or put to a violent death; and no coroner had yet held an inqueft on the body! no enquiry had been made whether it had been felo de fe, or murdered, or juare cæfus! Did the people then think the fubject too trifling for enquiry? did they think that all which might have been apprehended from fuch a death, had perished with the parliament? He feared that the fatal confequences of it would long survive it, and be entailed on future parliaments. Much had been faid of the fenfe of the people, as the grounds on which Ministers might reft their defence of the late diffolution; and on this head he was ready to confel, that the fenfe of the people, however erroneous at times, muft always govern the legislature of this country: but it was difficult to collect that fenfe: and it was fometimes the duty of the better informed and more enlightened part of the community to refift the fenfe of the people, when it appeared that the people were deceived or mified. For his part, he did not think that the wifer part of the public approved of the diffolution of the late parliament, or difapproved of the measures which avowedly were the occafions of that event. The people might be divided into three claffes, one compofed of perfons, who, dazzled with the luftre of the crown, can never bring themfelves to think that government may be in the wrong; they were the political highflyers, who made it a point to fupport the crown a tort et a travers: this claf, he faid, was very numerous and in it, he was forry to add, were to be found many refpectable characters. In the fecond clafs, he placed thofe who, the fworn enemies to the crown, were ever ready to fall upon the House of Commons, because they conceived that House to be the conftitutional guardians and defenders of that ipecies of monarchy which in this country had ever been thought ne ceffary for the well-being of government.Thefe two bodies of men, he said, generally united in running down the Houfe of Commons, though with the utmost oppofite views. The third class confifted of all thofe perfons who did not enter into the other two: they were the moderáte and impartial, who, alike friends to the crown and to the democratic part of the conftitntion, wished to maintain both in the full enjoyment of their refpe&ive prerogatives and privileges. Of thefe, he would not hesitate to lay, fall three fourths went heart and hand with the late House of Commons; the other fourth part, he believed, had been driven, by mifreprefentations, into a confederacy with two claffes of men, whofe principles they equally detefted, the lovers of abfolute monarchy, and the fworn enemies of every fpecies of regal government. He trufted, indeed, that many of them had lately been undeceived: it was the duty of the Houfe of Commone to warn the remainder of the dangers to which they expofed their liberties, thro' the delufion under which they acted. He feared, he laid, there was a fettled plan to destroy, not the form, but the effence and efficacy of the House of Commons. Doctrines., big with danger to the coattitution, had been broached within the two laft years, firft by a noble lord who was at the head of the adminiAtration before the laft (the Earl of Shelburne) and lately revived by the Minifter who had received his political education at the feet of Ga. malie!. In a fpeech from the throne, at the opening of the feffion before the laft, the King was made to fay by that Minifter, that "the people expected." This affumption of the tribunitian power by the fovereign was truly alarming. When Auguftus Cælar modeftly confented to become the tribune of the people, Rome gave up into the hands of that prince the only remaining fhield the had to protect her liberty. The tribunitian power in this country, as in antient Rome, was wifely kept diftin&t and feparate from the executive power: in this government it is conftitutionally lodged in the House of Commons; and to that Houle the people ought firft to carry their complaints, even when they were directed against the measures of the Houfe itself: but now the people were taught to pafs by the door of the House of Commons, and fupplicate the throne for the protection of their liberties. He warned the members to beware of this double House of Commons, which Minif ters were erecting on the foundation of their delufion; the Commons of England in parliament affembled; and the Commons of England in corporation and county meeting difperfed-an artful Minifter would craftily play off the one after the other: he would make ufe of a pliant House of Commons. If the proceedings of the late parliament had been really difagreeable to the people, why had they not petitioned that Houfe against thofe proceedings? If they had petitioned, and their prayer had been difregarded, or treated with contempt, the addreffes to the throne for a diffolution of parliament would have been extremely proper.- -When public economy became the general with of the peopie, petitions were prefented, not to the crown, but to the Houfe of Commons; but means had been contrived of late fo to delude the people, as to make them the very inftruments of the degradation of that branch of the government; the deftruction of which must necessarily be attended with the lofs of their liberty, The Eaft India bill had been made the fpecious pretext of the diffolution; it was reprefented as a violent attack upon the franchises of the people, an invafion of the royal prorogative, and a medium through which the late Minifters intended to have fecured themfelves a power paramount to every power in the kingdom.in defence of that bill, he said, that it did n't appear reasonable, that the proprietors of Eall India ftock fhould in fature retain in their hand a power which they had fo grotsly abuted; by which they had plundered and rendered miferable many millions of perfons, who were under the protection of this nation: a power which had enabled them to enter into the moft unjust and impolitic wars, the confequence of which brought very heavy expence upon this kingdom. As to the invasion of the royal prerogative, he was furprized to hear that brought as a charge laid at the door of the Eaft India bill: the power of making war, and of carrying it on where and in what manner he pleafed, was certainly one of the greatest prerogatives of the crown; and yet Kk 2 the the late House of Commons not only addreffed the King not to carry on the war on the continent of America, but went so far even as to vote that man an enemy to his country, who should advise the carrying it on, or who should affift in it; fo that though Sir Henry Clinton, for inftance, was bound by the mutiny act to obey the King's orders, and was even liable to be hot, if he should refufe to obey them, ftill the reiolutions of the Houfe of Commons fhould at tach upon him, and fufpend the whole fyftem of military fubordination; and yet that refolution had been fupported by the warmest friends of the prefent Minifter, and by himself; and no one ever thought of making it a ground for the diffolution of the parliament. As to the patronage of the Eaft India company, which it was faid Minifters intended to make the means of rendering themselves paramount to the crown, he obferved, that those who were at this moment in full poffeffion of that patronage (the company) were very far from being independent of the crown, io far from being paramount to it; and he could af fure the Houfe on his confcience, and on his honour, that the perfons who were to have been at the head of the company's affairs, had been bufied in devising means by which they might have put it molt effectually out of their own power to derive any emolument or parliamentary Support from their fituation. But had his right honourable friend's bill been as bad as fome people reprefented it to be, ftill he would maintain that the King could not, conftitutionally speaking, affign the exiftence of fuch a bill, as the reafon for his diffolving the parliament: for, in the first place, he ought not to have known that fuch a bill was in existence; and, in the next, the Houfe had a right to entertain whatever bill it pleated, even if it were poffible that it could be treasonable; or, if it were even' for lopping off a whole branch of the preroga tive. A bill of exclufion had been entertained by the parliament: and if the day fhould come, when either a member of the House, or the whole Houle, fhould be made refponfible for a part taken in any bill, on that day would the liberties of England expire. pre He then produced a reprefentation to be fented to his Majefty, which consisted of many fheets of paper, folded like a lawyer's brief, and fet the Houfe into a fit of laughter. He obferved, that he meant his motion as an epitaph on his departed friend, the fait parliament; that he had on fome occafions written long epitaphs to the memory of those that he honoured and respected; and on the prefent occafion he chote to follow the corpfe to the fepulchre, and go through the ceremony of faying, "athes to ather, and duft to deft," in fure and certain hopes, through the merit of the good works of the laft parliament, that it would have a glorious and joyful refurrection, and become immortal. No reply was made to this speech; but as foon 2s the remonttrance was read, and the queftion put by the speaker, there was a loud cry of No! Q T E. Probably alluding to an epitaph, faid to be written by him, on the Earl of Chatham. -After this propofed addrefs, and the light which it † As the great importance of the fubject of throws upon matters that do not feem to have its omiffion inexcufable, we have thought it ad been in general well understood, would render vifeable to infert it as a note, in order not to infome general expreffions of duty and respect to terrupt the course of our narrative.his Majefty, it reprefents, that, in the speech from the throne, his Minifters have thought proper to use the language of a very alarming imand irreconcileable to the principles of this go port, unauthorized by the practice of good times, this Houfe to guard the conftitution from all invernment. That it is the privilege and duty of fringement on the part of Minifters; and, whenever the occafion requires it, to warn them against any abuse of the authorities commit ted to them; but it is very lately, that, in a manner not more unfeemingly than irregular and prepofterous, Minilters have thought proper, by admonition from the throne, implying dif truft and reproach, to convey the expectations and have prefumed to caution us, the natural of the people to us, their fole reprefentatives ment of it on our parts. guardians of the constitution, against any infringe. ; Commons, think it our duty to mark; and as This dangerous innovation we, his faithful thefe admonitions from the throne, by their frequent repetition, feem intended to lead gradually felves bound thus folemnly to protest againft to the establishment of on ulage, we hold our them. anxiously attentive to the inclinations and joterThis houfe will be, as it ever ought to be, elts of its constituents: nor do we defire to either houfe of parliament. But the ancient orfraiten any of the avenues to the throne, or to der, in which the rights of the people have been exercised, is net a reftriction of these rights.It is a method providently framed in favour of thofe privileges, which it preferves and enforces by keeping in that courfe which has been found the most effectual for antwering their ends. His Majefty may receive the opinions and wishes of individuals under their fignatures, and of bo dies corporate under their feals, as expreffing their own particulár fénfe: and he may grant ̧ enables the crown to afford. luch rédréfs as the legal powers of the crown other house of parliament, may alfo receive the -This, and the petition. The collective fenfe of his people his withes of fuch corporations and individuals by Majefty is to receive from his Commons in parliament affembled. It would defroy the whole fpirit of the conffitution, if his Commons were to receive that fenfe from the Minilters of the gular channel for conveying it. crown, or to admit them to be a proper or a les - That the Minilters in the faid fpeech declare, "his Majefty has a just and confident reifance, (his faithful Coinmons) are animated with the See King's fpeech, Dec. 5, 1782, and May 19, 1794. fame On the diff of June, the Chancellor of the fame fentiments of loyalty, and the fame attach- To reprefent, that his faithful Commons have never failed in loyalty to his Majefty. It is new to them to be reminded of it. It is unneceffary and invidious to prefs it upon them by any example. This recommendation of loyalty, after his Majefty has fat for fo many years, with the full fupport of all defcriptions of his fubject, on the throne of this kingdom, at a time of pro found peace, and without any pretence of the exiftence of war or confpiracy, becomes in itfelf ☛ fource of no smail jealoufy to his faithful Commons; as many circumstances lead us to apprehend that therein the Minifters have reference to some other measures and principles of loyalty, and to fome other ideas of the conftitution, than the laws require, or the practice of parliament will admit. No regular communication of the proofs of loyalty and attachment to the conflitution, alluded to in the speech froth the throne, have been laid before the Houfe, in order to enable us to judge of the nature, tendency, or occafion of theth; or in what particular acts they were dif played; but if we are to fuppofe the manifeftations of loyalty (which are held out to us as an example for imitation) confift in certain addresfe delivered to his Majefty, promifing furport to his Majefty in the exercile of his prerogative, and thanking his Majefty for removing certain of his Moiffers, on account of the votes they have given upon bills depending in parliament,-if this be the example of loyalty alluded to in the to express our ferious concern for the impreflion fpeech from the throne, then we muff beg leave which has been made on any of our fellow-abjects by mifreprefentations, which have fedaced them into a feeming approbation of proceedings fubverfive of their own freedom. We conceive, that the opinions delivered in these papers were not well confidered; nor were the parties duly informed of the nature of the matters on which they were called to determine, nor of thofe proceedings of parliament which they were led to cenfure. We shall act more advisedly.The loyalty we fhall manifeft will not be the fame with theirs ; bur, we truft, it will be equally fincere, and more enlightened. It is no fight authority which fhall perfuade us (by receiving as proofs of loyalty the miltaken principles lightly taken up in thele addreffe) obliquely to criminate, with the heavy and ungrounded charge of difloyalty and difaffection, an uncorrupt, independent, and reforming parliament. Above all, we fhall take care that none of the rights and privileges, al ways claimed, and fince the acceffion of his Majefty's illuftrious family conftantly exerciled by this Houfe (and which we hold and exercise in traft for the Commons of Great Britain, and for their benefi:) shall be conftructively farrendered, or even weakened and impaired, under ambigu ous phrafes, and implications of cenfure on the are not well-founded, they ought to be honestly late parliamentary proceedings. If thefe claims abandoned; if they are juft, they ought to be fteadily and refolutely maintained. wards the true principles of our free conftitution, Of his Majefty's own gracious difpofition tohis faithful Commons never did, or could entercain a doubt: but we humbly beg leave to exprefs to his Majesty our neafinefs concerning other new and unutual expreffions of his Minifters, declaratory of a refolution "to fupport, in their just balance, the rights and privileges of every branch of the legislature." concerning a balance of rights and privileges (2 It were defirable that all hazardous theories mode of expreffion wholly foreign to parliamentry ufage) might have been forborne. His MaJefty's faithful Commons are well inftructed in their own rights and privileges, which they are which they were handed down from their ancel determined to maintain on the footing upon and privileges of the Houfe of Peers; and they tors: they are not unacquainted with the rights know and refpect the lawful pierogatives of the crown but they do not think it fafe to admit any thing concerning the existence of a balance of thofe rights, privilege, and prerogatives; nor are they able to difcern to what object Minifwhat they would confider as a juft one. These ters would apply their fiction of balance; nor unauthorized doctrines have a tendency to fir proper difcuffions; and to lead to mischievous innovations in the conftitution. That his faithful Commons moft humbly rerefort fhould be had to the happy practice of parcommend, instead of the inconfiderate fpeculatione of unexperienced men, that on all occafions, liament, and to thole fold maxims of governhis Majefty's illuftrious family, as furnishing the ment which have prevailed fince the acceffion of only fale principles on which the crown and parliament can proceed. We think it the more neceffary to be cautious fent Minifters had thought proper to counteon this head, as, in the last parliament, the prenance, if not to fuggeft, an attack upon the most clear and undoubted rights and privileges of this Houle t. Fearing, from thefe extraordinary admonitions, dictated feveral unufual expreffions, that his Maand from the new doctrines, which feem to have jefty has been abuted by talle reprefentations of the late proceedings in parliament, we think it our duty refpe&fully to inform his Majesty, that no attempt has been made against his lawful prerogatives, or against the rights and privileges of the Peers, by the late House of Commons, in any of their addreffes, votes, or refolutions : neither do we know of any proceeding by bill, in which it was proposed to abridge the extent of his royal prerogative: but, if fach provifion + Refolutions relative to the acceptance of India Bills. had exifted in any bill, we proteft, and we declare, against ail speeches, act, or addreffes, from any perfons whatsoever, which have a tendency to confider fuch bilis, or the perfons concerned in them, as juft object, of any kind of cenfure and punifhment from the throne. Neceffary reformations may hereafter require, as they have frequently done in former times, lime tations and abridgments, and in fome cafes an entire extinction of tome branch of prerogative. If bills fhould be improper in the form in which they appear in the Houfe where they originate, they are liable, by the wisdom of this conftitution, to be corrected, and even to be totally fet afide, elsewhere. This is the known, the legal, and the safe remedy: but whatever, by the ma nifeftation of the royal displeasure, tends to inti midate individual members from propofing, or this houfe from receiving, debating and pathing bills, tends to prevent even the beginning of every reformation in the ftate; and utterly deftroys the deliberative capacity of parliament. We therefore claim, demand, and infilt upon it, as our undoubted right, that no perions fhall be deemed proper objects of animadverfion by the crown, in any mode whatever, for the votes which they give, or the propofitions which they make, in parliament. - We humbly conceive, that befides its share of the legislative power, and its right of impeachment, that, by the law and ufage of parliament, this houfe has other powers and capacities, which it is bound to maintain. This houle is affured, that our humble advice on the exercife of prerogative will be heard with the fame attention with which it has ever been regarded; and that it will be followed by the fame effects which it has ever produced, during the happy and glorious reigns of his majesty's royal progenitors; not doubting but that, in all thole points, we fhall be confidered as a council of wildom and weight to advife, and not merely as an accufer of competence to criminate (a). This houfe claims both capacities; and we trust that we fhall be left to our free difcretion which of them we shall employ as belt calculated for his majesty's, and the national fervice. Whenever we hail tee it expedient to offer our advice concerning his majelty's fervants, who are thofe of the public, we confidently hope, that the perfonal favour of any minifter, or any let of minifters, will not be more dear to his majefty, than the credit and character of an houfe of commons. It is an experiment full of peril to put the reprefentative witdom and juflice of his majesty's people in the wrong; it is a crooked and delp rate defign; leading to mitchief, the extent of which no human wildom can forefee, to attempt to form a prerogative party in the nation, to be relorted fmuggling, that only 5,500,000 lb. weight of tea was fold annually by the East India company, whereas the annual confumption of the kingdom crown. to as occafion fhall require, in derogation from the authority of the commons of Great Britain in parliament affembled: it is a contrivance full of danger, for minifters to fet up the reprefentative and conftituent bodies of the commons of this kingdom, as two feparate and diftinct powers, formed to counterpoite each other, leaving the preference in the hands of fecret advisers of the In fuch a fituation of things, these adVilers, taking advantage of the differences which may accidentally arife, or may purposely be fo choice to refort to the one or the other, as may mented between them, will have it in their beft fuit the purposes of their finifter ambition. By exciting an emulation and contest between parties contending for credit and influence at the the reprefentative and the conftituent bodies, as whole can end in nothing else than the deftruethrone, facrifices will be made by both; and the tion of the dear it rights and liberties of the nation. If there must be another mode of con veying the collective fenfe of the people to the throne than that by the house of commons, it ought to be fixed and defined, and its authority ought to be fettled; it ought not to exift in to iters fhould have it in their power, at their own precarious and dependant a state, as that minimere pleasure, to acknowledge it with respect, or to reject it with icorn. diffolve parliament; but we beg leave to lay It is the undoubted prerogative of the crown to before his majelly, that it is, of all the trufts velted in his majesty, the molt critical and delicate, and that in which this houfe has the most reafon to require, not only the good faith, but the favour of the crown. His commons are not always upon a par with his minitters in an application to popular judgment: it is not in the power of the members of this houfe to go to ble for them. It is in the power of the crown their election at the moment the most favoura and arduous matters of ftate and legislation are to choose a time for their diffolution whilft great depending, which may be eatly milunderflood, and which cannot be fully explained before that mifunderstanding may prove fatal to the honour that belong, and to the confideration that is due, to members of parliament, With his majetty is the gift of all the reward the honour, dutinctions, tavour, and graces of the ftate; with his majetty is the mitigation of all the rigours of the law; and we rejoice to fee the crown poffeffed of trufts calculated to ebtain good-will, and charged with duties which ferent kind. Our duties are harsh and invidious are popular and pleafing. Our trufts are of a ditin their nature; and juftice and falety is all we can expect in the exercile of them. We are to offer falutary, which is not always pleating, counfel: we are to enquire and to accufe: and the objects of our enquiry and, charge will be for the most part perions of wealth, power, and extensive connections; we are to make rigid laws dom was fuppofed, from good authority, to trade in this article was more than double the exceed twelve millions †, fo that the illicit legal. NOT E S. †The whole quantity of tea imported from China is about nineteen millions of pounds, of which it is conjectured that not more is confumed in the other countries of Europe. Jaws for the preservation of revenue, which of neceffity more or lefs confine fome action, or reftrain fome function, which before was free: what is the most critical and invidious of all, the whole body of the public impofitions origi nate from us, and the hand of the house of commons is seen and felt in every burthen that preffes on the people. Whilft, ultimately, we are ferving them, and in the first instance whilft we are ferving his majesty, it will be hard, indeed, if we should fee a houfe of commons the victim of its zeal and fidelity, facrificed by his ministers to those very popular discontents which fhall be excited by our dutiful endeavours for the fecurity and greatness of his throne. No other confequence can refult from fuch an example, but that, in future, the house of commons, confult ing its falety at the expence of its duties, and fuffering the whole energy of the ftate to be rejaxed, will fhrink from every fervice, which, however neceflary, is of a great and arduous nacure; or that, willing to provide for the public neceffities, and, at the fame time, to fecure the means of performing that task, they will exchange independence for protection, and will court a fubfervient exiftence through the favour of those minifters of state, or thofe fecret advisers, who ought themselves to stand in awe of the commons of the realm. An houfe of commons, respected by his minifters, is effential to his majefty's fervice: it is fit that they should yield to parliament, and not that parliament thould be new modelled until it is fitted to their purpofes. If our authority is only to he held up when we coincide in opinion with his majesty's advisers, but is to be fet at nought the moment it differs from them, the house of commons will fink into a mere appendage of adminiftration, and will lofe that independent character which. infeparably connect ing the honour and reputation with the acts of this houfe, enables us to afford a real, effecative, and fubftantial fupport to his govern. ment. It is the deference fhewn to our opinion, when we diffent from the fervants of the crown, which alone can give authority to the proceedings of this houfe when it concurs with their measures. That authority once loft, the credit of his majesty's crown will be impaired in the eyes of all nations. Foreign powers, who may yet with to revive a friendly intercourfe with this nation, will look in vain for that hold which gave a connection with Great Britain the preference to an alliance with any other state, An houfe of commons, of which minifters were known to stand in awe, where every thing was neceffarily difcuffed, on principles fit to be openly and publicly avowed, and which could not be retracted or varied without danger, furnished a ground of confidence in the public faith, which the engage ment of no Rate dependent on the fluctuation of perfonal favour and private advice, can ever pretend to. If faith with the house of commons, the grand fecurity for the national faith itself, can be broken with impunity, a wound is given to the political importance of Great Britain, which will not eafily be healed. That there was a great variance between the late house of commons and certain perfons, whom his majesty has beer advised to make and continue as minifters; and they withheld their confi dence from them for reasons for which pofterity will honour and respect the names of those who composed that house of commons, diftinguished for its independence. They could not confide in persons who have shewn a difpofition to dark and dangerous intrigues. By these intrigues they have weakened, if not destroyed, the clear affurance which his majefty's people, and which all nations ought to have, of what are, and what are not, the real acts of his government. If it should be feen that his minifters may con tinue in their offices, without any fignification to them of his majefty's difpleasure at any of their measures, whilft perfons confiderable for their rank, and known to have had access to his majes ty's facred perfon, can with impunity abuse that advantage, and employ his majesty's name to difavow and counteract the proceedings of his official fervants, nothing but diftruft, discord, debility, contempt of all authority, and general co ufion, can prevail in his government. This we lay before his majesty with humili ty and concern, as the inevitable effect of a fpirit of intrigue in his executive government; an evil which we have but too much reason to be perfuaded exifts and increases. During the course of the laft seffion it broke out in a "manner the most alarming. This evil was infinitely aggravated by the unauthorized, but not difavowed use which has been made of his majesty's name, for the purpose of the most unconftitutional, corrupt, and difhonourable influence on the minds of the members of parliament, that ever was practifed in this kingdom. No atten tion, even to the exterior decorum, in the practice of corruption, and intimidation employed on peers, was observed: several peers were o. bliged under menaces to retract their declarati. on, and to recall their proxies. The commons have the deepest interest in the purity and integrity of the peerage. The peers dilpole of all the property in the kingdom, in the last refort; and they difpofe of it on their honour and not on their oaths, as all the members of every other tribunal in the kingdom muft do; though in them the proceeding is not conclufive. We have, therefore, a right to demand that no application shall be made to peers of such a nature as may give room to call in question, much lef to attaint our fole fecurity for all that we poffefs. This corrupt proceeding appeared to the houfe of commons, who are the natural guardians of the purity of parliament, and |
