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CHAPTER IX.

MOUNTED INFANTRY.

FROM the days of Alexander to those of Napoleon the creation of a force of infantry-possessing the steadiness, the solidity, and the weapons of the highly trained foot soldier— yet capable of making rapid marches, has been the ambition of every great commander. No victory can be made complete, no advance secured, no retreat effectively protected without the co-operation of infantry. The power and effect of cavalry acting alone has in all ages been found to be evanescent without the co-operation of infantry to enable them to reap the reward of victory or to save the defeated from total rout. The real difficulty has always been to obtain an infantry which shall have the requisite power of locomotion, and some of the mobility of cavalry, without loss to its value as infantry.

In the endeavour to overcome this difficulty the great leaders of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries created the dragoon force, which, distinct from "horse" and "foot," was intended to combine the shock tactics of the one with the fire power of the other. This system, followed by Napoleon at the commencement of the present century, shared the fate of the previous, and of later, attempts in the same direction, and the dragoon regiments, permanently constituted, became cavalry pure and simple, merging their value as " foot" in the more dashing and attractive rôle of "horse."

The experience of recent years, in our varied and trying campaigns in all parts of the globe, has shown that a mobile and rapidly moving infantry in the field is, for us, a grave necessity. The efforts of an infantry equipped and trained upon the European model, are paralyzed in

the face of an active native enemy operating on the interminable sands of Egypt or the Sudan, the monotonous rolling grass plains of South Africa, or the sultry forests and swamps of Burma. European soldiers on foot alone cannot contend against such an enemy when it is a question of guarding from surprise, of making a rapid advance, or of completing a victory. Necessity has therefore compelled each of our commanders in turn to improvise on the spot as best he could some species of extra mobile infantry, mounted upon ponies, horses, camels, or other animals suited to the climate and country.

The importance of a rapidly moving mounted force, equipped and armed as infantry, had been overlooked, in spite of the experiences in the Napoleonic wars, until the commencement of the War of Secession in America. The Americans, having no repressive military traditions to hamper them, evolved the organization and employment of a mounted force, which, suited to the physical characteristics of the country, combined the action of a rapidly moving infantry with the utmost mobility of cavalry. It may fairly be said that the early successes of the Southern armies were due to the excellence of their horsemen, and on the other hand that the collapse of the Confederate army under General Lee and its surrender at Appommatox court house was mainly due to the enterprise, vigour, and power of the northern mounted troops.

Reading aright the lessons of the American war, leading military opinions in this country have long acknowledged the importance of this new departure on the part of the Americans, and have recognized that while modern cavalry must be trained to act on foot if required, effective fire action can never be expected from cavalry trained as such. Our own regulations do not contemplate that cavalry should attempt to carry on a long continued fight with firearms. Dismounted cavalry can never be expected to compete on equal terms with infantry unless the present system of training and equipment of the cavalry is radically changed, to the probable detriment of its efficiency as cavalry.

Amongst European nations the Russians alone have followed the American lead, as regards cavalry equipment and tactics. While the British cavalry has held to the training and tactics common to all the great European powers, Russia excepted, a small proportion of the infantry of the line has been so organized and trained that, while capable of great expansion in numbers, it can be supplied with the extra means of locomotion necessary to enable it to cooperate with the cavalry-thus giving to a cavalry force the advantage of the additional fire power which brought such success and renown to the American cavalry leaders in 1862-65.

Our existing system, which will be more fully explained hereafter, besides providing a force of infantry capable of co-operating with cavalry, gives to each infantry battalion a small nucleus of picked men who can, if required, act with it as scouts or orderlies, mounted or otherwise provided with the requisite means of locomotion.

The following are the objects in view in the introduction of mounted infantry as an accepted, though not a permanently embodied portion of the British army.1

1.-To provide a force of infantry which shall be capable

of co-operating with cavalry and horse artillery when required.

2. To provide as many infantry battalions as possible with a nucleus of selected officers and men trained to act as rapidly moving infantry, for service on colonial expeditions, campaigns in uncivilized countries, or otherwise.

Experience warns us against setting up a permanently organized body of mounted infantry. If provided with horses, the time occupied in their care and manipulation prevents the proper training of the men in their infantry duties, for the careful performance of which alone they exist. It is moreover found that sufficient knowledge of riding and

See the official Regulations and Field Service Manual for Mounted Infantry, 1889.

horse management can be gained in a comparatively short period of training without incurring the unnecessary expense of a permanently mounted force. Infantry soldiers who are permanently associated with horses must in the ordinary course of nature speedily lose their identity as simple foot soldiers.

British infantry have repeatedly been employed as mounted infantry during the present century. The Camel Corps organised by Sir Charles Napier, from infantry detachments, took a leading part in the conquest of Scinde. A similarly organized force under Sir John Ross performed equally splendid work during the Indian Mutiny, while a small body of infantry mounted on ponies, organized and commanded by Captain Havelock (now General Sir Henry Havelock-Allan) finally dispersed in a few days the mutineers in the Shahabad district, who had successfully defied the efforts of a large body of infantry and cavalry for many weeks. In South Africa, mounted infantry played a conspicuous part during the war operations of 1878-79-81. In Egypt, during the campaigns of 1882, 1884, 1885, and more recently in Burma, mounted infantry provided either with horses, small ponies, or camels, have borne no inconsiderable part in the achievement of success in the field.

It was not until February, 1888, that the necessity of training infantry during peace as mounted infantry upon a recognized system was officially acknowledged. Directions were then issued for the organization and training of a limited number of companies of mounted infantry, composed of detachments from different infantry regiments serving in the United Kingdom, and an organization suitable to the given conditions was drawn up by Major (now Colonel) Hutton, to whom the conduct of the system thus initiated was given. A force of mounted infantry thus organized would be available for whatever means of locomotion the necessities of the campaign, or the physical characteristics of the country, might render most desirable. It was considered that men trained to ride horses and to horse management would be readily suited to the care and manipulation of mules, camels, waggons, carts, or cycles. It was moreover obvious that for colonial expeditions or campaigns, horses or ponies would be the most probable, as well as the most suitable, means of conveyance. The training of all detachments selected for mounted infantry has therefore been

hitherto conducted upon horses or cobs, and, to save expense in the initial experiments, the training was at first conducted during the winter months only, upon a small number of horses lent by several cavalry regiments during the furlough season, when they could be most easily spared without interfering with the cavalry training. The organization and training thus begun, proved so successful that it was eventually decided in 1891 to persevere with it and to provide a limited number of specially-purchased cobs for the purpose, and thus gradually to make the mounted infantry independent of any assistance on the part of the cavalry in regard to horses.

In this manner, by degrees, a system of organization has been built up at Aldershot, which, with little expense and without adding to the existing cadres of the army, provides the companies of mounted infantry required either for a foreign expedition or for home defence. The whole campaigning equipment necessary for eight companies is kept in the army corps stores at that station, and the whole of the horses necessary upon a national emergency, have been duly registered by the remount department. Effective machine guns have yet to be supplied and a system of instruction in their use has still to be arranged. The following is the system of organization and training to which reference has been made and which is now laid down for mounted infantry in all parts of the Empire :

A small but complete detachment of one officer and 32 non-commissioned officers and men, is furnished from each of certain selected infantry battalions. Each detachment thus composed, forms one-fourth of a company and is so organized that it can be used, either independently as a small unit in itself, or, in conjunction with three other detachments, as a complete company.

A sample of the company organization is given below.1

See also the Regulations for Mounted Infantry, 1st January, 1889.