or obscurity in the application of moral rules, seem at first to perplex and disturb the faculty which judges of right and wrong; and make it necessary to trace, in an exact and methodical manner, and with a careful exclusion of everything but moral considerations, the consequences of the fundamental rules of morality, in order that thus we may escape the doubt and confusion with which we are threatened. The Cases of Conscience of Jeremy Taylor, as one of his works is often termed, and similar writings of many others of our best divines, will at once recur to your recollection.

Nor, again, need I remark, (although the circumstance is full of instruction,) that since, in cases where obvious duties appear to be in conflict, we cannot decide either way without transgressing, or seeming to transgress, some plain rule of morality, the common mind is never fully satisfied with such a conclusion: and even when the decision is made on the most purely moral grounds, and when the reasons assigned for it are, to a person capable of following such reasoning, perfectly convincing and demonstrative, still the careless hearer attends to nothing but the fact that reasons are given for omitting a duty.

Hence it has come to pass, that when, in any cases, reasons are stated tending to evade some generally acknowledged rule of conduct, although the reasons have only the most shallow and transparent pretence of morality, still the popular mind will not take the trouble of distinguishing between such sophistry and the indispensable distinctions contemplated by the genuine moralist. And thus such evasive perversion of reason is also called Casuistry; and hence the word, in more modern times, and in certain classes of writers, is used in a somewhat obnoxious sense. Pope will supply us with examples of both shades of signification: as, first, in the sense of decisions on the best authority :

Who shall decide when doctors disagree,

And soundest casuists doubt, like you and me?

and again, in the unfavourable sense :

Morality by her false guardians drawn,

Chicane in furs, and Casuistry in lawn.

Technical law and technical morality are both often, as here, the objects of sarcasm and blame. Yet it must be obvious to every considerate person, that laws, to be consistent in practice, must be technical; and a very little attention to the subject will show us that morality also, in order to become a portion of exact truth, must assume, as all sciences must, a technical form. Such a form is one which the popular mind cannot and will not comprehend, and on which it willingly avenges itself by ridicule and dislike.

We know however that, notwithstanding the prevalence of such feelings, it is our business, in this, no less than other subjects, to aim at truth of the most rigorous and exact form, as well as of the most solid certainty, Nor will it ever be possible to treat of morality, in any complete and sufficient manner, without taking into our account the question of conflicting duties, and other questions such as have been termed Cases of Conscience. And though such cases are neither the main part of our subject (Moral Philosophy), nor that from which it can with propriety

derive its name, it may, as I have said, be worth our while to examine how an appellation so derived has been, in past times, applied and unde: stood; and it will, I trust, be found that in this manner some light w.. be thrown on the more recent progress of moral philosophy.

The works which contained collections of cases of conscience, and which the title commonly was Summa Casuum Conscientiæ, or something resembling this, were compiled at first for the use of confessors and ecclesiastical persons, who had to give their advice and decisions to those who made confession to them. It was requisite for them to know, for instance, in what cases penance of a heavier or lighter kind was to be im posed; and what offenses must, for the time, exclude the offender from the Communion.

As early as the 13th century Raymond of Pennaforti had published his Casuistical Summa, which came into very general use, and was referred to by the greater part of the succeeding casuists.

In the 14th and 15th century the number of such books increased very greatly. These Summa were in common speech known by certain abbreviated names, borrowed from the designation of the author, or other circumstances. Thus there was the Astesana, which derived its name from its author Astesanus, a Minorite of Asti in Piemont; the Angelica, compiled by Angelus de Clavasio, a Genoese Minorite; the Pisana or Pisanella, which was also termed Bartholina or Magistruccia; the Pacifica; the Rosella; the Sylvestrina. In these works the subjects were usually arranged alphabetically, and the decisions were given in the form of Responses to Questions proposed*; the opinions being often quoted

* I will give, as an example of the Summæ, one of the questions under the word Ebrietas in the Summa Angelica.

P. 61. "Ebrietas est privatio intellectus facta ad aliquod tempus ex immoderato potu vini vel cujuscunque rei potabilis.

"Q. Utrum ebrietas sit peccatum mortale. Respondetur ut colligo ex Alexan. Secunda Secundæ, et Glo. xxv. Dist. sect. alias ea demum. Et docetur ibidem quod aut raro contigit aut assiduè. Si raro: sic distinguo, quod aut inebrians se cognoscit vini potentiam, et suam complexionem dispositam ad ebrietatem, et tunc magis vult ebrietatem incurrere quam a vino abstinere, et sic est peccatum mortale; aut inebrians se nescit vini potentiam et ignorat quod ex tali potu potest inebriari vel non advertit; et sic est nullum peccatum vel veniale secundum excessum in potu, et negligentiam in advertendo. Si vero assidua sit ebrietas: sic est mortale peccatum, non propter iterationem actus, quæ multiplicatio actuum venialium non auget in infinitum; sed quod non potest esse quod homo assiduè inebrietur quin sciens et volens ebrietatem incurrat: aut saltem omittat diligentiam quam debet adhibere de necessitate ne inebrietur cum habeat tempus deliberationis reprimendi motus veniales ne procedant in regnum peccati."

I will also give the part of the article which refers to Acidia, ákŋdía, Indifference, and Dejection with regard to doing good, which the schoolmen had made a special sin. By Aquinas it is ranked among the vices opposite to the Christian virtue of Hope.

P. 3. "Acidia, secundum Ricardum de Sancto Victore, est torpor mentis bona inchoari negligentis, et secundum Damascenum est tristitia aggravans mentem ut nihil boni ei agere libeat. Q. Utrum acidia sit contra aliquod præceptum Decalogi. Respondet Alexander, Trac. de Acidia, quod est specialiter et explicite contra illud. Eccl. xxxviii. 20. [Take no heaviness to heart: drive it away, and remember the last end. Forget it not, for there is no turning again:

from, or supported by, the authority of the Scripture, or the Fathers, or Schoolmen. Thus, Astesanus says in his preface, that, conscious of his own poverty, he had, like Ruth, gone to glean in the grounds of the wealthy, the books of great doctors; and that he had put in his book "illa tantum quæ pertinebant ad consilium in foro conscientiæ tribuendum." There was not in these books any attempt to lay down general principles which might show that the decisions were right, or which might enable the inquirer to determine for himself the matter by which his conscience was disturbed. The lay disciple was supposed to be in entire dependence upon his spiritual teachers for the guidance of his conscience; or rather, for the determination of the penance and mortification by which his sins were to be obliterated. Moreover, a very large proportion of the offenses which were pointed out in such works were transgressions of the observances required by the Church of those days, and referred to matters of which the conscience could not take cognizance, without a very considerable amount of artificial training. Questions of rites and ceremonies were put upon an equal footing with the gravest questions of morals. The Church had given her decision respecting both; and the neglect or violation of her precepts, and of the interpretations of her doctors, could never, it was held, be other than sinful. Thus the body of Casuistry, of which I have been speakig, was intimately connected with the authority and practices of the Church of Rome. When, therefore, the domination of that Church was, by the blessing of Providence, overthrown in this and other countries, the office of such Casuistry was at an end. The decision of moral questions was left to each man's own conscience; and his responsibility as to his own moral and spiritual condition could no longer be transferred to others. For himself he must stand or fall. He might, indeed, aid himself by the best lights which the Church could supply by the counsel of wiser and holier servants of God; and he was earnestly enjoined to seek counsel of God himself by hearty and humble prayer. But he could no longer lean the whole weight of his doubts and his sins upon his father confessor and his mother church. He must ascertain for himself what is the true and perfect law of God. He could no longer derive hope or satisfaction from the collections of cases, in which the answers rested on the mere authority of men fallible and sinful like himself.

Thus the casuistical works of the Romanists lost all weight, and almost all value, in the eyes of the Reformed Churches. Indeed, they were looked upon, and in many respects justly, as among the glaring evidences of the perversions and human inventions by which the truth of God had been disfigured; so that a great Reformation became necessary; and from this period, beyond doubt, we may trace the origin of the disrepute under which, up to the present time, the name of Casuistry has laboured.

thou shalt not do him good, but hurt thyself.] Implicitè vero est contra illud Exod. xx. [Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath-day.] In acidia est tristitia de spirituali bono cum amore quietis carnalis. In illo vero precepto est amor sanctæ quietis quæ cum gaudio est in bono spirituali, licet sit laboriosum." P. 68. "Erubescentia de bono est peccatum, et est filia acidiæ."

The writers of the Reformed Churches did not at first attempt to substitute any thing in the place of the casuistical works of the Romish Church. Besides an averseness to the subject itself, which, as I have said, they naturally felt, they were, for a considerable period after the Reformation, fully employed upon more urgent objects. If this had not been so, they could not have failed soon to perceive that, in reality, most persons do require some guidance for their consciences; and that rules and precepts by which men may strengthen themselves against the temptations which cloud the judgment when it is brought into contact with special cases, are of great value to every body of moral and christian men. But the circumstances of the times compelled them to give their energies mainly to controversies with their Romish and other adversaries, and to leave to each man's own thoughts the regulation of his conduct and feelings They had to man the walls and carry on a war against an external enemy for their very existence; and hence they could the less bestow their labour in building the halls of justice, the houses of charity, and the temples of God, within their city. Or, to use an image of one of the first of our writers* who attempted to remedy this defect: "For any public provision of books of casuistical theology, we were almost wholly unprovided; and, like the children of Israel in the days of Saul and Jonathan, we were forced to go down to the forges of the Philistines to sharpen every man his share and his coulter, his axe and his mattock. We had swords and spears of our own, enough for defence, and more than enough for disputation: but in this more necessary part of the conduct of consciences, we did receive our answers from abroad, till we found that our old needs were very ill supplied, and new necessities did every day arise." In the use of this image, Taylor followed, perhaps imitated, a still earlier English writer on the same subject-William Ames. In the preface to his "Conscience, with the power and Cases thereof," (English Ed. 1643), he says "This part of prophecy hath hitherto been less practised in the schools of the prophets, because our captains were necessarily enforced to fight always in front against the enemies to defend the faith, and to purge the floor of the Church; so that they could not plant and water the fields and vineyards as they desired, as it useth to fall out in time of hot wars. They thought with themselves in the mean while (as one of some note writeth), if we have that single and clear eye of the gospel, if in the house of our heart the candle of pure faith be set upon a candlestick, these small matters might easily be discussed. But experience hath taught at length, that through neglect of this husbandry, a famine of true godliness hath followed in many places, and out of the famine a grievous spiritual plague; insomuch that the counsel of Nehemiah had need be practised, namely, that every one should labour in this work with one hand holding the plough, and in the other a spear or a dart, whereby he may repel the violence of the enemies."

[The works of Ames and of other English writers on this subject, are further noticed in Lecture I.]

*Jeremy Taylor.

THE

HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

LECTURE I.

PERKINS-AMES-HALL-SANDERSON-TAYLOR.

IN

N order that, in this course of Lectures, we may have before us a field of limited extent and definite boundaries, and thus, accommodated both to the novelty of Moral Philosophy among us as the subject of public lectures, and to the shortness of the time allowed the lecturer for preparation,—I shall direct your attention for the present principally or entirely to English writers of morals*. I trust that the interest which their works offer, both as a portion of the history of philosophy, and as our peculiar family inheritance, will be such as to justify my selection of the subject. Other portions of ethical literature, and wider views of ethical philosophy, remain for the business of future years.

Among the earliest and most considerable of the moral writers of the English Church, immediately after the Reformation, I may notice William Perkins, a learned divine who lived in this place in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. He was educated at Christ's College, of which he became Fellow in 1582; and being much admired as a preacher, was chosen minister of St Andrew's Church; in which church he was also buried in 1602†. He was esteemed the first preacher

* The previous part of this Lecture, referring principally to the special circumstances of the Professorship, and to the history of Moral Theology and Casuistry before the Reformation, is omitted here, and inserted as an Appendix.

I have not, however, been able to discover his tomb in this church,

B