where it appeared that a term had been granted to defendant's father in 1794, and that on his death, intestate, his son I. B. entered and took out administration, and was possessed until his death; and that on his death, defendant, his brother, entered; and that by indenture, bearing date July 1814, between defendant and B. M. (concerning other premises) it was recited that defendant was legal personal representative of I. B.; it was held that this was prima facie evidence that the term was vested in defendant. And Lord Ellenborough observed, that "the defendant being in possession, the law will refer that possession to a rightful rather than to a wrongful title; and there is a course through which that title may be lawfully derived, viz. by supposing the defendant to be privy to the term granted to his father. Now it appears by a recital in one of the conveyances to which the defendant is party, that he is the legal personal representative of his brother, who was administrator to the father; whence it may be presumed, as against him, either that he obtained administration de bonis non to his father, after the brother's decease, or that he took the term by assignment from his brother;" and the other judges, Bayley and Holroyd, laid down similar doctrine. (a)

Conveyances will also be presumed when land is given to trustees in trust to convey at a specified time, and the cestui que trust has enjoyed it from the appointed period for a period of twenty years, or even less, but the conveyance to the cestui que trust cannot be produced. In England d. Syburn v. Slade, (b) the

(a) Doe d. Batten v. Murless, 6 Mau. & Sel. 110; and see Livett v.

Wilson, 3 Bing 115.
(b) 4 T. R. 682.

time for which the lands were enjoyed was considerably less than twenty years. (a)

And where an estate is vested in trustees for a temporary purpose, and no further intention is declared which requires the legal estate to remain outstanding, a trust to reconvey, as soon as that purpose is effected, arises by implication; and taken in connexion with this implied duty, long subsequent possession, as of one hundred years, or even sixty years, becomes prima facie evidence of the legal estate having been reconveyed. (b)

The leading case on this subject is Hillary v. Waller, (c) which is so important not only as to the point which it more immediately decides, but in the general principles laid down in it, which carry the doctrines of presumption to their furthest extent, that it will be necessary to state it somewhat fully.

Lands had been enjoyed and conveyed for a period of one hundred and ten years, but the legal estate was shown to have been outstanding in 1694, and no deed reconveying it could be found. The question was, whether it might be presumed. Sir Wm. Grant, M. R., decided as follows: "The question is, whether a reconveyance of the legal estate ought, under the circumstances of the case, to be presumed. If it ought, then it is not an equitable but a legal title, that the defendant is desired to take. I agree that length of time does not, by itself, furnish the same sort of pre

(a) And see 8 T. R. 122; 1 Jac.

& W. 620; and see Wadsworth's

case, Clayt. 26.

(b) Lade v. Holford, Bull. N. P. 110, as explained in Doe v. Sybourn, 7 T. R. 2. Roe v. Reade, 8 T. R. 14. 118. Doe v Stable, 2 T. R. 634.

Tankard v. Wade, Irish T. R. 162. Doe. d. Howel v. Lloyd, Peake Ev. 5th edit. App. 41; Sug. V. & P. 407; but see Sug. V. & P. Vend. 324, 8th edit.

(c) 12 Ves. 239.

sumption in this case that it does in a case of adverse possession. Long-continued possession implies title; as, if there were a different right, the probability is that it would have been asserted. But undisturbed enjoyment does not show whether the title be equitable or legal. It does not follow, however, that a conveyance of the legal estate cannot be the subject of presumption; though the presumption be made upon a different ground. Lord Kenyon, though disinclined to permit ejectments to be maintained upon equitable titles, always admitted that it might be left to the jury to presume a conveyance of the legal estate; and so far acceded to Lord Mansfield's doctrine, in Lade v. Holford; (a) although dissenting from that of some other cases, in which a legal estate, clearly outstanding, was held to be no impediment to a recovery at law by the party beneficially entitled. On what ground was such presumption to be made? On thisthat what ought to have been done, should be presumed to have been done. When the purpose is answered for which the legal estate was conveyed, it ought to be reconveyed. Presumptions do not always proceed on a belief that the thing presumed has actually taken place. Grants are frequently presumed, as Lord Mansfield says, (b) merely for the purpose, and from a principle, of quieting the possession. There is as much occasion for presuming conveyances of legal estates; as, otherwise, titles must for ever remain imperfect, and in many respects unavailable, when from length of time it has become impossible to discover in whom the legal estate (if outstanding) is actually vested. If we could in this case ascertain at

(a) Bull. N. P. 110.

(b) Eldridge v. Knott, Cowp. 215.

what period the legal estate ought to have been reconveyed, I see no reason why the presumption of its being reconveyed at that period may not be made. The difficulty here is, that by the deed of 1664 it is only as to a moiety of the estate that any time is limited for their conveyance. It could not, however, be meant, that the legal estate in any part should be outstanding for ever. The conveyance of it was made for a purpose that must have some limit. It was by way of security against the eviction of the St. Clere's estate. At what precise moment the danger of eviction ceased, it is impossible to say. But if the time that has elapsed, one hundred and forty years, does not furnish the inference that none can be made, I do not know what period would be sufficient for that purpose. Mere possibilities ought not to be regarded. The court,' as Lord Hardwick says in the case of Lyddal v. Weston, (a) must govern itself by a moral certainty; for it is impossible in the nature of things there should be a mathematical certainty of a good title.' He adds, There are often suggestions of old entails; and often doubts what issue persons have left, whether more or fewer; and yet these were never allowed to be objections of that force to overturn a title to an estate. So we have here suggestions of possible grounds of claim. But no man can believe that the owners of the St. Clere's estate feel any apprehension of eviction by title existing prior to 1664; or that they would at any time, within the last sixty years, have had the least objection to direct a re-conveyance of the Fingreth Hall estate, if the persons in whom the legal interest is vested should have

(a) 2 Atk. 19. See ante, p, 60.

been discovered. Why, then, should not such reconveyance be presumed?" (His Honour then goes through the particular circumstances of the case.) "The evidence of actual re-conveyance must, however, be admitted to be slight and inconclusive. But on the general grounds I have before stated, I conceive that there is no court before which a question concerning this title can come, that would not, under all the circumstances of the case itself, presume, or direct a jury to presume, that the legal estate has been reconveyed. It is, therefore, such a title as a purchaser may safely take; and the defendant ought, consequently, specifically to perform his agreement."

A specific performance of the agreement was decreed accordingly. From that decree the defendant appealed to the Lord Chancellor.

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Erskine) decided as follows:-"I admit a purchaser ought not to be compelled specifically to perform the contract, unless the vendor is in a condition to make a good title; and, in a clear and full sense, such as ought to be considered by a court of justice a good title. The question, whether, under all the circumstances, I ought to consider this a good title, is of very great importance, and ought to be decided upon principles clear and satisfactory. The presumption in courts of law from length of time stands upon a clear principle, built upon reason, the nature and character of man, and the results of human experience. It resolves itself into this, that a man will naturally enjoy what belongs to him. This is the whole principle. It has application in cases of incorporeal hereditaments, and where there is a written title. As to incorporeal hereditaments, 1st. Rights of way, not enjoyed for a number of years,