truth."1 Instead of talking of the mind as an equal and uniform substance, we should say in modern language, that the process of thinking, unless regulated, has a tendency, like all other processes in nature, to move along the line of least resistance. When Mr. Arnold, for instance, makes his fundamental assumption on which "Literature and Dogma" is based, by saying, “The object of religion is conduct, . . . . and conduct is really the simplest thing in the world," he is feigning in conduct and religion "a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth." Conduct is a very difficult thing, and by no means simple, not only in the matter of doing but of knowing what ought to be done; and it becomes more difficult and less simple as society increases in complexity; it is again by no means clear or admitted that religion is concerned solely with conduct; that depends upon what religion you are speaking of, and upon the stage of culture at which you are supposing the worshipper to have arrived. In all religions there are other elements mixed, such, for example, as an interested curiosity about man's origin. and destiny, or, it may be, disinterested curiosity about the origin and destiny of the world. When we consider that it is out of the nidus of religion that all the sciences have sprung, we shall understand how important a part this disinterested or partly disinterested curiosity has played in religion. Then again, there is the enthusiasm for beauty which we remember was so large an element in the religion of the ancient Greeks; and there are many other factors in religion, such as consolation, quite independent of conduct; not to mention fear and lust and cruelty and magic, which form such large ingredients in the religions of primitive and barbarous peoples. To say, therefore, that religion is solely concerned with conduct, and that conduct is the simplest thing in the world, is to speak with desultoriness, to move along the 1 See "Novum Organum," lii., and Stebbing's note. 2 "Literature and Dogma," p. 14. lines of least resistance. It is as much an "idol of the tribe," a fiction of simplicity where simplicity is not, as the assertion of a friend of the late Mr. John Austin, that he found as little difficulty in conceiving of the Trinity in Unity as in thinking of three men in one cart: to which Mr. Austin, a man of strict and logical mind, is said to have replied, "The idea you have to frame is not the idea of three men in one cart, but of one man in three carts." Not assuredly by this short and easy road along the line of least resistance, but only by means of the metaphysical synthesis, the difficult mental process which holds in solution conflicting streams of thinking, can we adequately grasp the greater aspects of life which are of most importance to our lives, conduct, religion and the idea of God. Take, again, Mr. Arnold's second fundamental proposition in "Literature and Dogma," that "happiness follows conduct," or that "conduct brings happiness." Mr. Arnold is so sure of this that he says (p. 27) that it is "undeniably" so, and in p. 45 that "we know" it is so, and that "of course" it is so. But the connection of pleasure with conduct is not so simple as all this; nor is it a matter of course at all, either that pleasure always follows conduct, or that it does not follow other things quite different from and even opposed to conduct. What does Mr. Arnold's own Bishop Wilson say, as quoted in "St. Paul and Protestantism."3 but now apparently forgotten? If you can be good with pleasure,' God 1 "Literature and Dogma," p. 27. 2 P. 45. Arnold nowhere defines It may be remarked in passing, that Mr. happiness or distinguishes it from pleasure. Protestanism," p. 119, he says: "Our pleasure from a spring day we do not make; our pleasure even from an approving conscience we do not make. And yet we feel that both the one pleasure and the other can, and often do, work with us in a wonderful way for our good. So we get the thought of an impulsion outside ourselves which is at once awful and beneficent." It is evident that the thought in this passage is the same as that which runs through "Literature and Dogma," we did not provide that happiness should follow conduct (“ Literature and Dogma," p. 27). This is not the but such is our corruption Not to speak of the say If does not envy you your joy; that every man cannot be so. ing of St. Paul, also adduced by Mr. Arnold in his earlier and more careful book: "He who would cease from sin, must suffer in the flesh." But even admitting that it is in the majority of cases pleasant to do right, it is, such is the complexity of our nature, pleasant, very pleasant, also to do wrong. The gratification of all our desires is attended with momentary pleasure. What fruit is so agreeable to the taste as forbidden fruit? Indeed, a thing in itself indifferent may become an object of desire, and its attainment thenceforth pleasant, simply by being forbidden, as we may remember was the case with our first parents in the garden of Eden. the consciousness, again, of duties performed is pleasant, the consciousness of duties unperformed is also pleasant. Things quite indifferent, again, from the moral point of view, may, in certain temperaments, be attended with considerable pleasure. An American lady once confessed to Mr. Emerson that the consciousness of being well dressed imparted to her an inward tranquillity which religion was powerless to bestow. It is unnecessary to multiply instances to show how complex are the conditions of pleasure, and how obscure is its connection with right conduct. Some persons have conceived that all pleasure is but a particular state of the nervous system, and certain it is that some apparently high sorts of pleasure can be produced by purely physical means, opium for place to enter upon a discussion of the difference between pleasure and happiness; but I think Mr. Arnold, after seeing these two passages in juxtaposition, will scarcely consider that I am doing him an injustice if wherever he uses the words "happiness," "joy," "satisfaction," I simply translate "pleasure." 1 "St. Paul and Protestantism," p. 166. The late Dean Mansel used to tell a story of a colonel in the Life Guards who had been at the pains to invent a peculiar gratification of this sort for himself. His servant had to wake him every morning at five o'clock with the reminder that the parade was at six, in order that he might enjoy the satisfaction of saying, "D-n the parade!" and of then turning over and going to sleep again. instance. One of the most erudite students of philosophy in this country once enounced his opinion as follows: "Many a man," said he, " has been reduced to the lowest depths of despondency by an obstruction in the major viscera, and has subsequently been restored to a sense of the Divine favour by a mild course of aperient medicine.” As to the connection of pleasure with right conduct, perhaps, bearing in mind the various experiences with regard to pleasure here adduced, we might hazard a conjecture, that so long as a community is progressive, right conduct, being a series of actions along the lines within which the community is moving, will be for the most part pleasant; and that when the community begins to decline towards stagnation or dissolution, right conduct will encounter rebuffs both within and without, and become unpleasant; and contrariwise, bad conduct that is action which moves within the lines of declension in a community, will begin largely to be pleasant. So that, inasmuch as in every community there are processes of growth going on by the side of and intermingled with processes of decay, we can never count upon virtue being pleasant or vice disagreeable, but must expect each to be sometimes the one and sometimes the other; whilst it is certain that if we make happiness the aim of our endeavours, we are sure to miss it. We see then how difficult and complex this whole question of the connection of pleasure or happiness with conduct is: so that when Mr. Arnold says, "of course" and " undeniably," "we all know," that to righteousness belongs happiness, he is "feigning" in human nature. "a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth." But, in the second place, Bacon says that there are "the idols of the cave," the illusions peculiar to each individual, arising from character, education, circumstances, preferences in study, and the like: and that these things lead a man into " specum sive cavernam quandam individuam," a den or cavern of his own. Let Dogma." It is this. "what is the object of And when we are us examine Mr. Arnold's third fundamental proposition enunciated in "Literature and "When we are asked," he says, religion? let us reply, Conduct." asked further, What is conduct? let us answer, Threefourths of life." As a definition of conduct this is of course only quantitative or arithmetical, and as such is no answer at all to the question, "What is conduct?" It is like saying: "When we are asked what is the object of human anatomy? let us reply, Man's body. And when we are asked further, what is the body? let us answer, From nine to eighteen stone." But Mr. Arnold has told us on the previous page more explicitly what conduct is. After quoting an essay by M. Littré, he says All the impulses which can be conceived as derivable from the instinct of self-preservation in us and the reproductive instinct, these terms being applied in their ordinary sense, are matter of conduct. It is evident this includes, to say no more, every impulse relating to temper, every impulse relating to sensuality; and we all know how much that is. How we deal with these impulses is the matter of conduct-how we obey, regulate, or restrain them-that and nothing else. And he adds It is evident, if conduct deals with these, how important a thing conduct is, and how simple a thing.2 Impulses relating to temper, impulses relating to sensuality-three-fourths of our life are to be occupied with the management of these! "Three-fourths"-this is not a rhetorical way of saying how large, how important a thing conduct is; but it is the expression of an exact proportion, such as we might have in a recipe As the discipline of conduct is three-fourths of life, for our æsthetic and intellectual disciplines, real as these are, there is but one-fourth of life left; and if we let art and science 2 Ibid. p. 17. 1 "Literature and Dogma," p. 18. |