Book 1. afraid of; that the wormfeed or mustard it refuses, is not the apple or fugar it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly affured of: but will any one fay, it is by virtue of this principle, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be," that it fo firmly affents to thefe, and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehenfion of that propofition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will fay, children join these general abstract speculations with their fucking bottles and their rattles, may, perhaps, with juftice, be thought to have more paffion and zeal for his opinion, but lefs fincerity and truth, than one of that age.

And fo not innate.

§. 26. Though therefore there be several general propofitions, that meet with conftant and ready affent, as foon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names ftanding for them; yet they not being to be found in thofe of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to univerfal affent of intelligent perfons, and fo by no means can be fuppofed innate it being impoffible, that any truth which is innate (if there were any fuch) fhould be unknown, at least to any one who knows any thing elfe: fince, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts; there being nothing a truth in the mind, that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths in the mind, they must neceffarily be the first of any thought on; the firft that appear there.

Not innate,

because they

appear leaft, where what is innate fhows itself clearest.

§. 27. That the general maxims, we are difcourfing of, are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already fufficiently proved; whereby it is evident, they have not an univerfal affent, nor are general impreffions. But there is this farther argument in it againft their being innate, that these characters, if they were native and original impreffions, fhould appear faireft

and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them: and it is, in my opinion, a strong prefumption, that they are not innate; fince they are leaft known to thofe, in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, favages, and illiterate people, being of all others the leaft corrupted by cuftom, or borrowed opinions; learning and education having not caft their native thoughts into new moulds, nor, by fuperinducing foreign and ftudied doctrines, confounded thofe fair characters nature had written there; one might reasonably imagine, that in their minds these innate notions fhould lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that these principles fhould be perfectly known to naturals, which being ftamped immediately on the foul (as these men fuppofe) can have no dependance on the constitutions or organs of the body, the only confeffed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these men's principles, that all thefe native beams of light (were there any fuch) fhould in those who have no referves, no arts of concealment, fhine out in their full luftre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleafure, and abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongst children, idiots, favages, and the grofsly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? what univerfal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have had moft to do with, and which have made upon their fenfes the frequenteft and strongest impreflions. A child knows his nurfe and his cradle, and by degrees the play-things of a little more advanced age: and a young favage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect thefe abftract maxims and reputed principles of fcience, will, I fear, find himself miftaken. Such kind of general propofitions are fel

dom

dom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impreffions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the fchools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that fort of converfation or learning, where difputes are frequent: thefe maxims being fuited to artificial argumentation, and useful for conviction; but not much conducing to the discovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge. But of their fmall ufe for the improvement of knowledge, I fhall have occafion to speak more at large, 1.4. c. 7. Recapitula tion.

§. 28. I know not how abfurd this may feem to the mafters of demonftration: and probably it will hardly down with any body at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of cenfure, till I have been heard out in the fequel of this discourse, being very willing to fubmit to better judgments. And fince I impartially fearch after. truth, I fhall not be forry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confefs we are all apt to be, when application and study have warmed our heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot fee any ground to think these two fpeculative maxims innate, fince they are not univerfally affented to; and the affent they fa generally find, is no other than what feveral propofitions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them; and fince the affent that is given them, is praduced another way, and comes not from natural infcription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following difcourfe. And if these first principles of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no other fpeculative maxims can (I fuppofe) with better right pretend to be fo.

СНАР.

I.

we

No moral principles fo clear, and fo generally received, as the forementioned fpeculative maxims.

F thofe fpeculative maxims, whereof difcourfed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual univerfal affent from all mankind, as we there proved, it is much more vifible concerning practical principles, that they come fhort of an univerfal reception: and I think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule, which can pretend to fo general and ready an affent as, "what is, is;" or to be fo manifeft a truth as this, "that it is impossible for the fame thing to be, and not to be." Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being native impref fions on the mind, is ftronger against thofe moral principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in queftion: they are equally true, though not equally evident, Thofe fpeculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reasoning and difcourfe, and fome exercife of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters engraven on the mind; which, if any fuch were, they muft needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones; because it is not fo evident, as "the whole is bigger than a part;" nor fo apt to be affented to at first hearing. It may fuffice, that these moral rules are capable of demonftration; and therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance wherein many men are of them, and the flownefs of affent wherewith others receive them, are manifeft proofs that they are VOL. I.

D

not

not innate, and fuch as offer themfelves to their view without fearching.

Faith and

juftice not

owned as

all men.

§. 2. Whether there be any fuch moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any, who have been but modeprinciples by rately converfant in the hiftory of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimnies. Where is that practical truth, that is univerfally received without doubt or question, as it must be, if innate? Juftice, and keeping of contracts, is that which moft men feem to agree in. This is a principle, which is thought to extend itfelf to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greatest villains; and they who have gone farthest towards the putting off of humanity itself, keep faith and rules of juftice one with another. I grant that out-laws themfelves do this one amongst another; but it is without receiving these as the innate laws of nature. They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities: but it is impoffible to conceive, that he embraces justice as a practical principle, who acts fairly with his fellow highwayman, and at the fame time plunders or kills the next honeft man he meets with. Juftice and truth are the common ties of fociety; and therefore, even out-laws and robbers, who break with all the world befides, must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves, or elfe they cannot hold together. But will any one fay, that thofe that live by fraud or rapine, have innate principles of truth and juftice which they allow and affent to?

Objection. Though men deny them in their prac

fice, yet they

admit them in their

§. 3. Perhaps it will be urged, that the tacit affent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts. I anfwer, first, I have always thought the actions of men the beft interpreters of their thoughts. But fince it is certain, that most men's practices, and fome men's open profeffions, have either queftioned or denied thefe principles, it is impoffible to eftablish an univerfal confent, (though we fhould look for it only amongst grown men) without which it is impoffible to conclude them

thoughts, an

fwered.

innate.