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to have been subsequently acted upon, and may be properly used to explain the character of the enjoyment of the water."
14. Facts showing the existence of any state of mind—such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, illwill or good-will towards any particular person, or showing the existence of any state of body or bodily feeling are relevant, when the existence of any such state of mind or bodily feeling, is in issue or relevant.
existence of state body or bodily feeling.
of mind, or of
Explanation.-A fact relevant as showing the existence of a relevant state of mind must show that it exists, not generally, but in reference to the particular matter in question.
(a). A is accused of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen. It is proved that he was in possession of a particular stolen article. The fact that, at the same time, he was in possession of many other stolen articles is relevant, as tending to show that he knew each and all of the articles of which he was in possession to be stolen.
(6). A is accused of fraudulently delivering to another person a piece of counterfeit coin which, at the time when he delivered it, he knew to be counterfeit. The fact that, at the time of its delivery, A was possessed of a number of other pieces of counterfeit coin, is relevant.
The fact that A had been previously convicted of delivering to another person as genuine a counterfeit coin knowing it to be counterfeit is relevant.
(c). A sues B for damage done by a dog of B's, which B knew to be ferocious. The facts that the dog had previously bitten X, Y and Z, and that they had made complaints to B, are relevant.
(d). The question is, whether A, the acceptor of a bill of exchange, knew that the name of the payee was fictitious. The
fact that A had accepted other bills drawn in the same manner before they could have been transmitted to him by the payee if the payee had been a real person, is relevant, as showing that A knew that the payee was a fictitious person.
(e). A is accused of defaming B by publishing an imputation intended to harm the reputation of B. The fact of previous publication by A respecting B, showing ill-will on the part of A towards B, is relevant, as proving A's intention to harm B's reputation by the particular publication in question. The facts that there was no previous quarrel between A and B, and that A repeated the matter complained of as he heard it, are relevant, as showing that A did not intend to harm the reputation of B.
(f). A is sued by B for fraudulently representing to B that C was solvent, whereby B, being induced to trust C, who was insolvent, suffered loss. The fact that, at the time when A represented C to be solvent, C was supposed to be solvent by his neighbours and by persons dealing with him, is relevant, as showing that A made the representation in good faith.
(g). A is sued by B for the price of work done by B, upon a house of which A is owner, by the order of C, a contractor. A's defence is that B's contract was with C. The fact that A paid C for the work in question is relevant, as proving that A did, in good faith, make over to C the management of the work in question, so that C was in a position to contract with B on C's own account, and not as agent for A.
(h). A is accused of the dishonest misappropriation of property which he had found, and the question is whether, when he appropriated it, he believed in good faith that the real owner could not be found. The fact that public notice of the loss of the property had been given in the place where A was, is relevant, as showing that A did not in good faith believe that the real owner of the property could not be found. The fact that A knew, or had reason to believe, that the notice was given fraudulently by C, who had heard of the loss of the property and wished to set up a false claim to it, is relevant, as showing that the fact that A knew of the notice did not disprove A's good faith.
(i). A is charged with shooting at B with intent to kill him. In order to show A's intent, the fact of A's having previously shot at B may be proved.
). A is charged with sending threatening letters to B. Threatening letters previously sent by A to B may be proved, as showing the intention of the letters.
(*). The question is, whether A has been guilty of cruelty towards B, his wife. Expressions of their feeling towards each other shortly before or after the alleged cruelty, are relevant facts.
(1). The question is, whether A's death was caused by poison. Statements made by A during his illness as to his symptoms, are relevant facts.
(m). The question is, what was the state of A's health at the time when an assurance on his life was effected. Statements made by A as to the state of his health at or near the time in question, are relevant facts.
(n). A sues B for negligence in providing him with a carriage for hire not reasonably fit for use, whereby A was injured. The fact that B's attention was drawn on other occasions to the defect of that particular carriage, is relevant. The fact that B was habitually negligent about the carriages which he let to hire, is irrelevant.
(9). A is tried for the murder of B by intentionally shooting him dead. The fact that A, on other occasions, shot at B is relevant, as showing his intention to shoot B. The fact that A was in the habit of shooting at people with intent to murder them, is irrelevant.
(p). A is tried for a crime. The fact that he said something indicating an intention to commit that particular crime, is relevant. The fact that he said something indicating a general disposition to commit crimes of that class, is relevant.
Purport of the section.-This section seems to apply to that class of cases which is discussed in Taylor on Evidence, 6th Ed., secs. 318-322, that is to say, cases where a particular act is more less criminal or culpable according to the state of mind or feeling of the person who does it: as for instance, in actions of slander,
or false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, where malice is one of the main ingredients in the wrong which is charged, evidence is admissible to show that the defendant was actuated by spite or enmity against the plaintiff, or again, on a charge of uttering counterfeit coin, evidence is admissible to show that the prisoner knew the coin to be counterfeit, because, he had other similar coins in his possession, or had passed such coin before or after the particular occasion which formed the subject of the charge. The illustrations as well as the authorities cited in Taylor show with sufficient clearness the sorts of cases to which this section is applicable. Care should be taken not to extend the operation of this section to other cases where the question of guilt or innocence depends upon actual facts, and not upon the state of a man's mind or feeling. It cannot be proved that a man committed theft or any other crime on one occasion, by showing that he committed similar crimes on other occasions. Vide the remarks of Garth C. J. in Empress v. Vyapooria Moodalyar, I. L. R. 6 Cal. 655. States of mind, knowledge, intention, and the like are among the most important topics with which judicial inquiries are concerned. In criminal cases they are invariably a main consideration; and in civil cases they are often highly material, as for instance, where there is a question of fraud, malicious intention or negligence. The state of mind must be inferred from its cutward manifestations. "The state of mind to be proved must be, not merely a general tendency or disposition towards conduct of a similar description to that in question, but a condition of thought and feeling having distinct, immediate reference to the matter which is under inquiry. The fact that a man is generally dishonest, generally malicious, generally negligent or criminal in his proceedings, does not bear with sufficient directness on his conduct on any particular occasion, or as to any particular matter to make it safe to take it as a guide in interpreting his conduct : what is wanted is a fact which will throw light on his motives and state of mind with immediate reference to that particular occasion or matter. Illustrations (a) and (b) make this clear. A man is accused of receiving stolen goods with guilty knowledge: if he is merely shown to be generally dishonest, the probability of his having been dishonest in this particular transaction is perhaps increased, but only in a vague and indefinite way; but if, at the time, he is found in possession of a number of other stolen articles, this fact throws a distinct light on his knowledge and intentions as to the articles of which he is found in possession. It would be dangerous to infer that because a man was generally dishonest, he was dishonest in any single case; but it is not dangerous to infer that a man, who is found in possession of
50 articles, which are shown to have been stolen from different people, came by each and all in a dishonest manner."-Cunningham's Evidence Act, 120-122.
It is a general principle of law that in criminal as in civil cases, the evidence shall be confined to the point in issue. In criminal proceedings this rule should be more strictly enforced, if possible, than in civil cases, as the consequences of the violation of the rule in criminal matters are more serious than those in civil matters. Mr. Russel in his work on Crimes says that "where a prisoner is charged with an offence, it is of the utmost importance to him that the facts laid before the jury should consist exclusively of the transaction which forms the subject of the indictment, and matters relating thereto, which alone he can be expected to come prepared to answer." This rale prevents a man charged with a particular offence from having either to submit to imputations which in many cases would be fatal to him, or else to defend every action of his whole life in order to explain his conduct on the particular occasion. The illustrations given in this section mention the exceptions which have been generalised from some English cases. They will show that evidence is allowed in criminal cases, to be given of the prisoner's conduct on other occasions, where it has no other connection with the charge under inquiry than that it tends to throw light on what were his motive and intention in doing the act complained of; because, without such evidence, it is difficult to prove the true character of facts which standing alone, might be accounted for, on the supposition of accident, mistake or want of guilty knowledge.
This section enumerates the particular forms of connection constituting relevancy of facts showing the existence of-I, States of mind; II, States of body or bodily feeling. Illustrations (c), (e), (i), (j), (0), (p), have reference to intention; illustrations (a), (b), (d), to knowledge; illustrations (f), (g), (h), to good faith; illustration (k), to ill-will; and illustration (n), to negligence. Illustrations (1) and (m) have reference to states of body. Illustrations (n), (o) and (p) show that no evidence of facts tending to prove general disposition or conduct of a description similar to that in question, can be admitted.
Knowledge.-Mr. Taylor says: "Evidence of this kind (evidence of collateral facts) is very frequently admitted in criminal proceedings. Thus, on an indictment for knowingly uttering a forged document, or a counterfeit bank note, or counterfeit coin, proof of the possession, or of the prior or subsequent utterance, either to the prosecutor himself or to other persons, of other false documents or notes, or bad money, though of a different description, and though themselves the