a half miles south-west of the Capital, about a mile west of south from Chapultepec, and something farther east of south from Molino del Rey. A road conducted almost directly to the city, skirting the eastern base of Chapultepec, and entering at the gate San Cosme. Another led immediately to the southern extremity of the Molino. The Molino was a range of buildings, constructed with "hewn stone," five hundred yards long, the longitudinal course west of north and east of south, and forming the western side of nearly a parallelogram, which enclosed Chapultepec on the opposite front and distant eleven. hundred yards. The northern face of this figure, was an aqueduct flanked by a highway, both extending westward to and beyond the Casa Mata-the southern, was a wet ditch. The buildings, comprising in fact two milis, one for flour and the other formerly for powder, were of irregular form, with parapetted roofs, and having various subdivisions and several courts or yards. Besides the doors and windows opening to the exterior, there were two principal gates, respectively near the northern and southern termini of the range-the one an archway, the other strongly barricaded. Within the enclosure to the eastward was a field, beyond which was the grove of large trees extending to the base of the rock of Chapultepecleading into both of which, were several passages from the yards about the buildings. North-west of the upper end of the range, and within perhaps a hundred yards, stood a house or two, which, in certain of the sub-reports, are denominated a hacienda. Nearly in the same direction and five hundred yards distant, was the Casa Mata, used as a powder magazine, a massive stone edifice, parapetted, and crenelled for musketry, and surrounded by a quadrangular field fortification, having bastions and a ditch. Three hundred yards beyond, to the west, ran a wide and deep ravine, its course north-east, and difficult of passage, except on the road way along the southern front of Casa Mata, and commanded by its fire. A mile away to the north-west was the hacienda Morales, at which, the cavalry of Alvarez passed the night of the 7th. A shallow (dry) ditch, hedged with maguey trees, commencing near the Tacubaya road, passed within 25 yards of the southwest angle of Molino, and across the interval between that range and the Casa Mata, at the same distance south

of the latter, and debouched into the ravine. It formed a re-entering much the nearest to the Molino, corresponding to the angle made by north and east lines, respectively, along the western face of the Molino and the southern front of Casa Mata. Its general direction was northwest, and about parallel to the base of the foot hills of Tacubaya, the waters from which, it was probably designed, to convey into the ravine. This base was some five hundred or six hundred yards distant-the ground between it and the ditch, a gently inclined plain, half a mile in extent from the Tacubaya road to the ravinewith here and there a pulque bush, but almost entirely destitute of any growth, to shelter an approach to the lowest level. In rear of the ditch were irregularities of surface and scattering bushes and trees. The castle of Chapultepec had a plunging fire on most of the field-the Molino itself being partially intercepted from view by the foliage of the intervening grove. Its fire however, although greatly apprehended, did little or no execution in the* conflict.

The position was one of great strength, and the enemy occupied it on the 7th, as if moving to a chosen field of combat. Santa Annn's forces numbered 16,000† of all arms. A large body under Gen. Leon, commanded the Molino-another under Gen. Perez was posted in the Casa Mata a battery of four guns was planted at the re-entering of the ditch, nearly opposite one of the gates of Molino-the intervals on the right and left were covered with masses of infantry, commanded by Gen. Ramirez the 4,000 cavalry of Gen. Alvarez, towards Morales, were to cross the ravine, and in the crisis attack our left flank; the reserves were in the grove of Chapultepec, and also on the road north of the large enclosure, or in the castle. Santa Anna, in person, made all his arrangements "with the tranquillity and confidence" of assured victory-the minutiae of the cavalry movements were di

* Semmes says, not a man was killed by the fire—p. 434. This fire was at the end of the battle, directed at the wagons which were being filled with our wounded and killed.

The "Other Side" does not give the numbers. Prisoners on the field said 15,000. The translator of the " Other Side" in a note to p. 346, says the information he obtained in the city was that there were 16,000. This may not have been the aggregate. The number has been put at 17,000. The 4,000 cayalry are admitted by the "Other Side," p. 335.

rected" the harmony* between the troops of the line and the National Guards" was perfected-enthusiasm was at its height-the trap for the blind rabbit was set— not suspecting his possible metamorphose into a lion capable of breaking the net work, of destroying the springs and of humbling and expelling from the scene the masters of the game and all parties retired to repose in profound, but fanciful security!

Mason's reconnaisance exhibited the configuration of the ground-the line of infantry, the battery, the buildings; but the strength of these last was not well calculated, nor the forces which defended them. These were masked, and all conjecture fell short of the truth. Yet Worth requested a re-inforcement of his division, of about 2,000 men, of all arms. Scott allowed two† 24-pounder guns under Huger, to keep Chapultepec in check-which, as we shall see, were diverted properly to other uses, and Drum's section of a light battery, and Cadwallader's brigade, to support the assault. Duncan was charged with the disposition of the artillery, and his judgment was approved. Worth's entire force consisted of 3,447 men, aggregate, in proportion to the enemy in numbers, of about 1 to 5, and, considering the defences, of 1 to 8 or 10!! No such disparity is to be found elsewhere during the war-Buena Vista was about 1 to 4-Churubusco nearly the same. Few such are found in history, and none approaching it on this continent, resulting in an equally glorious triumph. But Worth's little division were veteran soldiers, thoroughly disciplined and ardently devoted to their chief-the supporting brigade of Cadwallader had burnt powder and were led by military men—the voltiguers claimed two West Point leaders of high rank-the 14th Inf'ry another--the 11th was commanded by a fourth, who was a hero fitted for display in any age or country, and in any field of arms-and Worth relied additionally on his own genius, to guide the whirlwind and direct the storm with the greatest effect.

*The "Other Side," p. 336.

Ripley, 2d vol. p. 364, says "allowed," for the purpose named.

Aggregate includes officers. Worth in report says 3,150 men: we follow the official report of Capt. Mackall, A. A. G. Doc. No. I. p. 369. There were 3,236 rank and file, and 211 officers-including 12 surgeons and assistants, and 8 quartermasters-191 combatant officers were therefore all.

The left flank of the enemy, posted in the Molino, was deemed the strongest point--the right flank, occupying the Casa Mata, was the next in strength, and the centre comprising the battery of four guns* and the heavy lines of infantry, and protected by the ditch and the maguey hedge, was the weakest. Worth made his dispositions for the attack accordingly. After placing a picket with ant 8-pounder gun (Mexican) on the main road leading by Chapultepec, with a view to isolating the Molino from the Castle, which he was forbidden to assail under any circumstances, he ordered‡ Garland's brigade (about 800 aggregate) strengthened by two guns under Capt. Drum, to take position on the Tacubaya road, about 600 yards from the southern extremity of Molino, to look to this latter point and to check any support from Chapultepec. The two 24-pounder siege pieces in charge of Capt. (now brevet Lieut. Col.) Huger, were planted to the left at the same distance from the works, to be supported by Garland if need be, and with the object of "battering and loosening Molino from Chapultepec." On the left of Huger was the storming party of 500 men, commanded by Major Wright, 8th infantry, forming five companies drawn from six regiments of the division, in proportion to their strength, with four Captains, six Lieutenants, and an Adjutant, to be conducted to the encounter by the gallant and accomplished Capt. (now Lieut. Col.) Mason, Engineers, assisted by Lieut. Foster, same corps, thus numbering in all, fourteen officers, and whose duty it was to "force the enemy's centre." The light battalion (4 companies) under Capt. E. K. Smith, (brevet Lieut. Col.

* The "Other Side" say that they had on the field 6 pieces of artillery. They are certainly not inclined after defeat to acknowledge greater power than they actually possesed. Worth speaks of 4. Col. Belton carried in a 9 pounder-Capt. Huger two 6-pounders-an 18 pounder was left spiked on the road north of Molino, and Lt. Col. Hubert speaks of a piece that Capt. Glenn fired until the ammunition was exhausted. Gen. Cadwallader alludes to a gun carried in by Capt. Biddle. These make the 6, perhaps.

This picket was out all night-the enemy approached and fired some shots, but seeing our port fire lighted, retired. Drum's report, Doc. No. 1. App. p. 155.

The disposition of the troops, and the quoted passages, are from Worth's report-which is admirable for its conciseness and fullness. The numbers of different corps are taken from the official report of Asst. Ajt. Gen. Mackall, countersigned by Worth. See Doc. No. 1.

Smith, its proper commander being sick) was posted in support of Huger's battery, and to aid, in contingency, the storming party. Farther to the left, opposite, and about 600 yards from the Casa Mata, was designated for Clarke's 2d brigade, commanded by Col. McIntosh, (Clarke being sick) and numbering about 900 aggregate. Duncan's battery of four pieces was posted on their right, to play upon any part of the field requiring their practice-the entire slope being favourable, and all points of the enemy within reach. Our cavalry, (310 aggregate) under Major Sumner, were stationed to guard the left flank, and "to repel or attack, as the commander's judgment might suggest." Cadwallader's brigade (816 aggregate) "was held in reserve, in a position on the ridge, between the battering guns (Huger's) and McIntosh's brigade, and in easy support of either."

The scheme of the contemplated attack, being fully matured, was explained to the chief commanders, and the same shades of night which enveloped in confident security the host of Santa Anna, equally invested an iron band, indomitable in their powers of endurance, and stern in their resolution to conquer.

About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, Worth's columns were ordered to their several positions. By 4 o'clock they had assumed them. Huger promptly opened his siege guns upon the buildings of the Molino del Rey. At the earliest dawn, Wright deployed his 500 men of the forlorn hope, on the left of the battery. After a few rounds from the 24-pounders-there were ten in all (see Huger's report)—the light of day being sufficient, Wright advanced against the Mexican centre. At two hundred yards, the ground nearly level, he received a partially enfilading fire of round shot and grape from the enemy's battery, which, during the night, had been drawn nearer to the buildings. The double quick step was taken-"the line* advanced rapidly, and immediately came within close musket range"-and the "charge bayonets" was ordered upon the battery. The rush was resistless, and,

*Wright's report. Doc. No. 1. App. p. 165. Our account is drawn from a close study and comparison of the general and all the sub-reports. We have followed none in particular-our aim being to give all the principal facts wherever found. To read the reports separately, one would suppose, that each column had mainly accomplished the victory!