1871 V. MANNING. were members of a society, or union, of Hand-made Brick Makers. The building set fire to was one of seven built in a row, and in- THE QUEEN tended for dwelling-houses, and built in part of machine-made bricks. On the night of the 25th of June, 1871, the prisoners (and some others who escaped) set fire to it by means of paraffin oil. All the walls, external and internal, of the house were built and finished. The roof was on and finished. A considerable part of the flooring was laid. The internal walls and ceilings were prepared ready for plastering. The house was in a forward state towards completion, but was not completed. At the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, it was objected by the counsel for the prisoners that the erection set fire to was not a building within the meaning of the statute, because it was not completely finished. The learned judge was against the objection, but it was stated that Lush, J., in a similar case, had expressed his intention to reserve the point for the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal, and, at the request of the counsel, the learned judge assented to take the same course. The learned judge took the opinion of the jury, whether, as a question of fact, the erection was a building, and they found that it was. The prisoners were found guilty. The questions for the opinion of the Court were : First: Was the question concluded by the finding of the jury? Secondly: If it was not, was the objection made by the learned counsel for the prisoners a valid one? No counsel appeared. KELLY, C.B. It is to be regretted that we have not had the assistance of counsel in this case, because the point raised is both new and important. We are of opinion that the question having been properly left to the jury, their finding upon it is conclusive. The building in question, though not completed, was intended to be a house. It was one of a row of seven houses, unfinished it is true, but in a forward state towards completion. Then the question arises whether this is a building within s. 6 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, which makes it felony unlawfully and maliciously to set fire to "any building other than such as are in 1871 v. MANNING. this Act before mentioned." As the buildings mentioned in the THE QUEEN earlier sections are here referred to, it may be well to see what some of those buildings are. Sect. 3 throws light upon the case. By that section: "Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously set fire to any house, stable, coach-house, out-house, warehouse, office, shop, mill, malthouse, hopoast, barn, storehouse, granary, hovel, shed, or fold, or to any farm building, or to any building or erection used in farming land, or in carrying on any trade or manufacture, or any branch thereof. . . . shall be guilty of felony." Now the argument may be urged that these several kinds of buildings enumerated in s. 3 are all necessarily completed buildings, but that is not so. Take for example the term "office." That may form only a part of a house; and an office may be completed on the ground floor, while the house above it is not completed. So again with the term "shop." There may well be a shop on the ground floor, with floors above it for lodgings or other purposes. In such a case the office or shop, though only part of a house, could be within s. 3. There is nothing in that section to limit its operation to completed buildings. Still less is there in s. 6. The words of that section are not " any other building," but the larger words, "any building other than such as are in this Act before mentioned." I think, therefore, the ruling of the learned judge and the finding of the jury were right; this was a building fairly and substantially within the Act of Parliament. I say nothing as to what extent of partial completion in an unfinished building may be necessary to bring it within the section. I do not say that two or three yards of wall would be a building. But when a house is in the state in which this was, I think it is within the Act. BYLES, J. I also think the conviction should be affirmed. It is not necessary to lay down a definition of what is a building. It is sufficient to say that the erection in this case was properly found to be one. Such words as those in the section must be interpreted in their ordinary sense. And it would certainly not have been a departure from ordinary language to have asked, "Who built that structure?" The judge considered it to be a building, and the jury found so; and the decision was right. PIGOTT, B. I am of the same opinion. This was not, I think, a house, but it was a building. LUSH, J. I am of the same opinion. A building need not necessarily be a completed structure; it is sufficient that it should be a connected and entire structure. I do not think four walls erected a foot high would be a building. And my impression is that in the case referred to, tried before me, there were only four walls unconnected, and not advanced further than a short distance towards completion. HANNEN, J. I am of the same opinion. It is very likely that a house can only mean a structure designed and sufficiently advanced for the habitation of man. But I think the structure in the present case was a building other than a house, and therefore within s. 6. 1871 THE QUEEN v. MANNING. Conviction affirmed. THE QUEEN v. CHAMBERS. Forgery-24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 23—“ Undertaking." The prisoner, being pressed for payment of a debt, obtained further time to pay, by giving, as security, an I. O. U., purporting to be signed by himself and another, the signature of the latter being forged by the prisoner: Held, that the instrument was an "undertaking for the payment of money" within the meaning of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 23. CASE stated by Blackburn, J. The prisoner was tried on an indictment for feloniously forging an instrument which was set out in the indictment in the words and figures following: It was described in one count as an undertaking for the payment of money, and in another as a security. On the trial, evidence was given that the prisoner having obtained a loan of 357., and being pressed for payment, obtained VOL. 1. 3 D 4 Nov. 11. further time by giving as a security the instrument which purTHE QUEEN ported to be signed by his brother-in-law, George Wickham. 1871 บ. CHAMBERS. It was objected that, though, if the instrument had been genuine, it might have been evidence of an account stated by Wickham, from which the law would have implied a promise on his part to pay the money; and so would in effect operate as an undertaking to pay the money, and as a security for its payment, yet it was not in itself either one or other. The learned judge reserved the point, and left to the jury whether the instrument was forged by the prisoner with intent to defraud. The verdict was "Guilty." The question was, whether the instrument in question was either an undertaking or a security within the meaning of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 23. (1) No counsel appeared. KELLY, C.B. The question in this case is, whether the instrument forged by the prisoner is an "undertaking for the payment of money" within the meaning of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 92, s. 23, so as to make the forgery of it an offence within that section. Now the instrument is in form an I. O. U. for thirty-five pounds, purporting to be signed by the prisoner and his brother-in-law, George Wickham. And it appears from the case that the prisoner, being pressed for repayment of a loan, obtained further time by giving this instrument as a security. I am clearly of opinion that such a (1) Sect. 23 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, enacts that: "Whosoever shall forge or alter, or shall offer, utter, dispose of, or put off, knowing the same to be forged or altered, any undertaking, warrant, order, authority, or request, for the payment of money, or for the delivery or transfer of any goods or chattels, or of any note, bill, or other security for the payment of money, or for procuring or giving credit, or any indorsement on, or assignment of, any such undertaking, warrant, order, authority, or request, or any accountable receipt, acquittance, or receipt for money or for goods, or for any note, bill, or other security for the payment of money, or any indorsement on or assignment of any such accountable receipt, with intent, in any of the cases aforesaid, to defraud, shall be guilty of felony. . . . .” It will be observed that this section does not make it an offence to forge a "security for money," but only to forge "an undertaking, &c., for the delivery, &c., of a security for money." It would appear, therefore, that the second count was not a good count under the section, 1871 v. CHAMBERS. security is an undertaking for the payment of money within the meaning of the Act. It may be argued that there was no con- THE QUEEN sideration for such an undertaking. But there was consideration for it. There was the giving of further time to the prisoner to pay the debt, for the payment of which he was being pressed. The instrument is therefore an undertaking for the payment of money given for sufficient consideration. If any doubt could formerly have existed, it has been removed by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, which makes it unnecessary that the consideration for a guarantee should appear in writing. BYLES, J. I am of the same opinion. PIGOTT, B. I think the instrument in question was an undertaking for the payment of money. It does not shew the consideration; but that is not necessary. It is a guarantee by Wickham of the prisoner's debt. LUSH, J. I am of the same opinion. It appears that the prisoner was indebted, and being pressed for payment, obtained further time to pay by giving this instrument as a security. If Wickham had signed it, I think he would have been bound by it, for the consideration need not now appear in writing. HANNEN, J. I am of the same opinion. Conviction affirmed. END OF MICHAELMAS TERM, 1871. VOL. I. 3 E 4 |