for the people. That insurrection was really the work of the poorer quarters of Dublin, where bitter distress reigned during the first part of the war. A movement led by a few mad fanatics, such as always come to the top in secret parties, succeeded in allying the Irish volunteers with Sinn Fein. The regular leader of the volunteers, Professor MacNeill, expressly disapproved of the revolt, which was obviously doomed to failure from the outset. Public opinion, as is now universally acknowledged, was at that time practically unanimous in condemning the insurrection. The penalties inflicted upon the insurgents appeared mild when regarded from a distance. Other governments would have taken still sterner measures with the who persons instigated such an attack against their authority in the midst of war. Ireland, however, where the citizens knew how much responsibility for what had occurred rested on the governing classes, the arrests and sentences of many people who were innocent at heart created deep indignation, which was increased by the secrecy of their trials. The fickle sympathies of the masses speedily took the side of Sinn Fein, which was theoretically the most radical party, and the only party which seemed in a position to offer effective resistance after the Easter insurrection had been crushed.

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drew their votes from the Nationalists, who favored legal agitation. Soon afterwards Lloyd George called an Irish Convention which was to settle by compromise the issues in dispute. Thereupon the Sinn Fein party, which was invited to take part, refused. This convention, which was a sort of national assembly, was thus doomed to failure from the outset by the obstruction of a party which, though of unknown strength, was generally believed to represent the real sentiment of the people. Nevertheless the convention went to work with zeal, and it looked as though a compromise might be effected, when the British Premier declared on February 25, 1918, that the Imperial government must retain control of customs duties and direct taxes in Ireland. Thereupon this last effort to settle the Irish question on the basis of free discussion by all parties failed. Soon afterwards an active agitation started in England to impose compulsory service upon Ireland. An effort to carry this would probably have been met by passive resistance if not by open revolt. Nothing came of this agitation; but it strengthened tremendously the Sinn Fein propaganda, so that in the parliamentary elections of December, 1918, this party which put up fusion candidates with the Socialists, won 73 of the 100 seats more or less, and the old legitimate Nationalist party practically vanished. The Sinn Fein candidates thus elected organized themselves at Dublin as an Irish Parliament, 'Dail Eireann,' proclaimed a republic, and formed a cabinet headed by Mr. De Valera as the first 'President of the Irish Republic.'

The policy of this organization, which claims to represent the whole Irish people, is to be gathered from the public statements of its leaders to the effect that they will make English rule

impossible in Ireland, and through the pressure of public opinion in the world at large, particularly America, compel the British government eventually to recognize Ireland's independence.

This policy has since then been pursued with great energy. Mr. De Valera is in charge of the propaganda abroad. He secretly made his escape to America. This agitation is by no means confined to the United States, where the large number of voters of Irish descent naturally gives it special importance, and where most of the funds which support it have been raised. It endeavors to utilize the difficulties which England faces in every country of the world. How far Sinn Fein has encouraged the unrest and outbreaks in Egypt, India, Mesopotamia, Syria and South Africa, and how far it has allied itself with the propaganda of the Russia Soviet Republic and the German military party, are questions which cannot yet be answered. However, the world-wide importance of this propaganda is undeniable. It may have decided the action of the American Senate upon the League of Nations. It threatens to sow dissension between the two great Anglo-Saxon powers, who are the most important pillars of peace and order throughout the world. If so the whole world will have to pay the penalty. Sinn Fein leaders are openly boasting to-day that they command millions of votes in the United States, and that they can prevent any man from becoming president there who does not solemnly promise to recognize the Irish Republic. At present, however, it is to be questioned whether either a Democrat or Republican candidate will make such an acknowledgment, since a promise of this kind would seriously compromise America's foreign policy. The effect of the Irish agitation upon domestic conditions in

the United States is already creating serious difficulties.

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The domestic policy of Sinn Fein comes into direct conflict with the legally constituted government, which for centuries has taken its name from the building it makes its headquarters, 'Dublin Castle.' This Castle is no turreted fortress, but a confused group of miscellaneous buildings crowded into a dark corner of old Dublin. Were it not for the strong guard in steel helmets stationed behind its high barred gates, the castle would give no impression of being the seat of power. would look as peaceful and purely bureaucratic as a municipal hall in Zurich. But the traditions of the Dublin bureaucracy are based on force. Liberal English cabinets, which, during the last few decades have tried to solve the Irish problem, have found the policy of the Dublin administration one of their greatest obstacles. The wisdom of the latter comprehends only police measures, and it has shown complete incapacity to accommodate itself to the broader plans of London. The suppression of the Easter revolt caused naturally a profound reaction in the politically irritated populace; after the proclamation of 'Dail Eireann,' a real official reign of terror was inaugurated. Nearly all of the Sinn Fein delegates were imprisoned. The authorities had a technical right to do this, inasmuch as the elected representatives had not formerly taken their seats in London, and therefore did not enjoy parliamentary immunity. Furthermore, their proclamation was accounted high treason. However, the local authorities did not stop there. Hundreds and thousands of arrests were made throughout the country. Inevitably many innocent and harmless people suffered; but even those who were guilty from the British point of view were enhaloed with the glory

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of martyrs, for in very few cases were they given a regular trial. The military courts which heard the cases Te of part of the people arrested enjoyed no confidence whatever in Ireland. The English government attempted to justify these proceedings which finally ended in the well-known hunger strike and the liberation of the prisoners under the pressure of public opinion, on the ground that it was impossible to prove legally the guilt of people against which it held strong circumstantial evidence, because the Sinn Fein terror shut the mouths of witnesses.

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This is only partly true. National sentiment was just as powerful a motive as fear of vengeance, and even the moderate Irish, and residents who were not Irish, shared the opinion that it was an issue in which both sides were equally guilty of brutal measures. Responsible, respectable, quiet citizens who have kept apart from all political agitation, frequently express this opinion.

they insisted on resisting superior forces after forces after being summoned to surrender.

No doubt, many of these murders have occurred against the wishes of the Sinn Fein leaders, who are no longer able to control the unchained passions of their partisans. The police, as has been demonstrated not only by the oath of Irish conspirators — which are hardly above question- but by the measures taken by the public prosecutors, have more than once met violence with brutal violence. Even the regular officers have on several occasions lost their heads. Common soldiers, who are frequently compelled to defend themselves against odds in isolated posts, have not always obeyed the commands of their superiors.

The Lord Mayor of Court, a haggard young man who bears in his face unmistakable traces of his long imprisonment, discussed with me at length, across the massive oak table in his office, the evidence which led the jury to give its well-known verdict, charging the British Premier and the Viceroy of Ireland with responsibility for the assassination of his predecessor. There is not the slightest evidence to justify this latter hypothesis; but the charges against the police themselves appear only too well founded. Their officers have had a hard time in Cork, which is the stronghold of Sinn Fein. Countless flags and hundreds of inscriptions defiantly glorify the republic. Actual attacks upon the police occurred shortly before the Lord Mayor was assassinated. From the psychological standpoint, it is not difficult to understand how reaction might assume such a frightful guise. In any case, every man in South Ireland is to-day convinced that the police were guilty, and city officials take care that their citizens shall not forget this is the case. Even the desk of the young

In truth, both sides are employing terror, and the outer world hears only of its extreme incidents. Naturally each party accuses the other of starting this policy. During the last six months the situation has reached a climax. Something like fifty police officers have been shot. Several civilians have been assassinated by Sinn Fein supporters, presumably for being Sinn Fein 'traitors.' No one can say how far the Sinn Fein leaders themselves are responsible for these deeds. Their followers appeal to the right of national defense against a 'foreign army of occupation.' Every little child in the streets thus designates the British troops. They assert that the murdered police officers were either personally guilty of serious offences and had been warned beforehand to leave the country, or that they fell in battle because

Lord Mayor, which was ornamented with an Irish coat of arms and Celtic inscriptions, was draped in black.

The disorders and murders which are unjustly attributed to Sinn Fein are a warning of what must inevitably occur if the present situation is allowed to continue a few months longer. Public authority will cease, and no improvised government can take its place. Already the moral standards of the nation would have been irretrievably corrupted, if the solid, respectable integrity of the peasantry had not stood in the way of anarchy. The government at Dublin Castle is by no means guiltless here. It has been seized with panic, has withdrawn the police from wide tracts of territory, and has left the people to defend themselves. The latter have naturally given their obedience to Sinn Fein; it was their only choice.

[L'Europe Nouvelle (Foreign Affairs Nationalist Weekly), June 13] GREECE AND THE NEAR EAST

BY CHARLES VELLAY

ATHENS, May 1920.

GREECE emerges from the peace negotiations practically a new state, whose influence promises to be preponderant not only in the Aegean Sea, which henceforth will be bounded by Greek territory for practically its whole circumference, but throughout the whole Levant from the Caucasus to Suez. It owes its rise in the world to other things than to its territorial accessions, though these are large. The fact that Greece is to-day the representative of the allied powers in this quarter of the world or, if one prefers, Great Britain's agent there is no longer a secret. We may dislike, fear, distrust this situation, but it is a fact, and we must deal with facts.

Much might be written on the incidents and influences which have determined the foreign policy of Greece during the last three years. Let us merely say that in becoming an ally of Greece, as England has done with a practical certainty of deriving great advantage from this relation, our British ally has taken a position which would naturally have fallen to France. Indeed, Mr. Venezelos tried for a long period to follow a common path with France. Surrounded by enemies, bounded by new frontiers of unusual vulnerability, requiring a long period of peace in order to reorganize its economic resources, Greece was compelled to seek the support of some great power. The prominent part taken by France in the Saloniki expedition and in the dethronement of King Constantine, the deep sympathy for that country which prevailed in Greece, the current use of the French language, and the preponderating influence of our literature, all seem to indicate, when the war terminated, that we were destined to be the partners of the Greeks in ruling the eastern Mediterranean.

How is it that our French diplomats have succeeded in destroying all these advantages? Their blunders have been so numerous and so serious that the consequences can not now be repaired. Of course they might have been avoided if the place which France disdained to occupy had remained vacant. But with a skill and foresight and resolution which deserve admiration, the English, by a series of bold measures, showed the great value they attached to the friendship of Greece. They won and consolidated a position which they evidently will not relinquish to any other power. The more France urged a reduction of the territories of Turkey granted to Greece, the more vigorously Great Britain

defended the latter's claims. By winning the case for Greece, that government won a prestige and popularity in the latter land which is already resulting in valuable economic benefits. So shrewd have been the diplomatic manœuvres of the British that we now witness the following curious spectacle: England, still holding Cyprus, a strictly Greek territory, wins the devotion, enthusiasm and friendship of the Greeks, while France, which does not possess an inch of Greek territory, and has nothing which the Greeks might wish, sees that nation turn its back on her and consider her, if not an enemy, at least an unreliable friend.

In outward appearances the coöperation between England and Greece looks only to the control of Constantinople, policing the straits, and watching over Ottoman affairs in a general way. But large as this order is, it is only part of the task which Greece must accomplish before its future is assured. That country must adjust its relations with the other Mediterranean powers, and in particular with Italy. It must stand on the defensive toward its Balkan neighbors. It must meet the Russian problem, which is bound up with the whole Slav question and threatens to dominate increasingly the politics and destinies of the whole eastern world.

At the present moment the relations between Italy and Greece, if not cordial, at least are courteous. Venezelos has made a very important concession to Italy by renouncing in its favor the rich valley of the Meander and an important port in the gulf of Ephesus. In return Greece has obtained the support of Italy in the Supreme Council for its claims in Thrace, and will probably likewise get back the Dodecanese Islands. However, this friendship goes no deeper

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than the surface; the interests of the two countries are too divergent to permit sincere good will. Even the return of the Dodecanese Islands will have but a relative value, since Italy intends to retain Rhodes, which in respect to wealth and population is more important than all the rest of the group. Now as long as a Greek island, like Rhodes, remains separate from its mother country, and the question of the Southern Sporades remains open, there will be ground for continued distrust and controversy between Italy and Greece. Furthermore, in Asia Minor, Italy, instead of coöperating with its neighbor, is doing exactly the reverse. By improving its new port, Scala Nova in the Gulf of Ephesus, it is creating a rival for the Greek city of Smyrna. Italians have also ensconced themselves in the Gulf of Adramyte, where they menace Greece from another direction. Furthermore, placing the Anatolian hinterland under Italian protection gives that country control of the territories upon which Smyrna depends for its prosperity. Consequently, the future relations of the two countries in Asia are far from promising, and the day will probably come when Greece will need the powerful buckler of Great Britain to protect it from Italian aggression.

Bulgaria is another black point on the horizon. We know that Mr. Stamboulisky had tried to reach an agreement with Greece; but on a basis which the latter government could not consider. He wished Greece to leave western Thrace to Bulgaria, thus renouncing its control of western Thrace. Disappointed in this, and likewise defeated in making Thrace an autonomous state, which Bulgaria might have absorbed later as it did eastern Roumelia, Bulgaria is now seeking closer relations with the other Balkan powers. If it assures itself of the