too short to admit of that efficiency which a man called upon to serve in these times of practised gunnery should possess, and which would be still further decreased by the system of broken periods. It is supposed that twenty-eight days will be as much time as could conveniently be exacted from a merchant-seaman, without great detriment to his interests; but it is also supposed that every seaman is on shore and out of employ for about three months in the year. Why not, then, give him the option of serving that time, or any portion of it, in a training-ship or man-of war? Many, instead of sloping and loafing about the seaports, casting about for a meal or a bed, would be glad of such a provision and maintenance, and would be rendering themselves more efficient members of the Reserve. Allowing, however, that the required numbers are raised-that the organisation is made, and the whole system brought into fair working order-we have still to ask how those men, or how many of them, will be available at a sudden summons? How many of the 30,000 would be forthcoming, or could be depended on at any instant? The obligation that each volunteer should report himself every six months, insures his not being long absent; but it would be entirely a matter of accident whether he would be present when required. It might be that, when the need arose, two-thirds of the force would be in the home ports, or it might also happen that the same proportion would be absent; at any rate, it could never be fairly calculated that more than one-half would be available. Even thus we believe that we overstate the actual dependence. However, even with these objections, it is the best plan for a volunteer force yet enacted; it will at any rate give us some hold on the merchant seamen, and, by familiarising them with the navy, will no doubt popularise that service, and open a wide field for recruitment; and as it is only the last reserve, we may accept it as a worthy addition to the national defences. The Commission further provided for the future main tenance of this force, and their recommendation was one which would have given it a certain permanency. They thought that, though it must be first constituted of adults carefully selected from the merchant service, it must be supplied and fed by boys. They acknowledge, throughout, the principle, that every force which is to be permanent and reliable must have a certain feeding source; and they wisely recommend, in all instances, that this Source should consist of boys chosen, trained, and educated for the purpose. In this case they propose "that schoolships should be established in all the principal commercial ports, capable of accommodating from 100 to 200 boarders in each ship, 100 of whom should be supported by the State; that these boys should be carefully chosen ; and that they should receive not only instruction for the merchant service, but also certain instructions in gunnery; that the schools should be open to day scholars, children residing at the ports; and that, at the expiration of the training, a certain number (limited, however) should have the option of entering the Royal Navy, the remainder being taken as apprentices by the shipowners, who, in return for the education given, would be required to subscribe to a certain fund in favour of the boys thus received. It is thought that, at the close of the apprenticeship, the habits acquired, the inducements of pay, and promised pension, would draw the sailor at once into the body of volunteers." Why not make it compulsory, at any rate on those who receive their education and maintenance gratis from the State? would not be any severe exaction from the others in return for the advantages given, and would insure a certain feeding source. It This part of the plan, like the other, will have a great effect in cementing the union betwixt the two services, and in creating a kindly feeling which, after some years' working and trial, would no doubt popularise the naval service and annul the man-difficulty. The Commissioners, in closing their labours, arrive at the conclusion that, by the means proposed, there would be placed at the disposal of the country, inclusive of the standing and the volunteer force, a body of 60,000 men available for defence. These are, however, paper figures, and any calculation which based a dependence on much more than one-half that number, would be illusory and dangerous. It must be allowed, however, that this Report contains sound and valuable suggestions-has added to our knowledge of the service-has produced most profitable investigation-has already led to great and worthy improvements; but it shrinks from the only real alternative left us -a standing navy. as These plans and propositions are all good in themselves-good auxiliaries; but they are all uncertain, all dependent on casualties and circumstances; and the safety, the glory of England, cannot be trusted to ropes of sand. Suppose these propositions all carried out these plans successful-all productive of the promised result. An invasion is threatened; war is imminent. We have our Channel fleet, fully manned, of ten or twelve sail; and, according to the Comptroller of the Coast Guard, we could, from that force and the Naval Coast Volunteers, man ten or eleven more, making allowance for the boys and marines who would be sent to complete the crews. Thus we should have a fleet equal, but not more than equal, to going forth to meet the first burst of a war, and thus we have at once used up almost all our standing reserve; for the reserve of seamen would be nearly absorbed in manning the additional frigates and gunboats required, and a great proportion of the marines on shore would be also disposed of. Then what have we left? The volunteer force; but these could not of themselves be trusted to form a fleet; there must be a large nucleus left of trained men to effect their organisation. This would effect large reductions in the fleet, and the vacant places must be filled by incapables, or left void. Our standing reserves are not more than enoughnot enough to insure the country a fleet of twenty sail, inclusive of the Channel squadron, with the proper proportion of frigates and gunboats, to enter on the first onset, or meet the first attack. Do our naval annals tell us that we could trust to less? Supposing this first fleet started, we have to form the second. There is a certain number of reserve seamen, of Coast-Guard men, retained for the purpose; some short-service men join; the volunteers are scattered in all parts; they have to come from distant stations; in a week they may be assembled, and this amalgamated force is organised for the manning of this second fleet. This, however, cannot be done at once, and yet this is all we could depend upon, did the first fleet meet with a reverse or disaster. Were the Channel the scene of action, the reinforcement would be required in a day or two. Could it with the present resources and appliances be ready? England must have fuller and better assurance of defence than this. She should have a standing body of seamen, which would suffice at once, and on the instant, to increase the Channel fleet to the required strength, without drawing on a single reserve, and should also furnish a nucleus on which the reserves might form. Thus a powerful fleet might go forth at once to challenge the danger; a second, almost equally efficient, manned by the Coast-Guard, Coast Volunteers, and marines, would be ready immediately to reinforce; and there would remain the Volunteers, formed and organised as trained seamen, to constitute the third fleet, the last reserve, the last resource of naval might and naval defence. To trust the existence, the glory, the defence of England, to less than this, would be a national crime; and this security can only be attained by the constitution of a standing navy, which should not only suffice for a peace establishment, but be capable of supplying a force of seamen numerous and efficient enough to satisfy the nation that it held the power of an instant and powerful war-development. On what principles this standing navy should be constituted, we must discuss hereafter. INDEX TO VOL. LXXXVI. Absolute, the, Dr. Marsel on, 49 et seq. Alva, the Duke of, his character, &c., 703. Anazeh, sketches among the, 267 et seq., Angelico, Fra, the paintings of, 601. ANOTHER PLEASANT FRENCH BOok, 669. Arab horses, the, 268 et seq.-character, Arabs, sketches among the, 265 et seq. Armada, connection of the, with Queen Armstrong gun, the, 336, 337. Art, conflict between the schools of, 127 Aylesbury election petition, the, 368. Baptistery of Florence, the, 593. -character of the, 426. Bellievre, M., mission of, to Elizabeth on Bible, Mansel on the, 50 et seq. BRETON BALLADS - King Louis the Bribery, the election petitions against, Bright, Mr., arguments of, against the Brown, Dr. T., Sir W. Hamilton on 500. Camel, the, among the Arabs, 424. massacre of Glencoe, 16 et seq. Carnival, the, in Florence, 595. Castelnau, French ambassador to Scot- Catherine de Medici, notices of, 519, 523 et seq. Cavour, count, connection of, with the CHANGE OF MINISTRY, THE, WHAT NEXT? Charlemagne, the legendary history of, Charles IX. of France, proposed mar- CHINA, ON ALLIED OPERATIONS IN, 627. Clarendon, Lord, and the Italian ques- Cleland, colonel, his account of the Cockneyism, London and Parisian, 88. Combin, ascent of the, 463. Comparison, Sir W. Hamilton's views Compiègne, the meeting of Napoleon III. and Lord Palmerston at, 118. Cornwall, effect of intercourse with the Cowper, lieutenant, peculiarities of mur- Derby ministry, the overthrow of the, DREAM OF THE DEAD, A, 358. Druses, sketches of the, 431. Duncanson, major, and the massacre of Duomo of Florence, the, 592 et seq. Edgeworth, Miss, the novels of, 99. Egbert, subjugation of the Heptarchy Egmont, count, execution, &c., of, 706. ELECTION PETITIONS, THE, WHO DOES THE BRIBERY 363. Elections, gains of the Conservatives by Elgin, lord, the instructions to, in cution of Queen Mary, 525-proposed CRUSADER'S RETURN, THE—a Breton ENGLISH HISTORY, VAUGHAN'S REVOLU ballad, 488. Daily News, the, on the bribery con- Damascus, the approach to, and sketches Danes, the inroads, &c., of, in England, 544. Dargaud's Histoire de Marie Stuart, on, Dartmouth election petition, the, 368. TIONS IN, reviewed, 537. Englishman, associations of the, with English school of painting, the, 127. Europe, the mountain ranges of, 459. Farel, the reformer, in Geneva, 179. Fenêtre de Salena, passage of the, 460. Fevers, severity of, in Africa, 572. FLEETS AND NAVIES, PART II., ENGLAND, Fletschhorn, ascent of the, 467. FOREIGN AFFAIRS-THE DISARMAMENT, Foster, Mr., visit to Martinsloch, by, 468. Frank, Richard, his account of the High- et seq. et seq.. French literature, influence of positiv- Grant, Mrs., her account of Glencoe and Granvelle, the cardinal, character of, Grotte, M. de la, death of, in the Alps, 469. Guise, the duke of, his murder, 525- Guises, effects of the connection of Guizot on the cause of the decline of Guns, the various, for naval warfare, 336. Hamerton, colonel, consul at Zanzibar, 340. HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM, LECTURES ON sination of the Regent Murray by, 520. Hardwicke, archdeacon, death of, 470. Frenchman, the, his attachment to Paris, HAUNTERS AND THE HAUNTED, THE, OR 87. French school of painting, the, 138. Galway contract, Sir James Graham on Géant, Col du, ascent of, 362. Geneva, influence of Calvin, &c, in, 179, et seq. George I., character andinfluence of,212. Germany, policy of Napoleon III. to- Ghiberti, the Gates of, at the Baptistery of Florence, 590, 593. of Macaulay's account of it, 1 et seq- Gothic architecture, domestic, 478. THE HOUSE AND THE BRAIN, 224. Hengist and Horsa, Dr. Vaughan on, 542. Henry VIII. of England, Latimer be- Henry III. of France, conduct of, on the execution of Queen Mary, 525-mur- Highland clans, position, &c., of the, in 1715, 216-their tactics, &c., as sol- Highlands, Macaulay's aspersions on Hill, colonel, account of the High- Hinduism, the Brahm of, 53. Hope, admiral, at the Peiho, 653 et seq. |