some degree then the confederation did operate on people as well as on States. Will it be said what extent of such action will re main only a confederation and where it begins to be a consolidated union? Who is to fix the boundary between these two forms of government-where ceasing to be a confederated union, it becomes a simple or consolidated union-in short a unit? Or is there a degree in a National Government, where ceasing to be a confederated, it becomes a consolidated, union? Strange, indeed, is the inconsistency in the opinion of that distinguished man, Chief Justice Marshall in the case of McCulloch vs. Maryland, when he says that "the assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity is implied in calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people"-" but the people were at liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance and could not be negatived by the State governments," and that the constitution obtained its complete obligation directly from the people, and not from the State governments. Now, if the sovereign power was exercised in calling a convention, it was exercised by the legislature, and it is an admission that the legislature is the sovereign power, and if it could call a convention, it might refuse to call one, and as no other power existed, whereby a convention could have been legally called, it would have been easy for the legislatures to have rejected the constitution by declining to call conventions. But in calling conventions and submitting the constitution to them, Judge Marshall, is an authority on our side to prove that the legislatures acted as the sovereign powers of the States, and that as such they had given the requisite assent to the constitution. It is strange then that he too should have fallen into the common error on this subject, and to have used words with such loose discrimination when he says that it required not the affirmance and could not have been rejected by the State governments, because it obtained its complete obligation directly from the people, whose act was final. Some of the greatest and best men are mislead by their party zeal.

"The Constitution," says Mr. Webster, in his argument in the Rhode Island case (one of the soundest in principle he ever made), "does not proceed on the ground of revolution; it does

not proceed on any right of revolution; but it does go on the idea, that within and without and under the constitution, no new form of government can be established in any State, without the authority of the existing government." This, we will show by and by, has been the decision of the government of the United States, as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States. If Judge Marshall was right in what he said in the case of McCulloch (4 Wheaton, 403), the court was wrong in its decision in the Rhode Island case, and poor Dorr has been a martyr to popular liberty. But "no political dreamer," says Judge Marshall, "was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass. Of course, when they act, they act in their States." In this case Judge Marshall distinctly admits that sovereignty is in the State governments, and that certain sovereign powers have been vested in the general government. The error and inconsistency of the great judge was in admitting that sovereignty was in the State governments, and that the State Legislatures alone could call a convention, and that they had the authority to form a political league or confederation, but at the same time denies them the power to make "a more perfect union," or effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers, which could act directly on the people, unless it came directly from them. Now we have shown that it could not come directly from them, and it is a mere figure of speech to say so, at best. It was an impossibility. What people? He says, not all the people compounded into one, but the people of the States. We have shown that the people of the States could only act through their government by their representatives, and, therefore, it is false (we say it with the greatest respect) to say that it comes directly from the people, though all its vitality be derived from a convention; for a convention is not one inch nearer, in fact, to the people than a legislature, and perhaps might well be said to have one link more in its distance from the original stock, for it is begot by the legislature, and is in truth only another and more extraordinary mode of ascertaining the will of the voters by their representatives. It is accumu

lative but not derogative; acccessory, but neither independent, adverse or subversive. Neither in conventions nor in legislatures are the people actually present--they are only figuratively so, and the figure is quite as true in the one case as in the other; in both they only appear by their representatives. Actual presence is at variance with our whole system. A convention with us has not the effect of one of Rousseau's sovereign assemblies-it does not dissolve all government, and, after sweeping away all organic institutions and laws, bear itself as the only life in a world of political chaos and death. "The power," says Mr. Webster, "is with the people; but they can only exercise it by their representatives." A convention is no more in the power of the people than the legislature. It represents the same constituents. The base is no broader, nor is either the numerical or unity principle acknowledged in either, or more favored by the one than by the other. In England the representative principle is only exerted in the House of Commons. In some degree the King is the representative of sovereignty, but he and the Lords constitute of themselves independent elements of their government, and legislate, not as representatives, but sui juris, and conventions there have been held in defiance of King and Lords, and is, therefore, revolutionary and subversive, and would seem to be a sort of national acknowledgment that the powers of government, however held, are originally derived from the people—we mean the legal people, not everybody, but such as the body politic recognizes as forming component elements. Ours is the first government that is entirely upon the representative principle, in all its parts, executive as legislative, and hence we very properly say that all power is derived from the people. In England the legislature cannot change the dynasty, or by revolution establish a new government, because Parliament cannot act without consent of King, Lords and Commons, and so long as they agree it is no revolution. Hence conventions are used there for revolutionary purposes, for in convention the kingdom is but one estate, and King and Lords can only enter as representatives of the kingdom-in short it is always an extra-constitutional, subversive measure, and by no means our legal, ordinary mode of organic

action, acknowledged and recognized by the Constitution. Hence it partakes, like all other departments or functions, of the representative, responsible principle. With us there is but one estate, the people, and all power is for their benefit, and is held by their officers or representatives as the body politic, and that body politic constitutes the sovereignty of the State, or THE STATE. SO far these officers are responsible to the people, and at certain fixed periods they may be pretermitted, and others substituted by the people in their place, but for all offences, breaches of trust, or other delinquencies or crimes, they are only liable to and are punishable by the law.

The absolute power of a convention was questioned and much discussed in South Carolina in 1832. The nullifiers generally thought that the convention was confined to the consideration of the objects for which it was called by the legislature, but many who were opposed to them at the time thought otherwise. Some of the Union men in the convention endeavored to take up other questions but received so little encouragement that the attempt was soon put down. At the time we did suppose that a convention was absolute, but we have, upon maturer reflection and more thorough examination, abandoned the idea as inconsistent with the representative principle, which recognizes responsibility in every department of government. The whole Court in the case of the State vs. McMeekin (Allegiance case) concurred in the opinion that the convention was confined to the consideration of questions for which they were called together, and for which it is to be presumed they were elected. During that discussion Judge Cheves expressed the same opinion. The public mind seems to have settled down to that opinion, and the practice of South Carolina, with which we are most familiar, has been to consider the convention as confined to the specific purposes of the call. The Constitution confines and limits the legislative powers, and the legislature may limit or confine all powers which it may call into exercise at its discretion. Otherwise the creature may destroy the creator against its own will and defeat the very object designed to be effected. Of course we do not consider the opinion of the Court on a mere political question like this as authoritative, but

IN

simply as the opinion of respectable men who have gravely considered the subject.

We think we have clearly proved that Mr. Calhoun was right when he said that the compact was formed by the governments or legislatures of the States, and that it is not true to say that "from the incapacity of the legislatures sprang the necessity of a ratification by conventions, and that the people by conventions authorized the legislatures to elect Senators, &c." The legislatures formed the old Congress which declared our independence, and urged a successful war in defence of it, formed alliances, entered into treaties and caused us to be acknowledged by the whole world to be "free and independent sovereign States."

We think we have shown that Mr. Walker is not justified in saying that two or more peoples cannot be united for specific purposes without becoming as to those purposes ONE PEOPLE; for if his position be true then Great Britain, France and Turkey, now united for the particular purpose of thrashing the Russians are One People-that Union under the confederation did not make us one; and that the word Union can not have the magical effect now only, for it existed then and produced no such result. To unite is to connect, to agree to, join in interest, to join in any act. A unit is the root of numbers; and units constitute the integral parts of a large number. A unit, therefore, cannot be a large number nor a large number an unit. The United States for the same reason cannot be an unit because it is a large number. Each State is a unit. The United States cannot be a unit, because it is composed, as its name implies, of many States which still retain their several characters under the Union. Besides an agreement is a compact between two or more, and to unite is to agree, and therefore, ex vi termini, excludes the idea of an unit. The Constitution is an agreement between several sovereign States to secure a closer union, and the union thus made is called the "United States." Why was it so called, if, quo ad this government, there was afterwards to be no States, but one State and one people? If but one people, why was not the whole body territorial divided off into districts of equal numbers, having the right to elect Senators and members, and Electors of President and