witches in Macbeth, however he might have fallen on fome particular modes of expreffion, that were fcarce avoidable on the fame fubject. The fcene of the witches with Macbeth, after their incantations at the cauldron, is inexpreffibly folemn: and the expedient of fhewing a future race of Kings, wonderfully striking and fublime. Diftance and obfcurity aflift and increafe that terror which is one capital fource of fublimity. But as if that were not fufficient, others are fhewn in a glafs, as the descendents of Banquo, whose ruin he was contriving. To fee them exalted to the height of power and authority, was an object to strike ambition to madnefs.-We have made these remarks, in order to evince how effentially different the gay witches of Middleton are from the awful fifters of Macbeth. In a future Review, we will present our readers with fome curious illustrations of difficult paffages in the plays, which cannot fail of being acceptable to all the lovers of Shakspeare. B... ART. III. Two Differtations. I. On the Preface to St. John's Gofpel. I. On praying to Jefus Chrift. By Theophilus Lindfey, A. M. With a fhort Poffcript by Dr. Jebb. 8vo. 2 s. 6d. Johnfon. 1779. I N the preface to this work, Mr. Lindfey gives his reafons for this addition to his former publications on the subject, in the following terms: I had refolved to have left my arguments to take their fate, as I had first put them down in the Apology and Sequel t. But the friend (Mr. Temple) who had confuted Mr. Burgh and Mr. Randolph, had alfo, with the fame difinterefted regards to truth, published his diffatisfaction with the interpretation I had given of the prologue of St. John's Gofpel, the right understanding whereof feems of great importance towards fettling the true character of Jefus Chrift; and objections from fuch a pen demand refpect. And a few months pait, an anonymous perfon, in a "Letter to Dr. Jebb, with relation to his declared Sentiments about the Unlawfulness of all religious Addreffes to Jefus Chrift," has laboured much to fhew, that I had not fufficiently proved that point. I have then judged it proper, and hope it may be of fome ufe, to review, and add farther fupport to what I had advanced on both thefe fubjects, with an eye, as I went along, to fuch objections as I had met with, but without entering into a direct controverfy with any one, to which I am much averfe.' * Vide Review, vol. L. p. 56. 100. + Ibid. vol. Iv. p. 195. 264. Vol. Ivi. p. 14. The The Differtation on the Preface to St. John's Gospel is divided into four fections, the first of which more directly confiders the paffage John i. 1-14. and is intended to fupport the affertion, or conclufion, that That the Logos, the Word, in this preface, is not Chrift, but the word, witdom, power of God, communicated to him, and manifefted by him.' The fecond fection mentions the filence, as he apprehends, of the three other Evangelifts on the fubject of Chrift's preexistence, and produces paffages, from St. Luke's Gospel, and the Acts of the Apoftles, which he concludes express a very different idea. A brief account of certain forms of expreffion in St. John's Gofpel, which have been thought to favour the fuppofition of Chrift being the Word, Logos, mentioned John i. 1.' conftitutes the third fection, and finishes what this writer has to offer on the immediate fubject of the firft differtation. For the fourth fection treats Of Socinianifm and Socinus.' This fection,' our Author informs us, has been added, to give fome little information concerning F. Socinus, who was nearly coeval with thofe great men, Luther and Calvin, and was one of the lights which Divine Providence raifed up at that period, to recover the loft truths of the Gofpel. And that fection, it is added, together with the whole of this work, may, perhaps, contribute to foften, if not to remove, the prejudices of fome perions against thofe to whom they give the name of Socinians, which name, as far as the author comprehends it, might be given to the Apostles of Jefus, as equally belonging to them.' The fecond differtation, On praying to Jefus Chrift, confifts of feveral fections, which, under different heads, repeat and farther illuftrate thofe arguments that have been frequently employed against the practice. However different Mr. Lindfey's fentiments on the above fubjects may be from thofe of many of his fellow-chriftians, it should be obferved, and it is greatly to be wifhed that it might be attended to, that he has a high veneration for the Scriptures, that he diligently and modeftly inveftigates ferip-. ture truth, and appears fincerely defirous to embrace it; no perfon, who may confider himfelf as most orthodox, or may be what is far better, really humble and pious, can be more truly and properly zealous for what he apprehends to be the truths of the Gospel, than this worthy divine: a confideration which fhould awaken and increase mutual candour and benevolence. The Poftfcript, written by Dr. Jebb, is addreffed to the author of A Letter to him, with relation to his declared Sentiments, &c.' as mentioned above. The writer of that letter, after having mentioned the Doctor's denial of the lawfulness of religious religious addreffes to Chrift, farther adds, that Dr. Jebb refers his readers to Mr. Lindley's Apology, for the proof thereof." Dr. Jebb thinks it requifite to obferve, that all the affertions and conclufions, proceeding on the idea of his having actually referred his readers to Mr. Lindfey's publication, for a proof of his pofition, are abfolutely deftitute of all foundation.' Dr. Jebb remarks, that the defign of his publication has been entirely mifapprehended; fince his intention was not to engage in controversy, but chiefly to affign the reasons which induced him to relinquifh his ftation in the Church of England. Had it been my intention,' fays he, to enter into the principles, on which my opinion, refpecting the point in question, is founded, it is not probable that I fhould have contented myfelf with referring to Mr. Lindfey's publication, however highly I approve his arguments, and refpect his authority. I fhould also have thought it my duty, to have endeavoured to eftablish the truth of fo important a pofition, by fuch deductions as at least would have convinced my readers, that I had not taken up my opinion without some reflection on the subject; and fhould unquestionably have referred, perhaps very largely, to thofe paffages in the facred writings, which, in my apprehenfion, would enable my readers to determine the question for them felves. It has long been my perfuafion, that we pay too much deference to the opinions of men refpecting religion, and too little to the word of God, from which alone all our ideas refpecting the Gofpel ought to be deduced.' The Doctor's letter, though fhort, is very fenfible, manifefting a candid and ingenuous mind, warm in the interests of religious liberty and truth. At the fame time that he endeavours to correct the falfe conception entertained of the defign of his pamphlet, he expreffes the highest respect for Mr. Lindley's abilities, and approbation of his argument. There are fome marks of negligence in the pamphlet, one inftance of which feems to be in a paffage we have quoted, where the Author obferves, that the name of Socinians might have been applied to the Apostles of Chrift: His meaning is obvious; but is there not a little Iricifm in fuppofing thofe to be followers of Socinus who lived ages before him? H. ART. IV. Obfervations in Defence of the Liberty of Man, as a Moral Agent; in Answer to Dr. Priestley's Illustrations of Philofophical Necefity. By John Palmer, Minister of New Broad Street. 8vo. 35. fewed. Johnson. 1779. ART. V. A Letter to the Rev. Mr. John Palmer, in Defence of the Illuftrations of Philofophical Neceffity. By Jofeph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S. 12mo. 1 s. 6. d Johnson. 1779. Dr. Priestley's (as we learn from the fecond of thefe articles), attacks the doctrine of Philofophical Neceffity, in the first firft of these two publications; which (fays Dr. Priestley in his letter to the Author of it) has been fubmitted to the perufal of perfons of great learning and worth, who, I am informed, think highly of it, and have recommended the publi cation, not only as excellent in itfelf, but as very proper to follow that of Dr. Price; who was thought by them to have been too tender of me, in our amicable difcuffion, and to have made fome imprudent conceffions. Your work, it is thought, will fupply the deficiency in his' Though Mr. Palmer does not, in this publication, particularly difcufs the queftion concerning the materiality or immateriality of the foul; one of his principal arguments, in favour of human liberty, or agency, is founded on the immateriality of that fubftance. If the fentient principle in man be of a material nature, it muft, as we have obferved in the former ftages of this difpute, be subject to the laws of matter or mechanism; and be neceffarily determined by the motives or external causes operating upon it: but, on the other hand, if the foul of man. be immaterial, or a fubftance perfectly diftinct from matter; it may be faid that the fame neceffity may not take place. The foul, thus conftituted, may be conceived endowed with a felf-determining power, imparted to it by the Creator. Motives, or external causes, will indeed have weight or influence over it; but that influence will not be a mechanical, and may not be a neceffitating influence. Motives may occafionally induce, but cannot compel to action, a spiritual fubftance, which is a felfmover, or which has a power imparted to it of beginning motion: a power, which, the Author obferves, as it exifts in the Supreme Being, may by him be communicated to created beings; as all other powers may, which do not imply felfexistence or independency. Accordingly, as Dr. Priestley has inferred, that if man be wholly a material, he must be a mechanical being; fo the Author, on the other hand, draws an oppofite conclufion from the contrary fuppofition; and further concludes, that if man be free, or poffeffed of the power of moral agency (as he endeavours to prove in the courfe of this work), there must be fomething in the constitution of his nature, to which this power belongs, that is intirely diftinct from matter, and not fubject to its laws; or that the spirit in man is properly immaterial.' In fhort, the tenour of this part of his argument confifts in fhewing that the neceffity, which must attend the operation of physical causes, is not applicable to, nor can take place with refpect to, a fubftance of a totally different nature from matter.- -But to reprefent this argument in another light- or rather perhaps only in other words: The The Neceffarians, in their arguments drawn from the confideration of caufe and effect, fuppofe, or rather take for granted, a fimilarity in the nature of matter and fpirit; and accordingly apply the fame general maxims to effects mechanically produced, and to effects depending upon the will and choice of a human mind: whereas the Author, as an advocate for human liberty, does not admit what is thus affumed by the Neceffarians. The advocate for liberty allows indeed that every effect must have a caufe; and that every caufe must be adequate to the effect: he admits too that bodies muft produce the fame effects. precifely on other bodies, under the fame precife circumstances: but the mind, according to his hypothefis, not being fubjected to the laws of matter, though liable to be influenced by it, and poffeffing a felf-moving or determining power, may will or determine differently, on different occafions, even though the circumftances are the fame.-Or, nearly in the words of the Author, the mind not being under the controul of matter, a variety of volition or determination, in the fame fituation or circumftances, may be admitted as poffible, at leaft, without any contradiction, or even feeming difficulty. In reply to this last observation, Dr. Priestley, in the second of thefe publications, obferves that the contradiction is not at all the lefs glaring, or the difficulty in any degree diminished, by afcribing immateriality to the mind. It does indeed follow,' fays he, that the mind, being immaterial, is not fubject to the laws of matter; but it does not therefore follow, that it is fubject to no laws at all, and confequently has a felf-determining power, independent of all laws, or rule of its determinations. In fact, there is the very fame reafon to conclude that the mind is fubject to laws as the body.'-He inftances in certain affections and paffions of the mind. Thus, perception invariably follows the prefentation of a proper object: the judgment follows, as certainly, the perceived agreement or difagreement of two ideas. Thefe affections belong to the mind as much as the will; they are invariably determined by à view of the objects prefented to them, and have nothing of felfdetermination belonging to them. The decifions of the will as invariably follow the motives, which are its objects; and it would be ftrange if the will could be afcribed to fome other fubftance, intirely different from that in which perception and judgment inhere--whether that fubftance be material or immaterial. It is impoffible for us to follow Mr. Palmer through the various questions into which this difpute has been branched out by Dr. Priestley and his anfwerers We fhall however take particular notice of that part of h., work, in which he treats of the moral influence of the doctrine of neceffity, and confiders how |