V. KILHAM. 1870 journey. The reasons for this decision do not very clearly appear, THE QUEEN but it may be distinguished from the present case in this respect: that the prisoner, by using the ticket for the purpose of travelling on the railway, entirely converted it to his own use for the only purpose for which it was capable of being applied. In this case the prisoner never intended to deprive the prosecutor of the horse or the property in it, or to appropriate it to himself, but only intended to obtain the use of the horse for a limited time. The conviction must, therefore, be quashed. Attorney for prosecution: Dale, York. Conviction quashed. June 4. THE QUEEN v. SVEN SEBERG. Evidence-Jurisdiction-Ship and Shipping-Ownership of Vessel-Registration On a trial for maliciously wounding on the high seas, it was stated by three witnesses that the vessel was a British ship of Shields, and that she was sailing under the British flag, but no proof was given of the register of the vessel or of the ownership: Held, that the Court had jurisdiction over the offence; first, because the evidence was sufficient to prove that the vessel was a British vessel; secondly, because even if it had appeared that the vessel was not registered, the Court would still have jurisdiction, as there is nothing in the Merchant Shipping Acts to take away that jurisdiction, and also, by reason of s. 106 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, which provides that, as regards the punishment of offences committed on board such a ship, she shall be dealt with in the same manner as if she were a recognized British ship. CASE stated by Hannen, J: Indictment charging the prisoner with maliciously wounding one W. Bedlington with intent to do him grievous bodily harm. The prisoner was tried at the last spring assizes for Cornwall. The prisoner was a sailor on board the bark Statesman, and while on the high seas on a voyage from Alexandria to Falmouth he inflicted on W. Bedlington, the mate of the vessel, a dangerous wound with a knife. The master, the boatswain, and one of the crew of the Statesman, stated that the vessel was a British ship of Shields, and that she was sailing under the British flag, but no proof of the register of the vessel, or of the ownership, was given. It was objected on behalf of the prisoner that this evidence was not sufficient to establish that the ship was a British ship, and that without proof of the ship having been registered as a British ship the prisoner could not be convicted. This was the question for the consideration of the Court. May 7. No counsel appeared. Cur. adv. vult. June 4. The judgment of the Court (Bovill, C.J., Willes, Byles, and Hannen, JJ., and Cleasby, B.) was delivered by BOVILL, C.J. We think the conviction in this case was correct. The evidence was, in our opinion, sufficient to prove that the vessel was a British ship without proof of her having been registered; and even if it had appeared that she had not been registered, we think the prisoner ought to have been convicted: first, because there is nothing in the Merchant Shipping Acts to take away the criminal jurisdiction of the Court; and, next, by reason of the provision at the end of s. 106 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104) (1), which provides that, as regards the punishment of offences committed on board such a ship, she shall be dealt with in the same manner as if she was a recognized British ship. The conviction will, therefore, be affirmed. (1) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 106, enacts that, "whenever it is declared by this Act that a ship belonging to any person... qualified according to this Act to be owner of British ships, shall not be recognized as a British ship, such ship shall not be entitled to any benefits, privileges, advantages, or protection usually enjoyed by British ships, and shall not be entitled to use the British flag or assume the British Conviction affirmed. (2) national character; but so far as regards (2) See Leary v. Lloyd, 3 E. & E. 1870 THE QUEEN V. SEBERG. 1870 June 4. THE QUEEN v. JESSE SMITH. Receiving Stolen Goods-Larceny by Partner-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 9131 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1-Construction. ... 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 91, enacts that, "whosoever shall receive any chattel, . . . the stealing or taking whereof shall amount to a felony, either at common law or by virtue of this Act, knowing the same to have been feloniously stolen or taken, . . . shall be guilty of felony." 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, enacts that, "if any person, being a member of any co-partnership. shall steal or embezzle any money or goods. . . of or belonging to such co-partnership, . . . every such person shall be liable to be dealt with, tried, convicted, and punished for the same, as if such person had not been or was not a member of such co-partnership":— ... Held, that it is not an offence, under s. 91 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, to receive stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, if the stealing is not a crime either at common law or under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, although the stealing is a felony under 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1. CASE stated by A. R. Adams, Q.C., Commissioner. Indictment under s. 91 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, for receiving goods, the property of G. Morton and another, knowing them to have been feloniously stolen. The prisoner was tried at the last assizes for the West Riding of Yorkshire, at Leeds. G. Morton was in partnership with one R. F. Martin, at Leeds, and they carried on business in that town as ironmongers, under the firm of "R. F. Martin & Co." The goods sold there were principally supplied by W. Morton, of Birmingham, trading under the firm of Haines and Morton. In consequence of certain rumours as to the solvency of his firm, G. Morton came to Leeds on the 13th of December, 1869, and made arrangements with his partner, R. F. Martin, to secure the debt due to Haines & Morton by giving a bill of sale of the goods then in the shop; and whilst this document was being prepared G. Morton left Leeds and went to Sheffield. During his absence his partner, R. F. Martin, had interviews with the prisoner, and before the return of G. Morton, on the 14th of December, shut up the shop, and in the evening of the following day he hired drays, and in the presence of the prisoner conveyed the whole of the goods to the house of the prisoner, who apparently paid 1007. for them to R. F. Martin; 1870 the goods were proved to be worth considerably more than 3007. The prisoner was aware of the intended bill of sale, and that THE QUEEN R. F. Martin was disposing of these goods in fraud of his partner, and to prevent the operation of the bill of sale. It was objected, on the part of the prisoner, that even if it were proved that R. F. Martin had committed an act of felony against his partner under 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1 (1), and that he had been guilty of larceny of the partnership goods, yet that the prisoner could not be indicted for receiving such goods, knowing them to be stolen, as that statute had not made such receiving a felony, and that under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 91 (2), only persons who received goods, the stealing of which amounted to felony either at common law or under the provisions of that Act, could be indicted as receivers; and as the stealing by a partner was not a larceny at common law, or under the provisions of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, no receiver of such goods could be indicted for a felony. The jury found the prisoner guilty of receiving the goods, knowing them to be stolen. The question was, whether the prisoner had been properly convicted. The case was argued before Bovill, C.J., Willes, Byles, and Hannen, JJ., and Cleasby, B. April 30. Waddy (Wilberforce with him), for the prisoner. The conviction should be quashed, first, because Martin was not guilty of a felony; secondly, because even if he was guilty of a felony, (1) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, enacts that, "if any person, being a member of any co-partnership, or being one of two or more beneficial owners of any money, goods, or effects, bills, notes, securities, or other property, shall steal or embezzle any such money, goods, or effects, bills, notes, securities, or other property of or belonging to any such co-partnership, or to such joint beneficial owners, every such person shall be liable to be dealt with, tried, convicted, and punished for the same, as if such person had not been or was not a member of such co-partnership, or one of such (2) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 91:- V. SMITH. 1870 v. SMITH. the receipt of the goods by the prisoner is not an offence under THE QUEEN 8. 91 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96. Martin's offence is only criminal by 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1. This section renders him liable to be dealt with as a felon, but does not make him a felon. The goods, therefore, were not feloniously stolen, and the prisoner was wrongly convicted. Secondly, even if Martin did feloniously steal the goods, still the prisoner cannot be convicted under s. 91 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, because that section only applies to the receipt of goods, the stealing of which amounts to a felony "either at common law or by virtue of this Act." The fraudulent taking of partnership goods by one of two partners is not a crime either at common law or by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, and therefore the case does not come within s. 91. No question can at present arise as to the prisoner's liability as an accessory, because he is not indicted as such. [He referred to Dwarris on Statutes, 634-5, and Rex v. Handy. (1)] Campbell Foster, for the prosecution. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 91, extends to the case of goods stolen by a partner. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, does not create any new offence, it only alters a technical rule respecting the effect of the joint ownership of property. The stealing of goods is a felony at common law, but one of several joint owners of goods taking the goods could not be convicted of this felony. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, abolishes this rule as to joint ownership; and a joint owner is now in the same position in this respect as a mere stranger, and may be convicted of stealing goods in which he has a joint property. The offence of which he may be thus convicted is not a new one created by the statute, but an old common law offence, and therefore within the meaning of s. 91 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96. Cur. adv. vult. June 4. The judgment of the Court (Bovill, C.J., Willes, Byles, and Hannen, JJ., and Cleasby, B.) was delivered by BOVILL, C.J. The prisoner was convicted for feloniously receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, contrà formam statuti. There was no count charging the prisoner as accessory either before or after the fact. The statement of facts shews (1) 6 T. R. 286. |