Butler pursued this view of the irascible part of our nature somewhat further. He distinguished Resentment, the name by which he describes this element, into sudden Resentment, which is given us as a Protector which acts with energy before Reflection has time to rouse herself into action, and whose office is to repel harm, without regard to its being wrong as well as harm;-and settled Resentment, which is naturally directed against vice and wickedness. "The one

stands in our nature for self-defence, the other for the administration of justice." It is by considerations such as these that the Idea, which at first appears so wide and barren, of a certain undefined Constitution of man, is traced by Butler into special moral duties. The proper office of each of the principles of our nature assists us also to determine their limits, and to lay down rules for their direction, control, or restraint.

I have already observed that while, among the defenders of Independent Morality, Clarke, in stating his moral opinions, entangled himself by adopting the terms of the prevalent metaphysical system, Butler too often perplexed his readers by trying to avoid all systematic metaphysics. But this mode of treating the subject does not answer the needs of those who pursue it as a speculative study. For short technical expressions, when they are familiar to us, enable us to avoid much labour of the intellect which we must otherwise incur; and to fix our attention at once upon the critical part of each proposition and argument. If there shall be found to be introduced afterwards a technical classification of the faculties and operations of the human mind, which shall be consistent with the truths asserted by Butler, the business of understanding his arguments will be much simplified. We may conceive that, in his enquiries, he was doing that which,

appetite provides for the needs of man's nature and anger for its defence, both in subservience to the governing power of reason.

in fact, discoverers always have to do. They search at the same time for true propositions and for precise definitions. Each of these elements depends upon the other; they are found at the same time, and approximated to by the same degrees. Men go on towards moral as they go on towards physical truth. The proposition that the planets are directed by a central force, became more and more certain, as the conception of a central force became more and more clear. We have already compared Cudworth to Kepler, who was confident there was such a force, yet most vague and loose in his description of it: perhaps not even Butler can be compared with Newton, who laid down the law of this force with complete evidence, and traced it to its remotest effects. rather resembles Borelli or Wren or Huyghens, who referred this force to its true center, and saw with entire conviction the certainty of its operation, but wavered from one form of expression to another in their description of its nature; and though they asserted its existence, did not lay down its law in words, nor draw out a system of its consequences.

He

Of the three principles of morality included in the Syncretism of Warburton, Right Reason-the Moral Senseand Divine Command, we may now consider the third; which brings us nearer to the domain of Theology.

I have hitherto considered Butler and his contemporaries (for, as I have said, Hutcheson's Inquiry and Butler's Sermons were published about the same time*) merely as moralists; as employed in determining the foundations of natural morals; -the principles of human conduct according to mere philosophy. But we shall not be able to understand the true bearing of the speculations of this time, and the causes which affected the fortunes of the subject in its next shape,

* Butler's Sermons, 1726; Hutcheson's Inquiry, third edition, 1729; the Dedication, to the second edition, is dated 1725.

without taking a survey of these speculations from another point of view; without considering what bearing Morality, according to the systems which were in currency at the time of which I speak, had upon Religion ;-how men's views of their duties in this life were connected with their eternal hopes.

The system of Clarke, according to which Morality is derived by rigorous deduction from right reason, and the doctrine of the Shaftesbury school, that virtue is the object of a peculiar Sense or Taste, each gave to virtue a kind of independence, which seemed to make extraneous support superfluous. And hence the enemies of revealed religion saw with pleasure, and its friends with pain, the probability of an attack upon it from this side; which accordingly took place. I have already said that Shaftesbury had been looked upon, and we must regret to say, with incontestable justice, as an enemy of Christianity. Not only did his view of the differences of actions, as founded upon inherent qualities, and perceived by a peculiar sense, make his Morality independent of Divine Command in its foundations, but he seemed unwillingly to admit a Divine Judgment into his scheme. It is true, that he often spoke of the Supreme Being and his government in a manner far from unseemly. (Inquiry, p. 56), "If there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is consider'd as worthy and good, and admir'd and reverenc'd as such; being understood to have, besides mere power and knowledge, the highest excellence of Nature, such as renders him justly amiable to all; and if in the manner this Sovereign and mighty Being is represented, or, as he is historically described, there appears in him a high and eminent regard to what is good and excellent, a concern for the good of all, and an affection of Benevolence and Love towards the whole; such an example must

Thus he says

*This is regretted by his admirer Hutcheson. Preface to Inquiry.

undoubtedly serve (as above explain'd) to raise and increase the affection towards Virtue, and help to submit and subdue all other affections to that alone." And to the influence of the Honour and Love which we must bear to such a Being, he adds the influence of a persuasion of his constant Presence. And again, "When the Theistical belief (his technical expression for the belief in a God) is intire and perfect (p. 57), there must be steady opinion of the superintendency of a Supreme Being, a witness and spectator of human life, and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the universe: so that in the perfectest recess, or deepest solitude, there must be One still presum'd remaining with us; whose presence singly must be of more moment than that of the most august assembly on earth. In such a presence, 'tis evident, that as the shame of guilty actions must be the greatest of any; so must the honour be of well-doing, even under the unjust censure of a world. And in this case, 'tis very apparent how conducing a perfect Theism must be to virtue, and how great deficiency there is in Atheism."

And he allows that a belief in a future state of reward and punishment may support and preserve a man wavering between right and wrong; may even restore and repair the moral constitution when by evil practice it has been debauched and perverted (p. 61); and may make virtue, which was at first pursued for its consequences, to be loved for its own sake (p. 62). "In the same manner, where instead of regard or love, there is rather an aversion to what is good and virtuous, (as, for instance, where lenity and forgiveness are despis'd, and revenge highly thought of and belov'd) if there be this consideration added, That lenity is, by its rewards, made the cause of a greater self-good and enjoyment than what is found in revenge;' that very affection of lenity and mildness may come to be industriously nou

rish'd, and the contrary passion depress'd. And thus Temperance, Modesty, Candour, Benignity, and other good affections, however despised at first, may come at last to be valu'd for their own sakes, the contrary species rejected, and the good and proper object belov'd and prosecuted, when the reward or punishment is not so much as thought of."

But this was so grudgingly allowed, so limited with conditions, and balanced with attendant dangers, that it was hardly to be wondered at that those who had trained their minds to think it man's duty to do all with reference to his great Master and Judge, were dissatisfied, and found that the language of the Characteristics was harsh and dissonant to their feelings. Of this we may take as an example the expressions of Bishop Berkeley, a man allowed by all his contemporaries of all parties to be one of the most amiable of men. In his Vindication of his Theory of Vision, p. 5, he says, "What availeth it in the cause of Virtue and Natural Religion, to acknowledge the strongest traces of wisdom and power, throughout the structure of the universe, if this wisdom is not employed to observe, nor this power to recompense our actions; if we neither believe ourselves accountable, nor God our Judge?

“All that is said of a vital principle of Order, Harmony, and Proportion; all that is said of the natural decorum and fitness of things; all that is said of taste and enthusiasm, may well consist and be supposed, without a grain even of Natural Religion, without any notion of Law or Duty, any belief of a Lord or Judge, or any religious sense of a God; the contemplation of the mind upon the ideas of Beauty, and Virtue, and Order, and Fitness, being one thing, and a sense of Religion another. So long as we admit no principle of good actions but Natural Affection, no reward but Natural Consequences; so long as we appre