development; after Waterloo large reductions were made, but "the peace establishment after, has assumed a far larger proportion than the peace establishment before, that event."

The contract of engagement of the soldier in these armies was for life, but this was very frequently modified when the army had to be augmented. Under Queen Anne a three years' term was general; in the special circumstances of 1745 men were enlisted for two years; and in 1759 and 1775 the term was three years or till the end of the war.

Repeated attempts were made in Parliament to give greater permanence to the system of enlistment for short periods, but in vain.2

During the Seven Years' war the militia was remodelled by Lord Chatham, the principle of the ballot and of a three years' service being adopted. This event had an important influence on the subsequent history of the standing army, to which the militia was destined from an early period to become an effective feeder.

It seems that so far back as 1752 the example of Prussia was held up to us for imitation. Mr. Thornton, when introducing the Militia Bill in that year promised that

"when this plan, limited as it is, shall take place we shall become a warlike and formidable nation; by such a plan Prussia.. has acquired a weight and influence which renders her superior to states with a larger extent of country and inhabitants," and he went on to show the advantage we should have "whenever we pursue our own interest with equal sagacity and diligence. Hitherto a policy not to be comprehended by every understanding had been preferred of paying large subsidies for foreign assistance rather than the obtaining a natural force of our own men.'

113

The commencement of the long struggle of war with France, lasting from 1793 to 1815, found the standing army modified in its constitution and government by Burke's Act of 1783, before referred to. The regiments had ceased to manage their financial affairs and recruiting; the War Office establishment had increased under the direction of a parliamentary Secretary at War; and the duties of Commander

Clode, vol. i., p. 274.

3 Parliamentary History, pp. 25, 27.

2 Ibid., vol, ii., chap. xv.

C

in-Chief were assigned to a general officer, Lord Amherst,1 whereby a larger measure of continuity was given to the government and discipline of the army.2

In 1792 the regular army (including India) numbered over 57,000 men, but the demand for more men rapidly became imperative. The militia was embodied, it was enrolled by ballot, and substitutes were allowed who were highly paid; the effect of this was to raise the cost of recruiting for the regular army, as every intending recruit was disposed to give his services to the militia; but if he passed thence to the regular army he was adjudged guilty of desertion.

Under these circumstances special Acts were passed permitting enlistment into the army from the militia and pardoning those who had already so enlisted. In 1799, there were as many as 15,000 who thus volunteered to the regular army; the standard was 5 feet 4 inches, the bounty ten guineas, the area of service was limited to Europe, and the term of enlistment was for five years or during the continuance of the war. Thus the bounty on entering the regular army was kept within some sort of limits.*

The ballot has been called the parent of high bounties, but it is well to remember that it is not the ballot itself but the mode of applying it that was to blame in a system which allowed a purchased substitute to give his services in lieu of those of the man chosen. At a later period, 1808, when the local militia was raised, ballot without the privilege of substitute became the rule, and at the same time men were enlisted who came forward voluntarily for a small bounty. It was found that the great majority were enlisted

1 To be shortly after (in 1795) succeeded by H.R.H. the Duke of York, who held the post till 1814, receiving the thanks of Parliament for his services in this office.

2 It was at this period--viz., in 1788, that the "Principles of military movements, illustrated by manoeuvres of the Prussian troops and by the British campaign in Germany in 1757," were published by Colonel Dundas, in consequence "of the want of uniformity and method long felt and to which a remedy was earnestly and universally desired." The system of manoeuvring then inculcated was that adopted during the long wars which so shortly after ensued.

3 Clode, vol. i., p. 289.

4 Ibid., pp. 285, 286.

in this way,' and the reduction of the bounty in 1809 from two guineas to one is evidence that the force was easily raised, The substitute system had operated in quite another manner. In 1803-4 out of 45,492 men raised for the militia by the operation of the ballot, no less than 40,998 were substitutes, and there was a waste by desertion and death of 8,106 men.

The policy of Mr. Pitt was to make the militia a regular feeder for the army. In 1805 each regiment of the line that X was to receive recruits had a regiment of militia attached to it, and, under certain restrictions as to numbers, volunteers from the militia were systematically passed into the army. A grant of bounty and a slightly higher pay operated as inducements for men to volunteer, and the numbers obtained were considerable, eg., 27,000 men in twelve months, 1807-8.

But, in describing the development of the connection of the militia with the standing army, the course of events has been somewhat anticipated.

With the rupture of the peace which succeeded the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, and the establishment of Napoleon's camp at Boulogne, there commenced a long period, from 1803 to 1805, of imminent danger of invasion.

At this time the military force of the United Kingdom, abroad and at home, consisted of 150,950 men, of whom 98,314 belonged to the regular army and the remainder to the militia. The regular infantry at home numbered only 39,370 men. "This force was so infinitely disproportional to the effective resistance of the formidable army expected to be brought against us, that Government felt it their duty to increase it by every means the country afforded."2 Numerous measures for the increase of the defensive forces of the country at large were passed, notably, as regards the standing army, Mr. Pitt's "Additional Forces Act," which established the principle of second or reserve

1 32,811 by ballot and 151,148 otherwise (Col. Stanley's Militia Committee, 1876, p. 557). 2 Sir J. W. Gordon's "Military Transactions," p. 1.

battalions to regiments abroad and with a county connection,1

Now that the peril of invasion was brought home to the minds of the inhabitants of this country, the patriotism of her citizens was aroused and very strong volunteer corps were speedily raised.

Springing from a crude organization of early date and on the authority of Acts passed in 1802, a force of volunteers, shown in the estimates of 1803-4 as of 463,000 men, was raised for local (not as in recent times, 1859, for general) service.

The numbers seem to have been thought excessive, all the more so as they were ill distributed, and although in theory the volunteers were drawn from a higher class than that ordinarily furnishing recruits to the army, it was felt that too many men were locked up in the volunteer corps to the detriment of the general recruiting. As was satirically said by Mr. Windham of the Prime Minister, Addington, "the Right Honourable gentleman has not only not provided an army, but has rendered it impossible that an army should be provided." Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that whatever its immediate effects on recruiting, this great and vigorous national movement did much to stimulate the warlike spirit of the country, and its power of endurance; and indirectly (if not directly) led to the maintenance of that army and navy whose exertions for the succeeding twelve years made Napoleon regard Great Britain as the most formidable and persistent of his foes.

With the advent of the Peninsular war, following on prolonged efforts in other quarters of the globe, the strain on the army proper increased. In the years 1805, 1807, and 1809, from returns taken about the 1st of June in each year,

1 For summary of Acts of this period, see Col. Stanley's "Militia Committee," 1876, p. 530, et seq. and Sir J. W. Gordon's "Military Transactions," supt.

Clode, vol. i., pp. 314, 316.

our forces, exclusive of volunteers, stood, in round numbers, thus:-1

In this latter year, 1809, the population of the United Kingdom being X 14,942,646, the total strength of the British forces was 821,650 including seamen and marines,2 viz :

Infantry

and Cavalry Regulars and Militia 285,398

Local Militia

Volunteers Ireland

Marines

Seamen

198,534

Great Britain

114,066

Artillery and Engineers

H.E.I.Co's. European troops

Reckoning regulars, general militia, and seamen alone, this gives a percentage of 2.9 men with respect to the population.

In the previous year, 1808, an important and comprehensive measure, interesting for what it failed to achieve, as well as for its degree of success, had been introduced by Lord Castlereagh. This was the Bill for the so-called "Local Militia," to be raised by ballot without substitute, as the reserve force for the country, an institution by means of which a large proportion of the male population should be

1 "Military Transactions," supt., pp. 13, 16, 18, 3 See chap. xxii. and ante p. 18.

2 Ibid., p. 19.