1868 v. ANDERSON. to try the prisoner? If any, the Central Criminal Court had. There are a vast number of cases which decide that when a ship THE QUEEN is sailing on the high seas, and bearing the flag of a particular nation, the ship forms a part of that nation's country, and all persons on board of her may be considered as within the jurisdiction of that nation whose flag is flying on the ship, in the same manner as if they were within the territory of that nation. The question now is, is the Garonne at the place in question to be considered the high seas? The term "high seas" has had various meanings attached to it, but from the earliest times in this country the Maritime Court has had jurisdiction over what happens on the common ground of nations, and, further than this, from the earliest times in England, an 1 I think abroad also, it has been established that the jurisdiction of the Admiralty extends over vessels, not only when they are in the open sea, but also when in places where great ships do generally go. In the present case the ship had gone some miles up the Garonne, and it may be that she was in French territory, so as to give the French courts jurisdiction, had they chosen to exercise it; but not only have the French courts not exercised jurisdiction in this case, or in such like cases, but, as I understand, they have absolutely repudiated any such jurisdiction. Then the question is, has England jurisdiction over an English vessel in such a place, or would there be jurisdiction in the United States over an American ship which happened to be there? There seems to be no doubt that at a place where the tide flows, and below all bridges, the Admiralty assumes to have jurisdiction at common law. I pass by the law as laid down in Hale's Pleas of the Crown, for it seems to me that the modern cases of Reg. v. Jemot (1) and Reg. v. Allen (2) are those most closely in point. Those were both cases of crimes committed on board British ships at a time when they were lying, not in the open sea, but at some distance up a Chinese river. Each of these cases was held to be within the Admiralty jurisdiction, and consequently within that of the Central Criminal Court. In the American case of United States v. Wiltberger (3) the Court seems 1868 V. ANDERSON. to have held as a fact that the ship was out of the Admiralty jurisTHE QUEEN diction, but in Thomas v. Lane (1) and United States v. Coombs (2) they give the grounds of their decision, not in conformity with the United States v. Wiltberger (3), but very much in conformity with the English decisions, and therefore I consider that the American courts would agree with us that the Admiralty jurisdiction would extend to this place; and so, just as an American seaman on board an American ship at the place in question would have been triable in America, so a foreign subject serving on board a British ship can be tried here. The difficulty as to the statute legislating for those out of the scope of its authority we must deal with when it arises. As a general rule, no doubt, we should construe a British statute according to the principles of international law, and should confine a legislative enactment to a British subject, or to a person subject to British protection. However, as long as the ship is at sea, we have no need of the statute. If the offence had been committed on land, or in harbour, it might become a question as to the construction of the statute. My present impression, however, is, that where a ship is sailing under a particular flag, the flag affords protection to all who sail under it, and the nation to which the flag belongs has a perfect right to legislate for all those on board, because she affords them that protection. Where a nation allows a vessel to sail under her flag, and the crew have the protection of that flag, common sense and justice require that they should be punishable by the law of the flag, and the 267th section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, might properly be construed to mean that. The latter part of the section, where the three months' clause is introduced, affords more difficulty, but that point does not now arise. The one and only point decided in the present case is, that under the circumstances, the ship being within the juris liction of the Admiralty, the prisoner was properly tried at the Central Criminal Court. LUSII, J. I also think that it is not necessary to resort to the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, and therefore I offer no opinion upon its construction. I concur in the judgment of the rest of the Court upon the ground, that at the time the offence was committed, the (3) 5 Wheat. 76, (1) 2 Sumner, 1. (2) 12 Peters. 72. vessel was in a tidal river and within the flux and reflux of the 1868 tide, and, not being within the body of a county, was within the THE QUEEN jurisdiction of the Admiralty. The prisoner was therefore properly convicted at the Central Criminal Court. v. ANDERSON. Conviction affirmed. Attorney for the Crown: The Solicitor to the Treasury. END OF MICHAELMAS TERM, 1868. 4 VOL. I 2 C CASES DETERMINED BY THE COURT FOR CROWN CASES RESERVED IN HILARY TERM, XXXII VICTORIA. 1869 Jan. 23. THE QUEEN v. FIRTH. Larceny-Continuous Taking—Abstraction of Gas. A. stole gas for the use of a manufactory by means of a pipe which drew off the gas from the main without allowing it to pass through the meter. The gas from this pipe was burnt every day, and turned off at night. The pipe was never closed at its junction with the main, and consequently always remained full of gas : Held, that as the pipe always remained full, there was, in fact, a continuous taking of the gas, and not a series of separate takings; but Held, further, that, even if the pipe had not been thus kept full, the taking would have been continuous, as it was substantially all one transaction. CASE stated by the Chairman of Quarter Sessions for the West Riding of Yorkshire. John Firth was tried at the quarter sessions for the West Riding of Yorkshire at Wakefield on the 17th of August, 1868, on an indictment which charged that he stole 1000 cubic feet of gas the property of the mayor, &c., of the borough of Halifax. The offence was alleged to have been committed on the 30th day of April, 1866. The corporation of Halifax are the owners of gas works within the borough, and a firm of S. and J. Firth, worsted manufacturers, had for some years been the occupiers of Lily Lane Mill in Halifax, which was lighted with gas supplied by the corporation by meter. The prisoner was the son of S. Firth; and, though not 1869 a partner, was employed by his father and took an active part in THE QUEEN the management of the business. The case then stated evidence which showed that the prisoner had for several years supplied a portion of the manufactory with gas, which he abstracted from a main gas-pipe of the corporation of Halifax by means of a pipe which drew off the gas from the main without allowing it to pass through the meter in the manufactory. The gas thus obtained was burnt during the day at a large number of burners, and was turned off at night. There was no means of closing the entrance from the pipe into the main, and the pipe in consequence always remained full of gas. The gas was turned off by turning the cocks at the burners. No further evidence was given of any specific taking of gas by the prisoner. At the close of the case for the prosecution it was objected by the prisoner's counsel, that if the taking of the gas amounted to larceny, the case for the prosecution proved a separate and distinct act of larceny committed almost daily during a period of several years. That the prisoner could not be called on to answer such a case on one indictment, and that the prosecution must confine their charge (1) to, and the case go to the jury on, one or any number of separate takings of the gas not exceeding three, by or under the orders of the prisoner, within a period of six calendar months from the first to the last of such takings. The chairman overruled the objection, but reserved the point for the Court of Criminal Appeals. The prisoner was convicted and liberated on bail. The question submitted to the Court was, whether the conviction under the circumstances above stated was according to law. (1) The case in fact stated that the objection was, "that the prosecution must confine their evidence to, and the case go to the jury on, one or any number," &c., &c. It was conceded by Manisty that this objection could not be sustained as stated, inasmuch as a number of successive takings might be shewn in order to establish the felonious intent of one specified taking. Atkinson stated that he was present at the trial, and that the objection was The Court then allowed the argu- 2 C 2 4 v. FIRTH. |