« ElőzőTovább »
CT. OF APP.]
REG. v. WORCESTERSHIRE JUSTICES.
Supreme Court of Judicature.
COURT OF APPEAL.
Wednesday, July 25, 1900.
(Before SMITH and WILLIAMS, L.JJ.)
REG. v. WORCESTERSHIRE JUSTICES. (a) APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Licensing-Refusal to renew licence-Appeal to quarter sessions-Licensing justices made respondents-Dismissal of appeal-Costs of licensing justices-Alehouse Act 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), s. 29.
Where an appeal against the refusal by licensing justices to renew a licence has been brought to the Court of Quarter Sessions under the Alehouse Act 1828 and has been dismissed, the licensing justices who have been made respondents to the appeal are entitled as of right under sect. 29 of the Act to an order for a sum sufficient in the opinion of the court to indemnify them from all cost and charge in consequence of their having been served by the appellant with notice of appeal.
THIS was an appeal from a judgment of the Queen's Bench Division (Ridley and Bigham, JJ.) discharging a rule nisi for a mandamus which had been obtained by the licensing justices of the city of Worcester against the justices of the county of Worcester.
At the general annual licensing meeting for the city of Worcester, the holder of a licence for the sale of intoxicating liquors made an application for the renewal of his licence. The licensing justices refused the application.
The licence holder then appealed to the Court of Quarter Sessions, and made the licensing justices respondents.
Upon the appeal coming on for hearing, the licensing justices appeared and produced evidence in opposition.
The Court of Quarter Sessions having heard the appeal dismissed it, and refused the application for costs which was thereupon made on behalf of the licensing justices.
The licensing justices then obtained a rule nisi for a mandamus to the county justices to enter continuances to the next quarter sessions upon the appeal and to hear and determine according to law and pursuant to the statutes in that behalf the matter of an application by the licensing justices, the respondents in the appeal, for an order adjudging that the appellant should pay to the licensing justices to whom notice of appeal had been given such sum by way of costs as should in the opinion of the Court of Quarter Sessions be sufficient to indemnify such justices from all costs and charges whatsoever to which such justices may have been put in consequence of there having been served upon them notice of the appellant's intention to appeal.
Upon cause being shown, there was some dispute as to the nature of the application for costs which had been made to the Court of Quarter Sessions on behalf of the licensing justices, and the Queen's Bench Division (Ridley (a) Reported by E. MANLEY SMITH, Esq., Barrister-at-Law,
[CT. OF APP.
and. Bigham, JJ.), being of opinion that there had been no real demand and refusal, discharged the rule.
The licensing justices appealed.
The Alehouse Act 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c. 61) provides as follows:
Sect. 29. And be it further enacted that in every case where notice of appeal against the judgment of any justice in or concerning the execution of this Act shall have been given, and such appeal shall have been dismissed, or the judgment so appealed against shall have been affirmed, or such appeal shall have been abandoned, it shall be lawful for the court to whom such appeal shall have been made, or intended to be made, and such court is hereby required, to adjudge and order that the party so having appealed, or given notice of his intention to appeal, shall pay to the justice to whom such notice shall have been given, or to whomsoever he shall appoint, such sum by way of costs as shall in the opinion of such court be sufficient to indemnify such justice from all cost and charge whatsoever to which such justice may have been put in consequence of his having had served upon him notice of the intention of such party to appeal.
A. Lyttelton, Q.C. (Coventry with him) for the licensing justices.-Sect. 29 of the Alehouse Act 1828 is imperative. With regard to the costs of a justice who has been served with notice of an appeal against his decision, the section does not give to the court which has heard and dismissed the appeal any discretion such as is given to the court in matters coming within the provisions of sect. 27. Under sect. 29, if the respondent justices succeed in the appeal they become absolutely entitled to indemnity costs; it is only if they fail that the court has any discretion to exercise in the matter. The section is inexplicable unless it is construed in that way. It is true that the Court of Appeal has held that sect. 29 does not apply to the costs of justices who make themselves parties" to an appeal within sect. 31, sub-sect. 5, of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), and that in such a case the Court of Quarter Sessions has a discretion to exercise with regard to the justices' costs:
Reg. v. Justices of London, 62 L. T. Rep. 211; (1895) 1 Q. B. 616.
But the grounds upon which the court came to that conclusion have been cut away by the subsequent decision of the House of Lords that justices at a licensing meeting are not a court of summary jurisdiction, and that appeals to quarter sessions against a refusal to grant a licence are not regulated by sect. 31 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879:
Boulter v. Justices of Kent, 77 L. T. Rep. 288; (1897) A C. 556.
They also cited
Reg. v. Justices of Staffordshire, 79 L. T. Rep. 142;
Mayor of Tynemouth v. Attorney-General, 80 L. T.
Evans v. Justices of Conway, 82 L. T. Rep. 704;
J. Alderson Foote, Q.C. and J. B. Matthews for the licence-holder.-The scheme of the Alehouse Act 1828 is that upon an appeal to quarter sessions from a refusal by the licensing justices to renew a licence, the objector should come and be heard by the quarter sessions exactly in the same way
APP.] JENNER INSTITUTE v. ST. GEORGE'S, HANOVER-SQUARE, ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE.
as he was heard by the licensing justices. But the objector does not thereby become a party to the proceedings so as to be either liable to pay, or able to get, costs. That is the effect of the two decisions of the House of Lords already cited:
Boulter v. Justices of Kent (ubi sup.);
Mayor of Tynemouth v. Attorney General (ubi sup.).
It was contemplated by the Legislature that in ordinary cases the licensing justices would not appear at the hearing of the appeal, and it is only in cases where the justices do not appear as parties that the provisions of sect. 29 with regard to their costs come into force. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Reg. v. Justices of London (ubi sup.) is still law, and is entirely applicable to the present case. The court there held that the licensing justices were not entitled as of right under sect. 29 of the Alehouse Act 1828 to their costs of the appeal. The error of the court as to the meaning of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 does not affect this part of their decison.
SMITH, L.J.-The point in this case is a very short one. What happened was this: The licensing justices of the city of Worcester at the brewster sessions refused an application for the renewal of a licence. From that refusal an appeal was brought before the Court of Quarter Sessions, the licensing justices being made the respondents. By a majority of the magistrates the appeal was dismissed. A controversy afterwards arose as to what took place before the magistrates upon the question of costs. Now, I agree that sects. 27 and 29 of the Alehouse Act 1828 deal with different matters, but in the case now before the court I think we have only to consider sect. 29. That section provides that in every case where notice of appeal against the judgment of any justice in or concerning the execution of the Act shall have been given, and such appeal shall have been dismissed or the judgment so appealed against shall have been affirmed, or such appeal shall have been abandoned, "it shall be lawful for the court to whom such appeal shall have been made, or intended to be made, and such court is hereby required, to adjudge and order that the party so having appealed, or given notice of his intention to appeal, shall pay to the justices to whom such notice shall have been given such sum by way of costs as shall in the opinion of such court be sufficient to indemnify such justice from all cost and charge whatsoever to which such justice may have been put in consequence of his having had served upon him notice of the intention of such party to appeal." I think that the words "such court is hereby required" are imperative, and if the events referred to in the beginning of the section should happen, the court must make an order as provided in the words I have read. With regard to the dispute as to whether there was any proper demand for costs made to the quarter sessions in the present case, it seems to me to be clear from the affidavits that, upon the appeal being dismissed by the quarter sessions, counsel for the licensing justices made an application to the court for an order for such costs as by law the licensing justices were entitled to-i.e., indemnity costs-and that the court, thinking that they had a discretion as to
costs, refused the application. Under sect. 29 the court had no discretion in the matter, and the rule nisi for a mandamus should therefore be made absolute. The appeal must be allowed. WILLIAMS, L.J.-I entirely agree.
Solicitors for the licence-holder, Smiles and Co., for A. H. Halford, Worcester.
Solicitors for the licensing justices, Church, Rendell, Todd, and Co., for S. Southall, Worcester.
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.
(Before GRANTHAM and CHANNELL. JJ.) JENNER INSTITUTE OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE (apps.) v. ST. GEORGE'S, HANOVER SQUARE, ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE (resps.). (a). Rates-Exemption-Society instituted for purposes of science exclusively-Manufacture and sale of scientific remedies-Annual voluntary contribu tions-Donations-Scientific Societies Act 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 36), s. 1.
A society was instituted for the purposes of advancing the study and application of preventive medicine. It taught and examined students, undertook original investigations, and prepared, and sold certain scientific remedies. The sale of these remedies did not cover the expense of their manufacture. It was supported partly by the payments received for medicines sold, partly by large donations, some of which had been devoted to the erection of buildings for the purposes of the society, and partly by fees paid by students. Certain rooms were sub-let to the Local Govern ment Board at a yearly rent, which rooms, by the terms of the tenancy, were to be used exclusively for investigations in connection with vaccination, and for the manufacture of pure lymph.
Held, that as the society carried on the manufacture and sale of preventive medicines, it was not a society instituted for purposes of science exclusively, within sect. I of the Scientific Societies Act 1843, and was therefore not entitled to have its premises exempted from
Per Channell, J.: The occupation of the Local Government Board of part of the assessed premises was not such an occupation as would make the board capable of being separately assessed in respect thereof, and therefore on this ground also the society was liable to rates. Query: Whether the society was supported by voluntary contributions within sect. 1.
CASE stated under sect. 40 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 97).
The appellants were a company incorporated on the 25th July 1891, under sect. 23 of the Companies Act 1867, under the name of "The British Institute of Preventive Medicine" without the word "Limited" being added to their name under a licence from the Board of Trade duly granted under the said section.
(a) Reported by J. ANDREW STRAHAN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
Q.B.] JENNER INSTITUTE v. ST. GEORGE'S, HANOVER-SQUARE, ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE. [Q.B.
The objects for which the institute is established are as follows: " (a) To study, investigate, discover, and improve the means of preventing and curing infective diseases of men and animals, and to provide a place where research may be carried on for the purposes aforesaid. (b) To provide instruction and education in preventive medicine to medical officers of health, medical practitioners, veterinary surgeons, and advanced students. (c) To prepare and to supply to those requiring them such special protective and curative materials as have been already found and shall in future be found of value in the prevention and treatment of infective diseases. (d) To treat persons suffering with infective diseases or threatened with them in buildings of the institute or elsewhere. (e) With a view to effecting those objects to provide laboratories, to appoint a scientific staff, to institute lectures and demonstrations, to issue publications of the transactions of the institute, and to found a library. (f) In case it should be thought desirable so to do, to examine students of the institute and to award prizes and certificates, subject to such regulations and conditions as the institute may from time to time determine; Provided that no certificate shall be granted unless there is clearly expressed on it a note to the effect that it is granted as showing the result of the examination held on behalf of the institute, and has no special virtue or effect by any statute or charter. (g) Subject to the provisions of the 21st section of the Companies Act 1862, to purchase, sell, rent, let, or hold lands, tenements, or other real or personal property which may be necessary or advantageous to the aforesaid objects, and to mortgage the same for the purposes of the institute. (h) To receive donations and subscriptions from persons desiring to promote the objects aforesaid or any of them, and to hold funds in trust for the same, provided that if the institute shall take any funds or property upon any such special trust, so as to make it subject to the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioners, the institute shall observe all the directions of the commissioners with respect thereto, and if required by them vest the same in special trustees. (i) To construct, alter, and maintain any buildings necessary or convenient for the purposes of the institute. (j) To do all such other lawful things as may from time to time be conducive to the attainment of the objects above set forth or any of them."
By the memorandum of association it was further provided as follows:
The income and property of the institute whencesoever derived shall be applied solely towards the promotion of the objects of the institute as set forth in this memorandum of association, and no portion thereof shall be paid or transferred directly or indirectly by way of dividend, bonus, or otherwise howsoever by way of profit to the members of the institute, provided that nothing herein contained shall prevent any payment in good faith of interest not exceeding 5 per cent. on any loan advanced by members of the institute to promote the objects thereof, or of remuneration to any professor, lecturer, director, officer, or servant of the institute, or to any member or other person in any wise howsoever connected with the institute in return for any services actually rendered to the institute, or undertaken by the authority of the council to promote the objects of the institute.
The institute was (subject to what is hereinafter stated) supported by interest and dividends
from investments, profits on sale of investments, by fees derived from lectures and from students and for the use of the laboratories, and by receipts from the sale of the records of the transactions of the institute, by fees received for diagnoses made at the institute, and receipts from the sale of protective and curative materials prepared and sold by the institute, such as mallein, tuberculin, and antitoxins, and also by donations. Part of the donations had been spent on the buildings or invested by the appellants, and the rest had gone in current expenditure.
The schedule attached to the case contained details of the subscriptions, amounting in 1895 to 15l. 10s., in 1896 to 137. 13s., in 1897 to 8l. 8s., in 1898 to 147. 14s., and in 1899 to 14l. 88. Annual subscriptions of 51. and upwards, under art. 3 (d) of the articles of association, entitled the subscribers to membership of the institute if they signified in writing their desire to become members, but of the subscribers mentioned in the detailed accounts only two were members of the institute. Members had the rights and privileges to which they were entitled under the Companies Acts and the appellants' memorandum and articles of association, but had no other or further rights or privileges.
Annual subscribers who were not members obtained nothing in return for their subscriptions.
The Poplars Farm mentioned in the institute's accounts was a branch establishment of the institute, and was the place where the preparation of antitoxin was regularly and continually carried on. The farm and preparation were managed from the headquarters of the institute.
The institute had obtained the certificate provided for by sects. 1 and 2 of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36, and sect. 2 of the Act was complied with.
There had been no appeal under sect. 6 of the Act.
The said certificate was obtained on the 18th June 1898, and the respondents had notice thereof. In or about March 1894 the institute had purchased the freehold of certain land situate in Chelsea Bridge-road, in the parish of St. George, Hanover-square, in the county of London, and erected certain buildings thereon for the purposes and objects stated in the memorandum of associa tion. The said land and buildings were the premises which were the subject of the assessment as hereinafter mentioned, and are hereinafter referred to as the "assessed premises."
An agreement was made between the institute of the one part and the Local Government Board of the other part. dated the 31st May 1898, whereby the institute agreed to let and the Local Government Board agreed to take certain rooms in the assessed premises for the term of one year from the 25th March 1898 and thereafter from year to year at an annual rent of 2501. upon the terms therein contained, of which the following were the chief-namely, that the institute should furnish two of the rooms demised as laboratories and the other as an office, that it should provide them with gas and water free of charge, that the board should not without the consent of the institute use the rooms for any other purpose than for the preparation of glycerinated calf lymph and investigations in connection with vaccination, and that the director of the institute should have access to the rooms at all times for the purpose
Q.B.] JENNER INSTITUTE v. ST. GEORGE'S, HANOVER-SQUARE, ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE. [Q.B.
of inspecting the same. The Local Government Board had entered into and had since been and were now in occupation of the rooms which formed part of the assessed premises which were the subject-matter of this appeal. The rooms were used by the Local Government Board for no other purpose than the preparation of glycerinated calf lymph and investigations in connection with vaccination. The rooms let were in no way structurally severed from the rest of the buildings, nor had they any separate entrance or staircase, and they opened into the landings by an ordinary door just as all the other rooms in the premises did.
With the exception of the parts let to the Local Government Board the assessed premises had been and were exclusively used by the institute. The assessed premises were the headquarters of the institute, and were the place where or from whence all its affairs and proceedings for which the institute was incorporated as aforesaid were managed and regulated.
In the accounts of income of the institute annexed to the case the item interest on investments" included sums derived from the investment of donations, gifts, bequests, &c. The fees from students represented payments made by pupils for courses of instruction. Such fees had hitherto not been sufficient to defray the expenses of such instruction, and the teaching of the institute was not carried on so as to result in a profit over and above the expenses thereof. The lectures were a means of imparting knowledge to the students which would be useful to them in their professions and assist them therein. The institute did not train medical officers of health, medical practitioners, or veterinary surgeons as such, nor had it instituted a course of study by attending which students could qualify for the above professions; but it had established courses of instruction on the subject of bacteriology, which would be of value to such persons. The lectures and courses of instruction were given in the assessed premises.
The antitoxin, mallein, and tuberculin were the protective, curative, and diagnostic materials which were produced (though not exclusively so) for sale, and were sold by the institute in pursuance of the powers contained in its memorandum of association. Mallein and tuberculin were prepared on the assessed premises. By far the largest portion of the receipts from sales were derived from antitoxins. The institute had, notwithstanding that it had so far sustained loss by carrying on the making and selling of antitoxins, continued the preparation of antitoxins because, amongst other reasons, they can only be produced in the necessary uncontaminated form and at the requisite grades of strength by exceedingly high scientific skill and care, and because the continued making of antitoxins is the only means of improving the process and through this great improvements are constantly being effected. The preparation of the antitoxin was carried on on the Poplars Farm, but was directed from the headquarters of the institute, where also orders were taken for its sale and delivery.
The institute had not in fact and did not in fact make any dividend, gift, or bonus in money unto or between any of its members.
The institute carried out for fees charged by it examinations of materials sent to it for the
purposes of bacteriological and chemical investigation These investigations were carried out in the assessed premises.
A supplemental valuation list for the parish of St. George, Hanover-square, made by the overseers of such parish, was dated and deposited on or about the 31st May 1898, and the in-titute was therein rated, charged, and assessed in respect of the assessed premises occupied by them as aforesaid in the said parish at and upon a gross value of 1000l. and a rateable value of 8341.
The appellants objected before the assessment committee on the grounds that the said premises so occupied by them as aforesaid were, in the circumstances already referred to, exempt from parochial and other local rates, and they duly gave notice of objection and specified the corrections which they desired to be made, but the committee refused to amend the list and confirmed the said assessment, and the appellants thereupon appealed.
The questions for the opinion of the court were: (1) Was the Jenner Institute of Preventive Medicine exempt under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36 from being assessed or rated and from liability to the payment of county, borough, parochial, and other local rates and cesses in respect of the assessed premises ? (2) If the Jenner Institute of Preventive Medicine was not exempt under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36 from liability to be assessed or rated and from liability to payment of the said rates and cesses in respect of the whole of the assessed premises by reason only of the said letting to the Local Government Board, was the said institute exempt under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36 from being assessed or rated and from liability to payment of county, borough, parochial, and other local rates and cesses in respect of such parts of the assessed premises as were not let to the Local Government Board?
The Scientific Societies Act 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 36):
Sect. 1. From and after the first of October, one thousand eight hundred and forty-three, no person or persons shall be assessed or rated, or liable to be assessed or rated, or liable to pay to any county, borough, parochial, or other local rates or cesses in respect of any land, houses, or buildings, or parts of houses or buildings, belonging to any society instituted for purposes of science, literature, or the fine arts exclusively, either as tenant or as owner, and occupied by it for the transaction of its business and for carrying into effect its purposes, provided that such society shall be supported wholly or in part by annual voluntary contributions, and shall not, and by its laws may not, make any dividend, gift, division, or bonus in money or between any of its members, and provided also that such society shall obtain the certificate of the barrister-at-law or Lord Advocate as hereinafter mentioned.
McCall, Q.C. (with him E. M. Pollock) for the appellants.-The institute is within the exemption created by sect. 1 of the Scientific Societies Act 1843, and therefore is not liable to be rated in respect of the premises occupied by it. The institute is a society instituted for purposes of science exclusively. The manufacture of antitoxin is a purpose of science, as it advances the objects of science:
Royal College of Music v. Westminster Vestry, 78
Q.B. JENNER INSTITUTE v. ST. GEORGE'S, HANOVER SQUARE, ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE. [Q.B.
Linnean Society of London v. Churchwardens of
Reg. v. Bradford Library and Literary Society, 1
It is contended that the fact that part of the premises is sub-let to the Local Government Board takes the case out of sect. 1. This is not so. The test in such circumstances is whether or not the sub-tenant would be rateable on his occupation. Here it is clear the Local Government Board if it had been an individual would be rateable. Purvis v. Traill (3 Ex. 344) is in effect overruled by Linnean Society of London v. Churchwardens of St. Anne's, Westminster (sup.), and see Earl Clarendon v. Rector of St. James's (10 C. B. 449). The society is supported wholly by annual voluntary subscriptions. These cases show that the fact that the subscriptions take the form of donations and that fees are paid by students makes no difference in this respect.
Danckwerts, Q.C. and Ryde for the respondents. -The requirements which a society must fulfil before it can obtain the benefit of sect. 1 of the Scientific Societies Act are stated by Smith, L.J. in Art Union of London v. Savoy Overseers (71 L. T. Rep. 40; (1894) 2 Q. B. 609). The institute does not fulfil all these requirements. In the first place, it is not instituted for purposes of science exclusively. By purposes of science is here meant for the purpose of advancing and disseminating science, not by advancing the benefits of science:
Royal College of Music v. Westminster Vestry (sup.).
Here the institute carries on the manufacture of certain medicines and sells them. This is not a purpose of science within the section, but a trade, however beneficial it may be to the community. In the next place, the institute is not a society supported exclusively by annual voluntary contributions:
Savoy Overseers v. Art Union of London, 74 L. T.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Forest, 63 L. T.
GRANTHAM, J.-This is a case of considerable importance, and I may add also of considerable interest. One is always glad to hear of the existence of such an institution as this. It is well to know that there are gentlemen who are prepared to devote time and money to the preparation of new medicines which science has discovered, and which are undoubtedly of the greatest advantage to humanity. We have, however, a strict duty to perform-that is, to construe an Act of Parliament. We have to determine whether or not the objects of this society bring it within the provisions of sect. 1 of the Scientific Societies Act 1843, so as to exempt it from rateability in respect of the premises occupied by it. I have no doubt myself that they do not. It seems to me that the earlier cases cited on behalf of the appellants are no authority for adopting the contrary view. It is not necessary to go into these cases, but I may remark that they were all decided by Lord Campbell, who seems to have had a fixed view with regard to the objects of such societies. Lord Macnaghten in Savoy Overseers v. Art Union of
London (sup.) states that these earlier decisions have given rise to a great deal of difficulty. Thus in one of these earlier cases-Reg. v. Bradford Library and Literary Society (sup.)-an institution which I should be inclined to call a circulating library was held to be within the exception; but we have not to deal with such an institution as that at the present time. This is not a society instituted for purposes of science, literature, or the fine arts exclusively. One main object of
the society is clearly the manufacture of certain medicines which have been found of infinite value in preventing and curing certain diseases, but which demand the greatest skill in their manufacture, and which can be manufactured properly only by such an institution as this. Having succeeded in manufacturing the materials or medicines of the necessary purity, they then sell them, as I understand it, to anyone requiring them for medical use; but, as the prices charged or obtained for them are not sufficient to maintain the institution, it seeks and fortunately obtains subscriptions and donations which enable it to continue its most valuable work. There is no case, however, in which such an object as this has been held to exempt a society from rateability, and we have, therefore, no power to extend the exemption to this society.
CHANNELL, J.-I am of the same opinion. Although one of the objects of the society is undoubtedly the promotion of science, another, and probably the chief of them, is to give to individuals the practical benefits of science. therefore seems to me that it is not a society instituted for purposes of science exclusively, within the meaning of sect. 1 of the Scientific Societies Act 1843. That view is borne out by the cases, if I understand them rightly. In Royal College of Music v. Westminster Vestry, Smith, L.J. defines the expression "instituted for the purposes of science, literature, or the fine arts exclusively used in the Act as meaning instituted for the purpose of advancing, disseminating, or propagating science, literature, or the fine arts. In that definition the only word which could be considered to apply to the distribution of the products or results of science is the word disseminating"; but I do not think it was the intention of the learned Lord Justice that the word should have any such application. I desire to base my judgment mainly on the ground that this is not a society instituted for the purposes of science exclusively. I should not wish to base my judgment upon the ground that the society is not supported wholly or in part by "annual voluntary contributions." Though not entirely free from doubt, still I am inclined to think that the donations to this society would come within these words. They are not like the contributions which were paid to the Art Union of London; they resemble subscriptions rather. I do not suppose that it is contended that subscriptions are other than annual contributions. difficulty in the way of this society arises from the occupation of a portion of its premises by the Local Government Board. The answer to the question whether or not a subordinate occupation of this kind prevents the premises from being used exclusively for the purposes of the society appears to me to depend upon whether or not the occupation of the subordinate occupier is such