into the Roman Catholic Church. Mr. Connelly subsequently took holy orders in that Church, and Mrs. Connelly became the superioress of a community of religious women founded by her at Derby, and afterwards removed to Hastings, both parties having previously taken a solemn vow of perpetual chastity. In December, 1847, Mrs. Connelly also took the vows of poverty and obedience, her husband having in the first instance given his assent, but afterwards protested against it, on the ground that he was responsible for any debts which she might contract. In January, 1848, Mr. Connelly went to Hastings, where he demanded an interview with his wife, who declined to see him, whereupon the present proceedings were instituted. The laws of the Roman Church applicable to the case were stated by Mrs. Connelly to be applicable to the question at issue between the parties in this cause, derived from and regulated by its written laws or canons in that behalf, and of which the principal are to be found in the Decretals, liber 3, title 32. That a husband and wife post matrimonium consummatum may lawfully separate by mutual consent, in order that they may enter into religion. That a separation founded on such mutual consent and for such purpose, though not annulling such matrimonium consummatum, debars the parties in perpetuum ab omni usu ejusdem, and from that time forth alter alterum repetere non potest. That such separation must be approved of and allowed by the Pope, and his rescript, being a conditional sentence in the first instance, has all the force of a judicial sentence when the conditions are fulfilled. Admitting such to be the law by

which the Roman Catholic subjects of Rome were governed, what was the effect of it as applicable to American subjects being Protestants at the time of marriage, and afterwards abjuring that faith, and being admitted members of the Roman Catholic Church, the husband taking orders in that Church? In order to make that law binding in this country it must be shown that it had been received here. In questions of marriage contract the lex loci contractus was that which was to determine the status of the parties, but it was not known, nor had cases been cited to show, that those laws which were applicable to a particular state, and were not part of the jus gentium, were necessarily taken notice of by other countries. It was not sufficient, therefore, to say that the law of Rome had decided so and so; it must be shown that the law of Rome for that purpose was the law of this country. The Court must not look to the law of Rome, nor to the law of the United States of America, but to the law of England for the rights, obligations, and duties which proceeded from the relation of husband and wife. What was the law of this country with respect to the rights, duties, and obligations arising from the contraction of marriage? One obligation undoubtedly was the cohabitation of the parties. The law would not permit them voluntarily to separate themselves from each other. Separation could only be effected by a judicial sentence. Ecclesiastical Courts paid no attention to deeds of separation, but set them aside and pronounced for that restitution of conjugal rights which was sought either by the one party or the other. What was the distinction attempted to be made in the present case? It was said the

dant and gave him notice that he wished to be married the next morning. The defendant inquired of Fisher if he had been baptized, to which he answered that he had. The defendant then inquired if he had been asked in church? Fisher said "No, at the board of guardians." The defendant then asked if he had been confirmed? Fisher said no, he had not, and then the defendant said he would have nothing to do with him, and that, as he had been asked at the board of guardians, the board of guardians might marry him. Prior to the expiring of the time during which the certificate is valid, formal application was made to the defendant, who still refused, saying, "I will marry you when you have expressed a desire to be confirmed, not otherwise." This was a denial of the ceremony to him, and the parties were still unmarried. Taking, then, these to be the facts, he understood the refusal of the defendant was thus grounded-that according to the marriage service in the Book of Common Prayer they would see that the rubric at the end of it admonished or recommended parties to partake of the holy communion at a nient" time, or as soon as they conveniently could; and he believed the argument for the defendant would be, that inasmuch as a person not confirmed was not in a state to partake of the holy communion, Mr. James considered this declaration of the rubric as an injunction addressed to him, and that it was his duty not to marry parties who were not in a state to become partakers of the holy communion. Could such a doctrine contravene the express direction of an Act of Parliament? How could a Dissenter get married at all prior to VOL. XCII.

66 conve

His Lordship.-So they have kept you in a state of sin in order to try this cause. Very well; if that is not a sin, I don't know what is. It is disgraceful. At the present day there is a determination to drive everything to extremities. Perhaps the young man won't marry you now.

Witness.-Yes, he will.

Henry Fisher was recalled, and, in answer to the learned counsel for the prosecution, said, he was living with the girl and had not married her until this cause was tried because of his own personal feeling in one sense, and because it was ordered he should not be married till this was settled.

The Attorney-General.-Who ordered you?

Witness.-Why, I had warning from the Registration-Office. Y

the absence of any evidence to show that he had been actuated by any corrupt or fraudulent motive, he was entitled to assume that the defendant's motives had been of an honourable character. Second marriages of a kind like the one now in question were not at all rare, and it would be too harsh to say that every person who for an honourable purpose shall be married a second time, and should represent himself and his wife as single persons, could be convicted under the Act of wilfully making a false statement for the purpose of causing the marriage to be inserted in the register. The learned counsel instanced the case of Lord Eldon, who, having been married in Scotland, was again married in England, according to the rites of the church of England, and represented himself on that occasion as John Scott, bachelor; and his wife as Elizabeth Surtees, spinster.

Lord Campbell, in summing up, said it was for the jury to say whether, upon the evidence, they were prepared to come to the conelusion that the defendant had made the statement wilfully, within the meaning of the Act of Parliament. Before the jury could find the defendant guilty they must be persuaded that he was not actuated by good motives. If the defendant did what he did without any intention to injure any human being—if for some reason he wanted to have the marriage solemnized and registered a second time, and was acting fairly towards all the world, the mistake which he made would not subject him to this indictment. The false statement which the defendant was charged with making was that he himself was a widower, and that Lady

Dunboyne was a widow, when, in point of fact, they were man and wife. If a second marriage was to take place at all, he (Lord Campbell) was at a loss to know how the marriage was to be registered in any other fashion, for the parties could not be described as Lord and Lady Dunboyne. If there had been any motive to defraud any human being, or to injure any children who might have been born, the case might have been different; but no bad motive was suggested. If the jury should be of opinion that Lord Dunboyne, for any good motive, wished to be married a second time and to have the marriage registered, and at the time had no notion that he was doing wrong, the jury were at liberty to say that he was not guilty upon this indictment.

The Jury found the defendant "Not Guilty."

CIVIL CAUSES. SUMMER ASSIZES-STAFford.

July 30.