our existence; and society. I shall, therefore, divide my discussion of the duties of men into three branches; which will form the three remaining Parts of this work. One Part will contain an investigation of the Private Duties of Men; in another Part, I shall consider the subject of Religion; and, in the last Part, I shall endeavour to state the Public Duties of Men as Members of Society.

Our private duties consist of the various efforts which it is in our power to make for our own improvement as individuals.

A man, as an individual, may improve his mind in two ways; first, by speculation, or the acquisition of knowledge; and, secondly, by action or business.

Men are chiefly induced to engage both in speculation and in action by their appetites, passions, and affections; that is, by the pleasure they receive from certain objects, and the pain they derive from others.

In stating our duty to ourselves as individuals, I shall consider, first, those exertions of the mind by which its speculative powers are most successfully improved, or by which its discernment of truth is best promoted; and, secondly, I shall consider the more remarkable appetites, passions, and affections which excite our nature to activity, and consequently to improve

ment.

PART II.

OF THE PRIVATE DUTIES OF MEN.

CHAP. I.

OF THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND ITS SUBOR

DINATE FACULTIES.

It has been usual with metaphysicians, or those who attempt to investigate the qualities of intelligent beings, to consider the human mind as a very complex organ. They represent it as possessed of various faculties, altogether distinct from each other. Thus they consider the understanding, or judgment, as one faculty; the imagination as a different faculty; the powers of taste, for what is beautiful, of moral perception, and of abstraction, as altogether distinct faculties in themselves, and as implanted by nature for different purposes.

Hence a variety of abstruse questions have arisen, which have long perplexed this class of philosophers. It has been said, for example, that the

understanding is given us for the investigation of general truth; but that our moral faculty is bestowed for the discovery of that quality in actions in consequence of which they are called right or wrong. Hence it has been accounted a matter of great doubt whether any human actions are truly right or wrong in themselves, seeing they are not discovered to be so by the understanding, which is the faculty appropriated to the investigation of truth; and it has been sometimes supposed, that actions only appear to us to be right or wrong, in consequence of the peculiar faculty or taste which the Author of nature has thought fit to implant in our constitution during our present existence.

In the same manner, it has been made a question, whether there is in truth any such thing as beauty or deformity in the universe? or whether certain objects only seem beautiful or deformed to us, in consequence of the particular taste with which we have been formed?

As. I do not wish to bewilder myself or others by entering unnecessarily into the misty regions of metaphysical controversy, I shall rest satisfied with merely stating what I regard as the actual constitution of the human mind, so far as a statement of that constitution may appear necessary to the explanation of the duties of life; but I shall avoid attempting either an elaborate refutation of the opinions of others, or

even an anxious defence of my own sentiIf the notions which I have adopted

ments.

are erroneous, they cannot be too soon refuted; whereas, if they are well founded, they will ultimately support themselves; and the candid consideration of them would be equally injured by the favourable or the hostile prejudice which an attempt to aid them by eloquence, or by acute disputation, might excite.

We do not know, and perhaps we do not pos sess, any means of discovering what that substance is which we call mind or intellect; neither are we acquainted with the substance.or essence of any object in nature. We can only observe the changes that occur within or around us, and describe the appearance or qualities of things. In speaking of the human mind, therefore, I mean to say nothing of its physical constitution, or of the unknown energy or substance that produces those exertions or powers which form its most remarkable qualities. I shall merely attempt to give a correct enumeration and arrangement of these qualities or powers.

The human mind consists of three powers or faculties; Sensation, Memory, and Understanding. The powers of sensation and memory are of a secondary nature, and subordinate to the understanding; or, rather, the understanding alone ought to be regarded as the mind or intellect; memory and sense being merely or

gans with which it is furnished for the acquisition of knowledge, and the exertion of itspowers in its present state.

1st, The senses are of two kinds. By one class of sensations we acquire knowledge; and by another class of sensations we are stimulated to activity.

The senses which are subservient to the acquisition of speculative knowledge are five; touch, taste, hearing, seeing, and smelling.

The senses which incite us to exertion are chiefly three; hunger, thirst, and lust. They usually receive the appellation of appetites, in consequence of the tendency which they have to urge the mind to make efforts for their gratification.

2d, Memory is another organ or subordinate faculty that assists the understanding in the acquisition of knowledge. It is of two kinds; involuntary and voluntary. This last is usually called Recollection. The two kinds of memory ought to be carefully discriminated. It is only of involuntary memory that I mean to take notice at present.

To understand correctly what is meant by the subordinate organ or faculty in our constitution, called involuntary memory, let a man sit down for a few moments in a silent and solitary place, and attempt to exclude all thought from his mind; he will speedily find that, in