peror Alexander had hastened to Moscow, to accelerate by his presence the armaments in the interior of the empire. By an edict dated from the camp of Drissa, the 12th July, he had already ordered a new levy of one in one hundred in the provinces nearest to the seat of war; but this supply not being deemed sufficient, a proclamation, couched in the most energetic language, was addressed a few days afterwards from Polotsk to the inhabitants of Moscow :-"Never," said he, "was danger more urgent. The national religion, the throne, the state, can be preserved only by the greatest sacrifices. May the hearts of our illustrious nobles and people be filled with the spirit of true valour; and may God bless the righteous cause! May this holy spirit, emanating from Moscow, spread to the extremities of the empire! May the destruction with which we are menaced recoil upon the head of the invader, and may Europe, freed from the yoke of servitude, have cause to bless the name of Russia!" 28. A similar address was on the 18th published to the whole Russian people: "The enemy has crossed our frontiers, and penetrated into the interior of Russia. Unable by treachery to overturn an empire which has grown with the growth of ages, he now endeavours to overturn it with the accumulated forces of Europe. Perfidy in his heart, honour on his lips, he seeks to seduce the credulous ears, and enchain the manly arms; and if the captive hardly perceives at first his chains under the flowers in which they are hid, tyranny ere long discloses itself in all its odious colours. But Russia has penetrated his views! The path of duty lies before her; she has invoked the protection of the Most High. She opposes to the machinations of the enemy an army undaunted in courage, which burns with the desire to chase the enemy from its country; to destroy those locusts who appear to overload the earth, but whom the earth will reject from its bosom and deny even the rites of sepulture. We demand forces proportioned to such an object; and that object is, the destruction of a tyrant who oppresses the universe. Great as is the valour of our troops, they have need of reinforcements in the interior to sustain their efforts. We have called on our ancient metropolis of Moscow to give the first example of this heroic devotion. We address the same appeal to all our subjects in Europe or Asia, and to all communities and religions. We invite all classes to a general armament, in order to co-operate with ourselves against the designs of the enemy. Let him find at every step the faithful sons of Russia ready to combat all his forces, and deaf to all his seductions; despising his fraud, trampling under foot his gold, paralysing by the heroism of true valour all the efforts of his legions of slaves. In every noble may he find a Posankoi, in every ecclesiastic a Palistyn, in every citizen a Menin.* Illustrious nobles! in every age you have been the saviours of your country; holy clergy! by your prayers you have always invoked the Divine blessing on the arms of Russia; people! worthy descendants of the brave Sclavonians, often have you broken the jaws of the lions which were open to devour you! Unite then, with the cross in your hearts and the sword in your hands, and no human power shall prevail against you." 29. While the minds of all ranks were in the highest state of excitement from these proclamations, and a sense of the crisis which awaited their country, the Emperor arrived in Moscow from the army. On the 27th July the nobles and the merchants were invited to a solemn assembly at the imperial palace. Count Rostopchin, the governor of Moscow, then read the Emperor's address, and invited all the nobles to contribute to the defence of their country. A levy of ten in one hundred of the male population was immediately proposed and unanimously adopted; and they further agreed to clothe and arm them at their own expense. It was calculated that if the other parts of the empire followed this example, which they immediately did, it would produce five hundred thousand warriors. Nor did the assembly of mer* Patriots celebrated in Russian history. chants evince less zeal in the public service: a contribution proportioned to the capital of each was instantly agreed to; a voluntary additional subscription was further opened, and in less than an hour the sum subscribed exceeded £180,000. While all hearts were touched by these splendid efforts, the Emperor appeared in the assembly, and after openly explaining the dangers of the state, declared, amidst a transport of general enthusiasm, that he would exhaust his last resources before giving up the contest. "The disasters," said he, "with which you are menaced, should be considered as the means necessary to complete the ruin of the enemy." History affords few examples of so generous a confidence on the part of the sovereign, and such devoted patriotism on the part of his subjects. By these means a powerful auxiliary force was created in the interior, destined to fill up the chasm in the regular army. The example of Moscow was speedily followed by the other cities and provinces in the centre of the empire; and the patriotic levies thus formed powerfully contributed to the final success of the campaign. Having taken these energetic measures, the Emperor set out for St Petersburg, where he arrived on the 15th August; and, by an edict published on the 16th, an additional levy was ordered in all the provinces not actually the seat of war. 30. These proclamations, and some rumours of the extensive preparations going forward in the interior, speedily reached the French headquarters, where they excited no small astonishment. The religious strain of the addresses especially, and the repeated appeals to the protection of Heaven, were the subject of unbounded ridicule among the gay and thoughtless officers of the grand army. Not so, however, with Napoleon. He received with equal surprise, but very different feelings from those of contempt, the report of these energetic efforts to give a devotional character to the contest. Again and again he caused the proclamations, and the still more impassioned addresses of the metropolitan Archbishop of Moscow to the clergy of the empire, to be read to him; and long did he muse on their contents. "What," said he, "can have wrought such a change in the Emperor Alexander? Whence has sprung all this venom which he has infused into the quarrel? Now there is nothing but the force of arms which can terminate the contest: war alone can put a period to war. It was to avoid such a necessity that I was so careful, at the outset of the contest, not to implicate myself by any declarations in favour of the re-establishment of Poland; now I see my moderation was a fault." 31. While the centre of the French army thus advanced to Witepsk, and Barclay retired to Smolensko, Count WITTGENSTEIN,* with twenty-five thousand men, was detached from the army of the latter, in order to retain a position upon the Dwina, and cover the road to St Petersburg. Oudinot was opposed to him by Napoleon; and he occupied Polotsk with twenty-seven thousand excellent soldiers. On the 30th July he advanced against the Russian general, and a severe action ensued on the following day. The Russian vanguard, under Kutusoff, in the first instance imprudently crossed the Drissa, and was driven back with the loss of a thousand men; but the French under Verdier, hurried on by the eagerness of the pursuit, committed the same fault, and brought on a general action, in which the Russians, after a long and bloody struggle, were victorious. Oudinot, weakened by the loss of four thousand men, retired across the Drissa, and took * Wittgenstein was at this period forty years of age, having been born in 1772. A German by birth, he had early entered the Russian service, and had risen by his energy and perseverance to the high command which he now enjoyed. He was brave, active, and persevering; full of energy, and indefatiga ble in his habits. No man exceeded him in patriotic spirit, or enthusiastic devotion to the service. Without the first qualities of a great general, at least when at the head of very large armies, he was admirably qualified for the subordinate part with which he was now intrusted, of covering St Petersburg, and compensating, by his obstinacy and perseverance in resisting the attacks of the French marshals, the decided superiority of their numbers.-CLAUSEWITZ, 203. campaign. While the Emperor, too, lay inactive at Witepsk, he received two pieces of intelligence which had a material influence upon his ulterior views in the campaign. The first was the peace of Bucharest, concluded on 14th July between the Russians and the Turks, whereby a large part of their army on the Danube was rendered disposable; and the second, the discovery of the treaty of the 24th March preceding, between the Swedes and the Emperor Alexander, which not only promised to set free the Russian army in Finland, but threatened his rear with a descent from the Swedish forces. Information at the same time was received of powerful reinforcements to the army of Tormasoff, which were approaching from the Danube, and of great additions to the corps of Wittgenstein, which might soon be expected from the army of observation in Finland. At the same period, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was signed between Russia and England, by which a subsidy of £800,000 was provided to the former power; and it was stipulated, that in the event of the French invasion endangering the Russian fleet, it would be removed, as a measure of security, to the British shores. shelter under the walls of Polotsk, | port of that auxiliary force, on which where, as mentioned below, he was he had reckoned to supply the proshortly after joined by St Cyr, at the digious waste of human life in the head of twelve thousand Bavarians, which raised his army, notwithstanding its losses, to thirty-five thousand men. 32. Napoleon was no sooner informed of this check on the Drissa, than he gave vent to severe invectives against Oudinot, who, he insisted, was superior in force to the enemy, and, instead of awaiting an attack, should have taken the initiative, and assumed a victorious attitude towards the enemy. Stung to the quick by these reproaches, which he was conscious were by no means deserved, the brave marshal obeyed his orders and advanced against his antagonist; while the Emperor, who felt the full importance, during his advance into the interior, of preserving his left flank on the Dwina secure, ordered up St Cyr with his corps of Bavarians, who were estimated at twenty-two thousand men, but who had already wasted away to half that number, by forced marches to Polotsk; and he arrived there on the 6th August. Alexander, on his side, who was not less interested in the operations of a corps which at once covered the road to St Petersburg and menaced the communications of the French army, ordered up powerful reinforcements, sixteen thousand strong, under Count Steinheil, who had been stationed in Finland, but were now rendered disposable by the conclusion of the treaty with Sweden, to the same destination; and the militia of St Petersburg also received orders to advance to his support. Thus everything announced that the war on the Dwina would become of great, if not decisive importance, before the close of the campaign. 34. These important events, and the intelligence of the prodigious armaments preparing in the interior by the activity of the Emperor Alexander, and the patriotic efforts of his subjects, led to the most serious reflections at Napoleon's headquarters. The expedience of a farther advance into the heart of the empire was discussed in 33. On the other flank, Tormasoff, his military council for some days. finding that the Austrians under Several of his generals openly dissuadSchwartzenberg were not advancing ed him from the enterprise, as fraught against him, fell suddenly on the with the greatest hazard; but after corps of Saxons under Reynier at they had all delivered their opinions, Kobrin, and on the 23d July made the Emperor expressed his own as folprisoners an entire brigade of their lows: "Why should we remain at best troops. It became indispensable, Witepsk? The vicinity of the rivers, therefore, to support the Saxon corps indeed, makes it a defensible position by the Austrians under Schwartzen- in summer; but in winter what would berg; and thus Napoleon lost the sup- | avail their frozen streams? We must, such arguments did Napoleon justify his resolution to advance into the interior of the empire; but, in truth, the campaigns of Echmühl and Jena had spoiled him for the delays of ordinary war, or the precautions requisite between equal combatants. His career seemed blasted, unless he stepped from victory to victory; and even the dangers of a Russian winter were preferable, in his estimation, to the insupportable tedium of a lengthened residence at Witepsk. therefore, construct everything for our- | I will treat with his nobles. Moscow selves: whereas at Moscow all is ready- hates St Petersburg; the effects of made to our hands. A return to Wilna that jealousy are incalculable.”—With would be still more dangerous: it would necessarily lead to a retreat to the Vistula, and the loss of the whole of Lithuania. At Smolensko, again, we shall find at least a fortified town, and a position on the Dnieper. The example of Charles XII. is out of place he did not fail because his enterprise was impracticable, but because he had not force sufficient to accomplish it. In war, fortune has an equal share with ability in success: if we wait for an entirely favourable train of circumstances, we shall never attempt anything; to gain an object we must commence it. No blood has yet been shed: Russia is too powerful to yield without fighting: Alexander will not treat till a great battle has been fought. It is a mistake to suppose he is retiring from any premeditated design; his armies retreated from the Dwina to effect a junction with Bagrathion; from Witepsk, to unite with him at Smolensko. 35. "The hour of battle is arrived: you will not have Smolensko without a battle; you will not have Moscow without a battle. I cannot think of taking up my winter quarters in the middle of July. Our troops are always in spirits when they advance: a prolonged and defensive position is not suited to the French genius. Are we accustomed to halt behind rivers? to remain cantoned in huts? to manœuvre in the same spot during eight months of privations? The line of defence of the Dwina or the Dnieper is illusory: let winter come with its snows, and where are your barriers? Why should we leave the fanatical people of the East time to empty their immense plains and fall upon us? Why should we remain here eight months, when twenty days are sufficient to accomplish our purpose? Let us anticipate winter and its reflections. We must strike soon and strongly, or we shall be in danger. We must be in Moscow in a month, or we shall never be there. Peace awaits us under its walls. Should Alexander still persist, 36. In truth, the result is not always a proof of the wisdom either of military or political measures, because many things enter into its composition which cannot be foreseen by the greatest sagacity: a due appreciation of all the considerations which present themselves at the moment, is the utmost that can be effected by human ability. Before we condemn Napoleon's advance to Moscow as imprudent, we should recollect that similar temerity had, in all his former wars, been crowned with success; that the experience he had had of Russian firmness at Austerlitz and Friedland, afforded no ground for supposing that the Emperor would resist the force of circumstances which had more than once constrained the pride of Austria and Prussia to submit; that a throne raised by the sword would be endangered by the least pause even in the career of success which had established it; that the peace with Turkey and Sweden would shortly expose his flanks to attack from forces which could not as yet be brought into the field; and that the fact of his actually entering Moscow with a victorious army demonstrates that he possessed the means of reducing the Russians to that extremity, in which, according to all former experience, he might expect a glorious peace. These considerations, while they tend to exculpate Napoleon from blame in the important step which he now took, enhance to the highest degree the glory of the Emperor and people of Russia, by showing that the success which ultimately crowned their efforts was owing to a degree of firmness in adversity which was deemed beyond the bounds of human fortitude. 37. By a singular coincidence, at the very moment that Napoleon was thus adopting the resolution to advance into the interior of Russia, a similar resolution to resume the offensive had been taken at the Russian headquarters. Many causes had contributed to produce this result. The long-continued retreat, which had now extended to three hundred miles, had both depressed the spirits and excited the indignation of the soldiers, who, ignorant of the vast superiority of force with which they were threatened, murmured loudly at thus abandoning so considerable a portion of the empire without a struggle. The great losses sustained by the French during their advance, amounting to a hundred thousand men, were perfectly known at the Russian headquarters. Schouvaloff, who had been sent from Swanziani to Napoleon's headquarters on a political mission, had returned in perfect astonishment at the multitude of carcasses of men and horses which strewed the roads, and the swarms of sick and stragglers which crowded the villages. On the other hand, their own loss during the retreat had not hitherto exceeded ten thousand men, and twenty guns abandoned in the mud. They had now a united army of a hundred and twenty thousand men in the centre, and two wings of thirty thousand each, under Wittgenstein and Tormasoff, supported by the fortresses of Riga and Bobrinsk, to operate on its flank. The Russians had been greatly deceived as to the strength of the French army which had hitherto crossed the Niemen; they reckoned it at three hundred and fifty thousand, whereas in truth it was four hundred and seventy thousand. Judging by this standard, they conceived they had not more than one hundred and fifty thousand in front of Barclay, and this did not appear so great a superiority as to justify, against the opinion of the army, a fur VOL. X. ther continuance of the retreat. In fact, however, the enemy's army under the immediate command of Napoleon, was fully two hundred thousand strong, when the Viceroy and Junot, who were coming up, were taken into account. After much anxious consideration on the part of the Russian generals, in the course of which Yermoloff and Toll, the chief staff-officers, strenuously urged that the retreat should be discontinued, and a vigorous offensive commenced, it was determined to move forward, and strike a blow at Napoleon while his forces still lay dispersed in their cantonments. 38. The scattered position of the French army presented an opportunity for such an enterprise, with something approaching to equality of numbersan object of the utmost importance, as their vast amount, when all collected, was still too great to justify the risking of a general battle; and it was indispensable, by all means, to protract the war, in order to give time for the completion of the armaments in the interior. With this view, the Russians broke up early on the morn ing of 7th August, and advanced in three great columns against the French quarters. The mass of their forces, one hundred and fourteen thousand strong, was directed towards Rudnia; while Platoff, with a chain of Cossacks, covered their movements. At Inkowa, this enterprising commander fell upon the advanced guard of Murat, under Sebastiani, consisting of six thousand horse and a regiment of light infan try, and defeated it with the loss of five hundred prisoners. This check roused the genius of Napoleon. He instantly despatched couriers in all directions to collect his corps, and assembled them in a body round his headquarters; and moved from Witepsk, by his own right, on the 13th August, in the direction of Smolensko. To repair the error which he had committed in leaving his forces so much dispersed, and giving the enemy the advantage of the initiative, he resolved to turn the left of the Russian army, and, by crossing the Dnieper, gain B |