by strangers, but by persons belonging to his own university. Mr Gisborne, since appointed a prebendary of Durham, favourably known to the public as the author of several works on subjects connected with Morals, remonstrated against the adoption of Paley's principles by this University, in an Examination of them which he published in 1790*. "The subsequent Treatise," he says in the Preface to this work, "was occasioned by an appointment which I understand to have taken place in the University of Cambridge, that candidates for the degree of Bachelor of Arts shall be examined in the Elements of Moral and Political Philosophy." He proceeds to say that, rejoicing that the study of Morality is thus made a portion of academical instruction, he is still persuaded that Paley's fundamental principle is exposed to most grave objections. In the sequel, he states the objections to which he thus refers. His first argument is from the impossibility of really and rigorously applying the criterion by which Paley professes to decide questions of morals. He takes in succession the steps of Paley's reasoning: To the first, "that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures," he assents; as also to the second, that "those actions which promote that happiness must be agreeable to him, and the contrary." He then comes to the inference drawn from these positions, “that the method of coming at the will of God concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness." Here

he stops, and refuses his assent. How does it appear, he

asks, that we can wield with good effect a principle so vast and complex as this one of universal tendency? "Were the power of the human intellect unlimited, and capable of deriving knowledge from any specified source, of drawing it forth from every secret repository in which it is stored,

*This is the date of the Second Edition.

But

Mr Paley's conclusion would be just. In that case, in order to indicate the method of obtaining knowledge of any kind, nothing more could be requisite than that the storehouse in which it is hidden should be specified. But human faculties being imperfect and circumscribed, no one can be justly held to have pointed out the method of acquiring a knowledge either of the will of God or of any other subject, unless, besides pointing out the source, he proves also that man has faculties enabling him to derive it from that source." this Paley does not do. He contents himself with directing us to inquire, when he should have proved us able to discover. This defect utterly destroys the validity of his argument, and leaves, as an assertion unsupported by proof, the conclusion that the consideration of general expediency is the method of learning the will of God. Mr Gisborne then proceeds to illustrate this remark by comparison with the case of a workman executing the plan of an architect. This image appears to me by no means happily chosen for his purpose; and has been retorted by writers on the other side. But as the argument against the doctrine of general expediency, drawn from the impossibility of fitly applying it with our limited views and faculties, is one of great importance, I will take the liberty of offering an illustration of a different kind, which, in this University at least, may, I trust, be considered as allowable, and which seems well fitted to throw light on the subject. I have on former occasions endeavoured to point out an analogy between the progress of the science of Morals and other sciences; and such a comparison is, I believe, very far from being merely fanciful. I conceive we may especially derive instruction regarding the progress of all branches of human knowledge, by contemplating the history of a science of which the successive steps and advances can all be distinctly traced, and which has risen from gross errors, and rudiments of mere practical knowledge, through

various gradations of partial truths, up to truths of the most general kind, which, now that they are thus established, appear to be self-evident. I speak of the science of Mechanics.

Now it is well known to those who have attended to the history of this science, that in the course of the last century a principle termed the Principle of Least Action, was propounded as a mode of determining the course which a body would follow moving from point to point under the influence of external agents. The import of the principle was, that the body would select such a path, and move in such a manner, that the total action which took place in consequence of the body's motion would be smaller than if the body had moved in any other line or in any other manner.

Maupertuis, the philosopher who first asserted this principle, conceived that he could establish it as a universal truth by reasonings drawn from the nature of the Deity and the rules of His operation. And if true, it undoubtedly embraced all cases of motion under all circumstances, and promised to give the solution of all mechanical problems whatever.

The truth and the meaning of this principle were the subject of a long and angry controversy; and, as is usual in such controversies, the meaning of the principle was so modified as to ensure its truth. For what is quantity of action? Many different meanings might be given to such a word: but it was found that one very simple meaning might be assigned to it, which would make the Principle include many mechanical truths. And in the sequel, it was proved by Lagrange, that, with the definition which had been adopted, the principle was a universal and necessary truth in all possible combinations of bodies and motions.

Thus then the Principle of Least Action was allowed and proved to be true. But how far was it adopted as a means of solving special problems? Did it supersede other methods

of dealing with mechanical questions? Did men apply it to the simple cases of mechanical action which they had to consider? Was it desirable that they should do so? Could they have done so if they had tried?

If a mathematician of Maupertuis' time had set about solving a simple problem, or almost any problem, by means of the principle of Least Action, as the best way of obtaining the solution, he would have been very unwise. The principle then was precarious; for every mechanical principle is precarious so long as it rests upon metaphysical reasonings alone, though these may, perhaps, convert known truths into necessary truths :—the principle was of doubtful meaning if true, for its real meaning was only established when its universal truth was proved. But, dismissing these objections, the method was a bad method of solution, as being superfluously and extravagantly general and complex ;-introducing the consideration of very many indefinite and entangled elements, in a case which really required but few and simple considerations. And this is not the less the case, now that the principle is demonstrably confirmed. If any mechanical calculator were to attempt to trace the path of a projectile or a planet by Maupertuis' principle of Least Action, he would be looked upon with a smile of pity by all good mathematicians. He might perhaps excite admiration in some novice, enthusiastic in his love of generalities; but the probability is, that he would fail in his attempt, and be lost in the labyrinth of symbols into which he had so unadvisedly and unnecessarily rushed.

No

What the Principle of Least Action is in Mechanics, the Principle of Greatest resulting Good is in Morals. one questions its truth: every investigation has more and more firmly established its reality. But then, how hard to fix its precise meaning! What is Good? Our judgments of the nature of Good change, as our views of the tendency of

all things to good expand. Is Pleasure the Good? So says the system of which we are speaking: but what pleasure? The Pleasure of a calm mind, a pure conscience, a benevolent heart the Pleasure of a state of future happiness when all sensual delights shall have passed away. But when we have given our principle this meaning, how shall we apply it? Who can foresee how far men's actions tend to increase such good as this? Who can calculate all the effect which his actions produce by their consequences immediate and remote; by their operation on his own character and habits; by their influence in the way of example and reputation; by their fitting him for another state of existence. Can it really be true that we cannot estimate the good or evil of any of our doings, without summing the infinite series of such terms as these, which is appended to each? and each of these terms, too, depending upon actions and thoughts of other men as its elements :-all these series, each in itself involving so much that is indefinite, so much that is incalculable, all mixed and entangled, and inter-dependent in modes innumerable. If we cannot call our actions good or evil till we have performed this summation, till we have balanced against each other the positive and the negative quantities of such a calculation, we are surely thrown upon a task for which our faculties are quite unfit: we have the tangled course of life to run, and are blindfolded by the hand which is to assign the prize.

But it will perhaps be said that we have no better means of solving the moral problem of our being; it will be demanded what other rule can be proposed for determining the good or evil of our actions than the consideration of their consequences. If such a question were asked, we should have to reply, in the first place, that this is not the matter under consideration. Our business at present is to weigh the value of the theory of morals which