dominions is genuine and accurate, if the document purports to be certified in any manner which is certified by any representative of Her Majesty or of the Government of India in or for such country to be the manner commonly in use in that country for the certification of copies of judicial records.

An officer who, with respect to any territory or place not forming part of Her Majesty's dominions, is a Political Agent therefor, as defined in sec. 3 of the Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act, 1879, and sec. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a representative of the Government of India in and for the country comprising that territory or place.

In Ghani Mahomed Sarkar v. Tarini Charan Chakravarti, I. L. R. 14 Cal. 546, their Lordships held that there is now no representative of Her Majesty or of the Government of India, residing in Kuch Behar, and consequently, that certified copies of judicial records of that State could not be received in the Courts of British India, under the provisions of this section as it then stood. After the decision of the above case, the latter clause of the section was added by sec. 8, Act III of 1891.

In Srimatty Manmohiny Dassi v. Grish Chundra Bose, 8 M. J. 14, the copy of a foreign judgment, which was sworn to by a witness as having been duly sealed and certified by the Registrar of the Foreign Court, but which was not, according to the present section, certified by the representative of Her Majesty or of the Government of India, was admitted in evidence.

Sec. 13, Explanation 6 of Act X of 1882 (The Code of Civil Procedure) declares that "where a foreign judgment is relied on, the production of the judgment, duly authenticated, is presumptive evidence that the Court which made it had competent jurisdiction, unless the contrary appear on the record, but such presumption may be removed by proving the want of jurisdiction."

87. The Court may presume that any book to which it may refer for information on matters of public or general interest, and that any published map or chart, the statements of which are relevant

facts, and which is produced for its inspection, was written and published by the person, and at the time and place, by whom or at which it purports to have been written or published.

Vide notes to sec. 36 ante.

Presumption as

to telegraphic messages.

88. The Court may presume that a message, forwarded from a telegraph office to the person to whom such message purports to be addressed, corresponds with a message delivered for transmission at the office from which the message purports to be sent; but the Court shall not make any presumption as to the person by whom such message was delivered for transmission.

In England the original message is the best evidence, and in the absence of proof that the original has been destroyed, no copy is admissible in evidence-R. v. Regan (16 Cox. C. C. 203).

Vide sec. 62, Explanation 2, and sec. 63, cl. 2.

89. The Court shall presume that every document, called for and not produced after notice to produce, was attest

Presumption as

to due execution, &c., of docu

ments not pro- ed, stamped and executed in the manner required by law.

duced.

According to the English authorities a document, which is lost, will be presumed to be duly stamped until the contrary is shown-Pooley v. Goodwin, 4 A. and E. 94.

Read along with this section, sec. 66 ante, and sec. 164 post. 90. Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports

Presumption as to documents thirty years old.

to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested.

Explanation.-Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. This explanation applies also to section eighty-one.

Illustrations.

(a). A has been in possession of landed property for a long time. He produces from his custody deeds relating to the land showing his titles to it. The custody is proper.

(b). A produces deeds relating to landed property of which he is the mortgagee. The mortgagor is in possession. The custody is proper.

(c). A, a connection of B, produces deeds relating to lands in B's possession, which were deposited with him by B for safe custody. The custody is proper.

Reason of the Rule.-As ancient documents often furnish the only attainable evidence of ancient possession, the law, on the principle of necessity, allows them to be read in Courts of Justice on behalf of persons claiming under them, and against persons in no way privy to them, provided that they are not mere narratives of past events, but that they purport to have formed a part of the act of ownership, exercise of right, or other transaction to which they relate. No doubt, this species of proof deserves to be scrutinized with care; for, its effect is to benefit those who are connected in interest with the original parties to the documents which are not proved, but are only presumed to have constituted part of the res gesta. Still, as forgery and fraud are, comparatively speaking, of rare

occurrence, and as a fabricated deed will generally, from some anachronism or other inconsistency, afford internal evidence of its real character, the danger of admitting these documents is less than might be supposed; and, at any rate, it is deemed more expedient to run some risk of occasional deception than to permit injustice to be done by strict exclusion of what, in many cases, would turn out to be highly material evidence. On a balance, therefore, of evils, this kind of proof has, for many years past, been admitted, subject to certain qualifications. Vide Taylor's Evi., secs. 593 and 658. This section makes it unnecessary to call the attesting witness, or, indeed, to give any other proof of a deed thirty years old or upwards, and coming from an unsuspected repository; unless, perhaps, when there is an erasure or other blemish in some material part of it. Should the genuineness of the document be for any reason doubtful, it is perfectly open to the Court or jury to reject it, however ancient it may be.

Scope of the Section.-This rule of ancient documents is sometimes stated with the qualifications, provided that possessions be proved to have followed similar documents, or that there is some proof of actual enjoyment in accordance with the title to which the document related. And, certainly, in the case of property allowing of continuous enjoyment, without proof of actual exercise of the right, any number of mere pieces of paper or parchment purporting to be leases or licenses ought to be of no avail. It may be a question whether the absence of the proof of enjoyment consistent with such documents goes to the admissibility or only to the weight of the evidence, probably the latter-Malcolm Aon v. O. Dea, H. L. 393; P. Welties T. 614. Vide Norton's Evidence.

How much credit to be given to such Evidence.-(a). In Phul Bibi v. Gour Saran Das, 18 W. R. 485, Couch C. J. observed: "We feel obliged to say that this reason has not the same weight in this country as it is supposed to have in England, and here less credit should be given to ancient documents which are unsupported by any evidence that might free them from the suspicion of being fabricated. Even in England this evidence when unsupported is of very little weight."

(b). Although ancient documents are admissible in evidence on proof that they have been produced from proper custody, their value as evidence when admitted must depend in each case upon the corroboration derivable from external circumstances, e.g., from the documents having been produced on previous occasions upon which they would naturally have been produced, if in existence at the time,

or from acts having been done under them--Boykant Nath Kundu v. Lukhan Manjhi, 9 C. L. R. 425. In this case Field J. made the following observations: "Our experience in this country tells us that forgery and fraud are not of such rare occurrence in India as they are in England; and therefore it behoves us to scrutinize this kind of evidence with more care in this country than may be necessary in the country with direct reference to which the above quoted remarks (vide Taylor, secs. 593 and 658) were used. Then, further, the possibility of discovering fabrication by an anachronism or other inconsistency is much less in this country than in England. In the first place written instruments are not so common, and the materials for comparison are therefore fewer. Then the care with which a case is prepared for trial, the industry with which evidence is sought out and brought forward are much less, regard being had to the average skill and experience of muffasil practitioners and those agents who have the management of the greater portion of the litigation in the muffasil."

(c). In Trailokia Nath Nandi v. Shurno Chungoni, I. L. R. 11 Cal. 539, Garth C. J. observed: "I need hardly say that the more frequent fraud and forgery are, the more care and caution is necessary in applying this rule, because nothing can be more easy than for an unscrupulous person, who is wrongfully in possession of property, and wants to make out a title to it, to forge a deed in his own favour more than thirty years old, and then produce it himself in Court, and say that, because he is in possession of the land, he must be the proper custodian of the deed, and so relieve himself from the necessity of proving the execution of the instrument."

(d). The degree of credit to be given to a document more than thirty years old, which has been admitted in evidence, depends on circumstances, chiefly on the proof of transactions or states of affairs necessarily, or at least properly or naturally, referable to it-Hari Chintamoni Dikshit v. Moro Lakshan, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 89.

Computation of period of thirty years.-(a). In applying the presumption allowed by this section, the period of thirty years is to be reckoned, not from the date upon which the document is filed in Court, but from the date on which, it having been tendered in evidence, its genuineness or otherwise becomes the subject of proof— Minu Sarkar v. Rhedoy Nath Roy, 5 C. L. R. 135.

Proper Custody.-The following observations of Chief Justice Tindal, in the case of Bishop of Meath v. The Marquess of Winchester, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 183, are worthy of special attention. He, in speaking of documents found in a place in which, and under the