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Marshals Niel and Macmahon, think the tion to Holland, but only of the insolence of Army prepared for a great war? If they do Prussia in garrisoning a fortress which does not, war is pretty certain to be postponed, not belong to her, and which menaces but it is excessively improbable that any France. It is the point of honour on which one except the Emperor and one or two Frenchmen are now insisting, and when a men in their own close confidence know Frenchman, growing grave and white, talks their real opinion. Paris thinks it does, and seriously of the point of honour, he is usually the Bourse thinks it does, and many news- very near action. Our own belief is, that paper correspondents think they do, but the French Army, and great masses of the French Marshals and their Staffs are not French people, have made up their minds given greatly to chatter about the highest that their honour is concerned in the Prusmilitary secrets, and the Emperor has a fac-sian evacuation of Luxemburg; that not to ulty for silence. Nobody really knows insist on this, and yet give up the province, this point, and the only hint by which for- is to yield to a distinct menace, which they eigners may guide their judgment is this. do not think it honourable to do. If that If the Emperor cannot go to war, it is his view is correct, questions about the number interest, by saying that he will not, to make of rifles in hand will have about as much commercial France a present of many mil- weight as the question of his skill with the lions, and he does not do that, shows no in- sabre would have on a French gentleman tention of doing that. Then are the people who had been struck. of France, and by people we mean all who We see but two distinctly conservative vote under a universal suffrage, inclined for elements in the situation the desperate war? On this point, again, probably no one magnitude of the stake for which the Embut the Emperor and M. de Lavalette know peror must play, and his own growing irresthe precise truth. All reporters decide ac- olution on great questions. Apart altogethcording to the class among which they hap- er from changes of frontier, of possible terripen to live, the papers are not good guides, torial losses by treaty after war, all of which being either official or influenced by Paris- would fall on France, as well as her Soverian opinion alone, and the masses have no eign, Napoleon if he goes to war must, by means of expressing their thoughts. But it the conditions of his position, stake his is notable that the freer a paper is, or a throne. The Empire would not survive demember, or a person, the more bitter it is feat by Germany six days. The Emperor against Prussia. M. Emile de Girardin is is not, like his uncle, necessarily Comat present among journalists the freest, and mander-in-Chief of the Army of Defence, and La Liberte openly says the alternatives are would either be compelled to give place to the evacuation of Luxemburg as an amende the man who was, or by appealing to the to France or war. M. Ollivier is a Liberal representatives of the people for aid and who supports the Empire, and is therefore for the hour a Free Lance, and he declares that France is humiliated by Prussia. The workmen are the freest men in Paris, and they have attacked the Prussians in the Exhibition for crowning their King's statue with laurel. Reasoning from these slight but continually recurring indications, from the known jealousy of the French for their position in Europe, and the known soreness of the Army at the unavoidable humiliation involved in the retreat from Mexico, it is reasonable to believe that the balance of opinion in France is in favour of war. It is the more reasonable, from the sudden and very remarkable change in the mode of describing the probable cause of war. Nobody talks of the value of Luxemburg, or its rela

counsel, to terminate his own regime. France will not lose rank and liberty too, of that we may be sure. The Emperor would have feared this tremendous risk at any time, did fear it in the Mexican affair, and now all accounts represent his irresolution as increas ing. He intervenes less and less in business, transfers his power more and more to M. Rouher, allows his will to be turned by his Cabinet much more frequently than of old. He may in the end prefer to meet the series of minor difficulties to which retreat would expose him, rather than risk for a final triumph, which would seat his dynasty for a century, its final overthrow, and this is, we honestly believe, the strongest obstacle remaining in the way of war.

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From the Saturday Review, 13th April.
FRANCE AND GERMANY.

The Emperor NAPOLEON, bent on satisfying his countrymen that the union of THE French negotiation for the purchase Germany was compatible with the aggrandof Luxemburg was a grave mistake. Dy-izement of France, cast his eye on the halfnastically the province had no sovereign, vacant territory of Luxemburg, without except an alien Grand Duke, who was reflecting that the fortress was occupied. willing to sell for a reasonable sum rights As M. DE MOUSTIER has lately informed which were not unlikely to be confiscated the Legislative Body, the acquisition was without compensation. The Dutch subjects to be effected in the most peaceable and of the King of the NETHERLANDS had regular manner. It was intended to pronothing to do with the matter, except that cure the consent of the GRAND DUKE, to they probably regarded the German domin- consult the parties to the Treaty of 1839, ion of the House of ORANGE as English and, finally, to procure a vote of annexation men formerly regarded Hanover. The gol- by universal suffrage. The King of the den link of a Crown uniting two recipro- NETHERLANDS willingly named his price, cally independent States generally involves and England and other Powers declared an inconvenient strain on the more power- that the treaty which secured the federal ful and independent Government. In the privileges of the province had been practieighteenth century England was always en- cally abrogated by the dissolution of the gaged in wars on behalf of Hanover, and German Confederacy, and that the GRAND the Dutch probably feared that the connex- DUKE could not be compelled to assert his ion with Luxemburg might at some time dynastic rights. Universal suffrage, as pracinvolve a quarrel with Prussia or with tised by France, strongly resembles the France. It was not quite certain that the WHARNCLIFFE meetings which are called to province would break off at the proper line sanction Railway Bills after they have passed of severance, for within recent experience the House of Commons. The shareholders Schleswig had come away from Denmark can withdraw the Bill if they think fit, but with the purely German province of Hol- they feel that they are in the hands of the stein. Untroubled by domestic opposition, Directors, and that it will probably be unthe King of the NETHERLANDS thought wise to reverse a deliberate decision. If himself as free to sell Luxemburg as if he there had been no Prussia to consult, the had been an Emperor of RUSSIA dealing Luxemburgers would not have ventured to with a frozen territory on the other side of offend a Government which had bought the globe. The difference was that, in the them before it asked their consent to the old language of diplomacy, there were souls sale. A clever French prefect would have in Luxemburg, whereas the souls of the few soon contrived to secure an overwhelming hundred Russian, settlers on the North majority to approve of an accomplished American coast are of little account. At fact. At present, however, it seems doubtthe Congress of Vienna, as for many previ- ful whether Luxemburg will ever be reous generations, it was customary to award quired to hold its WHARNCLIFFE meetthousands or millions of souls to princes ing. who were supposed to have established a Every rational Frenchman would allow title to compensation; but modern opinion that Luxemburg is in itself not worth a sindisapproves of the diplomatic trade in hu- gle day of war. It was one of the early man beings, and the Luxemburg souls hap- conquests of the Republic, and with many pened to be Germans, as well as inhabitants other acquisitions it was reclaimed from of the Grand Duchy. On the dissolution Frane in 1815. Almost any border disof the Confederation they were left outside trict would be equally useful in rounding of all political organizations in an obviously the frontier, and the national honour provisional condition. Count BISMARK was in no degree concerned in the quarrel. had the less reason for preferring an imme- before the interference of Prussia with the diate claim to the Grand Duchy, because a proposed purchase. But the interruption Prussian garrison held the fortress, which which has occurred has converted a trivial is also the capital. It was thought expedi- arrangement into a question of etiquette or ent not to notice the hostile measures of of temper. French politicians declare that, the GRAND DUKE, as they had not been although France is not called upon to refollowed by military preparations. Sooner quire additions to her territory, she can or later, Luxemburg, if it was not absorbed tolerate no interference with her reasonable by a foreign Power, was nearly certain to demands. It can only be said in answer, form a part of the inheritance of the old that it is better to retract a blunder than to Confederation. persist in maintaining it by force. The

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Emperor NAPOLEON, who may almost claim to have invented the doctrine of nationality, ought to have remembered that the Luxemburgers share the descent and language of their powerful neighbours. Before the war of 1866 Luxemburg was a Federal fortress with a Prussian garrison, and no French interest is compromised by the continuance of the former arrangement. The Germans, even in their divided state, were never thoroughly reconciled to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, although both provinces have been united to France for a century and a half. Since the fall of the first French Empire, not a German village has been alienated, and the policy of the present Government of Prussia has been accepted by the entire nation because the creation of a great German monarchy furnished a security against future spoliation. It seemed tolerable to allow the King of the NETHERLANDS to retain the Grand Duchy for a time; but the projected annexation of a German province to France was at once regarded as a challenge. When the subject was first mentioned in the North German Parliament, Count BISMARK prudently used ambiguous language; but it was fully understood that he sanctioned the protests against the alienation of Luxemburg, and he is believed to have added largely to the garrison of the fort

ress.

when it was attacked by a foreign enemy. The minor princes who were once the tools of French ambition know that their thrones would be instantly forfeited if they refused to join in the struggle against an invader; and Austria herself would probably forfeit her German provinces by an alliance with France in the present quarrel. It is a discredit to civilization that war should still be possible on an arbitrary pique or point of honour; but in the present instance the French Government has created the difficulty for itself, while Prussia has only objected to a measure which necessarily seemed an affront to Germany

If the pending quarrel were to be decided by war, the inconvenience to neutral States would be measured by the interruption of commerce; but a contest between two Powers of the first order has always a tendency to spread. France will not conquer Germany, nor will Germany dismem ber France; but the independence of Holland or of Belgium might be sacrificed in the gigantic conflict. The delicate and undeveloped liberties of Germany would be temporarily crushed by the necessities of war, and it is not the interest of France to injure a rival Power by converting a partially constitutional Government into a military monarchy. The consequences which might result from a great European war are too complicated and uncertain to be distinctly foreseen. It is enough to know that the belligerents could by no possibility do good to themselves or to others, except in the accelerated consolidation of German unity. The incipient panic in the Exchanges of London and Paris represents the effect of even a threatened quarrel on peaceful industry. The Governments which are most immediately concerned must by anxious to avoid a collision; and it is easier for France to withdraw an unnecessary claim than for Prussia to evacuate the fortress of Luxemburg, or to abdicate the championship of Germany. If attempts are made to settle the dispute by diplomatic arrangements, friendly States might easily raise convenient difficulties by de clining to approve the cession of Luxem burg. If the King of HOLLAND is proprietor of the territory, he is also trustee for Europe, and the parties to the conveyance may plausibly insist on the performance of all attendant conditions and duties. If France is bent on war, remonstrance would be useless, but it would be expedient to encourage a meditated retreat by building a golden bridge.

If there is a sacrifice of French pride in the withdrawal of an injudicious claim, the completion of the bargain would have involved an unprovoked slight to Prussia. If war should unhappily ensue, the Emperor NAPOLEON and the French people will probably be acting against their inclination, as well as against their interest. It is impossible to believe that either the dynasty or the nation can profit by an unnecessary war with an equal Power. There is perhaps some security for peace in the practical difficulty which must attend the opening of a campaign. The Grand Duchy is, for military purposes, fully occupied by the Prussian army; nor is it desirable to commence offensive operations by the siege of a great fortress. It would be impossible to take Luxemburg without a pitched battle against an enemy who would enjoy every advantage of position. A French army is always formidable, and often victorious, but the chances of war would, in the first collision, be scarcely equal. M. THIERS himself must comprehend the imprudence of taking issue with Germany on the question of the national integrity; for good or bad fortune would equally tend to cement German unity

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From The Economist, 13 April.
THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

inquired of the Prussian envoy at the Hague whether he was in a position to tell him what the Prussian Government would think of his parting with the sovereign WITHOUT wishing to criticise the wise rights he owned as Grand Duke of Luxemcheerfulness which the Chancellor of the bourg," and further, that after this question Exchequer told us last week that he thinks had been answered, "the Dutch Governit wise to cherish concerning the attitude ment charged their representative at this of foreign affairs, we cannot avoid express- capital (Berlin) to offer us their good offiing our own opinion that there is at all ces in the event of our needing them in events plenty of reason for grave anxiety those negotiations with France, which they in the situation of Europe. Whenever thought would be shortly opened." Of men of the world hear of a shrewd attorney course it may be true, as it is now stated, buying up the little debts and obligations that those negotiations have been suspenddue to any one of his acquaintances, they ed, as a consequence of that conversation in usually infer and generally, we think, the German Parliament. But whether the newith justice that that attorney is intend-gotiation is cut short or not, the same lesson ing to press for a discharge in full of those is to be read from the obvious eagerness of liabilities, and that he supposes that he has France to buy up a weak power's political a better chance than his acquaintance of claims on Prussia. It is clear that France obtaining a satisfactory discharge of those wishes to get these political claims on liabilities. And when, in like manner, we Prussia. She might not enforce them at hear of a shrewd emperor buying up the once she may even be unwilling to accept little political debts due from a great pow- them just yet, because she may think it preer to a small one, we may usually infer mature to enforce them. But anyhow, that that emperor is intending to press for France is avowedly inclined to pounce upa discharge in full of the liabilities incurred on such claims. She could not have felt by the great power to the small, and thinks disposed to do so without a distinct intenthat he shall, probably, succeed better in tion of pressing for payment. And that compelling that discharge in full than his distinct intention of pressing for payment weaker acquaintance who has transferred, must have meant either war with Prussia, or wishes to transfer, the right. Now this or, perhaps more formidable still, is, as we understand it, precisely the pres- "transaction with Prussia, of which the ent situation between France, Holland, and object would be to satisy both parties. And Prussia. The King of Holland obtained, we fancy that of this last possibility, there by the treaty of 1839, one third of the old is some trace in Count Bismarck's lanDuchy of Luxembourg, including the impor-guage. It was obvious not only that he tant fortress of that name- the other was very anxious, while stimulating the two-thirds, Belgian-Luxembourg that is, national pride of Germany, to say nothing in having been, at the same time, incorpor- any way disagreeable to the pride of France, ated in Belgium. But Prussia had, and but that there was even a doubt lingerstill assumes to have, the right to garrison ing in his mind, not certainly as to the cesLuxembourg, and the right to demand the sion of Luxembourg, but as to the proper evacuation of Luxembourg by Prussia is object of retribution in case that cession the real obligation which Holland is now should be attempted. The King of Holwilling to transfer to France, and which land, he said, in a very marked manner, France is anxious to enforce. It is cer- would be left to the responsibility of his tain that Holland has been encouraged by own acts. Was there not here a sort of France to transfer to her, for a consider- hint as to a possible door out of the difficulation, all her sovereign rights to the fortress ty? We may be quite sure that the Emand territory which belonged to her, and peror of the French will never rush into a which is now garrisoned by Prussia, and European war for so small a corner of teralso certain that the cession of Luxembourg ritory as the Dutch portion of Luxemhas at least been offered by Holland to bourg. All the teaching of our recent hisFrance, and not rejected by the Emperor. tory shows that wars are now waged for In the important conversation between great objects, and no man would feel more Count Bismarck and Herr von Bennigsen, keenly than the Emperor that a great risk which took place on Monday week in the and a great war for so small an object as German Parliament, Count Bismarck ad- the possession of one fortress, and the anmitted as much as this, that "a few days nexation of a territory containing much ago, the King of the Netherlands orally fewer than the population of Marseilles,

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foolish engagements, we think - prevent us from escaping with honour, would be so obviously undesirable, that Spain is very likely to take her tone from her estimate of the chance of some other and more heavy draught upon our strength.

would be an act of folly. We may be sure which would be popular enough in France that if the Emperor intends moving for to render a great war worth the while of Luxembourg, the move is only the first the dynasty. In case such a war is really move of a much larger game, and we should imminent, and that, or something on that be disposed to think that, if he really means scale, is what we really have to fear, the war at all, he means a war in which he complication for England would be very hopes to gain Belgium. And to gain Bel-great and unpleasant. Our most cautious gium, he must either fight a very form- statesmen admit that we are deeply pledged idable European alliance, even Lord to defend Belgium from such an invasion of Stanley has said that our engagements to her independence; and we are now apdefend Belgium are explicit and not to be parently on the very verge of a war with evaded, or he must detach Prussia by Spain, should Spain be foolish enough to some sort of territorial bribe, of which none resist Lord Stanley's obviously just deis so easy as giving up Holland to her will. mands. If the threatening aspect of affairs We do not suppose that when the Emperor in Europe continues, there can be no doubt made a step towards buying up the claims that it would be a very great encourage of Holland on Prussia, he had already de- ment to Spain to resist our demands. A termined on this dangerous policy. The trumpery war with Spain, just on the eve Emperor's mind is essentially tentative, of a great struggle, which our engagements and he would reflect long on any very great scheme before he took the last and irretrievable step. It seems that he is even now pausing, as he always pauses at intervals, in the policy he had half adopted. He may still abandon it, as all who heartily desire the peace and prosperity of Europe would pray that he may. But there is no doubt that the disappointment of the Emperor's plans in Mexico, and his great failure in the negotiation for a rectification of frontier after the Geman campaign of last year, have greatly irritated the national vanity of France; and that a fresh failure, a more open snub administered by Prussia, and accepted meekly by France, would excite real uneasiness in the Emperor for the safety of his dynasty. And taking all these things into consideration, and the proverbial caution with which the Emperor of the French always picks his way to a new and perilous move-moving on, hesitating, moving on again, - there seems real danger before us in this Luxembourg question. It may be quite true, as we are now told, that Holland will not proceed without the consent of Prussia. But is it equally certain that Prussia may not proceed further without the consent of Holland? Belgium, or a large slice of Belgium, is certainly the only territorial object

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We do not write thus in an alarmist spirit. The Emperor of the French, though bold in conception, is very cautious in execution, and at present he has so far saved appearances that France appears in a rather passive attitude in this Luxembourg matter, and is only discussing the treaty of 1839 with the various signataries of that treaty in a calm and conciliatory spirit. But when France begins to discuss the means of gaining accessions of territory, even in a calm and conciliatory spirit, a pacific solution depends rather on the willingness of other Powers to concede her concessions of territory. And such a willing ness certainly does not at present exist. We can scarcely suppose that France will endure to be absolutely thwarted. The true anxiety of the situation is that France has lost greatly in relative strength, that the Emperor's policy has twice failed in the attempt to retrieve his position, and that he will be very anxious now not to admit even the appearance of yielding to German dictation.

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