what does it amount to? Its principle is, that the majority possesses right by the mere circumstance of its being the majority. But two very different ideas are included in the one expressionthe majority-the idea of an opinion which is accredited, and that of a force which is preponderant. So far as force is concerned, the majority possesses no right different from that possessed by force itself, which cannot be, upon this ground alone, the legitimate sovereignty. As to the expression of opinion, is the majority infallible? Does it always apprehend and respect the claims of reason and justice, which alone constitute the true law, and confer legitimate sovereignty? Experience testifies to the contrary. The majority, by mere fact of its being a majority, that is to say, by the mere force of numbers, does not, then, possess legitimate authority, either by virtue of power, which never does confer it, nor by virtue of infallibilty, which it does not possess.'

"The principle of sovereignty of the people starts from the supposition that each man possesses, as his birth-right, not merely an equal right of being governed but an equal right of governing others. Like aristocratic governments, it connects the right to govern not with capacity but with birth. Aristocratic government is the sovereignty of the people in the minority; the sovereignty of the people is aristocratic despotism and privilege in the hands of the majority. The principle of the sovereignty of the people, that is to say the equal rights of all individuals to concur in the exercise of sovereignty is then radically false; for under the pretext of maintaining legitimate equality it silently introduces equality where none exists, and pays no regard to legitimate. inequality. The consequences of this principle are the despotism of number, the domination of inferiorities over superiorities; that is a tyranny of all others the most violent and unjust. Such cannot be the principle of representative government. Representative government applies to general interests and to the government of society, the same which the good sense of the human race has led it to apply to individual interests and to the control of each man's private life. It distributes sovereignty according to the capacity required for it, that is to say, it only places actual power or any portion of actual power where it has discovered the presence

of rightful power, presumed to exist by certain symptoms or vested by certain proofs.'

He goes on to say that the representative system comfines power fully and completely to no one. The majority which governs in the representative system is very different from that majority which the sovereignty of the people implies. The latter embraces all individuals because they exist-the representative system seeks for a majority among those who are capable. It excludes the idea that all men were born equal, or equally independent. "It is in this way, in fact, that men have every where proceeded, even where they have been supposed to act according to the idea of the sovereignty of the people. Never have they been entirely faithful to it; they have always demanded for political actions certain conditions, that is to say, indications of a certain capacity."

"The sovereignty of the people sees legitimate power in the multitude; representative government sees it only in unity, that is to say, in the reason to which the multitude ought to reduce itself. The principle of the sovereignty of the people is contrary to all the facts which reveal themselves in the actual origin of power and in the progress of societies; representative govern- . ment does not blink any one of these facts. Last, the sovereignty of the people is no sooner proclaimed than it is compelled to abdicate its power and to confess the impracticability of its aims; representative government moves naturally and steadily onward, and develops itself by its very existence. Sovereignty of the people is only a weapon of attack and distruction, never an instrument for the foundation of liberty. It is not a principle of government, it is a terrible dictatorship exercised by the multitude-a dictatorship that ceases and that aught to cease as soon as the multitude has accomplished its work of destruction. The true theory of sovereignty, that is, the radical illegitimacy of all absolute power, whatever may be its name and place, is the principle of representative government. The responsibility of power is, in fact, inherent in the representative system; it is the only system which makes it one of its fundamental conditions. Finally, he says, "Man has not an absolute power over himself in virtue of his will; as a moral and reasonable being he is a subject-subject

to laws which he did not himself make, but which have a rightful authority over him." The Northern freesoil, abolition doctrine, we repeat, is the legitimate offspring of the principles inculcated by the sovereignty of the people. Let Southern men look to the consequences of a doctrine they themselves have taught, and they will see their mistake. Their safety depends on the sovereignty of the Constitution, and the laws made in conformity with its provisions and compromises, and not upon the temporary compromises of a fluctuating irresponsible majority.

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A State is a body politic, but every body of people does not constitute a State. No inorganic mass, or masses have ever been recognized as a State. Until a people are organized and have a legal existence, a government, defacto, at least, and present a a probable chance of standing alone, they are never acknowledged by the most liberal governments as standing in the rank of sovereign nations. When people are so organized that they can treat with other States and can make laws and establish forms that will protect every citizen from the mass, and the State from foreign danger it is a State, and its government becomes the sovereign power. Until there is government there can be no sovereignty. Otherwise every assembly or congregation of people might claim sovereignty. Whilst the government exists the people can only express their will through the government, and the will of that ernment, if it be a representative government, is said to be the will of the people, because qui facit per alium facit per se. In no other way can a compact entered into between several governments be considered as the compact of the people, and we have shown from Vattel, that according to the laws of nations such a compact does not render them one constituted people-but each State may still remain a sovereign State. Voluntary restraints may be placed on the exercise of certain sovereign powers and such powers for certain and specific objects may be exercised by an authority mutually agreed upon, and powers so transferred may constitute sovereign powers, and the double sovereignty may act harmoniously without destroying but rather protecting each other. To the first, prior or paramount, we might say, indigenous obedience is due, and the second is a factitious obligation, assumed and accepted with a full knowledge of the facts on all

sides. And, if we are right, a State may, without cause of just offence to the others, withdraw from the Union upon sufficient cause, of which she alone can justly be the judge, and in that case obedience is due to the State, and the citizen must necessarily be absolved from any inconsistent duty to which he may be exposed in such emergency. We believe that the legislature, where not restrained by the Constitution, may do whatever is necessary to the welfare and safety of the State; and where the general government, losing sight of constitutional obligations, does what endangers the existence and vital welfare of the State that the legislature may withdraw from the Union or defend the State from wrong without the necessity of calling a Convention--which would be a mere question of policy-and this opinion was expressed in the late Convention of South Carolina by the Hon. Langdon Cheves, aptly characterized in a late pamphlet as "so pure and so wise."

This now brings us to that important-that vital questionwhether the Constitution of the United States was ratified and established by the governments of the several States or by the people, and if by the latter whether they are thereby created ONE PEOPLE?

That the Constitution was established by the people of America, as we are generally called, and not by the peoples of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, &c., &c., no one pretends as we have seen. If established by the people, it must have been done by the peoples of the various States, and not by one people. If done by the several people of the several States, it was not done by one people, or the people of one great State, but of many. But the people constitute the body politic of the State, and the body politic is the State, the government of the State; and the terms, the people of the State-the State-the government of the State, are every day used the one for the other, and the people as mere people, and not in the character of government, can do no act that has legal vitality either in a domestic or foreign relation. Then, to say with any legal consequence that a thing was done by the people of a State, or by the State, or by the government of the State, is one and the same. This conclusion is right, or all our premises are wrong.

Be it as it will, if by this Union we are made One, then we are a consolidated people, with a consolidated government, and we would agree with Mr. Walker, that the sooner an amendment is made the better-and, indeed, the sooner we are dissolved the better. We do not, however, agree with Mr. Walker, and shall proceed to give our reasons.

We are told every day that men may be judged by their antecedents. It is only saying that they may be known by their history. The same may be said of constitutions and forms of government. There is always an external and internal history. Neither should be neglected.

At the beginning, it has been asked, why a peculiar name, like that of Columbia or some other appropriate one, had not been selected, by which this great country might have been known. The reason was palpable enough. It was only intended to be The United States, and it was never intended that they should be one people. This is what many of the wisest dreaded, as is evident from the debates on the Constitution, in the course of its progress, and from the Constitution itself, and from the proceedings in the formation and adoption of the Constitution.

Whatever power in the State is exercised by permission or consent, or at the suggestion of the State, is done, of course, by authority of that government. The permission or assent may be directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, and must be such as would raise the implication in the case of a private individual. More or less is not necessary, where no express form is required. According to the meaning of the words, as understood by Aristotle, Algernon Sidney, Lock, Grotius, Montesquieu, Vattel, Blackstone, Kent, Nott, and others of our judges, and by every lexicographical work we can lay our hands on, the sovereign power of the State means every department or form by which the legal authority of the State is enforced, or can be exercised, whether it take the name of Convention, Legislature, Executive, Judicial, or any other; and all exercise of power not proceeding from the law is a violation of sovereignty. Hence, we repeat, no meeting or convention, without the authority of the law, can create any new organic law, or do any act that shall have the