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growing rapidly. The Japanese have extended the cultivation of cocoanuts, rubber, sisal, cacao, coffee, and tobacco, and have simultaneously seized a growing share of the trade formerly in the hands of English and Austraians. Japan's commercial influence is being felt in the English island groups and throughout the whole Pacific area. That country's merchants learn the ative dialects, study the markets on the spot, and have for instance built ailing ships specially designed for andling copra. The trade mark Made in Japan' is becoming familiar o all the inhabitants of this part of the anworld, and in the wake of the commerce which it symbolizes flows a teady stream of Japanese political propaganda and influence.

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It is reported that the natives of the Marshall islands in particular have dopted Japanese customs and habits, lothing and opinions, with great rapidity. During his leisure the Japnese merchant becomes a teacher, and mpresses upon the natives the power nd prestige of his empire. Soon you Fee in the huts of the islanders Japnese books and newspapers side by ide with other merchandise from that ountry. The native chiefs and their vives wear kimonos and sandals, carry apanese fans and umbrellas, wear the apanese ornaments, and even imitate he peculiar walk of the Japanese. The raders of the Island Empire exhibit rearkable push and enterprise; their ares are cheap and attractive, and uropeans find it increasingly difficult ith each passing day to compete With them.

Furthermore, Japan's business with Australia and New Zealand has grown eyond precedent and the people of hat country have probably suplanted the Germans for good and all a certain lines of trade. Consumers ere are not satisfied with the quality

of many Japanese goods. The latter are regarded as imitations and substitutes. One gentleman told me that he commissioned a Japanese firm to send him certain articles which he had formerly bought from Germany. The goods arrived in due time, exactly according to sample, even bearing the mark 'Made in Germany.'

The Japanese have acquired their strongest foothold, however, in the Hawaiian islands, where they form about half of the population. Since there are also some 20,000 Chinese in the Territory, and the native Hawaiians are dying out rapidly, it is very obvious that the yellow race will speedily be in complete possession of the whole archipelago, even though the United States prohibits further immigration. In case of a war between the North American Republic and Empire of the Rising Sun, this Japanese settlement will inevitably prove very dangerous and only the future will show whether the government at Washington and other interested powers will have the courage and foresight to check in time the advance of the Japanese race in that quarter.

Japanese are met with in larger or smaller numbers on the other islands of the Pacific, particularly in New Caledonia, and more recently in the New Hebrides, an archipelago now under the joint administration of England and France. The Japanese are interested particularly in the French portion of the latter group, because they hope eventually to purchase it from that country.

Japan is not particularly well pleased with the Australian mandate over the former German possessions in Melanesia. They fear that with the Australians in full control, they will enjoy even fewer rights in those colonies than when the Germans were their masters.

Japan's pressure to the South begins with being economic and commercial, but where they once acquire a foothold it speedily assumes the character of a colonization. The new positions it has recently won in this region are of the first importance from a strategic standpoint. For instance, the Marshall islands possess harbors ample to accommodate in safety the largest war ships. Rumors are current from time to time that the Japanese have already investigated the capabilities of these islands as submarine bases. Of course such rumors are difficult to prove. However, we are already justified in saying that the provisions in the League of Nations mandate, by which the former German colonies were not to be fortified or used as military bases, are already a dead letter. Consequently the Australasian public was not surprised in the slightest when the Anglican Bishop of Melanesia recently stated in a public address, at a meeting in Wellington, in referring to the growing importance of his diocese, that he was informed that Great Britain was preparing to establish two important naval bases in the Solomon islands.

By occupying the former German colonies in Micronesia, the Japanese are in a position, in case of war, to cut the connections of the United States with the Philippines and the Hawaiian islands; for little Guam would be completely isolated. Therefore the defense of the Philippines must depend hereafter upon the British naval bases in Singapore and Hongkong. This makes the informal community of interest between the United States and Great Britain grow constantly closer; for it is absolutely essential to both powers that the safety of 'White Australia,' and the predominant influence of the white race in the Pacific should be guaranteed. This close community of interest constitutes to-day a much

more important factor in the Pacific question than the British Japanese alliance.

The United States also has important commercial interests in the Pacific and its western border lands, especial ly China. Therefore its government keeps postponing the proclamation of Philippine independence, believing that the people of that country could not long preserve their freedom, but would inevitably fall into the hands of Japan This has become increasingly probabl since the archipelago has been en circled on the North and East by Japan's recently acquired possessions American newspapers do not overlook the fact that the Japanese already con trol hemp and sugar plantations in the Philippines. Indeed it is for this reason that the local legislature has tried to restrict the acquisition of land by for eigners. Once in possession of the Philippines, Japan would enclose th entire western coast of Asia by a chair of islands, and thus dominate practi cally all Asia and the western side o the Pacific ocean, or practically hal the surface of the globe. That country can even to-day concentrate a larg army in Formosa only two days fron the Philippines, and whenever i wishes can throw a powerful force int the latter country.

So the Pacific question involves struggle for supremacy between the yellow and the white race. The nativ populations of the Pacific islands an dying out, and have already lost any political importance they might hav once possessed. So far as we can se to-day this contest will for the time being be fought only with economic and diplomatic weapons. If Japan should succeed in its propaganda of 'Asia for the Asiatics,' so as to secure a true community of action between itself and China, the fate of the white race on this half the globe would al

much greater danger than the passing Bolshevist infection, which may run its course in a few years. The well-known Indian poet and philosopher, Rabindranath Tagore, personally visited Japan during the war and probably made a recognizance of the country. He could be proffered no aid officially, and returned from that country, as he did from America, considerably disillusioned. But the mere fact of his visit is significant. Tagore believes, as one of the Indian nationalist leaders, that Japan has a great mission in the East. He says in his work entitled 'Nationalism' that Japan, as the first Oriental power which has broken the barriers Europe has opposed to the progress of eastern nations, has become a beacon of hope for all the people of Asia, to which they look for their salvation.

ready be sealed; and Australia, which did not become white territory until the Nineteenth Century, would in the course of the next hundred years be converted into a yellow continent. Japan would be master of the whole Pacific ocean and would aid India to acquire independence. The British Empire could not survive the loss of these two territories and would fall to pieces. We should bear in mind that the interest of the white race in the Pacific is primarily the interest of Great Britain and Australasia. The only exclusively Pacific territories held by the white race are Australia and New Zealand. The United States has only commercial and territorial interests in this region; for its possessions there are inhabited mainly by native peoples. But the World War which America entered principally from racial sympathy with England, has created exceedingly intimate ties between these two branches of the AngloSaxon stock, the existence of which would make itself powerfully felt the moment White Australia was threatened by Japan.

Meantime, let us remember that the Indian question is closely tied up with the Pacific question. Natives of India reside in the Pacific territories. They are especially numerous in the Fiji islands, whither they have been imported to labor on the sugar plantations. They multiply rapidly and good observers say that within twenty years they will outnumber the natives in the latter archipelago, converting it into an outpost of their own country. Were a war to break out these Indians would naturally sympathize with the Japanese. Most people already know that the Indian nationalist movement has excellent connections in the Land of the Rising Sun. In case of a serious conflict this fact may have far reaching consequences, and is likely to prove a

As I said before, the struggle for the Pacific will be fought in the Orient. With this truth in view Japan's penetration of China, its tenacious retention of Shantung, its permanent occupation of Korea, its recent seizure of the Amur territories, its invasion of Mongolia, and its occupation of Manchuria, are well pondered measures to advance a definite and thought-out policy; a policy which may avenge itself bloodily upon the children of those who to-day are leaving Japan practically a free hand in the Orient.

It is reported that Clemenceau asked the Japanese Ambassador, Viscount Chinda, at the Paris conference, what Japan would demand in return for crushing the Bolshevist movement in Russia. The shrewd Japanese diplomat began by mentioning concessions in French Indo-China, another evidence that his government considers the occupation of strategic points along the coast of eastern Asia one of the most important preliminaries for increasing its power. However, Clem

enceau was willing at that time to discuss only concessions in the North. Perhaps this conversation helps to explain why Japan is meeting no diplomatic resistance to its measures in eastern Siberia. In any case that territory is, we hope, only temporarily infected with Bolshevism; and if Japan is given concessions there or in China. it may be with the object of diverting its attention from territories farther South. That may succeed for the moment, but it is no assurance for the future. We may say with fair certainty that every new point which Japan occupies on the eastern coast of Asia is another nail in the coffin of White Australia.

European and American diplomats seem to appreciate this, and they are secretly rejoiced at China's boycott against Japanese goods. Throughout the islands of the Pacific it is noticeable that the Chinese are more welcome than the Japanese, because they are less advanced in the modern sense and therefore less dangerous. A feeling exists that, in case of an eventual conflict with Japan, these people may help form a bridge to China, although as yet such an engagement is avoided.

Were we disposed to view the situation cynically-and the Paris conference illustrates the low level of modern diplomacy-we would have to admit that the World War, in which Europeans have so preposterously slaughtered each other, has seriously imperilled the predominance of the white race in both the Near East and the Far East; and that henceforth we can maintain that supremacy only by promoting mutual controversies and enmities among the eastern nations. The only question is, how long will the Orientals, who can boast of an older culture in many fields than their western masters, allow themselves to be thus beguiled?

[The Outlook (London Conservative Weekly), July 3]

II. Japan, Britain, and China

BY ANTHONY CLYNE

THE political history of Japan during the last fifty years, in its rapid and sure rise to the position of a Great Power both in the economic and political spheres, possesses no inconsiderable significance for us at this time, though its fundamental facts and their present implications receive no wide recognition.

The history of Japan previous to 1868 is of practically no importance from an international view-point. In 1868 came a revolution of which we are yet far from discerning the ultimate effects. To that original emergence of Japan into world politics the historian of the future may trace movements and events transcending in importance even the great war which has for its results an impoverished, a politically and socially unstable Europe, and a dubious League of Nations.

The three great politicians who did most to bring Western ideals and methods to Japan were Iwakura, Okubo, and Kido, and the history of modern Japan begins with the mission of which they were members to America and Europe in 1871, 'to study the institutions of other countries, their laws, commerce, and educational methods, as well as their naval and military systems.' The special embassy visited England with the intention of gaining sufficient knowledge of the British Constitution to construct that of their own country in accordance with its pattern. But the British Constitution was of traditional vagueness and elusiveness. 'We went to London to study the British Constitution,' said one of their states

men, 'with the intention of taking it as our model, but we could not find it anywhere; so we had to go to Berlin, where they showed us, with great readiness, something that we could easily understand, for it was clear, logical, and set forth plainly in black and white.' Thus Japan moulded her political institutions on the lines of Prussian bureaucracy, with its restricted popular liberties, and Prussian ideals entirely captured the minds of the Japanese leaders. The German triumph of 1870 could not fail to be appreciated by the Japanese, and 'Blood and Iron,' Force and Efficiency, determined the course of political thought until 1895. Germans were numerous among the Occidental technical experts and eminent advisers whom Japan engaged in the task of national reorganization.

The Japanese were from their national character particularly disposed to be attracted by the success of the German gospel of might. A material victory gained by force they could appreciate. They are distinguished by a certain recklessness of bravery, contempt for death, delight in conflict, which found a kinship with the spirit of Prussia. There is also a spirit of self-effacement fostered by the old clan system which produced a lack of individuality analogous to the complete subordination of persons to the state which marked Prussianism. Their power of effective combination alone rendered possible their remarkable advance in political and economic power. They have also a faculty for careful attention to what may seem to the English temperament minute details, a regard for complete efficiency which is reminiscent of the German character. Japanese haughtiness may sometimes approximate to Prussian arrogance, and Japanese exclusiveness, the result

of centuries of carefully fostered hatred of foreigners, has some affinity to the extreme nationalism of Germany.

We can understand, therefore, why those principles, which we associate with reactionary influences in Europe, were adopted by Japan. The Germanization was thorough. The government was entirely bureaucratic, and not responsible to nor dependent upon the representatives elected by the enfranchised classes. In 1895 came the war with China, and while this served to establish yet more firmly the faith in national destiny, it also marked the decline of German influence. The Chino-Japanese War convinced Japan of the necessity of acquiring sea-power, and this, together with the recognition of common political aims with Britain as regards Russia, led Japan inevitably to desire

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understanding with us. Both Japan and Britain looked upon the growing Eastern influence of Russia with anxiety. It threatened both the safety of Japan and that of our Eastern possessions. In 1904 came the Russo-Japanese War, which was the fulfilment of a long antagonism, followed by a firm renewal of the AngloJapanese treaty signed two years earlier.

The effect of the waning of German influence can be detected in the internal politics of Japan. Count Okuma, who is before all others the great democrat among the statesmen of modern Japan, in 1898 attempted to discard the Prussian bureaucratic system of government for that of government by parties with a cabinet on party lines, in accordance with the example of Britain. The reform, however, was premature, and though by no means a negligible advance in the direction of democratic government was accomplished by an extension of the franchise and other