able act in revealing it; as e.g., where a man has purposely been made drunk with a view to confession, or where the accused has been tempted to write to his friends, and his letters have been opened, or where he has been led to confess by a false representation that his accomplices have confessed."-Cunningham's Evi. Act, 148.

Promise of secrecy.-A, a fellow-prisoner, said to B, who was in custody for murder, "I wish you would tell me how you murdered the boy, pray split." B replied, "will you be on your oath not to mention what I tell you?" A promised on his oath and then B confessed. B's confession was admitted in evidence-R. v. Shaw, 6 C. and P. 372.

Deception.-(a). In the case of Queen v. Ram Churn Ghose, 20 W. R. Cr. 33, the confession made by the prisoner before the Assistant Magistrate, was objected to, on the ground that the Police-officer practised deception upon the accused before he confessed, saying that the prisoner's brother-in-law had given out that he (prisoner) was guilty. The Judges remarked: "If this amounted to anything at all, it was a deception practised on the prisoner, but though we might disapprove of any deception being practised, sec. 29 expressly says that a confession made in consequence of a deception is not to be excluded. What, it seems to us, we have to consider is not any technical objection of that kind, but whether or no, under all the circumstances of this case, we can fairly trust that the statement made by the prisoner before the Assistant Magistrate was made by him under such circumstances that we may safely rely upon it.”

(b). It is no objection that the confession was made under a mistaken supposition that some of the prisoner's accomplices were in custody, and even though some artifice has been used to draw him into that supposition—R. v. Burley, East. T. 1818.

(c). Where a turnkey was asked by the prisoner if he would put a letter into the post, and, on receiving a promise that he would do so, gave him the letter, which was detained by the turnkey and given in evidence as a confession at the trial; the letter was received in evidence—R. v. Derrington, 2 C. and P. 418.

(d). Where a person took an oath that he would not mention what the prisoner would tell him and the prisoner made a confession, such confession was held admissible in evidence-R. v. Shaw, 6 C. and P. 373.

Drunk. A confession was made by the prisoner while drunk, and to whom liquor was given to cause him to be so. On its being objected that what the prisoner said under such circumstances was not receivable in evidence, Coleridge J. said, "I am of opinion that ́a

statement made by a prisoner while he was drunk is not therefore inadmissible; it must either be obtained by hope or fear. This is matter of observation for me, upon the weight that ought to attach to this statement when it is considered by the jury "-R. v. Spilsbury, 7 C. and P. 187.

Questioning, &c.—(a). A confession is admissible in evidence where it has been elicited by questions put by a person in authorityR. v. Thornton, 1 Moo. C. C. 27.

(b). It does not appear that it makes any difference that the questions put assume the guilt of the prisoner.-Phill. Evi., 10th Ed., 421.

(c). The evidence of a Police-man who overheard a prisoner's statement made in another room, and in ignorance of the Police-man's vicinity, is admissible-Queen v. Sageena, 7 W. R. Cr. 56.

Warning. No warning is necessary to make a confession admissible in evidence. Vide (1)—Queen v. Navadwipa Goswami, 1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 15; (2)—Queen-Empress v. Uzir, I. L. R. 10 Cal. 775. See also sec. 163, Criminal Procedure Code.

Consideration

of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence.

30. When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.

Illustrations.

(a). A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved that A said,--' B and I murdered C.' The Court may consider the effect of this confession as against B.

(b). A is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered by A and B, and that B said,-'A and I murdered C.' This statement may not be taken into consideration by Court against A, as B is not being jointly tried.

Reason of the rule.-This section forms an important exception to the general principle of law that the confession of an accused person is

not evidence against any one but himself. Mr. Jackson J., who was one of the Judges who decided the case of Ashutosh Chuckerbutty, 4 Cal. 483, has given the reason which probably led Sir J. F. Stephen to make this important change in the law. He said, "In truth it seems impossible to avoid in such cases producing an effect upon the mind when a confession is read, extending to every person named in the confession; even the Judge with the best balanced mind conceivable, if he spoke with absolute sincerity and self-examination, would probably admit that his mind was in some degree affected by the confession of one man criminating another, provided that he believed the confessing prisoner to be in the main veracious. It may be, therefore, that the Legislature did wisely in recognizing and taking under its control the impression thus unavoidable, which might actually do more harm if unrecognized."

Infirmity of such evidence.-Until the passing of the present Act such dangerous material as this could not be used as evidence against another accused person; but it must be remembered that such confessions are evidence of a peculiarly infirm and defective character, requiring specially careful scrutiny before they can be taken into consideration, and Judges should bear in mind that an accused person, other than he who has confessed, cannot lawfully be convicted upon such confessions alone, nor ought he be convicted on the ground of such confession being corroborated by circumstantial evidence, unless the circumstances constituting corroboration would, if believed to exist, themselves support a conviction. The Judges of the several High Courts of this country have strictly interpreted the provisions of this section. The following observations should be borne in mind when dealing with such evidence :

(a). Phear J., in the case of The Queen v. Jadu Mondul, 21 W, R. Cr. 69, said: "Until the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, such dangerous material as this (confession of a fellow-prisoner) could not be used as evidence against the accused person, and even by that Act the Legislature only bestowed a discretion upon the Court to take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession." The same Judge, in the case of The Queen v. Naga and others, 23 W. R. Cr. 24, remarked: "And it is obvious that the confessions of co-prisoners are characterized by a very serious infirmity as regards the prisoners against whom they were sought to be used under sec. 30 of the Evidence Act. In addition to the infirmity inherent in an accomplice's testimony, i.e., they are neither sanctioned by an oath, nor can they be tested, developed, or explained by cross-examination, ... it is, we conceive, generally unsafe to use materials of this

character against persons under trial without carefully bearing in mind its special infirmity of character."

(b). In the case of The Queen v. Chunder Bhattacherjee, 24 W. R. Cr. 42, L. S. Jackson J. observed: "The section (sec. 30 of the Evidence Act) does not provide, as has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court, that such confession is evidence, still less does it say that it shall be the foundation of a case against the person implicated. The Legislature very guardedly says that it may be 'taken into consideration,' and I think that the obvious intention of the Legislature in so saying was that, when, as against any such person, there is evidence tending to his conviction, the truth or completeness of this evidence being the matter in question, the circumstance of such person being implicated by the confession of one of those who are being jointly tried with him, should be taken into consideration as bearing upon the truth or sufficiency of such evidence."

(c). In the case of Queen-Empress v. Jagrup and another, I. L. R. 7 All. 646, Straight J. observed: "What was intended (by the Legislature) was, that where a prisoner-to use a popular phrase'makes a clean breast of it,' and unreservedly confesses his own guilt, and at the same time implicates another person who is jointly tried with him for the same offence, his confession may be taken into consideration against such other person as well as against himself, because the admission of his own guilt operates as a sort of sanction which, to some extent, takes the place of the sanction of an oath, and so affords some guarantee that the whole statement is a true one. But where there is no full and complete admission of guilt, no such sanction or guarantee exists; and, for this reason, the word 'confession' in sec. 30 cannot be construed as including a mere inculpatory admission which falls short of being an admission of guilt."

(d). West J., in Empress v. Daji Nasru and Govinda Natha, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 288, remarked: "When a person admits guilt to the fullest extent, and exposes himself to the pains and penalties provided for his guilt, there is a guarantee for his truth, and the Legislature provides that his statement may be considered against his fellow-prisoners charged with the same crime."

(e). In the case of Jaffir Ali, 19 W. R. Cr. 57, Glover J. observed: "Sec. 30, Act I of 1872, introducing as it does an entirely new, and, I am inclined to think, rather dangerous element into the conduct of criminal trials, ought to be construed with great strictness."

Joint trial.-(a). Several prisoners being charged together with house-breaking, some of them pleaded guilty. The Sessions Judge used the confessions made by those who pleaded guilty as evidence

against a prisoner who was tried. Held, that such confessions were not evidence under this section, as the confessing prisoners were not tried at all-Venkatasami and others v. The Queen, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 102. See Empress v. Bala Patel, 1. L. R. 5 Bom. 63.

(b). A confession made by one accused cannot be used as evidence against another, after the person making it has been convicted and sentenced-Reg. v. Kalu Patel, 11 Bom. H. C. R. 146.

(c). This section applies only to cases in which the confession is made by a prisoner tried at the same time with the accused person, against whom the confession is used-Queen v. Sheikh Buxoo, 21 W. R. Cr. 65.

(d). Two persons were jointly tried before the Sessions Judge on a charge of murder. The Sessions Judge examined each of the accused in the absence of the other, making the latter withdraw from the Court during the examination of the former, though without objection from the pleaders of the accused person: Held, that the examination of the accused could be used only against himself, and not against his fellow-accused-Empress v. Lakshman Bala and Bala Ramseth, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 124.

(e). Several persons were charged together with several offences. The Sessions Judge, when about to examine the prisoners, required all but the prisoner under examination to withdraw from the Court, until his turn for examination came round, and convicted each prisoner chiefly upon what was said by his co-prisoner during his absence from the Court. Held, that the evidence so given was inadmissible-The Empress v. Chundranath Sarkar, I. L. R. 7 Cal. 65.

Same offence. (a). The confession of one person is not admissible in evidence against another, although the two are jointly tried, if one is tried for the abetment of the offence for which the other is on his trial-The Queen v. Jaffir Ali and others, 19 W. R. Cr. 57.

(b). Upon the trial of A for murder, and B for abetment thereof, a confession by A implicating B cannot be taken into consideration against B under this section-Badi v. The Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 579.

(c). Statements made by one set of prisoners criminating another set of prisoners, when each individual prisoner made a case for himself on which he was free from any criminal offence, ought not to be taken into consideration against the prisoners of the second set, when the two sets, although tried together, were tried upon totally different charges-Queen v. Bunwarilol, 21 W. R. Cr. 55.