Superior Courts: Common Pleas; Exchequer. dant had therefore delivered them on his default, under the provisions of the R. G., H. T. 4 W. 4, 8.7; 2 Dowl. P. C. 304; Jerv. Rules, p. 105. This was a writ of false judgment, which was not one of the cases specifically alluded to in the rule of Court, but the case of Best v. Prior, 2 Dowl. P. C. 189, was in point. There the plaintiff in error having omitted to deliver paper books, and the defendant having delivered them, the latter was held to be entitled to judgment. Stephen, Serjt., for the plaintiff in error. This case did not fall within the terms of the rule of Court. He cited Fulham v. Bagshawe, 1 B. and P. 292. Tindal, C. J.-The new rules have not interfered with the already existing practice in cases of this kind, but here is a case cited to us, which is in favour of the defendant, and which has good sense on its side. The only question is, whether there is really any difference between the cases of a writ of error, and a writ of false judgment. The writ of error being on the judgment of a Court of record, and the writ of false judgment being on the judgment of a Court not of record. I think that there is no substantial difference. Stephen, Serjt.-Then the plaintiff may now pay for the books. Per Curiam.-Let the money be paid stanter, and the plaintiff may be heard. Dempster v. Purnell, M. Í. 1841. C. P. Court of Exchequer. BANKRUPTCY.-EXECUTION. 95 sufficient execution before the date of the fiat, provided the plaintiff has no notice of a prior act of bankruptcy; and it seems also clear that these executions are not made valid for every purpose, so as to entitle the respective plaintiffs at all events to the benefit of them, but only so far as they would be defeated by an act of bankruptcy prior to the execution, that is the seizure; for all that is done is to make them valid, notwithstanding a prior act of bankruptcy. They are, therefore, placed in the same situation as if no such prior act of bankruptcy had occurred; and in cases of executions otherwise than on a warrant of attorney or cognovit without adverse suit, the effect of this enactment would be to entitle the plaintiff to the fruits of them, for he could be deprived of them only by reason of such act of bankruptcy. But an execution on such warrant of attorney, or cognovit, stands on a different footing, and would have been defeated not only by a prior act of bankruptcy, but by one intervening between seizure and sale, by virtue of 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 108; the construction put on that section by several cases having been, that if the plaintiff was a creditor of the bankrupt at the time of the act of bankruptcy, he had no priority, as he was such creditor of the bankrupt until, by the actual sale of the goods, the sheriff became liable to him for the in-proceeds of the sale. The established distinction by the recent act between execution on a verdict and on a judgment on warrant of attorney, or by confession, was that the plaintiff acquired title against the assignees by seizure only in the former cases; in the latter, by seizure and sale before the act of bankruptcy. So far, then, as the execution on a warrant of attorney would have been invalidated by an act of bankruptcy before seizure, the statute affords a protection; but as the fiat itself issued in this case before the sale, the execution thereby absolutely became inoperative, and for that the statute appears to have provided no remedy. The effect of this provision seems to be, in cases of bond fide contracts, dealings, and executions, to do away with the relation to the act of bankruptcy, and to substitute the issuing of the fiat for the act of bankruptcy, as the time at which the right of the assignees is to accrue. This seems to us to be the fair construction of the words of this enactment; and it is some confirmation of this view of the case, that there is not only no express repeal of the latter part of the 108th section of 6 Geo. 4, but no recital of it as a provision that is to be qualified or altered by the act. The concluding proviso, "Nothing in the act shall be deemed or taken to give validity to any payment made by any bankrupt, being a fraudulent preference of any creditor or creditors of such bankrupt, or to any execution founded on a judgment on a warrant of attorney or cognovit given by any bankrupt, by way of such fraudulent preference," does not warrant the inference that the legislature meant to render valid all executions on such instruments, which were not given by way of fraudulent preference; that enactment (introduced, perhaps, from super The statute 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29, has not the effect of rendering valid a fi. fa. issued on a judgment signed on a warrant of attorney: such execution having been executed by seizure after a secret act of bankruptcy, but not completed by sale of the effects before the issuing of the fiat. This case was argued, and in the present term Parke, Baron, delivered judgment.-The question raised by the pleadings in this case is one of considerable importance; it is this Whether the late statute of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29,a in cases of fiats subsequently to it, has the effect of rendering valid the execution of a fi. fa. on a judgment on a warrant of attorney, so as to entitle the plaintiff to the benefit of it against the assignees, such execution having been executed by seizure after a secret act of bankruptcy, but not completed by sale of the effects seized before the issuing of the fiat, and the warrant of attorney not being given by way of fraudulent preference. The question depends on the true construction of the act. According to the ordinary meaning of the language used in the enactment, it is clear that all executions, whether on judgments on warrants of attorney and confessions or not, are rendered valid to some extent, if bona fide executed or levied; and seizure would be a a See 18 L. O. 229. 93 Superior Courts: Exchequer.-Sittings of the Courts.-Editor's Letter Box. abundant and unnecessary caution) would have an operation by depriving of the benefit of the act all executions on warrants of attorney or cognovits fraudulently given, even although the execution may have been completed by sale as well as seizure before the date of the fiat. We are of opinion, therefore, although we have entertained considerable doubt on the question, that the execution in this case was defeated by the fiat. There is another point of view in which the subject may be considered, but which leads to the same result. It may be that the term "executed or levied," in the statute of Victoria, may be taken, in conjunction with the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 108, to have a different meaning, as applied to one description of executions and another; it may mean with respect to executions on judgments after verdict, executions by seizure only; with regard to those on judgments on warrants of attorney, execution by seizure and selling; if this be the construction of the clause in question, the assignees are still entitled, for the execution was not executed by seizure and sale before the issuing of the fiat. We are of opinion, therefore, that the assignees are entitled, and our judgment must be for the plaintiffs. Whitmore v. Robertson, 12th Nov., 1841. Exch. [Reed and Shaw, plaintiffs' attorneys. Bell, Broderick, and Bell, defendant's attorneys.] CHANCERY SITTINGS. AT LINCOLN'S INN. After Michaelmas Term, 1811. Appeal Motions and Appeals, Dec. 2, 9, 16, 21. Appeals and Causes, Motions and Causes-Dec. 2 Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, and Unopposed Petitions, Short Causes, and Gene- THE EDITOR'S LETTER BOX. The further letters on the Certificate Duty and the Law of Attorney's Bill shall be considered at the first opportunity. the benefit of the proposed aid of J. F. B. R. W. J.; "Sub. Art. ;" and "Civis" shall be attended to. his observations on the cases he refers us. We tion Questions, it would seem that he supposes We were aware at the time, of the case at the Rolls, between a Country Attorney and his London Agent. It does not appear that any decision was made affecting the Law of Attorneys. W. C. S. is informed that Articles expiring on the 6th December will not enable a clerk to go up for examination in the Michaelmas Term preceding, without a special rule of Court. A. B. C., whose articles will not expire till the 21st day of June next, cannot pass his Examination in Trinity Term without the Dec. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, leave of the Court; and he cannot be ad 17, 18, 20. Petitions-Dec. 22. Vice Chancellor of England. Motions-Dec. 2, 9, 16, 21. Unopposed Petitions, Short Causes, and Ad- Further Directions, Imitted till Michaelmas Term, because he must be sworn in open Court. We are informed that the Clerks of Magistrates in London differ in opinion from those in the country, as to the necessity of a 2s. 6d. in lieu of affidavits. stamp, on declaration made before Magistrates See the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 34, printed 22 L. O. 197. The Questions since Trinity Term, 1839, as Dec. 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20.well as before, were printed in the Legal Ób Petitions-Dec. 22. Vice Chancellor Knight Bruce. Dec. 2 Motions and Causes. 9, 16, Motions, Pleas, &c. 21, Motions and General Paper. Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, and Further Directions, Dec. 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20. server immediately after each Examination, and the numbers may be obtained of the publisher. stances. The instances in which the Court has permitted persons to be examined who are not of age are very few, and under special circumin the habit of making orders on many points The Judges sitting at chambers are relating to the Examination, but we think Z. should apply to the Court. He cannot be Unopposed Petitions, Short Causes, and Gene-admitted till he is of age. ral Paper-Dec. 4, 11. 18. Petitions-Dec. 22. A Student at Ashbourne should peruse the work either of Mr. Daniel or Mr. Sidney Smith. The Legal Observer. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1841. "Quod magis ad NOS HORAT. THE PRINCE OF WALES. THE present position of the royal family is new in the history of this country. Queens have reigned before, but they have never been mothers. Princes of Wales have been born and flourished heretofore, but not while their mothers reigned as Queens Regnant. The imperious Elizabeth would admit no partner to her power, or permit herself to feel one particle of that sense of inferiority which the wife must, at times, render to the husband. Mary was married, but although she deluded herself with teeming fancies, was never blessed with children, who might, perhaps, have softened her gloomy disposition. She had but "A barren sceptre in her gripe, Thence to be wrench'd by an unlineal hand, special creation and investiture; but, as the Queen's eldest son, he is by inheritance Duke of Cornwall without any new creation. every de Some question has been raised as to the precedency of the Prince of Wales, so far as Prince Albert is concerned; but this question has been already settled by the royal warrant of the 5th of March, 1840, which ordains that Prince Albert shall upon all occasions and in all meetings, except when otherwise provided by act of parliament, have and enjoy place and precedence next to her Majesty. This leaves the question unsettled as to the precedency of the Prince Albert in the House of Lords and in the Privy Council, but it will give his Royal Highness rank to the Queen every where else; at ceremonials of scription; at royal christenings, marriages, and funerals; at banquets, processions, Anne also was married, but she also investitures; at all religious, civil, and and courtly festivals; at installations and died childless. We have had one King, military celebrations; and upon all other the child of a Queen Regnant, James the occasions formal or social, public or priFirst, but he was taken early, in his in-vate, during the life of her Majesty. On fancy, from his unfortunate mother, and all such occasions, therefore, Prince Albert forms no parallel case to the present one. will rank before both heirs apparent and Time will show how far the novel position heirs presumptive to the throne.b in which the new-born Prince will be placed, will alter the historical relation which the Crown and the Prince of Wales have hitherto borne to each other. The heir apparent by the practice, if not the policy of the constitution, has hitherto been the rallying point for the opposition; and we shall hereafter see whether a mother's fondness will be more powerful than a father's command. The Prince of Wales has always been peculiarly regarded by the law. He is usually made, as in the present case, Prince of Wales and Earl of Chester, by VOL. XXIII.-No. 691. The Gazette of the 7th instant contains an order of her Majesty that Letters Patent should pass the Great Seal for creating his Royal Highness the Prince of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Duke of Saxony, Duke of Cornwall and Rothsay, Earl of Carrick, Baron of Renfrew, Lord of the Isles, and Great Steward of Scotland), Prince of Wales, and Earl of Chester. 8 Rep. 1; Seld. Tit. Hon. 2, 5; Lomax v. Holmden, 1 Ves. sen. 294. b See the question of Prince Albert's precedency considered, 19 L. O. 273, 370. H 98 Distinct Bar for each Court.-Judicial Business.-Law of Joint-stock Companies. EXPEDIENCY OF A DISTINCT BAR FOR EACH COURT. WE adverted in our last Numbera to the necessity of a separate Bar in each Court. The exclusive nature of the Common Pleas Bar, (though occasioning difficulty in cases arising from the Circuits,) and the recent arrangements in the Courts of Chancery are calculated to promote the object. tion. down in Hilary Term, and this transfer would be subject to arrangement hereafter regarding any particular cause." The order has been since placed up in the Registrar's Office, and by referring to the Cause List, at p. 110, post, the effect of this alteration will be seen. The following is a copy of the order : The Lord Chancellor has directed that the causes set down in the book of causes, Some hesitation, however, may be ex- to be heard before the Vice Chancellor of pected amongst Counsel in choosing their England, from "Clifford v. Turrell to Hall respective Courts, and they may not all bev. Rawdon," both inclusive, and which able to come to an immediate determina- were set down in Hilary Term last, be For instance, in the list which we transferred from such book to that of the gave at the commencement of last Term of Vice Chancellor Knight Bruce, and that the Equity Counsel, a few alterations, which they be heard immediately after those we subsequently noticed, took place. To already set down before the Vice Chanthese alterations, however, there should be cellor Knight Bruce. some such limit as adopted on the Circuits. A Barrister who selects his Circuit may change to another, but he can do this once only. So the Metropolitan Leaders should be at liberty to correct a mistaken choice, but within due limits; and we have no doubt these limits will be properly settled by the Members of the Bar themselves. There may be difficulties amongst the Leaders of the Common Law Bar in following the examples we have mentioned; but we trust an attempt will be made by the next Term to apportion the business of the Queen's Bench and the Exchequer. It is clear that the general business of the Court must not be impeded because a few favourite Counsel hold briefs in several Courts at the same time. An Attorney in a difficult or important case is, of course, desirous of securing the most eminent Counsel, so long as the present practice continues, and will take his chance of their being present. We have received some suggestions, which we shall notice hereafter, on this subject. E. D. C. 8th December, 1841. LAW OF JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES. TRANSFER OF SHARES. We have already collected the principal cases relative to the transfer of shares, in our twentieth volume, p. 1, et seq. We then shewed that in the transfer, the regulations of the company must be strictly complied with, in order to divest the holder of all responsibility: any other mode of transfer will not constitute an equitable mortgage. Ex parte Lancaster Canal Company, 1 Dea. & Ch. 411. Where the act or deed of settlement, by which the fer of shares shall be in writing, duly stamped, company is established, provides that the transunder the hands and seals of both parties, and the clause afterwards calls the instrument a "deed or conveyance," and "a deed of sale or transfer," such transfer must, in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, be by deed; and an instrument of transfer of shares, executed of the purchaser in blank, and handed over by by the proprietor of such shares with the name him to the plaintiff, by whom, on the sale of such shares to the defendant, the defendant's name was inserted as the purchaser, is void. A deed with the name of the vendee in blank at the time of sealing and delivery is void. Hibblewhite v. M'Morine, 6 M. & W. 200. In a more recent case, the circumstances were these. The plaintiff in the month of February, 1838, entered into a contract with the defendant, through their respective brokers, Exeter Railway, at 77. 58. per share, and the for the sale of thirty shares in the Bristol and usual contract notes passed between the parties, no time being mentioned for the completion of the purchase. On the 3d of March, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff's brokers requesting them "to despatch the thirty Bristol and Exeter shares forthwith," and they replied the same day, "we herewith send you transfer of thirty Bristol and Exeter shares in blunk.” The Law of Joint-stock Companies. 99 This was accordingly done, and the purchase law, in the absence of custom, prescribes, the money was paid. Calls were subsequently plaintiff might have insisted that he would not made on these shares, and they not being deliver such a blank conveyance as was asked, registered in the name of the defendant, and which might postpone indefinitely the actual the plaintiff remaining the apparent owner of conveyance to a vendee, unless the defendant them, he was compelled to pay the calls. In would indemnify him against all intermediate an action against the defendant for not in- calls; and if that had been done, the plaintiff demnifying the plaintiff for the payments and would have been safe; but this he omitted, liabilities in respect of the calls; it was held, and there is no trace of any evidence of such a that under the above circumstances, there contract having been made or contemplated. was no undertaking implied by law to in- The truth probably is, that the plaintiff did demnify against all subsequent calls, nor any not think of this future liability at all, or if evidence of such an undertaking in point of fact. he did, he thought that the shares would be We extract a portion of the judgment of Mr. sold, after a new call, to a purchaser who Baron Parke as to this. "We are of opinion would take the amount into consideration in that under the circumstances of the case, there fixing the price, and pay the calls to the comwas no undertaking implied by law, to indemnify pany, in order to get the transfer completed. against all subsequent calls, nor any evidence We cannot, therefore, think that the plaintiff of such an undertaking in point of fact. On and defendant ever contemplated such an the 20th of February, 1838, the contract was undertaking as the declaration in this case entered into, which was simply an agreemant subscribes; and that the evidence does not by the plaintiff to sell, and the defendant to warrant the jury in drawing an inference of buy thirty shares, at the price of 71. 5s. per any such engagement. Does the law raise share, no time being specified for the comple- any such contract? We think it does not. tion of the purchase: nor was there any such The plaintiff by his neglect to get the conveystipulation in the contract as the conveyance ance completed, and the transfer entered, beitself would have contained if completed, that comes a trustee for the defendant and his is, that the vendee should be subject from the assigns, and receives the profit, and must pay date of it, or any future time, to the conditions the outgoings; but there is no authority for upon which the vendor held them. If the saying that the law makes any promise by a case had rested upon this contract, the situa- cestui que trust, to a trustee simply to repay tion of the parties would have been this: The all that the trustee may pay on his own account, plaintiff, after shewing a good title to the de- still less on that of the subsequent cestui que fendant, would have had a right to call upon trust." Rule absolute. Humble v. Langston, him to complete his purchase in a reasonable 7 M. & W. 517. time, by preparing a deed in the statutory form; and if the defendant had done so, the plaintiff might then have executed it, and Where, by act of parliament, a joint-stock required the defendant to do the same, and to deliver, or attend with him to deliver, the deed their public officer, he is the proper person to company may be sued through the medium of to the company, that a memorial might be en-be sued, and not the directors, even where the tered into and indorsed on the deed of transfer directors are charged with a gross fraud; at pursuant to the 169th section. If all this had all events, that one only of such directors ought been done, the plaintiff would have been no not to be made a party. Pendlebury v. Walker, longer liable to any call; if the defendant had 4 Yo. & Col. 424. refused to perform his part, he would have subjected himself to an action for the non-performance of that which he omitted to do; and if in consequence of the defendant's breach of his contract, the plaintiff had been obliged to pay future calls, he might have recovered this amount, by way of special damage for the defendant's breach of contract. But in this case the plaintiff did not pursue the course which, according to law, he ought to have done. The defendant appears to have been satisfied with the title, and both the plaintiff and he to have been content, the one to deliver, and the other to accept, a transfer with the name of the vendee in blank; for the purpose, no doubt, of the defendant selling and transferring those shares to another, and filling in the name of some subsequent purchaser from himself; or more probably of handing over the instrument to some purchaser from himself, or receiving the price; for the shares were clearly bought on speculation. On this occasion, when this, probably the customary course, was adopted instead of that which the JOINT STOCK BANKS. COMPENSATION. A mandamus to a railway company, commanding them to summon a jury to assess compensation to a claimant, will not be granted, where it appears that the works calculated to damnify the claimant are still bond fide proceeding, although the applicant also claims for land taken by the company, and considerable delay has taken place since the commencement of the works. Mr. Justice Coleridge said, "The demand here made is for compensation in respect of the land which is taken, and the damage done to that which is left. It is put to me to say, whether this conduct on the part of the company does not amount to a virtual refusal to give compensation. I confess that, from the experience I have had of these applications, I have no doubt, that if this rule was granted, it would be discharged. An applica tion has been made to the company to summon a jury to assess the value of the land taken, and the amount of the injury done by the |