« ElőzőTovább »
Q.B.] BURTON v. ASSESS. COM. OF ST. GILES-IN-THE-FIELDS & ST. GEORGE, BLOOMSBURY. [Q.B.
meaning of the section. He may be the person who uses the hoardings for that purpose, but he is not the person who permits the user, and therefore he is not the person aimed at by the section. There have been two cases decided on the construction of the section. In Chappell v. Overseers of St. Botolph (65 L. T. Rep. 581; (1892) 1 Q. B. 561) the question arose under the same section. There the appellant, who had contracted for the erection of certain buildings, had let the hoarding which was erected upon the public street to a firm of advertisement contractors, and these advertisement contractors had used the hoardings for the displaying of advertisements, and it was there held that the appellantthe builder-who had let the hoardings, was the person who had "permitted" the land to be used for the exhibition of advertisements within the meaning of sect. 3, and was therefore the person liable to be rated under the section. Mathew, J. there said that the description in the section of a person permitting land to be used for the exhibition of advertisements "only applies to the appellant, who let the hoardings to advertisement contractors, and who did, therefore, in fact, permit the hoarding to be used for the advertisements." In the case of Shelly v. Dillon (30 L. Rep. Ir. 304), decided by the Exchequer Division (Palles, C.B., Andrews and Murphy, JJ.) in Ireland in 1892, the court held that it was the owner of the land on which hoardings for adver tisements were erected, and not the person who used the hoardings for advertising, who was rateable under the section. That case is a clear authority to show that the advertising agent is not liable.
Macmorran, Q.C. and Ryde for the respondents. -There is a preliminary objection which was taken before the quarter sessions, and which is open to the respondents in this court. The objection was taken for the respondents that this was not matter for appeal at all, and that the appellant was not "aggrieved" merely by having his name inserted in the valuation list. valuation list is conclusive as to values only; it is by sect. 45 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 67) made conclusive evidence as to the gross and rateable values, but not otherwise. It is not evidence as to who is the owner or who is the occupier. The overseers make the valuation list, and that list goes before the assessment com. mittee, and persons who object to that list can, under sect. 11 of the Act of 1869, go before the assessment committee and object. If their objection is overruled, then they can, under sect. 32, appeal to the quarter sessions, but under that section it is only those who "feel aggrieved by any decision of the assessment committee " who can appeal to quarter sessions. A person whose name is merely put in the valuation list is not a person aggrieved," as he cannot be made to pay any rate in consequence. A person whose name is wrongfully in the valuation list cannot appeal to the quarter sessions on that ground. He must wait until a rate is made upon him; then he can move in the matter, and he may either appeal against the rate or refuse to pay it. In the present case the appellant's name was merely inserted in the valuation list as the occupier. He is therefore not a person aggrieved, and had no right of appeal to the quarter sessions. This point was taken before
the quarter sessions, who simply said they would hear the case on the merits, and, although the poiut is not raised or stated in the case, submit that under the power given to this court by sect. 2 of the Judicature Act 1894 the point may now be taken. That section gives this court power to make any order or give any judgment which the Court of Quarter Sessions might or ought to have given. [R. Cunningham Glen.-The appellant is a person "aggrieved" by having his name inserted in the valuation list as occupier if he was not occupier. Upon that ground he was entitled under sect. 32 to appeal to the quarter sessions. In addition, the point is not stated in the case, and therefore this court has no power to entertain it.] Next as to the merits of the case. Before this Act of 1889 was passed there some cases decided on this question. In Reg. v. St. Pancras Assessment Committee (2 Q. B. Div. 581, sub nom. Willing v. St. Pancras Assessment Committee, 37 L. T. Rep. 126) it was held that a person who had permission from the owner to affix to the land a hoarding for advertisements was not the occupier of the hoarding and was not rateable. In Taylor v. Overseers of Pendleton (57 L. T. Rep. 530; 19 Q. B. Div. 288), where the agreement created a tenancy, and conferred upon the advertising agent, not merely a licence, but an exclusive occupation, it was held that the advertising agent was rateable. That case was decided in 1887, and probably in consequence the Act of 1889 was passed; and all that sect. 3 of that Act does is to define who is rateable. The case of Chappell v. Overseers of St. Botolph (ubi sup.) is clearly distinguishable, as there the question was whether the builder was the person liable to be rated under the section, and the court held that as between him and the owner he (the builder) was the person who had permitted the land to be used for the displaying of the advertisements. Although the builder in that case had let the use of the hoardings to advertising contractors there was no question raised that the advertising contractors were liable. In that case the question was not as to the advertising agent, but as to the builder. Here the question is as to the rateability of the advertising agent, and not the builder, so that the questions in the two cases were different. The question who was liable was a question of fact, and, the Court of Quarter Sessions having decided the matter, this court ought not to overrule their decision.
Glen was not called upon to reply.
GRANTHAM, J.-We think in this case that the justices were wrong, and that their order must be quashed. We have no doubts upon the facts in this case, as they have been stated on the one side and admitted on the other, that the advertising agent, or the person who merely puts up the advertisement or placard, is not the person to be rated under sect. 3. can well understand why that should be so. It would be a most inconvenient thing if the person who uses the hoarding were to be rated, because, although in this case there might not be much difficulty, yet if one takes many of those advertisements which disfigure the fields throughout England, they are advertisements put there by persons in London or other towns, and how are the overseers of those country parishes to get at those persons? The overseers see a notice on a
DAVIS (app.) v. Woodfield (resp.).
board in the country. Are they to send up to London and are they to bring those persons down into the country on a question as to whether they are to be rated, and, if so, what is the measure of rateability? It would be equally inconvenient for all parties, and therefore I think the provision in sect. 3 of this Act is most wise. Under those circumstances I have no doubt that the decision
of the magistrates was wrong With regard to the question whether or not there is any jurisdiction here to hear this appeal, or whether there was any jurisdiction for the quarter sessions to have heard the appeal on the question whether or not the name of the appellant ought to appear in the valuation list, that does not come before us directly or indirectly, but we think under the circumstances it is not a point we can refer to or take any notice of in this case.
CHANNELL, J.-I am of the same opinion. The facts are stated at great length in the case, and as I understand those facts there is no pretence for saying that the appellant was the occupier of a rateable hereditament for which he could have been rated at common law under the old rating statutes, and, if rateable at all, he could only be rateable under this Act. That being so, on the merits there is no doubt as I read what took place before the quarter sessions, and we are not in any way precluded from giving effect to their decision; and in point of fact we are giving effect to their decision, as they have stated what is to be the result of our view on that point.
Appeal allowed, with costs, including costs in quarter sessions.
Solicitors for the appellant, John H. Mote and Son.
Solicitor for the respondents, H. C. Jones.
Thursday, Jan. 18, 1900.
(Before CHANNELL and BUCKNILL, JJ.) DAVIS (app.) v. WOODFIELD (resp.). (a) Poor law-Rate Change of occupation - Payment of proportion-Period for making the rate -Period from allowance by justices-Issue of distress warrant.
The appellant was summoned on a complaint preferred on behalf of the overseers to show cause why he had not paid a certain poor rate. The rate was allowed by the justices on the 21st Oct. 1898, and was intended for the period from the 29th Sept. 1898 up to the 25th March 1899. The premises, in respect of which the appellant was rated, were occupied by him from before the 29th Sept. 1898 up to the 30th Nov 1898, and the complaint was in respect of the proportion of the rate from the 29th Sept. to the 30th Nov. 1898. It was contended by the appellant that he was only liable to pay the proportion of the rate from the 21st Oct. to the 30th Nov. 1898, and not the proportion from the 29th Sept. to the 30th Nov. 1898.
The magistrates were of opinion that their duties were ministerial only, and that they had no jurisdiction to inquire what excess had been charged, and they directed a distress warrant to issue for the whole amount claimed-viz., from the 29th Sept. to the 30th Nov. 1898.
(a) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
[Q.B. DIV. Held, allowing the appeal, that the contention of the appellant was right, and that he was only liable to pay the proportion from the 21st Oct. to the 30th Nov. 1898.
CASE stated by justices of the peace of the county of Gloucester, sitting at Stroud in that county, upon a complaint preferred by Thomas Woodfield, assistant overseer of the parish of Cranham (the respondent), on behalf of the overseers of the poor of that parish against John Gordon Davis, for that he, the appellant, being a person duly rated and assessed to the relief of the poor of the parish in and by the rate following (that is to say): A rate made on the 21st Oct. 1898 on a house and garden for two months' occupation (the 29th Sept. to the 30th Nov. 1898) in the sum of 13s. 1d.; on land for six months (the 29th Sept. 1898 to the 25th March 1899), 2s. 93d.-total 15s. 11 d., had not paid the same nor any part thereof, but had refused to do so.
At the hearing of the complaint the following facts were proved or admitted:
The appellant was summoned to appear on the 28th April 1899 to show cause why he had not paid the rate mentioned in the complaint hereinbefore set forth.
The case was partially heard on the 28th April and concluded on the 23rd June 1899.
At the hearing of the summons the respondent appeared and produced the rate book showing the making and publication of the rate. He also proved the rating of the appellant and nonpayment after demand for seven days previous to the
The title to the rate was set forth in the words or figures appearing in the papers hereto annexed.
The respondent gave evidence on oath that he was present when the rate was made by the overseers in Cranham parish, but he could not say when it was, but that the overseers met to make the rate, and that a precept from the guardians was produced dated he believed, the 7th Oct. 1898, being the contribution required by the guardians from the parish of Cranham, and the meeting was certainly held after the 7th Oct. 1898. He stated that the period which the poor rate was for was determined at that meeting. It was for six months, and he did not remember any entry being made in any book about the period for which it was made. He assumed it was for six months without anything being said about it; and the period was not set out in the heading of the rate because it was not the custom, and he never heard that it was his duty to do it, but he and the overseers intended it to commence on the 29th Sept., and that the overseers had 17. or ll. and a few shillings from the former rate in hand, and it was not his business to know what the guardians had in hand. He also stated that the rate was made to cover other expenses besides the guardians' call, and it included the assistant overseer's salary.
The rate was allowed by the justices on the 21st Oct. 1898.
With regard to the demand for the rate, the respondent proved that the appellant had been served by post in the first instance with the usual printed demand note for the full amount of the rates payable in respect of the house and land to the 25th March then next.
The appellant thereupon wrote that the house had been void since the 1st Dec. 1898, and he objected to pay for the period during which he had ceased to occupy it.
The respondent then seat an amended demand by letter dated the 25th March 1899, to which the appellant objected as incorrect. The respondent then made further amended demands by letters dated respectively the 3rd April and 6th April 1899, to which the appellant still objected, and ultimately the appellant on the 8th April wrote to the overseers of Cranham a letter.
It was proved at the hearing that the appellant occupied the house from the 1st March 1898 until the 30th Nov. 1898, and that he had underlet the grass keep of the land from the 29th Sept. 1898 to the 24th June 1899 without any agreement as to rates; but that he had not occupied the land since the 28th Sept. 1898 in any other manner.
The period between the 29th Sept. 1898 and the 25th March 1899 is 177 days; between the 29th Sept. 1898 and the 30th Nov. 1898 is sixtytwo days; between the 21st Oct. 1898 and the 25th March 1899 is 155 days; between the 21st Oct. 1898 and the 30th Nov. 1898 is forty days.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant: (1) That under 45 & 46 Vict. c. 20, s. 3, an outgoing occupier was only liable to pay so much of the rate as was proportionate to the time of his occupation within the period for which the rate was made. (2) That 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, s. 14, required overseers to set forth in the title of the rate the period for which the same is estimated, and this they had failed to do. (3) That they could not supply this omission by going behind the rate and give evidence as to where the period commenced, and that, if they could, the respondent's evidence did not show that the period was determined by the overseers. (4) That under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, s. 17, a poor rate shall be deemed to be made on the day when it is allowed by the justices; and that a rate is made for expenses which will be incurred between the time when it is made and a given date (in this case the 25th March 1899), and that the period for which the rate is made is the period between these two dates, consequently that the proper proportion for which the appellant was liable in respect of the house was 40-155ths of the rate, and not 62-177ths, as charged, and that he was not liable for the rate on the land. (5) It was also contended that the appellant had not occupied the land after the 29th Sept. 1898. (6) It was further contended that a demand note had not been served as required by the Demand Note for the Payment of Rates Order, the 14th June 1875, art. 2.
It was contended on behalf of the respondent : (1) That it had been the practice throughout the Stroud Union heretofore to make two rates in each year in or about the months of April and October, and that such rates were estimated to cover six months each-that in April to cover the period from the 25th March to the 29th Sept, and that in October to cover the period from the 29th Sept. to the 25th March, and to apportion it on that basis. (2) That the rate and heading had been made in accordance with the form prescribed by art. 16 of the order made under the Agricultural Rating Act 1896 and the form in sched. Y to such order, and that the order requires every poor rate to be made in accordance
with such form, and that as the period for which the rate was made did not appear on the face of it, it was competent for the overseers to give supplementary evidence as to what that period was and the date when the period commenced. (3) That the period for which the rate was "estimated" (sect. 14 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41) was the six months from the 29th Sept. to the 25th March, and that this is the same thing as the period for which the rate was made: (sect. 16 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41). (4) That sect. 14 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41 must be read as amended by the Agricultural Rates Order 1896, the effect of which is to render the statement of the date previously to which the expenses the rate is made to meet "will be" incurred a sufficient compliance with sect. 14 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, leaving it to be proved aliunde when the period of the rate commenced. (5) That if the appellant objected to the rate on the ground that it was retrospective, he should have appealed against it, and that he had not done so. The duties of the magistrates were ministerial only.
The justices found as a fact that the appellant was the occupier of the house from the 1st March 1898 to the 30th Nov. 1898, and that he was the occupier of the land from the 1st March 1898 to the 24th June 1898, and that no appeal had been made against the rates.
They were of opinion that the rate was good on the face of it; that, following the case of Reg. v. Headlam and The London and NorthWestern Railway Company (57 L. J. 89, M. C.), their duties were ministerial only; also that they had no jurisdiction to decide whether any and, if any, what excess had been charged against the appellant, and they directed a distress warrant to issue for the whole amount claimed. but to be suspended pending the opinion of the court.
The questions of law arising upon the above statements of fact are: (1) Were the justices right in holding that the rate was good on the face of it? (2) If the rate was good on the face of it, were the justices right in assuming that they had excessive amount demanded? (3) Was a legal no jurisdiction to inquire into the question of the demand made upon the appellant for the exact sum due from him in respect of the said rate?
The heading to the rate was as follows:
An assessment for the relief of the poor of the parish of Cranham, in the county of Gloucester, and for other purposes chargeable thereon according to law made this 21st day of Oct. in the year of our Lord 1898 after the rate of eighteenpence in the pound on buildings and other hereditaments not being agricultural land and at one half of the said rate on agricultural land, which is estimated to meet all the expenses for the above purposes which will be incurred before the 25th day of March next.
There were two demand notes, one in respect of the buildings and other hereditaments, and the other in respect of the agricultural land.
Brooke Little for the appellant.-The short point here is, Is the proportion of the rate to be calculated from the time the rate was made or from the time at which the rate was intended to be made? He referred to Poor Rate Assessment and Collection Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 41), ss. 14, 16. Owing to the decisions in St. Werburgh Overseers v. Hutchinson (42 L. T. Rep. 153; 5 Ex. Div. 19) and Hare v. Putney Overseers (45 L. T.
Rep. 337; 7 Q. B. Div. 223) the Pour Rate Assessment and Collection Act 1869 Amendment Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 30) was passed, which by sect. 3 made the outgoing tenant liable for his proportion only, notwithstanding the fact that he was not succeeded by a tenant. Reg. v. Tempest; Ex parte Townend (14 Times L. Rep. 199) shows that the rate only operates from the time it is made. He also referred to
Bushell v. Luckett, 2 C. B. 111.
CHANNELL, J.-We think that this appeal must be allowed. The question is of little importance in this case, except whether the appellant is entitled to get off paying a sum at the expense of his successor, on the ground of the negligence of the overseers. I think, however, that the appellant is right on the question of proportion. It arises from the question of retrospective rates, and, as to the machinery, the difficulty is how and where the proper proportion is to be arrived at. Who has to settle that point? Mr. Brooke Little's contention, that it is the duty of the overseers to find out the proper amount, and that unless a proper demand is made a distress warrant cannot issue, may be right, though that contention may only apply where the proportion of the rate is wrong. The magistrates may be the persons to fix the amount for which the warrant is to issue, but, whether that is right or wrong, it is clear they cannot issue a distress warrant for the full amount where the statute says the occupier is only to be liable for less. BUCKNILL, J. concurred. Appeal allowed.
Solicitors for the appellant, T. White and Son, for A. H. G. Heelas, Stroud.
Thursday, Jan. 18, 1900.
(Before CHANNELL and BUCKNILL, JJ.) COCKER (app.) v. MCMULLEN (resp.). (a) Licensing-Sale of beer-Sale at unlicensed place -Traveller-Order-Appropriation-Licensing Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94), s. 3.
The respondent, a brewer, carrying on business in W.-road. L., held a wholesale licence besides a retail licence in respect of those premises enabling him to sell beer for consumption off the premises. On the 10th July his traveller called at the house of M. A. B., K.-terrace, H., and obtained an order for six bottles of beer. He entered the order in a memorandum book he had with him. Nothing more was done at this house by the traveller, and the goods were delivered by the respondent's carter on the 14th July. On delivering the bottles, which were not marked in any way indicating any appropriation, the carter took the bottles from a box which was constructed to contain twelve, but which only contained the six ordered by M. A. B. There was no address or label on the boxes, and the beer was paid for on delivery, and the appellant contended the sale took place at K.-terrace. It was proved that the practice was for each traveller to enter his orders in an order book at the licensed premises. The respondent himself enters all these orders in a private general order book, and contended that he accepted or rejected each order as he considered (a) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
[Q.B. DIV. fit. He then entered them in the general delivery book. The justices considered that there was no sale of beer at K.-terrace, and that the sale and appropriation took place at the licensed premises, and dismissed the summons.
Held, allowing the appeal, that the justices were
CASE stated by justices of the peace of the county of Lancaster.
At a petty sessions held at Lancaster Castle on the 22nd July 1899 an information was preferred by John Milne Cocker (hereinafter called the appellant) against Herbert Robert McMullen (hereinafter called the respondent), under sect. 3 of the Licensing Act 1872, charging him for that he on the 14th July 1899, at Halton, then being duly licensed to sell by retail intoxicating liquors in his house and premises No. 88, Windermereroad, Lancaster, unlawfully did sell by retail certain intoxicating liquor-to wit, beer-at certain other places situate in Kirby-terrace, in the county of Lancaster, where he was not authorised to sell the same.
The following facts were proved or admitted:The respondent is a brewer carrying on business in Windermere-road, Lancaster, and at the time alleged in the information held a wholesale licence besides a retail licence in respect of those premises enabling him to sell beer for consumption off the premises.
On the 10th July the respondent's traveller called at the house of Mary Ann Beaumont, Kirby-terrace, Halton, and obtained an order for six bottles of beer. He entered the order in a memorandum book he had with him. Nothing more was done at this house by the traveller, and the goods were delivered by the respondent's carter at that house on the 14th July.
On delivering the bottles, which were not marked in any way indicating any appropriation, the carter took the bottles from a box which was constructed to contain twelve, but which was contended by the respondent only contained the six ordered by Beaumont. There was no address or label on the boxes, and the beer was paid for on delivery, and the appellant contended the sale took place at Kirby-terrace. A like transaction took place at another house in the same terrace.
On behalf of the respondent it was proved that his practice was for each traveller to enter his orders in an order book at his licensed premises, each traveller having a separate book. The respondent himself enters all these orders in a private general order book, and contended that he accepted or rejected each order as he considered fit.
He then entered them in the general delivery book.
It was submitted on his behalf that the counter. foil delivery book made up from the general delivery book is handed to the carter with each customer's order in a separate box, and placed in the same order on the cart as in the delivery book.
It was admitted that one of the reasons for doing this was to check the carter, and, it was also submitted, for the purpose of complying with the law. It was also admitted that there was nothing on the bottles to show to whom they belonged, but it was proved that each customer's order, however small. was placed in a separate box, no two orders being placed in any one box.
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that no sale took place in Kirby-terrace, and that the orders were not accepted until they reached the licensed premises, and that the appropriation of the goods took place at such premises.
The justices considered that there was no sale of beer at Kirby-terrace, and that the sale and appropriation took place at the licensed premises, and dismissed the summons.
Horridge for the appellant.-The sale was com. plete either when the order was given or when the incomplete contract was made complete by appropriation and delivery. Both of these events took place off the licensed premises. In Stephenson v. Roger (80 L T. Rep. 193) the court held on the facts there that there had been no sale, but the statements of the law in that case are in my favour. The headnote is: "Brewers having a retail off-licence for the sale of beer in respect of premises in P.-street, Cardiff, occupied an office in M.-street, Cardiff, for which they held no licence and at which no beer was kept. This office was opened merely for the of purpose receiving orders, which were then sent on to the licensed premises in P.-street, where they were accepted or rejected. No orders were accepted and no payments were made at this office, and there was no appropriation of the beer there, but the orders were simply forwarded to the licensed premises, where, if the order were accepted, the beer was appropriated to the purchaser, and the beer so appropriated was afterwards delivered at the purchaser's residence, where payment was made. Held, that what took place in the office in M.-street, where the orders were merely received and forwarded, was not a sale of the beer at that place within the meaning of sect. 37 of the Excise Act 1860, and that the brewers could not be convicted under that section of selling the beer at any other house or place than the house or place specified in their licence.' Per Channell, J.: To bring a case within the section it is not necessary that there should be an actual sale and the passing of the property in the liquor sold; it is sufficient if there be a binding executory contract for a sale to be carried out at a future time, though no property passes at the time." Here there was either a complete and binding executory contract or an incomplete contract made complete by appropriation. Practically, the case of Pletts v. Campbell (73 L. T. Rep. 344; (1895) 2 Q. B. 229) is on all fours with this. At first sight Pletts v. Beattie (74 L. T. Rep. 148; (1896) 1 Q. B. 519) seems to be against me; but it is not really so, as the facts are different to the present case, as there everything was done at the brewery except delivery. [BUCKNILL, J. referred to Trappe v. Eagan (1898) Q. B Div. Ir. June 13, referred to in Highmore's Excise Laws, vol. 2.]
The respondent did not appear.
CHANNELL, J.-In this case the appeal must be allowed. On the facts as here stated there was no complete sale at the licensed premises. The contract was not made there, neither were the goods appropriated. The only place of the transaction was at the customer's house, so the appeal must be allowed.
Saturday, Jan. 20, 1900.
The respondent was charged with selling milk contrary to sect. 6 of the Food and Drugs Act 1875. At the hearing of the information the certificate of the analyst was produced and proved on behalf of the appellant, and showed as follows: "I, the undersigned public analyst for the county of Essex, do hereby certify that I received on the 5th June 1899 a sample of milk. I am of
opinion that the same contained the parts as under: Fat, 3.55 parts; non-fatty solids, 7 46 parts; water, 88 99 parts; total, 100.00. I am therefore of opinion that this milk contains
per cent. of added water."
The justices received the certificate of the analyst as sufficient evidence of the facts as herein stated, but it appeared to them that the milk was exceptionally good, the butter fat being above normal, and, having regard to all the circumstances, they thought that, though the charge was proved, the offence was of so trifling a nature that it was inexpedient to inflict any punishment, and they therefore dismissed the information.
Held, remitting the case to the justices, that if the milk was exceptionally good after the adulteration they need not convict, but if it was only exceptionally good before, the offence was one for which they should convict.
CASE stated on an information charging the respondent with selling milk contrary to sect. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875.
At the hearing of the information it was proved that the appellant was the inspector of nuisances duly appointed by the East Ham Urban District Council, and that he, acting on their behalf, purchased one pint of milk from the servant of the respondent within that district with the intention of submitting the same for analysis. All the provisions of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875, with regard to the taking of the sample, its division and analysis, were duly complied with.
The certificate of the analyst was produced and proved on behalf of the appellant, and showed as
I, the undersigned public analyst for the county of Essex, do hereby certify that I received on June 5, 1899, a sample of milk for analysis (which then measured about one-third of a pint), and have analysed the same, and declare the result of my analysis to be as follows. I am of opinion that the same contained the parts as under: Fat, 3:55 parts; non-fatty solids, 7:46 parts; water, 88.99 parts; total, 100.00. I am therefore of opinion that this milk contains 10 per cent of added water. This opinion is based upon the above analytical result in conjunction with the fact that normal milk contains not less than 8.5 of non-fatty solids. At the time the above analysis was performed, no change had taken place in the constitution of the milk that could interfere with the analysis.
The respondent pleaded not guilty, but did not tender himself or any witness or other evidence on his behalf, and did not require that the analyst should be called as a witness.
(a) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.