moderation to the one party, counsels of submission, much more loudly, to the other; but substantially allows one of her constituent States to dispose arbitrarily of another without her consent. Mr. Frederick Harrison, borrowing a word from the German Moniteur of Versailles, * has spoken of the “effacement of England.” But it is the "effacement of Europe” which, in fact, we are witnessing—not, indeed, in its inception, but in its consummation. That "effacement," we may say, began with the gobbling up by Austria of the microscopic

* The article, it is said, has been officially disowned. But it must have expressed German opinion; and Count Bismarck professes that his whole policy is only an expression of German opinion. Besides, such disclaimers, after the whole effect of a publication has been produced, amount to very little.



republic of Cracow. Its second step was the spoiling of Denmark by Prussia. Its final one is the disabling of France. Politically, Europe exists no longer. If it ever is to be again, it must be reconstituted. For the present, force reigns alone.

And what is most painful to an Englishman is that the consummation of this “effacement” of Europe during the present war is mainly owing to England herself. “It appears, from a dispatch of Lord Granville to Lord Lyons on the 16th August” (1870), says the Times summary of “the Diplomatic Correspondence upon the War” (Feb. 14, 1871), that

"Several Powers, since the beginning of the war, had proposed that a combined neutrality should be formed of all the neutral Powers. Her Majesty's Government, however, had always objected to any formal compact, although expressing their desire to exchange freely ideas which would tend to circumscribe the war, or which would lead to any prospect of peace. The Italian Government seems to have been the most anxious for some such mutual understanding, and in answer to their renewed suggestions, Lord Granville replied that he still objected to any formal engagement, but that if the Italian Government wished to interchange an assurance that Great Britain and Italy would not depart from their neutrality without announcing to each other their intention, he was ready to do so. This proposal was accepted, and assurances were accordingly exchanged between England on the one hand, and Italy, Austria, Russia, and the other Powers. The Russian Government hastened to close with this proposal, and even anticipated the proceedings of England, observing that the general concert thus established among them would greatly increase the moral influence which the neutral Powers would be entitled to exercise in any conferences which might take place for the establishment of peace.' Count Beust desired, on the part of Austria, to render this mutual engagement more extensive. He said, on the 23rd of August, he would be ready to agree to the proposals, on the condition that the Powers did not act separately in the future work of mediation between France and Germany.' Eventually Count Beust waived his reservation, and exchanged the common form of assurances.

.. Russia at this moment showed a disposition to prepare for an offer of mediation, though Prince Gortschakoff appeared to be conscious that the moment had not yet arrived. Lord Granville, in a dispatch of the 17th of August to our ambassador at St. Petersburg, says her Majesty's Government are convinced that any suggestion of the kind would be now disregarded by the two belligerents, and this would make it a matter of greater delicacy and difficulty hereafter for neutral Powers who might be anxious to exert themselves for the restoration of peace.” Prince Gortschakoff

, in reply, expressed his entire concurrence in this view of the case.' Count Beust, on the 11th of August, told Lord Bloomfield he had been informed of Lord Granville's anxiety “to profit of [by ?] the first opening to suggest propositions of peace to France and Prussia.' He expressed his desire to aid in establishing an understanding among the neutral Powers for this purpose, but at present he saw no chance of entering upon any negotiations with either belligerent.' . . . Italy, however, towards the end of the month, again came forward in the matter, and a dispatch from Lord Granville to Sir A. Paget, on the 27th of August, lays down the position which the Government continued consistently to maintain."

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I pass over the repeated and express requests from the French Government of National Defence for English, for European, mediation. In the course of the next month Count Bernstorff officially communicated to Lord Granville the circular of Count Bismarck, dated from Rheims, declaring the intention of the German Government “to push back the French frontier on the south-west, and thereby the starting-point of the French attacks,” and “to acquire for Germany the fortresses with which France threatens us, so as to make of them bulwarks of defence”-in other words, gave formal notice to England that France was to be dismantled and dismembered. Lord Granville "asked whether any expression of opinion on the contents of the circular was invited by the Prussian Government (!)” and the reply was in the negative.

Still some of the neutrals at least were hardly satisfied; for “in answer to M. Cadorna, Lord Granville again expressed the opinion that there is no means at present by which the neutral Powers can accelerate the conclusion of peace.” And “in a dispatch of the 4th of October Lord Granville, after a review of the course hitherto pursued by the Government, states explicitly that they are not prepared to support by force any representations they might make to Prussia, and that they must await some more favourable moment for interposition.” That more “favourable moment” hardly seemed nearer when, on the 11th of October, Count Bismarck issued from Ferrières his short dispatch to Count Bernstorff, speaking of “the cession of Strasburg and Metz,” which the Germans were “striving for.” Austria, however, after Italy, pressed England again, for

“On the 10th of October Lord Granville writes to Lord Bloomfield, at Vienna, a report of a communication which Count Apponyi had been instructed to make to him on the expediency of mediation between France and Prussia, and on the views with regard to it entertained by the AustroHungarian Government. Count Beust said that for special reasons it was impossible for Austria to take the initiative; but he was distressed at the

torpor' of Europe, and he thought England and Russia might move. Lord Granville adhered to his ordinary language on the subject. On the 12th of October, Lord Granville tells Lord Bloomfield he has learnt from Count Apponyi that the Provisional Government of France had appealed for. • the active support of Austria, even supposing that Russia should maintain her present attitude.' Count Beust again expressed the opinion that England and Russia might interfere, but he declined to do so himself.”

Now, indeed, comes in a dispatch of what Mr. Auberon Herbert, in the late debate, truly called an “astonishing ” character. On the 16th of October, writing to Sir A. Buchanan, Lord Granville “ wished to know whether Prince Gortschakoff thought it might be possible for England and Russia to come to some understanding on the reasonable terms of peace, and then make a joint appeal to both parties.” But Russia was already preparing to take advantage of

European disorganization (Circular denouncing the Treaty of Paris, dated October 19–31, presented to Lord Granville November 9). “Prince Gortschakoff expressed a conviction even stronger than that of Lord Granville, that it would at present be of no avail to interpose, and he added that Russia had already gone further than any other Power, 'as the Emperor, in his private correspondence with the King of Prussia, had expressed a hope that no annexation of French territory would be required.'

Finally, on the 19th of December, in a dispatch to Lord Lyons, Lord Granville records, without a word of comment, Count Bismarck's express refusal to accede, amongst other things, to“ the assembly of a European Congress, which should discuss the questions at issue between France and Prussia."

Was there ever a display of such fatuity? We are accustomed to the curious reasoning of certain employers, to the effect that working men are likely to obtain better terms for themselves when they don't agree or even consult beforehand what they will ask than when they do; but the logic of that at least lies obviously in the reasoner's purse. Here we find the bystanders of a great conflict, all interested in and desirous of its termination, pressing upon one of their number the expediency of coming to an agreement as to their common action, as to the means by which the common end might be effected, and that one persistently refusing. Was it ever possible to conceive for one moment that better terms could be obtained by any one of the Powers separately than by all, or even only several, combined ? How could England be weakened by the support of Europe? Is the fable of the bundle of sticks really a mystery of a nature so recondite as to be utterly beyond the comprehension of an English Foreign Minister, of an English Cabinet ?

Let the tree be judged by its fruits, you say. It was for the sake of peace that England refused to interfere, and practically to allow Europe to interfere, even with unsolicited counsel, unsolicited expressions of opinion. England has not interfered; Europe has not interfered; and, lo! peace is at hand. Ay, but a peace which is no peace. Is there peace between garotter and garotted, when the garotted yields up his watch to save his life? Can there be peace between nation and nation, when the conquered nation, with the conqueror in possession of nearly half her territory, her capital, almost all her strongholds, and nearly a million of prisoners—in two words, with his knee upon her very throat -yields up a couple of millions of her most faithful population to save the rest? In presence of the late vote of Alsace for the National Assembly, sublime in its patriotism,* in presence of that of Paris,

* Out of the 145,000 electors belonging to the arrondissements of Strasburg, Savergne, Schlestadt, Wissembourg, nearly 102,000 registered their votes; out of 60,000 votes Strasburg itself contributed 40,000.— Times, Feb. 22. Letter from Bordeaux Correspondent. Not one Germanizer has been elected.

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