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BROOKS AND ANOTHER (apps.) v. HAMLYN AND OTHERS (resps.).
their rights of pasturage, which they had always claimed existed over the land in dispute and still believed did actually exist, and that she told respondents' agents at that time that she would not allow the hedge to be built there as that would deprive her of her rights.
On cross-examination she deposed that many years since she lived in another leasehold house for which they also claimed a right on Fernworthy Down, and that she removed to her present abode in 1897 and supposed she claimed the right in respect thereof, the lease of the other having expired, and that others besides her had grazed their cattle there. She remembers about two years ago having received a communication from Messrs. Ford, solicitors for the late Mr. Hamlyn, father of one of the respondents, F. G. S. Hamlyn, to the effect that her cattle would be impounded if not cleared off by the following Monday at twelve o'clock, and that on receipt of such message she and her family on the morning of the Monday in question turned their cattle on the down, and that none of such cattle were impounded as threatened in the communication so received.
The appellant, Jane Stanbury, admitted knocking down the hedge, on the ground that it was part of the commons of Dartmoor, and that she herself could remember having pastured her cattle there for over thirty-four years, and that her mother had also grazed her cattle there, and she claimed to have a right of pasture thereon. She further admitted having pulled down the hedge on the 8th Dec. last as it was being erected, telling the respondents' agents she had a right there and should tear it down again; and, further, that she would not have knocked it down unless she believed they really had that right. Further, that she had fetched water from the place in question for a like number of years. On crossexamination she deposed that she claimed the right as a leaseholder of the cottage.
Further evidence was adduced by the appellants to show that grazing rights had been exercised for a quarter of a century by many persons-that ferns for bedding cattle had been taken from the down fifty years ago, but one of the witnesses admitted that the down was separated from Dartmoor by the King's Wall.
Evidence was also adduced on behalf of the appellants by one George Lavis, who was sixtyeight years of age, to the effect that he had been acquainted with Vale and Fernworthy for up to eight years since, and that the down was known as Vale Down and not Fernworthy Down, and that he himself considered that he had the right to put cattle on the land sought to be enclosed and had exercised that right, and, further, had never been applied to for rent in respect thereof. That, on one occasion on missing his cattle from the ground in question, he made enquiries and ascertained that they had been impounded by Michael Davey, one of the present respondents, who claimed 18. 6d. poundage which he paid, but did not know where the cattle had been taken from.
It was contended on the part of the respondents that a profit à prendre in alieno solo could not be claimed by custom nor by prescription by occupiers, nor a common in gross unless under an express grant to parties capable of taking a grant, which merely occupiers could not do, it
having been shown that the appellants were only leaseholders under one of the respondents, and that the claims they set up could not exist in law.
It was contended on the part of the appellants, that in the face of the evidence of the respondents that the action was brought to find out whether the appellants had any right over Fernworthy Down, and as the appellants had, in destroying the fence, acted under a bonâ fide belief that they were exercising their lawful rights, which rights were, either that they had a right of common or had gained such a right by prescription under the prescription Act, the justices should have declined to proceed with the hearing.
That such a claim was neither unreasonable nor impossible in law, and that it was the claim of right, and not the right itself which the justices had to consider and that if that right appeared to be a bona fide and reasonable one, whether it actually existed or not, the jurisdiction of the justices was ousted, quoting in support of such contention the case of Scott v. Baring (72 L. T. Rep. 495).
The justices were of opinion that the defendants were mistaken in their action as the rights they claimed could not exist in law, and convicted the appellants.
The questions of law arising for the opinion of the court were: (a) Whether the claim of the appellants was a bona fide and reasonable one and one that was not absurd or impossible in point of law; (b) Whether the justices were estopped from inquiry into the merits of the case; (c) Whether the jurisdiction of the justices was ousted.
Lawrence (Duke, Q.C. with him) for the appellants.
Bodilly (Foote, Q.C. with him), for the respondents.
LAWRENCE, J.-I think that the magistrates were quite right. This is not a question of bonâ fide rights at all, but the question is whether the claim was fair and reasonable? I think that White v. Feast (26 L. T. Rep 611) is a case in point, where the conviction was upheld. could there be here a fair and reasonable claim of right? It is clearly impossible. They could not claim as against their landlord. For myself, I do not think that there was even a bona fide claim of right.
CHANNELL, J.-I agree, and I also think that if the case were not even brought under the special proviso in the Act, yet the jurisdiction of the magistrates would not have been ousted, but as it is brought under the proviso, à fortiori their jurisdiction is not ousted, because, not only a bona fide claim, but a reasonable one must be shown. All the claimants were the tenants of the respondents, who owned the land over which the right was claimed. Therefore, they could have no right by prescription aginst the landlord, 'ut only by the terms of their leases, which give no such rights. No such rights are given at all by the terms of the tenancy. A claim outside those are clearly impossible. Appeal dismissed.
Solicitors for the appellants, Law and Worssam, for Bond and Pearce, Plymouth.
Solicitors for the respondents, Field, Roscoe, and Co., for Peter and Son, Launceston.
PEASE AND OTHERS (pets.) v. Lowden anD OTHERS (resps.).
Tuesday, Jan. 17, 1899.
(Before WRIGHT and BRUCE, JJ.) PEASE AND OTHERS (pets.) v. LOWDEN AND OTHERS (resps.). (a)
Election-Aldermen of borough-Vote-Outgoing alderman-Municipal Corporations Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict, c. 50) ss. 14, (6), (7), 36, 60. Sect. 14 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 provides for the retirement by rotation of a certain number of aldermen.
Sect. 36 allows the holder of any corporate office to resign on giving notice in writing to the town clerk and paying a fine, and in such a case the council shall declare the office vacant, and after signifying the same by notice, the office shall become vacant.
Sect. 60 provides for the election of new aldermen
and says “(3) an outgoing alderman, although mayor elect, shall not vote."
The 9th of Nov. is the ordinary day for the election of aldermen for a borough.
At 5p.m. on the 8th Nov., J. T, one of the outgoing aldermen, gave the town clerk notice in writing of his resignation of office and paid the fine. There was no meeting of the council till noon on the 9th Nov., when J. T. was elected mayor. Upon the election of the new aldermen J. T. voted. Held, that although he had given notice of resignation and paid the fine on the 8th Nov. he was "an outgoing alderman" and could not vote. SPECIAL case.
The 9th Nov. 1898 was the ordinary day of election of aldermen of the borough of Pontefract, and on that day one-half of the whole number of aldermen for the borough were, pursuant to sect. 14 sub-sects. 6 and 7 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 to go out of office and their places were to be filled by election. The three aldermen who were thus to go out of office were Thomas Wadswater, George Grandidge, and, subject to the question hereinafter raised, Joseph Taylor.
At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 8th Nov. 1898 Joseph Taylor paid the town clerk the fine provided for the non acceptance of office and delivered to him a notice in writing resigning his position as alderman.
No meeting of the council had been called by the mayor or requisitioned by members of the council for either the 8th or 9th Nov. 1898. No such meeting was held on either of the days. The quarterly meeting of the council was duly held at noon on the 9th Nov. 1898. On the 4th Nov. 1898, a summons to attend the said quarterly meeting was duly delivered at the usual place of abode of each councillor. Such summons specified the business proposed to be done at such quarterly meeting, viz.: (1) the election of mayor, (2) the election of three aldermen, (3) the appointment of (a) returning officers, (b) monthly and quarterly council meeting, (c) committees.
No business was transacted or attempted to be transacted at these quarterly meetings other than that specified in the summons. The council did did not before or at the quarterly meeting declare the office of alderman which Joseph Taylor had resigned or purported to resign vacant, nor did the council signify the same by notice in writing signed by three members of the council and
(a) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
[Q.B. DIV. countersigned by the town clerk and fixed on the town ball.
The first business transacted at the quarterly meeting was the election of mayor. Joseph Taylor was duly elected and accepted office and made and subscribed the required declaration. Thereupon he became, as mayor, chairman of the quarterly meeting. There being no sheriff in the borough, the election of aldermen was held immediately after the election of mayor.
At the election of aldermen, the candidates for the three vacancies were respectively the three petitioners and the three respondents. At the election, the aldermen and the councillors entitled to vote to the number of 21, voted by signing and delivering to Joseph Taylor the chairman, voting papers, and he added to the voting papers so delivered a voting paper signed by himself and containing or purporting to contain one vote for each of the respondents. Upon counting the votes it was found that 11 (including those of Taylor) purported to be given to each of the respondents, and 11 to each of the petitioners. Thereupon Joseph Taylor gave a casting vote in favour of each of the respondents and declared each of them to be duly elected.
If Joseph Taylor was not entitled to vote at the election on the ground that he was an outgoing alderman" within the meaning of sect. 60, subsect. 3, then the lawful votes for the various candidates would have been 11 votes for each of the petitioners and ten votes for each of the respondents.
Robson, Q.C. (S. H. Day with him) for the petitioners. Mr. Taylor was an outgoing alderman within sect. 60 of the Municipal Corporations. Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50). His resignation under sect. 36, which he purported to carry out, was not complete until all the terms of that section had been complied with. Until that was done, although he could not act, his office was not vacant, and so at the meeting, on the 9th Nov., he was an outgoing alderman, and could only vote for the mayor. In the case of Hardwicke v. Brown (28 L. T. Rep. 502; L. Rep. 8 C. P. 406), by sect. 52 of the Municipal Corpora. tions Act 1835, it was enacted that any councillor who compounds with his creditors by deed, shall "thereupon immediately become disqualified, and shall cease to hold the office of such councillor," and the council shall thereupon declare the office void, and shall signify the same by notice, &c., and the office shall thereupon become void.” In July a councillor made a composition, and on the 4th Nov. placed his resignation in the hands of the town clerk. Later he offered himself for re-election. On the 9th Nov. the resignation was accepted by the council, and on the 18th Nov., there having been no declaration by the council that the office was void, he was re-elected. it was held that the councillor was incapable of resigning, and the council not having pursued the course under sect. 52, the election was void. Although under the old statute the case is in point. He also referred to
Reg. v. The Mayor of Welshpool, 35 L. T. Rep. 594. Jelf, Q.C. (E. A. Jelf with him) for the respon dents. There can be two sorts of vacancies, the one caused by a retirement in rotation, and the other by retirements such as under sect. 36 or by death. On resignation Mr. Taylor had ceased to
Q.B. DIV.] WEST LANCASHIRE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL (apps.) v. OGILVY (resp.). [Q.B. Div.
be an alderman. By the Act an outgoing alderman can vote for the new mayor; but Mr. Taylor could not have done so as he had resigned and was no longer an alderman. This resignation is final and cannot be withdrawn, as is shown by the case of
Reg. v. The Mayor of Wigan, 52 L. T. Rep. 435; 14 Q. B. Div. '908.
There it was held that when a person has complied with sect. 36 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 the resignation is completed by the delivery of the writing to the town clerk and payment of the fine, and cannot afterwards even with the assent of the corporation be withdrawn. The cases cited by the other side are on the old statutes.
Robson, Q.C. in reply.
WRIGHT, J.-In this case it seems tolerably elear that on the 9th Nov. Mr. Taylor was in the condition of a person who has resigned the office of alderman, but whose office was not vacant. But it is not so clear that an election might have been held. It is provided by the 36th section of the Municipal Corporations Act 1888 that “a person elected to a corporate office may at any time by writing signed by him and delivered to the town clerk resign the office on payment of the fine provided for non-acceptance thereof." That conferred the power of resignation. Then by subsect. 2 it is provided: "In any such case the council shall forthwith declare the office to be vacant and signify the same by notice in writing signed by three members of the council and countersigned by the town clerk and fixed on the town-hall, and the office shall thereupon become vacant." It was held in the case of Reg. v. The Mayor of Wigan (52 L. T. Rep. 435; 14 Q. B. Div. 908) that resignation could not be withdrawn, and was complete upon the delivery of the writing, and the payment to the town clerk of the fine. But upon the plain construction of sect. 36, although a man cannot vote or act, the office is filled until the council have declared a vacancy. The effect of that section having regard to what has happened in the present case, is that, although Mr. Taylor was unable to act as alderman, the office still remains filled up. The fact that the council ought to have declared a vacancy but had not done so, does not create a vacancy. Now, how is this to be applied to sect. 60? That section says: "(1) The ordinary day of election of alder. men shall be the 9th Nov., and the election shall be held at the quarterly meeting of the council. (2) The election shall be held immediately after the election of the mayor, or, if there is a sheriff, the appointment of the sheriff. (3) An outgoing alderman, although mayor elect, shall not vote. (6) In case of equality of votes the chairman, although as an outgoing alderman or otherwise not entitled to vote in the first instance, shall have the casting vote." That section gives the time and mode of election of the aldermen. The question that arises here is the meaning of the words " an outgoing alderman, although mayor elect, shall not vote." Mr. Jelf says that as Mr. Taylor had no vote as an alderman, he was not within the purview of the section. He was not an outgoing alderman, and was therefore entitled to vote when elected mayor. There is some force in the argument, but I do not think that this is so, and the more reasonable construction of the
(Before LAWRANCE and CHANNELL, JJ.) THE WEST LANCASHIRE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL (apps.) v. OGILVY (resp.). (a) Local government-Water supply-Supply provided within reasonable distance of dwellinghouse-Communication of such supply to house -Liability of owner for whole cost-Limit of cost fixed by Local Government Board-Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 62Public Health (Water) Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 25), ss. 3, 8.
Where a rural sanitary authority, acting under the provisions of sect. 3 of the Public Health (Water) Act 1878, have brought a supply of water within a reasonable distance of a dwelling. house within their district which has no proper supply of water, they are then empowered under sect. 62 of the Public Health Act 1875 to require the owner of the house to make a communication of such supply to his house, and, if he fails to do so, the local authority may themselves make the communication to the house, and recover from the owner the whole expenses of so doing, although such expenses exceed the limit or scale of charges fixed by the Local Government Board under sect. 8 of the Public Health (Water) Act 1878, as the provisions of sect. 3 of that Act and the limits of cost thereunder do not apply to the cost of communicating the supply from a reasonable distance to the house, but only to the cost of bringing the supply to a reasonable distance from the house.
CASE stated by justices of the peace for the county of Lancaster sitting at Croston on the 13th July 1898
The respondent was summoned upon the complaint of the West Lancashire Rural District Council (the appellants) to show cause why an order should not be made for payment by him to the appellants of the sum of 6l. 10s. 5d., being the balance of expenses incurred by them in executing works for obtaining and furnishing a supply of water for or in respect of premises situate at Holmeswood, Tarleton, in the West Lancashire Rural Sanitary District, of which the respondent was at the time of the execution of such works the owner.
Upon the hearing of the summons, the following facts were admitted :
The appellants are the local authority, within the meaning of that term as defined by sect. 4 of the Public Health Act 1875, for the rural sanitary district of West Lancashire, and the respondent is and was the owner of the dwelling-house, farm, and lands known as Shortwood Hall, in that district.
(a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law
Q.B. DIV.] WEST LANCASHIRE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL (apps.) v. OGILVY (resp.). [Q.B. Div.
In the year 1897, the appellants, acting under the powers conferred upon them by the Public Health Act 1875, provided a supply of water for a portion of their district, namely, the township of Tarleton, in which township the respondent's premises are situate, and (inter alia) laid down, at a cost of about 3407., a 3in. water main or pipe in a highway known as Marsh-lane, for the supply of premises belonging to the respondent, and 'known as Mere House, Holmeswood Hall, and Fells Farm, as well as Shortwood Hall.
There was no invitation to the appellants on the part of the respondent to furnish such supply.
In order to provide a supply of water for the respondent's premises known as Fells Farm and Shortwood Hall, the appellants laid in a public footpath leading from Marsh-lane to Fells Farm to a point about 293 yards from Shortwood Hall a branch main or pipe, which was connected with a main or pipe in Marsh-lane.
The footpath is upon land of which the respondent is the owner, and the land between such footpath and Shortwood Hall is also the property of the respondent.
The mains so laid by the appellants are connected with other mains forming part of the appellants' water system to Marsh-lane. and by means of such mains water could on the 5th Oct. 1897 have been furnished to Shortwood Hall had it been connected there with by means of service pipes and the necessary fittings to such pipes.
By an order, dated the 19th June 1897, the Local Government Board, in pursuance of sect. 8 of the Public Health (Water) Act 1878, duly fixed a general scale of charges for the compulsory supply of water to houses within the area of that part of the West Lancashire Rural Sanitary District which comprises the township of Tarleton, and determined and declared that the charge for a supply of water according to the scale so fixed should be deemed to be a reasonable cost within the meaning of sect. 62 of the Public Health Act 1875 and sect. 8 of the Public Health (Water) Act 1878.
On the 5th Oct. 1897 the appellants' surveyor examined Shortwood Hall and found that it was without a proper supply of water, and he reported such fact to the appellants, and also reported that a proper supply of water could be furnished thereto at a cost not exceeding the scale of charges authorised by the order of the Local Government Board.
The appellants being satisfied on the report of their surveyor that the respondent's house, Shortwood Hall, was without a proper supply of water, and that such supply could be furnished thereto by them at a cost not exceeding the scale of charges authorised by the order of the Local Government Board, resolved that notice in writing be given to the respondent requiring him to obtain such supply and to do all such works as might be necessary for that purpose, and in pursuance of the resolution, notice, dated the 16th Oct. 1897, was served upon the respondent requiring him within the space of fourteen days to obtain a proper supply of water for his house, and to do all such works as might be necessary for that purpose and provide and lay a branch pipe from the appellants' main and affix a tap thereto on his premises.
The respondent not having complied with this notice, the appellants on or about the 17th May 1898 caused the works necessary for obtaining a proper supply of water to Shortwood Hall from their main in the footpath to be executed, and in so doing incurred expenses amounting to the sum of 191. 10s. 5d., which sum was demanded by the appellants from the respondent, who paid to the appellants the sum of 131., which he stated was in his opinion the maximum an owner could be required to pay, at the same time stating that he must not be taken as admitting that, under the proceeding adopted by the appellants, they were entitled to charge the owner any part of the costs of the works.
On behalf of the appellants it was contended before the justices that upon the foregoing facts they had power under sect. 62 of the Public Health Act 1875, having first provided an available supply of wholesome water within about 293 yards of the respondent's premises, to require the respondent to obtain a proper supply of water to Shortwood Hall and to execute the works necessary for that purpose, and, upon his default, to execute such works themselves and recover the whole expense incurred by them in executing the works from the respondent; that, with the exception of the provision that it was the appellants' duty under sect. 3 of the Public Health (Water) Act 1878 to see that the respondent's house had within a reasonable distance an available supply of wholesome water sufficient for the consumption and use for domestic purposes of the inmates of the house, the provisions of such lastmentioned section did not apply; and that there was an available supply of such water within a reasonable distance of the respondent's house.
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the appellants could not recover a greater sum for putting the water on the premises of the respondent than the sum of 137., paid by the respondent, being the maximum amount allowed to be charged under the provisions of the Public Health (Water) Act 1878, and that the appellants could not in this case proceed under sect. 62 of the Public Health Act 1875, but should have proceeded under sect. 3 of the Public Health (Water) Act 1878.
The justices were of opinion that the effect of sect. 3 of the Public Health (Water) Act 1878 was that the appellants were not entitled to recover from the respondent a greater amount than 131., and, such sum having been paid by the respondent to the appellants, they decided to dismiss the summons and accordingly did so.
The question for the opinion of the court was, whether or not the justices were right in their decision.
The Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55) provides :
Sect. 62. Where on the report of the surveyor of a local authority it appears to such authority that any house within their district is without a proper supply of water, and that such a supply of water can be furnished thereto at a cost not exceeding the water rate authorised by any local Act in force within the district, or, where there is not any local Act, at a cost not exceeding twopence a week, or at such other cost as the Local Government Board may, on the application of the local authority, determine under all the circumstances of the case to be reasonable, the local authority shall give notice in writing to the owner, requiring him, within a time therein
STEPHENSON (app.) v. W. J. ROGERS LIMITED (resps.).
specified, to obtain such supply, and to do all such works as may be necessary for that purpose. If such notice is not complied with within the time specified, the local authority may, if they think fit, do such works and obtain such supply and any expenses incurred
by the local authority in doing any such works may be recovered in a summary manner from the owner of the premises.
The Public Health (Water) Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 25) provides:
Sect. 3. It shall be the duty of every rural sanitary authority, regard being had to the provisions in this Act contained, to see that every occupied dwellinghouse within their district has within a reasonable distance an available supply of wholesome water sufficient for the consumption and use for domestic purposes of the inmates of the house. Where it appears to a rural sanitary authority on the report of their inspector of nuisances, or their medical officer of bealth, that any occupied dwelling-house within their district has not such supply within a reasonable distance, and the authority are of opinion that such supply can be provided at a reasonable cost not exceeding a capita sum the interest on which at the rate of five per centum per annum would amount to twopence per week, or at such other cost not exceeding a capital sum the interest on which at the rate of five per centum per annum would amount to threepence per week, as the Local Government Board may, on the application of the local authority, determine under all the circumstances of the case to be reasonable, and that the expense of providing the supply ought to be paid by the owner or defrayed as private improvement expenses, proceedings may be taken as follows:
Then sub-sects. 1 and 2 provide for the serving hy the authority of certain notices upon the owner of the house; and sub-sect. 3 provides that, if at the expiration of one month from the date of the second notice the requirements of the authority are not complied with, the authority may themselves provide the supply; and subsect. 4 provides :
Any expenses incurred by the authority in providing such supply and doing such works may, when the supply has been provided, be recovered in a summary manner from the owner of the house, or may, at the option of the authority, be declared, by their order, to be private improvement expenses.
And the section ends with this proviso:
Provided that nothing in this section contained shall be deemed to relieve the authority from the duty imposed upon them by the Public Health Act 1875, of providing their district, or any contributory place, or part of a contributory place therein with a supply of water in cases where danger arises to the health of the inhabitants from the insufficiency or unwholesomeness of the existing supply, and a general scheme of supply s required, and such supply can be got at a reasonable cost.
Sect. 8. Where application is made to the Local Government Board by a local authority under sect. 62 of the Public Health Act 1875, to determine what is a reasonable cost within the meaning of that section, the board may for that purpose fix, by order, a general scale of charges for the whole or any part of the district of the local authority, and the cost of the supply of water to any house within the area specified in the order shall be deemed to be determined to be a reasonable cost within the meaning of that section if it does not exceed the cost authorised by such general scale of charges.
R. Cunningham Glen for the appellants.
MAG. CAS.-VOL. XIX.
LAWRANCE, J.-I do not see how this case can be sent back to the magistrates, as has been suggested, for them to say whether the place to which the local authority had brought the supply of water was a reasonable distance or not from this dwelling-house. It seems to me that sect. 3 of the Act of 1878 does not apply, because, in the opinion of the local authority, there was a supply of water within a reasonable distance. If the respondent had been dissatisfied as to that, his proper remedy would have been to appeal to the Local Government Board under sect. 268 of the Public Health Act 1875. Sect. 3 of the Act of 1878 not applying to the case, the appellants are entitled to our judgment.
CHANNELL, J.-The view I take of sect. 62 of the Act of 1875 is that the whole thing proceeds upon the assumption that there is a water supply within a reasonable distance. Then, there being a water supply within a reasonable distance of the dwelling-house, sect. 62 provides for the owner making a communication from that supply to his own house and paying the cost of the same. Sect. 3 of the Act of 1878 applies to a different thing. It applies to the bringing the supply of water into the neighbourhood of the house, and within a reasonable distance of the same. The cost of doing so is the cost of the additional mains required to bring the water within a reasonable distance of the house, and the cost of these additional mains may also be put upon the owner as well as the cost of the communication from the mains to the house. As to the cost of communicating the supply to the house, there is no limit of cost. The only limit of cost in sect. 62 is the cost of the water, and, that being so, the result seems to be that, if the local authority were to require the owner to lay on water to the house from an unreasonable distance, such owner would have an appeal to the Local Government Board under sect. 268 of the Act of 1875, and, if the distance were an unreasonable distance, the Local Government Board would disallow the claim of the local authority. The proper thing, therefore, for us is to say that the decision of the magistrates as to the 137. limit was wrong, and the case must go back to the magistrates practically for them to order the balance of the expenses, namely, the 61. 10s. 5d., to be paid.
Solicitors for the appellants, Rowcliffes, Rawle, and Co., for Alfred Dickinson, Ormskirk.
Solicitors for the respondent, Patersons, Snow, Bloxam, and Kinder, for Wilson, Wright, and Wilsons, Preston
Tuesday, Jan. 17, 1899.
(Before LAWRANCE and CHANNELL, JJ.) STEPHENSON (app.) v. W. J. ROGERS LIMITED (resps.) (a)
Licensing-Sale of beer-Sale at unlicensed place -Office opened for the receiving of ordersOrders transmitted to licensed place-Appropriation at licensed place-Offence-Excise Act 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 113), s. 37.
Brewers having a retail off-licence for the sale of beer in respect of premises in P.-street, Cardiff,
(a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.