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ROBERTSON (app.) v. HARRIS (resp.).
Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 that the milk should be new milk.
Sect. 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63) provides :
If the defendant in any prosecution under this Act prove to the satisfaction of the justices or court that he had purchased the article in question as the same in nature, substance, and quality as that demanded of him by the prosecutor, and with a written warranty to that effect, that he had no reason to believe at the time when he sold it that the article was otherwise, and that he sold it in the same state as when he purchased it, he shall be discharged from the prosecution, but shall be liable to pay the costs incurred by the prosecutor, unless he shall have given due notice to him that he will rely on the above defence.
Reginald Brown, Q.C. for the appellant.-The question is whether the one original contract of warranty was sufficient to cover each particular delivery of the milk. We submit that in this case it was not sufficient. There must be some evidence in writing accompanying the delivery in question, identifying or earmarking the delivery. To bring the case within the protection of sect. 25 there must be with each particular delivery a written warranty, or something in writing, such as an invoice or a label, to identify that particular delivery as coming under the warranty. In Rook v. Hopley (38 L. T. Rep. 649; 3 Ex. Div. 209) an invoice containing a mere description of the article sold was held not to be a written warranty within sect. 25. Kelly, C.B. there said that as the invoice contained nothing more than a description it could not be deemed a warranty; and Pollock, B. said: "In my opinion what is required by the statute is a writing expressing on the face of it that it is a warranty." In Harris V. May (ubi sup.) a written contract similar to the present, whereby F. agreed to sell to the appellant eighty-six gallons of good and pure milk a day for six months, was held not to constitute a written warranty in respect of a specific delivery of milk sold by the appellant on a subsequent day. [DARLING, J.-The contract here is a contract for a future sale of milk to be pure, which is somewhat different from a warranty as to an existing thing.] There is not a decided case of a warranty under this section in which there has not been a written warranty, or an invoice or label referring to the written warranty. In Farmers and Cleveland Dairies Company Limited v. Stevenson (63 L. T. Rep. 776), it was held that the contract and the label together formed a written warranty, but the label bore the words" warranted genuine new milk, &c."; and the effect of Hotchin v. Hindmarsh (65 L. T. Rep. 149; (1891) 2 Q. B. 181), is that there must be a written warranty with each parcel delivered. So, in Elder v. Smithson (57 J. P. 809), a label with the words "warrarted pure" printed thereon was held not to be of itself sufficient; but in Laidlaw v. Wilson (ubi sup.), in which Harris v. May (ubi sup.) was distinguished, the original contract and the invoice of a particular parcel were held to form a sufficient written warranty of that parcel. There there was an invoice with each parcel identifying that parcel with the contract, as there was in Lindsay v. Rook (63 L. J. 231, M. C.); but if the invoice or label is not connected with an original contract of warranty, then neither the invoice nor label, even
though they contain the words "warranted genuine and pure," can of themselves constitute a written warranty within sect. 25:
Iorns v. Van Tromp, 72 L. T. Rep. 499;
Upon these authorities, and especially upon Harris v. May (ubi sup.), and upon the words of sect. 25 it is clear that there must be some written document amounting to a warranty passing at the time of each delivery, or some words to the like effect stamped on the article or the vessel containing the article which is being sold. A statute which was passed for the protection of the public should be construed in this sense, otherwise it would open the door to considerable adulteration of articles.
Frankau for the respondent. The question put by the magistrate was whether, by virtue of the written agreement of the 20th Jan. 1899, there was or was not a written warranty within sect. 25. The case has been argued for the appellant as if the only question were whether there was any evidence to connect the written warranty with the delivery. That point is not open, as the magistrate must be taken to have held that the delivery was under the contract. It must be admitted that the document of the 20th Jan. did contain a written warranty, and that really concludes the point for decision. In the first place, this document was a warranty. Warranty is defined in Benjamin on Sale (p. 607), as a "collateral undertaking, forming part of the contract by the agreement of the parties express or implied." The words in this contract "to be pure new milk' are an undertaking, and a written undertaking, satisfying the statute. By reason of the form of the words in this case it is easily distinguishable from Harris v. May (ubi sup.). The words there were a mere sale by description and would perhaps imply a warranty, but not a written warranty as the section requires; so that in Harris v. May (ubi sup.) there was no written warranty, although there may have been an implied warranty. Sect. 25 does not say delivered" with a written warranty, but "purchased" with a written warranty; and in the present case the milk was purchased with a written warranty. "Purchased with a written warranty" merely means that the contract which ultimately leads to the delivery must itself contain the warranty; it does not mean that the warranty is to go along with the delivery, and all the cases show that it is the contract which is to be looked at and nothing else. In Laidlaw v. Wilson (ubi sup.), Charles, J. says: But the invoice was no part of the contract, and it is in the contract, and in the contract alone, that the warranty which the statute requires must be sought." The same principle was laid down in Farmers and Cleveland Dairies Company v. Stevenson (ubi sup.), showing that there must be an express written warranty in the writing itself, though there need not be the word " warranty" if there be something amounting to it; and in Iorns v. Van Tromp (ubi sup.) Cave, J. said that the magistrates were perfectly right in not looking at the invoice, in other words, that they were to look at the contract itself. There was no need for the warranty to go with each article; if it were otherwise, it would not be possible to carry on business;
ROBERTSON (app.) v. HARRIS (resp.).
and there was no need to have the word "warranty":
Laidlaw v. Wilson (ubi sup.);
Iorns v. Van Tromp (ubi sup.).
The magistrate was satisfied that the delivery was under the contract, and it was a question of fact for him whether the two things were sufficiently connected.
RIDLEY, J.-I think that our judgment should be for the appellant. The question is whether there was put forward on behalf of the defendant, William Harris, a written warranty sufficient to satisfy the 25th section of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875. He has satisfied the statute in this respect, that it is found as a fact that he had no reason to believe at the time when he sold the milk that the article was otherwise than as represented, but the question is whether he has shown that he purchased it with a written warranty to the effect that it was the same in nature, substance and quality as that demanded of him by the prosecutor. I do not think that he has shown it. He has satisfied the provision in the section to some extent-that is to say, he has produced a written agreement under which he agreed to buy 1000 gallons of milk to be sold in certain quantities, the milk to be pure new milk delivered over a certain period of time. That is a written warranty. I adopt for that purpose the reasoning of Charles, J. in Laidlaw v. Wilson (ubi sup.), where he says: "To my mind it is enough if the language of the document imports a warranty, and shows an intention on the part of the vendor to warrant." The word "warrant "is not in this agreement for the supply of the milk; but the document does contain language which imports a warranty and shows an intention on the part of the vendor to warrant. So far the defendant is right. There is a written document containing a warranty to that effect. But the statute does not say merely that; it says that the defendant must show that he purchased the article with a written warranty to that effect; and after the decisions which have been given on this question-after Harris v. May (ubi sup.), supported as it is, although distinguished, by Laidlaw v. Wilson (ubi sup.)-it appears to me that it is not sufficient merely to show that a general agreement like the one now in question has been arrived at, unless it can be shown further that the particular article in question has been bought with it. For that purpose it is necessary to produce some further evidence. There was no such evidence in this case as there was in Harris v. May (ubi sup.), which otherwise was very like this case; for the agreement there did not contain the words "the milk to be pure new milk," which are the words in this case, but simply the description-that is to say, "pure milk "-" eightysix gallons of good and pure milk." Although those words which are present in this case were not present in the case of Harris v. May (ubi sup.), I think it is clear that the court in that case found that the words in the contract itself did amount to a warranty. Lord Coleridge, C.J. there says: "It is true that an action for breach of warranty could be brought upon that contract." That means that it was a warranty, and the observations made upon those words by Charles J. in the subsequent case of Laidlaw v. Wilson (ubi sup.) show clearly what he
[Q.B. DIV. understood was intended by the court in Harris v. May (ubi sup.). Charles, J. speaking of Harris v. May (ubi sup.), says (1894) I Q. B. at p. 78: "There, no doubt, Lord Coleridge, at the commencement of his judgment, said that, in his opinion, the contract relied on by the defendant was not a written warranty within the meaning of the Act. But, on looking on his judgment as a whole, I think that what he really meant was that it was not such a warranty as would cover the specific delivery of milk on the 12th April, in the absence of some written evidence that that specific delivery was made under the contract." That is to say, that there may be a warranty under the general agreement to deliver the milk, but there must be something more. It must be shown that the purchase of this particular article was made with that warranty. There ought to be something in writing to show that the warranty which is contained in the general agreement is extended to and includes this specific article. I can imagine, if this point had been free from decisions, that that was well capable of argument, but it is certainly too late for us, even if we felt any doubt in the matter, to say the contrary to this; and therefore in a case like the present there must be some evidence to show that that particular article has been bought with that warranty. In the case of Laidlaw v. Wilson (ubi sup.), which is a fair instance of this particular subject, there was some written evidence to show that the specific delivery was made under the contract, thus connecting the written warranty with the article which was the subject of the purchase. It is quite true that it was more easily done in that case because there was not the difficulty that arises as to the date, as in the present case. The purchase was made and the sale was completed at or about the same time; but if there had been something in this case to show that the written warranty contained in the general agreement for the delivery of the milk, extended to and related to the article in question, that is to say, the daily delivery or supply of the milk, then there would have been enough to satisfy the statute. In the absence of that evidence it appears to me that the magistrate came to the wrong conclusion when he said that the defendant who was charged with the offence under this statute had brought himself under the provisions of sect. 25. For these reasons I think that the conclusion arrived at was not a correct one, and that the case should be sent back with a direction that the defendant ought to be convicted.
DARLING, J.-This case raises questions of some difficulty, and, speaking for myself, I do not think that all the cases can be entirely reconciled. In fact, I find it difficult to come to the conclusion that there is not a difference of opinion between the judges who decided Laidlaw v. Wilson (ubi sup) and the judges who decided the case of Harris v. May (ubi sup.). What happened in the present case was this. A retailer sold milk which was not pure milk, and he was summoned for that. Then he sought to show that he was excused-and the magistrate held that he was-by virtue of sect. 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875. [His Lordship read the section.] In this case what the defendant had done was that long before the time in question he had entered into a contract for the supply of milk. He was supplied with this milk in small quantities,
but he had entered into a contract for the supply of milk for a considerable period, and the contract was this: "I, Sarah Sheldon, agree to sell to William Harris 1000 gallons of milk weekly in such quantities as arranged, the milk to be pure new milk, delivered," &c. He had entered into a contract to buy in future 1000 gallons of milk to be delivered weekly, the milk to be pure. That is the same as if the person contracting to supply the milk had said "the milk is to be pure new milk," but there is no statement that it is pure milk; it does not exist at the time. To my mind this statute, as Lord Coleridge has said, has to be construed strictly, especially as it relates to the food of the people, and I have very great doubt, although it is said for the first time, as to whether such a contract which says what is to be the state of things in future, can be called a warranty at alla written warranty within this sect. 25 of the Sale of Food and Drug Act 1875. I have great doubt about that, and when that question is distinctly raised in some future case I think it will be interesting to have it decided. It might have been raised in Harris v. May (ubi sup.), but there counsel on one side only was called upon, and the question was not raised. Blackstone in his Commentaries (3rd vol., p. 180, 20th edit.) says: "Also if he that selleth any thing doth upon the sale warrant it to be good, the law annexes a tacit contract to this warranty that if it be not so he shall make compensation to the buyer; else it is an injury to good faith, for which an action on the case will lie to recover damages. The warranty must be upon the sale; for if it be made after, and not at the time of the sale, it is a void warranty; for it is then made without any consideration; neither does the buyer then take the goods upon the credit of the vendor. Also the warranty can only reach to things in being at the time of the warranty made, and not to things in futuro; as, that a horse is sound at the buying of him, not that he will be sound two years hence." I know it has been said by Lord Mansfield in a later case in which that same passage was cited to him, namely, the case of Eden v. Parkinson (2 Doug. 732): "Many points have been gone into on both sides which are not necessary for the decision of this case. For instance, there is no doubt but you may warrant a future event." It is perfectly clear, from Lord Mansfield's own statement in that case, that it was not necessary for the decision of the case that the point should be considered, and his own observation upon the point therefore is only an obiter dictum; but, at all events, take it to be good law that you may warrant a future event, and take it that you may so warrant a future event, yet I do not think it is at all clear that this statute, which Lord Coleridge, C.J. has said in Harris v. May (ubi sup) is to be construed strictly for the benefit of the health of the people, did not mean a warranty in the strict sense in which warranty of goods was used by Blackstone, a warranty that a thing in being was of a certain quality. I do not affect to decide that it is so; I only say that it seems to me there is the gravest reason to suppose that that is what the statute means; and if it were necessary to decide it, I might very possibly decide it in that sense.
(27 L. T. Rep. 398, at p. 402; L. Rep. 7 Ch. 777, at p. 804), where Mellish, L.J. says that "there is a clear difference between a misrepresentation in point of fact-a representation that something exists at that moment which does not exist-and a representation that something will be done in the future. Of course, a representation that something will be done in the future cannot either be true or false at the moment it is made; and, although you may call it a representation, if it is anything it is a contract or promise." Here, as Mellish, L.J. says, one may call this contract that the milk shall be pure a representation in one sense; one may, if he pleases, call it a warranty, and if one likes to rely on what Lord Mansfield says that a warranty may be of a future event and still be a warranty, he is justified; but, as Mellish, L.J. says, although one may call it a representation, yet if it is anything it is a contract or promise. I should myself have great hesitation in holding, if it were absolutely necessary to the decision of this case, that this contract dealing Iwith what shall be the case in the future with regard to milk not in existence at the time the contract was made was a warranty at all within the meaning of sect. 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875. It is not, however, necessary to give any definite opinion upon the point. It would be merely an obiter dictum. I might decide the case on that ground and on that ground alone, but it is not necessary to do so, as I agree with the judgment given that this decision must be reversed on other grounds.
Appeal allowed. Case remitted to the magistrate.
Solicitors for the appellant, Richard Smith and Sons, for Sayer, Sheffield.
Solicitors for the respondents, Geare and Pease, for Robert Fairburn, Sheffield.
Saturday, May 5, 1900.
(Before Lord RUSSELL, C.J., WRIGHT and DARLING, JJ.)
SAGAR (app.) v. CLARE (resp.). (a) Registration of voters-Division of district or borough into wards-Notice of objectionOmission of notice to specify ward of person objected to-Registration Order 1895, sched. 2, form I.
A notice of objection to the overseers objecting to
CASE stated by the revising barrister for the
It was proved before the revising barrister that
leave this point I should like to call attention to one other case the case of Beattie v. Lord Ebury
sion 1 of the Occupiers List of Electors of such parish (or township) as a Parliamentary elector of the Blackpool Parliamentary division of the county of Lancaster (Blackpool polling district) and as a burgess of the borough of Blackpool.
Such notice of objection was in the following form:
Notice of objection to be given to overseers in respect of the occupation franchise.-Parliamentary and Municipal (division 1).-To the overseers of the parish or township of Blackpool.-"I hereby give you notice that I object to the name of Robert Fielding, of 103, Adelaide-street being retained on division 1 of the Occupiers List of Electors for your parish (or township) as a Parliamentary elector for the Blackpool Parliamentary division of the county of Lancaster (Blackpool polling district) and as a burgess of the borough of Blackpool.Dated this 16th day of Oct. 1899.-Signed Elijah Sagar. -Place of abode: 24, Albert-road, Blackpool, on division 1 of the Occupiers List of Parliamentary electors for the parish (or township) of Blackpool, in the Blackpool division of the county of Lancaster (Blackpool polling district), and also upon the burgess list for the borough of Blackpool (Brunswick Ward). ·
The notice of objection to the person objected to-namely, Robert Fielding-in describing the occupiers list did state the name of the ward on which his name appeared-namely, "Bank Hey Ward," in addition to the words "Division 1."
The borough of Blackpool is conterminous with the parish or township of Blackpool. Such borough is divided into six wards, of which "Bank Hey Ward" is one.
The lists of voters are made out and published by the overseers of the parish or township of Blackpool for Parliamentary purposes in the divisions prescribed by sect. 15 of the statute 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26 (the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act 1878), and also in wards as prescribed by sub-sect. 8 of the same section, and also by the Registration Order 1895 (Occupation Electors) clauses 15 and 22.
The list of electors of each of such six wards consisted of three divisions.
The name of Robert Fielding was on the list of voters for the year 1899, occupiers list, division 1, in respect of his qualification of dwelling-house, 103, Adelaide-street, Bunk Hey Ward. There is only one Adelaide-street in the borough.
On behalf of the voter objected to (Robert Fielding) it was argued before the revising barrister that the form of notice to the overseers was insufficient, inasmuch as it did not state the name of the ward-namely, Bank Hey Ward-on the list of voters whereof the name of Robert Fielding, the person objected to, appeared.
On behalf of the objector it was argued that the notice to the overseers was sufficient, as it complied with the form of notice of objection to overseers (Registration Order 1895, Form No. I., sched. 2, Occupation Electors of Counties), and form of notice of objection to overseers (Form No. I., sched. 3, Borough), and that the address of Robert Fielding being stated in such notice, in addition to division 1 of the occupiers list, it sufficiently identified the voter objected to.
The revising barrister was asked on behalf of the objector to amend the form of notice in question, under 41 and 42 Vict. c. 26, s. 28, sub-s. 2, by adding the name of the ward, but he declined to amend.
On the authority of Barton v. Ashley (2 C. B. 4) he held that publication by the overseers of the name of the person so objected to by Sagar in the proper ward list was no waiver of the ground of objection that the name of the ward should have been inserted in the notice of objection to the overseers, and that the decision in that case required that where there are more than one list of voters the notice of objection to overseers should specify the list to which the objection refers; and being of opinion that the list of voters for each of the six wards was a separate list having three divisions in it, and having sepa rate progressive numbers limited to such ward, and containing only the streets and qualifications in such ward, and that the statement of the divisions was not of itself sufficient, there being six division 1 lists in the whole occupiers list of Blackpool as prepared by the overseers, the revising barrister decided that the notice of objection to the overseers ought to specify the name of the ward on which the name of the voter objected to appeared, and as the notice to the overseers in Fielding's case did not state the name of the ward he held such notice to be bad, and retained the name of Robert Fielding on the list; and that although by some additional labour the overeeers with an imperfect notice of objection to guide them, might come to the same result as if they had been served with a notice in perfect compliance with the form in the schedule, it was the intention of the Act to save them that trouble.
Similar notices of objection were served on the same overseers to the retention of the names of the persons set forth in a schedule without stating in any case in such notices of objection the ward list on which the names of such voters so objected to appeared, and certain of these names were affected by the decision in this case.
If the court should be of opinion that the notice to the overseers in the case of Robert Fielding was sufficient, then the decision of the court is to apply to the names of the other voters set forth in the second schedule to the case. Otherwise, if the decision of the revising barrister be upheld, and such notices are held to be bad, then the names are to be retained on the respective registers of voters on which they were.
H. Tindal Atkinson for the appellant.-The question is whether the revising barrister was right in holding that the notice of objection to the overseers ought to have specified the name of the ward on which the name of the voter objected to appeared, and was a bad notice in consequence of the omission so to specify the ward. The notice follows precisely the forms in respect of occupation electors in the Registration Order 1895namely, form I., sched. 2, (Rogers, p. 663), and with regard to boroughs, form I., sched. 3 (Rogers, p. 699). The notice was therefore a good notice, although it did not state the ward. The overseers got the notice, and they understood what was meant by it. [Lord RUSSELL, C.J.-If the notice was a bad notice, it ought to have been within the power of amendment, and ought to have been amended, but I do not think it was a bad notice.] The case of Mortlock v. Farrer (41 L. T. Rep. 470; 5 C. P. Div. 73) clearly shows that it was not necessary to specify the ward and that the notice was good. There it was held that it was not necessary to specify the particular
VESTRY OF ST. MARY, ISLINGTON v. HORNSEY URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL.
parochial list to which the objection referred. All the cases on the point are in the same direction. [He was stopped. The case of Chorlton v. Overseers of Tonge (26 L. T. Rep. 25; L. Rep. 7 C. P. 178) was also referred to.]
The respondent did not appear.
Lord RUSSELL, C.J.-We think that this was a case in which if an amendment was necessary it ought to have been made; but we do not think that any amendment was necessary. This notice sets out and follows verbatim et literatim the form given in the Registration Order 1895, with the exception of the name of Blackpool filled in. The notice was therefore a good notice of objection to the overseers.
WRIGHT and DARLING, JJ. concurred.
Solicitors for the appellant, Bower, Cotton, and Bower, for Dean and Waterhouse, Blackpool.
Supreme Court of Judicature.
COURT OF APPEAL.
Feb. 22, 23, 26, 27, and March 20, 1900.
VESTRY OF ST. MARY, ISLINGTON v. HORNSEY
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION.
Local government-Metropolitan main drainage -Persons outside metropolitan area-Power to allow use of sewer-Public body-Ultra vires agreement-Estoppel-Laches and acquiescence -Metropolis Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), ss. 135, 138, 140, 250-Metropolis Management Amendment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), 8. 61-Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 13, 22, 28.
Local authorities within the metropolitan area have no power to contract to admit sewage from outside the metropolitan area into their drainage
Decision of Hall, V.C. in Metropolitan Board of Works v. London and North-Western Railway Company (42 L. T. Rep. 830; 14 Ch. Div. 521) on this point approved.
The vestry of I., in the county of London, brought an action against the urban district council of H., which was outside the county of London, for an injunction to restrain the defendants from permitting their drains and sewers to be connected with the plaintiffs' sewer. The plaintiffs had permitted the sewage from H. to pass down their sewer for many years, but there was no formal agreement on the subject.
Held, that all the plaintiff's could legally do was to grant a revocable licence for the sewage of H. to pass under their sewer, for they had no power to bind the parish of I. to receive the sewage of H. for ever or for any definite time.
Held, also, that the plaintiffs being a public body with public duties to perform, were not estopped
(a) Reported by W. C. Biss, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
from asserting their right to put an end to a nuisance, although they had permitted and agreed to allow the acts which caused it, as they had no power to agree to permit such acts.
Great North-West Central Railway Company v. Charlebois (79 L. T. Rep. 35; (1899) A. C. 114) followed.
Held, also, having regard to the fact that the sewers were in daily use, and that a nuisance would be caused if they were closed immediately, the court would now only make a declaration establishing the plaintiffs' right to relief, and would allow the defendants reasonable time to make other arrangements for draining their district, with liberty to the plaintiffs at the end of that time to apply for an injunction to enforce their rights. Decision of Kekewich, J. (ante, p. 278; 80 L. T. Rep. 746) reversed.
THIS was an action to restrain the defendants from permitting certain drains and sewers in their district to remain connected with the Stroud Green-road sewer, which the plaintiffs claimed was in their district, and from permitting any drains and sewers thereafter to be connected with the Stroud Green-road sewer.
The case was heard by Kekewich, J. who dismissed the action, and the plaintiffs appeal-d The further facts appear in the judgment. Danckwerts, Q.C. and Micklem, Q.C. for the appellants.-The question to be decided is whether the defendants are entitled to discharge the sewage of a part of the parish of Hornsey into a sewer vested in the plaintiffs, which is in the parish of Islington. The sewer was made for the parish of Islington by the Tottenham and Hampstead Junction Railway Company under the powers of their Act of 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. cc.) and is vested in the plaintiffs by virtue of sect. 59 of that Act and sect. 68 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855. Hornsey was outside the metropolitan area, and had nothing to do with this sewer. There is a dispute as to the boundary between the two parishes, but it was fixed by the Inclosure Commissioners, and the whole of the sewer is within the parish of Islington:
Rex v. Inhabitants of St. Mary in Bury St.
By sect. 80 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855 a vestry may order contribution towards the construction of sewers from the owners of houses which drain into them, and sect. 59 of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102) makes that provision apply as to sewers vested in the Metropolitan Board of Works. Under sect. 38 of the Public Health Act 1875 local authorities have power to send sewage into the sewers of an adjoining district provided they obtain the consent of the adjoining local authority and the Local Government Board. But that does not apply in the case of a district adjoining the metropolitan area, as no sewage from outside the metropolitan area can be sent into the sewers within it. This is shown by the Metropolis Management Act 1855, ss. 135, 138, 140, and 250, and the Metropolis Management Amendment Act 1862, ss. 32, 45, 58, 61. Therefore, plaintiffs to take the Hornsey sewage it would be even if there was an express agreement by the ultra vires. The judgment of Hall, V.C. in Metropolitan Board of Works v. London and