the philosophers themselves. Supposing that every word which bears the form of a name or substantive noun must represent a particular object, it became a very puzzling question, What particular object we speak of when we use such words as a tree, goodness, motion? or what idea is present to the mind when we think of a tree or of goodness in general, and not of any particular tree, or particular example of goodness?

The Platonists supposed that there are certain uncreated essences of things, which existed from all eternity in the Divine Mind; and that these essences are the objects of thought, or the things signified by general terms.

The followers of Aristotle believed the existence of something like the Platonic essences, which they called substantial forms; which they said are continually flying off from all bodies, and which form the objects of thought when we use general expressions.

At last, during the dark ages, there arose a new sect of philosophers, led by Peter Abelard, whose misfortunes have been rendered interesting by the talents of Mr Pope. The followers of this new sect asserted, that when we think of a general term, we think only of the term or word itself. They were called NOMINALISTS, in opposition to the followers of Aristotle and Plato, who were called REALISTS. The nomina

lists were nearly in the right; for when we think of the number nine, in general, without thinking of any set of objects in particular, it is obvious that we do not think of any object that exists in Nature, but merely of a word which may be used to avoid a tedious enumeration of particulars. If at any time we proceed farther than this, it is only to recollect some of the particular objects that we suppose the speaker to include under the general term, that we may be the more certain of his meaning. Thus when a tree in general is spoken of, without reference to any particular tree, we satisfy ourselves with calling into the memory an indistinct image of a trunk and branches.

To this day, however, the nature of language is by no means well understood. And hence we find the writings of metaphysicians filled with discussions about time, space, and eternity; as if they were objects which actually exist, and not merely general terms intended to represent trains of perception or of thought in the human mind. The mathematicians also, who usually pay little attention to the operations of intellect, and have little knowledge of them, are still disputing about the definition of points, and lines, and surfaces; as if they were objects actually existing, and capable of being defined, or specially marked out and distinguished from other particular objects. Thus they define a

point to be that which hath no parts or no magnitude; or, in other words, they define it to be nothing at all. Indeed their point is nothing at all. A point or puncture is no doubt something, when made with a needle on the skin, or with a pen upon paper; but the mathematical point, or the general term, is merely the verb to point or puncture under the disguise of a substantive noun, in the same manner that the werb to move is converted into motion, or to exert into exertion. The only explanation that can be given of such words, consists, not of defining or describing their objects (for they are not the names of real objects), but of exhibiting particular instances of punctuation, exertion, or motion, to which they may at pleasure be applied; just as we explain the word sour by presenting a sour object, or the word five by exhibiting so many individual objects, and by declaring that this word applies to all similar classifications or quantities.

Much of what is called argument is often nothing more than an explanation of words: Thus, to prove that temperance is a virtue, we may say that virtue consists of intelligence and self-command: But temperance is an exertion of self-command; therefore temperance is a virtue. Here the conclusion is contained under the first proposition or expression; and the

argument is nothing more than a statement of one of the particular facts contained under it.

I shall here quit the subject of language; because I wish to discuss it no farther than is necessary to point out the importance of the study of it to the improvement of the human mind. Endless literary disputes have arisen from the want of a correct knowledge of the meaning of the words which the disputants employed, and from their consequent misunderstanding of each other. Systems of superstition have arisen out of mistakes concerning the nature of words. Truth and falsehood have been confounded, and the affairs of life rendered difficult and intricate, from inattention to their precise import. Hence it becomes, in some measure, every man's duty, as he wishes either to give or to receive improvement, to endeavour to understand clearly, and to use correctly, this great organ of social communication.

APPENDIX TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTER.

OF THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES OF THE
INFERIOR ANIMALS.

WHEN discussing the subject of language, the question naturally suggested itself, how it comes to pass that none of the inferior animals possess the power of speech? On pausing to consider the proper answer to this question, it occurred, that it would afford no bad test whereby to discover whether I had been giving a correct account of the human faculties; because if I had given a complete, and at the same time a well discriminated, detail of the intellectual powers of man, I ought to find no difficulty in explaining, with precision, wherein the intellectual inferiority of the other animals consists, or in pointing out the particular powers by the want of which they are disqualified from acquiring the use of language, and from engaging in a eareer of improvement.