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speak for themselves what they are: I have no mind to speak for them.

The Apostle in the text has pointed out to us the common fource from whence vices of this kind proceed; they arise from fleshly lufts: words which carry a reason in them, to all who value their rea fon, not to give themselves up to the dominion of appetites, made not to govern, but to serve the man. But reason, when it becomes a flave to vice, must do the drudgery of vice, and fupport its cause: and therefore, upon this topic, vice has borrowed fome affiftance from reason, and made a fhew of arguing in its own defence. Thefe fleshly lufts, as the Scripture calls them, others are willing to call natural defires and then the question is afked, How it becomes fo heinous an offence to comply with the defires which God, for wife reasons, has made to be part of the nature which he has given us? Were this question afked in behalf of the brute creatures, we would readily answer, We accuse them not : but when man asks it in his own behalf, he forgets that he has another question to answer before he can be entitled to ask this, For what purpose was reason and understanding given to man? Brutes have no higher rule to act by than thefe inftincts and natural impreffions; and therefore, in acting according to these, they act up to the dignity of the nature beftowed on them, and are blameless. But can you fay the fame of man? Does he act up to the dignity of his nature, when he makes that his rule which is common to him and the beafts; when he purfues the fame inclinations, and with as little regard to virtue and morality? Why is man diftin

guished from the brute creatures by fo fuperior a degree of reafon and understanding, by a knowledge of moral good and evil, by a notion of God his creator and governor, by a certain expectation of judgment, arifing from a sense of his being accountable, if after all there is but one rule of acting for him and for the beafts that perifh? Let these defires be natural; yet tell me, Does the addition of reafon make no difference? Is a creature endowed with knowledge at liberty to indulge his defires with the fame freedom, as a creature that has no reason to restrain it? If this be abfurd, it is to little purpose to plead that the defires are natural, fince we have reafon given us to direct them, and are not at liberty to do whatever appetite prompts us to do, but muft in all things confider what is reasonable and fit for us to do: for furely there is no cafe in which a reasonable creature may renounce the direction of reafon.

It will be farther urged, To what purpose were these defires given, which are apparently the caufe of much mischief and iniquity in the world, and oftentimes a great difturbance to the beft in a life of religion? In reply to this, it will be neceffary to confider how far thefe defires are natural.

If we look into mankind, we fhall find that the defires which are common, and therefore may be called natural, are fuch as are neceffary to the preservation of individuals, and fuch as are neceffary for the preservation of the fpecies. At the fame time that we find these natural defires, we discover the ends which nature has to serve by them; and reafon from thence difcerns the true rule for the

government and direction of them. Our bodies are fo made, that they cannot be supported without conftant nourishment: hunger and thirft therefore are natural appetites given us to be conftant calls to us to administer to the body the neceffary fupports of the animal life. Afk any man of common sense now, how far these appetites ought to be indulged; he cannot help seeing that nature calls for no more than is proper for the health and prefervation of the body, and that reafon prescribes the fame bounds; and that when these appetites are made occafions of intemperance, an offence is committed against as well the order of nature, as the rule of reason. The excess therefore of these appetites is not natural but vicious: the intemperate man is not called upon by his natural appetites, but he does, in truth, call upon them to affift his fenfuality, and often loads them so hard that they recoil, and nauseate what is obtruded upon them. An habitual drunkard may have, and has, I fuppofe, an uncommon craving upon him; but the excess of his craving is not natural: it is not of God's making, but of his own, the effect of a long practifed intemperance: and fuch an appetite will be so far from being an excuse, that it is itself a crime.

In other inftances of a like nature, they who have inflamed defires, commonly owe the excess of them to their own mifconduct. There is a great deal of difference between men of the fame temper, where one fhuns, and where the other feeks the temptation; where one employs his wit to minister to his appetite, and the other uses his reason to subdue it: the paffions of one, by being used to subjection, are

taught to obey; the appetites of the other, knowing no restraint, take fire upon every occafion; and the corrupted mind, instead of oppofing, endeavours to heighten as well the temptation as the fin: and often it is feen, that the relish for the fin outlafts the temptation: a plain evidence that there is a greater corruption in fenfual men than can be charged upon natural inclination.

Since therefore the defires of nature are in themfelves innocent, and ordained to ferve good ends; fince God has given us reafon and understanding to moderate and direct our paffions; it is in vain to plead our paffion in defence or excuse of fenfuality, unless at the fame time we could plead that we were void of reason, and had no higher principle than paffion to influence our actions: for if it be the work of reason to keep the paffions within their proper bounds, the reasonable creature must be accountable for the work of his paffion. And fo the cafe is in human judicatures: anger and revenge, pride and ambition, are very headstrong paffions, and the cause of great mischief in the world; but they cannot be alleged in excufe of the iniquity they produce, because the reason of the offender makes him liable to answer for the extravagance of his paffion. Take away reason, and bring a madman or an ideot into judgment, and the magistrate has nothing to say to him, whatever his paffions, or the effects of them, may be.

It is the work of reafon then to prefide over the paffions and feeing it is fo, let us confider what great motives we have to guard against the irregularities of them. St. Peter is very earneft in the

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exhortation of the text, Dearly beloved, I beseech you as ftrangers and pilgrims, abftain from fleshly lufts, which war against the foul. Here are two things offered to our confideration as motives:

First, That we are frangers and pilgrims, and ought therefore to abftain from fleshly lufts.

Secondly, That fleshly lufts war against the foul, and therefore we ought to abftain from them. I fhall confider them in their order.

First, We are frangers and pilgrims, and ought therefore to abftain from fleshly lufts.

St. Peter directs this Epiftle to the frangers feattered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Afia, and Bithynia; which has led fome to think that he applies to them in the text under the fame notion, and calls them ftrangers and pilgrims upon account of their difperfion upon the earth. But I fee no force in the exhortation upon this view. With refpect to religion and morality, there is no more reason to abftain from vice in a foreign country than in your own. There may poffibly be sometimes prudential reasons for fo doing but this is too narrow, and too mean a confideration, for an Apoftle of Chrift to build fo weighty an exhortation on it, as that of the text. We must look out therefore for a more proper meaning of these words, and more fuitable to the occafion. And we need not look far for it in the firft chapter of this Epistle, verfe 17, St. Peter thus exhorts, If you call on the Father, who without refpect of perfons judgeth according to every man's work, pass the time of your fojourning here with fear. It is plain that St. Peter here calls the time of life the time of our fojourning here; and confequently

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