(d). Where two prisoners are tried together for different offences committed in the same transaction, e.g., the one as the thief of certain articles and the other as the receiver of those articles, knowing them to be stolen property, the confession of one cannot be used as evidence against the other-In re A. David, 5 C. L. R. 574.

(e). When two persons are accused of an offence of the same definition arising out of a single transaction, the confession of the one may be used against the other, though it inculpates himself through acts separable from those ascribed to his accomplice, and capable, therefore, of constituting a separate offence from that of the accomplice; and capable, therefore, of constituting a separate offence from that of the accomplice. The object sought by the rule of law is a safeguard for sincerity and for information, and this safeguard equally subsists in the case supposed as where the confession implicates both in an identical act-Queen-Empress v. Nur Mahomed, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 223.

Statement must substantially implicate the person making it. This section means that the statement of fact made by the prisoner, which amounts to a confession of guilt on his part, may be taken into consideration so far, and so far only, as that particular statement of fact itself extends, against the other prisoners who are being tried, as well as himself, for the offence which is thus confessed.* The test that this section intended should be applied to a statement of one prisoner proposed to be used in evidence as against another, is to see whether it is sufficient by itself to justify the conviction of the person making it, of the offence for which he is being jointly tried, with the other persons against whom it is tendered. In fact, to use a popular and well-understood phrase, the confessing prisoner must tar himself and the person or persons he implicates, with one and the same brush.t

(a). Before a confession of a person jointly tried with the prisoner can be taken into consideration against such prisoner, it must appear that that confession implicates the confessing person substantially to the same extent as it implicates the person against whom it is to be used in the commission of the offence for which the prisoners are being jointly tried-The Queen v. Belat Ali Moonshee and others, 19 W. R. Cr. 67.

(b). Statements made by a prisoner before the committing officer, which implicate his fellows, and exculpate himself, cannot be regarded as evidence under this section-The Queen v. Keshub Bhoonia and others, 25 W. R. Cr. 8.

* Queen v. Mohes Biswas, 19 W, R. Cr. 16.

↑ Empress v. Gunraj, I. L. R. 2 All. 444.

(c). The statement of one prisoner cannot be taken as evidence against another prisoner under sec. 30, unless the parties are admittedly in pari delictu, when, that is, the confessing prisoner implicates bimself to the full as much as his co-prisoner whom he is criminating -The Queen v. Baijoo Chowdhry and others, 25 W. R. 43.

(d). Where the confession of a person being tried jointly with other persons did not implicate him to the same extent as it implicated such other persons, and was not sufficient of itself to justify his conviction, held, that such confession could not be taken into consideration under this section, against such other persons-Empress v. Ganraj and others, I. L. R. 2 All. 444.

(e). In the case of Empress v. Mulu, I. L. R. 2 All. 646, it was held, that where a person being tried jointly with other persons made a statement deprecating any guilty knowledge, and seeking to clear himself at the expense of such other persons, such statement could not be taken into consideration under this section.

(ƒ). A prisoner, charged together with others with being a member of an unlawful assembly, made a statement before the committing Magistrate, implicating his fellow-prisoners and another person. He subsequently withdrew this statement, and made another in which he endeavoured to exculpate himself. Held, that the statement was not evidence against the other prisoners under sec. 30, for it was not a confession, as it did not amount to any admission by the prisoner making the statement, that he was guilty in any degree of the offence charged; but was simply an endeavour on his part to explain his own presence on the occasion, in such a manner as to exculpate himself—Noor Bux Kazi v. The Empress, I. L. R. 6 Cal. 279.

(g). If an accused person admits that he witnessed the perpetration of a crime, but denies having participated in it, and alleges that he protested against it, such a statement is not a confession within the meaning of this section-Empress v. Jagrup, I. L. R. 7 All. 646.

(h). To render the statement of one person jointly tried with another for the same offence liable to consideration against that other, it is necessary that it should amount to a distinct confession of the offence charged – Empress v. Daji Warsa and Govind Natha, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 288.

(1). The confession of a person who says he abetted a murder, but withdrew before the actual perpetration of that murder by his associates, cannot be used as evidence against those associates, though the person confessing is tried with them jointly on a charge of murder-Reg. v. Amirta Govinda, 10 Bom. H. C. R. 497.

Corroboration necessary for conviction.-(a). Confessions of persons tried jointly for the same offence may be 'considered' as against other parties then on their trial with them, but such confessions, when used as evidence against others, stand themselves in need of corroboration, and cannot be used to corroborate other evidence against parties not making confessions; tainted evidence is not made better by being in quantity doubled-The Queen v. Jaffir Ali and others, 19 W. R. Cr. 57.

(b). A conviction of a person who is tried jointly with other persons for the same offence cannot proceed merely upon the uncorroborated confession of one of such other persons-Queen-Empress v. Dosa Jiva, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 231.

(c). When the accused was convicted solely on the confessions of his fellow-prisoners, who were tried jointly with him for the same offence, held, that the conviction was bad, such confessions not being evidence within the definition given in sec. 3, and not being sufficient to form the basis of a conviction-Queen-Empress v. Khandia bin Pandu, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 66.

(d). A confession made by a co-defendant is not sufficient to support a conviction, even if corroborated by circumstantial evidence, unless the circumstances constituting corroboration would, if believed to exist, themselves support a conviction. Vide the observations of Jackson and McDonnell JJ., in the case of Empress v. Ashootosh Chuckerbutty, I. L. R. 4 Cal. 483.

(e). A conviction of a person who is being tried together with other persons for the same offence cannot proceed merely on an uncorroborated statement or the confession of one of such other persons-Empress v. Bhawani and another, I. L. R. 1 All. 664; see also (1) Empress v. Ram Chand, I. L. R. 1 All. 675; (2) Queen v. Naga, 23 W. R. Cr. 24 ; (3) Reg. v. Ambigara Halaga, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 163. 31. Admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but they may conclusive proof, operate as estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained.

Admissions not

but may estop.

As to admissions vide sec. 17, ante.

For the provisions as to estoppels refer to secs. 115-117, post.

Effect of Admissions. It is the policy of law to favour the investigation of truth by all expedient means. It is therefore a general doctrine that a party is at liberty to prove that an admission made

by him was mistaken or untrue and he is not estopped by it, unless another person has been induced thereby to act upon it or to alter his condition. The doctrine of estoppel by which further investigation is precluded, being an exception to the general rule and being adopted only for the sake of general convenience and for the prevention of fraud, is not to be extended beyond the reason on which it is founded. A statement made by a party is not ipso facto conclusive against him, though it may be used against him and may be evidence more or less weighty, possibly even conclusive, according to the circumstances of each case and the result come to by judicia investigation.

Instances of Admissions not operating as Estoppels.-(a). It is open to a mortgagor to deny that the money, the receipt of which is formally acknowledged under his hand and seal, was advanced, and to cut it down to a nominal sum or nothing and that being so there was nothing whatever to prevent the defendant from showing the real truth of the transaction-Ram Saran Singh v. Mussamat Pran Peari, 13 Moo. I. A. 551.

(b). Defendants who have represented the fact of an adoption, which they erroneously conclude to be an adoption valid in law, can not be charged with misrepresentation so far as the fact is concerned, and are not estopped from setting up the true facts of the case— Gopilol v. Mussamut Sree Chundraolee Buhoojee, 19 W. R. (P. C.) 12.

(c). The circumstance of a party having in a previous suit admitted the execution of a deed, does not preclude him from contesting its validity and maintaining that it was colorable, not real. See Mussamat Ushrafoonissa Begum v. Babu Gridhari Lal, 19 W. R. 118.

(d). Where the Lower Appellate Court did not allow a defendant in the present suit to deny the truth of admissions made by her in a former case, or to adduce evidence of her own falsehood and deceit, it was deemed to have acted in opposition to the ruling of the Privy Council in a case in which a statement previously put forward in a Court of justice with a view to defeat the claim of the plaintiff was held to be no estoppel to the party's showing the real truth of the transaction. Even where the object of a benami transaction is to obtain a shield against a creditor, the parties are not precluded from showing that it was not intended that the property should pass by the instrument creating the benami, and that, in truth, it still remained with the person who professed to part with it-Srematty Dabia Chowdhrain v. Bimola Sundari Dabi, 21 W. R. 422.

· Brøjendro Cumar Rai Chowdhary v. The Chairman of Dacca Municipality, 21 W. R. 223.

(e). A party claiming under another, who has made admissions to a transaction to which that other was a party, is at liberty to allege and prove that the admissions were made with a fraudulent purpose and were not true, and to show the real nature of the transaction-Sreenath Roy v. Bindoo Bashiny Dabi, 20 W. R. 112.

(f). If the defendants in a boundary suit accepted in a former suit a particular map as correct, their acceptance is legal, though not conclusive evidence against them in the boundary suit, and is tantamount to an admission and stands upon a different footing from the decree in the first suit-Gordon Stuart & Co. v. Bejoy Govind Chowdhary, 8 W. R. 291.

(g). An admission in a previous suit as to the identity of certain lands, though not allowed the effect of an estoppel, was held to cast upon the person who made it, the burden of showing that what was then deliberately asserted, was not the fact-Forbes v. Mir Mahomed Tuki, 5 B. L. R. 540.

(h). An admission before the Registrar of the receipt of purchasemoney, attested by his endorsement, though evidence of the strongest and most reliable description, ought not to be treated as conclusiveMahomed Haneef Meajee v. Mozhur Ali, 15 W. R. 280.

The whole Admission to be considered.-Upon this point refer to he following cases :

(1). Jadunath Rai v. Baroda Kant Rai, 22 W. R. 220.

(2). Niamatullah Khadim v. Himmat Ali Khaddim, 22 W. R.

519.

(3). Tariny Prausad Sen v. Dwarkanath Rakshit, 15 W. R. 451.
(4). Nilmony Sing Deo v. Ramanugraha Rai, 7 W. R. 29.
(5). Pulin Behari Sen v. Watson & Co., (F. B.) 9 W. R. 190.
(6). Radha Charn Chowdhari v. Chundra Mani Sikdar, 9 W. R.

290.

(7). Bycanta Nath Kumar v. Chundra Mohan Chowdhary, 10

W. R. 190.

Non-traverse.-A written statement is not a pleading in confession and avoidance by which the defendant is bound by the confession and so compelled to prove the avoidance. If used against him, as it may be used, the whole statement must be taken together.

(a). The mere fact of non-traverse of the plaintiff's allegation does not amount to an admission of his title, especially in a case where there is a general denial of the plaintiff's allegation which included