Daldy for the appellant.-The revising barrister had no power to amend. The incorrect statement of the objector's place of abode was not a mistake. The objector knew perfectly well what he was putting down in the form, and purposely gave his business address. This is a case of an omission of something required by the statutory form, and is distinguishable from a case of insufficient description which has been held capable of amend

ment:

James v. Howarth, 5 C. P. Div. 225.

In one case it has been held by a divisional court that the omission to give any place of abode was a mistake which the revising barrister could amend, but it is submitted that case went too far and ought to be overruled:

Adams v. Bostock, 45 L. T. Rep. 443; 8 Q. B. Div. 259.

It has been held that the omission of the date from a notice of objection invalidates it so that the notice cannot be amended:

Freeman v. Newman, 51 L. T. Rep. 396; 12 Q. B.
Div. 373.

This is not a case where the information intended to be conveyed was given, though in an imperfect manner, as in

Bollen v. Southall, 15 Q. B. Div. 461.

The next two cases were not cases of amendment, because in both cases the revising barrister held the notice of objection was good, but they show that in the present case no amendment ought to be allowed:

Humphrey v. Earle, 58 L. T. Rep. 403; 20 Q. B.
Div. 294;

Wood v. Chandler, 20 Q. B. Div. 297.

The objector's mistake in the present case arose from the view he took of the law; such a mistake cannot be amended:

Bridges v. Miller, 58 L. T. Rep. 405; 20 Q. B. Div. 287.

The omission of the date of attestation in a notice of claim delivered by a lodger claimant has been held fatal:

Smith v. Chandler, 60 L. T. Rep. 327; 22 Q. B.
Div. 208.

In Hicks v. Stokes (1893) 1 Q. B. 124) the court held that the notice of objection was good, and did not require amendment. The last case is

Sandford v. Beal, 73 L. T. Rep. 406.

There an amendment was allowed, but Lord Russell, C.J. said the mistake was not made by design. Here the objector knew quite well that the address he put on the notice of objection was not his place of abode. He must be taken to have known the law.

Lawless for the respondent was not called upon. LINDLEY, M.R.-I have not the slightest doubt that the revising barrister had power to amend this notice of objection. It is only by Act of Parliament that a revising barrister has any power of amendment, and in the case now before us the Act which is applicable is the Parlia mentary and Municipal Registration Act 1878. By sect. 28, sub-sect. 2, of that Act, a revising barrister "may correct any mistake which is proved to him to have been made in any claim or notice of objection." The revising barrister found that as a fact Prescott was not entitled to a vote; that

[CT. OF APP.

In

is to say, the objection made to his being on the list of voters was a good one, subject only to this, that in form it was open to remark because the objector, instead of giving after his name at the end of the objection his place of abode which as appears from the overseers' list was at Wimbledon, had given his business address in Drury-lane, within the borough. It is plain how. it happened that he gave his business address instead of his place of abode. The objection was made on a printed form which ends "(signed, A. B. of on the list of Parliamentary electors and burgesses." The objector ought to have filled in the blank with his place of abode, but it appears that he thought he ought to give his address within the borough, and so he put in his business address. There was no idea of deception on his part. No one was misled by what he did. The revising barrister in the exercise of his discretion amended the notice of objection by adding the objector's place of abode. The only question for our consideration is whether the revising barrister had power to do that. The Queen's Bench Division held that the barrister had power, Wills, J. dissenting from the judgments of Lord Russell, C.J. and Lawrance, J. I cannot agree with the judgment of Wills, J., and I think the point is not a difficult one. construing an Act such as this which gives a revising barrister power to amend, I think the court should be slow to hold that in any particular case that may arise the barrister has not power to amend, and if he has that power the court should not differ from him on a question of discretion. I do not think any of the cases cited on behalf of the appellant show that the barrister had no power to amend in this case. Of the cases cited I think only two have any bearing upon the point. In Bridges v. Miller (ubi sup.) the court held that the objection was radically bad, that in fact it was no objection at all. Therefore they held that the revising barrister had no power to amend in such a way as to put in an objection which the objector himself had not put in. The decision seems to me sensible enough, and I have nothing to say against it. The other case was Smith v. Chandler (ubi sup.). The ratio decidendi there was that the Parliamentary form of claim for lodgers was deliberately not used; that the claimant had deliberately used another form which omitted something contained in the statutory form. The claim was held bad on that ground. In the case before us now the objection is a good one, except so far as regards the address there given. I think that the revising barrister had power to amend that, and this appeal must be dismissed.

same

SMITH, L.J.-I am entirely of the opinion. It seems to me that sect. 28, sub-sect. 2, was passed for the express purpose of curing blunders such as the objector has made here. The substance of the objection was good, because when it had been amended the barrister struck the appellant's name out of the list of voters. Now the Act of Parliament says that the revising barrister may correct "any mistake. Why should we try and cut down that provision and say that the barrister may correct only "some mistakes? No injustice will be done by amending this notice of objection. In the Divisional Court Wills, J. says he thinks that the objector did not make a mistake." He says: "I think it is a

"

CHAN. DIV.]

mistake within that section if a man says one thing meaning to say another; but that it is not a mistake if he deliberately says a thing meaning to say it, although he has been induced to say it by erroneous reasoning." I think that what the objector did here was a "mistake." The statutory form of notice of objection ends, "(signed) A. B. of " I think that the objector's putting down his business address intentionally when he ought properly to have given his place of abode, was a mistake or blunder well within the purview of the Act.

CHANCERY DIVISION July 25, 26, and Aug. 2, 1899. (Before COZENS-HARDY, J.) LLANDUDNO URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL v. WOODS. (a)

Foreshore-Seaside town-Lease by Crown to local authority-Right of preaching on beachDeclaration of plaintiffs' right to forbid-Injunction refused.

The foreshore is not a highway in the full sense of the word, and the public have no right at common law to enter upon it, when dry, except for the purposes of navigation or fishing.

More extensive rights may be acquired by custom or prescription, but the existence of such rights will not be presumed, and must be strictly proved.

Blundell v. Catterall (5 B. & Ald. 268) followed. The plaintiffs, as lessees from the Crown of the foreshore at Llandudno, sought to restrain a clergyman of the Church of England from holding services and delivering lectures and addresses on the beach.

Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that the defendant was not entitled to do so without their consent, but that the occasion was too trivial to induce the court to grant an injunction.

THIS action raised the question of the rights of the public over the foreshore.

By an indenture of lease, the foreshore of the town of Llandudno was demised by the Crown to the plaintiffs' predecessors in title for a term of years expiring in Oct. 1901.

The plaintiffs had also jurisdiction over the promenade, for the regulation of which they had, with the sanction of the Local Government Board, made certain bye-laws.

The defendant was a clergyman of the Church of England, and was carrying on an antiRitualistic crusade in North Wales, in the course of which he visited Llandudno, and in July 1898 he requested the plaintiffs to allow him to hold religious services on the promenade and foreshore, which was refused. Nevertheless, he held meetings on the promenade, and was convicted

(a) Reported by A. L. MORRIS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

[CHAN. DIV.

before the magistrates of committing a breach of the bye-laws, and fined.

Immediately after the conviction, the defendant began to hold meetings and deliver addresses on the beach or foreshore.

The plaintiffs alleged that the matter and manner of the defendant's addresses gave offence to the inhabitants and visitors of the town; that large crowds assembled and angry discussions took place, and that the meetings seriously interfered with the free use and ordinary enjoyment by the public of the beach and foreshore, and they brought this action claiming a declaration that the defendant was not entitled without their consent to hold meetings or deliver addresses, lectures, or sermons on any part of the foreshore, and an injunction to restrain him from so doing.

An interim injunction was obtained in Aug. 1898, and the action now came on for trial, the defendant contending that he had a right as a member of the public to do as he had done.

Eve, Q.C. and E. P. Hewitt for the plaintiffs.We admit that there has been a limited dedication, and that the public have a right of passing and repassing along the foreshore, but that does not give the right for which the defendant contends. The onus is upon him to show a user for a long time, capable of a legal origin. In Blundell v. Catterall (5 B. & Ald. 268) it was decided that the public have no common law right of bathing in the sea, or of crossing the foreshore to get at it, and this was followed in

Mace v. Philcox, 9 L. T. Rep. 766; 15 C. B. N. S. 600.

In Ex parte Lewis (59 L. T. Rep. 338; 21 Q. B. Div. 191) it was laid down that the dedication of Trafalgar-square for a public right of passage did not confer a right to hold public meetings there. In Attorney-General v. Wright (77 L. T. Rep. 295; (1897) 2 Q. B. 318) the plaintiffs proved an immemorial user of the foreshore for the purpose of fixing moorings, while in the present case the plaintiffs have never permitted preaching, though they have allowed children's services. They also referred to Callis on Sewers, 2nd edit., pp. 54-5, and to the Encyclopædia of the Laws of England, tit. Foreshore.

Aug. 2-COZENS-HARDY, J.-The plaintiffs have, in respect of the promenade at Llandudno, by virtue of bye-laws approved by the Local Government Board in 1878, the right of preventing any public address from being delivered, and they took proceedings against the defendant before the magistrates for breach of these byelaws. This action in no way relates to the promenade. Between the foot of the promenade and the commencement of the foreshore is a strip about which I know nothing. The defendant has sometimes delivered addresses from this strip. But this action in no way relates to this strip. In June 1898 he applied civilly to the plaintiffs for permission to hold religious services on the shore. In reply he received the following answer: "Dear Sir,Your application for permission to hold religious services on the beach was submitted to my council this afternoon, when I was requested to express regret that they cannot acc-de thereto, inasmuch as they have granted a similar privilege

to the organisation which has been in the habit of visiting Llandudno in past years, and proposes to come again tois season. Yours truly, ALFRED CONOLLY." I may observe that the organisation referred to in this letter is not antagonistic to the defendant, and that there is ample space on the extensive shore for more than one service. The defendant has since held services on the shore, until he was restrained by an interlocutory injunction. The evidence satisfies me that there was no breach of the peace, no disorder worth mentioning, and no inconvenience except of the most trivial kind to any of the public resorting to the shore. It is, however, contended on the part of the plaintiffs that they are entitled as lessees to the possession of the foreshore, and that the public have no right at common law to enter upon the shore, when dry, except for the purposes of navigation or fishing. I think I am bound by the decision of the majority of the judges of the Court of King's Bench in 1821 in Blundell v. Catterall (5 B. & Ald. 268) to hold that in strict law this proposition is well founded. The public are not entitled to cross the shore even for purposes of bathing or amusement. The sands on the seashore are not to be regarded as in the full sense of the word a highway. A more extensive right may possibly have been gained by prescription or by custom either by individuals or by the permanent or temporary inhabitants of Llandudno, but the existence of this more extensive right must be proved, and will not be presumed in the absence of proof. The plaintiffs have therefore, primâ facie, a right to treat every bather, every nursemaid with a perambulator, every boy riding a donkey, and every preacher on the shore at Llandudno as a trespasser. In the present case there is no evidence from which I can find the existence of a legal usage or custom entitling the defendant to deliver sermons addresses on the shore at Llandudno. The defendant seems to imagine that his position as a clergyman of the Established Church, bound to preach the Gospel both in season and out of season, gives him some special and peculiar rights. It is needless for me to say that this contention cannot for one moment be maintained. I must treat the defendant precisely as I should treat a Roman Catholic priest, a Methodist preacher, or a Salvation Army captain. court has nothing to do with the truth or falsehood of the doctrines which the defendant has preached. I feel bound to say that I consider this action wholly unnecessary, and one which ought not to have been brought. It is no part of the duty of the council, as lessees from the Crown for an unexpired term of two years, to prevent a harmless user of the shore. There are persons who derive satisfaction from listening to the addresses of the defendant, and the defendant derives satisfaction from delivering these addresses. I cannot conceive why they should be deprived of this innocent pleasure. Nobody is obliged to listen; nobody is molested. This action is an attempt to assert rights which the Crown would never have thought of putting forward, and which are in no way necessary for the peace and good order of the town of Llandudno. Charges have been made against the defendant in the pleadings and in the evidence for which there is no justification. I cannot refuse to make a declaration that the defendant is not MAG. CAS.-VOL. XIX.

or

This

entitled without the consent of the plaintiffs to hold meetings or deliver addresses, lectures, or sermons on any part of the foreshore in lease from the Crown. But I decline to go further. I decline to grant an injunction. That is a formidable legal weapon which ought to be reserved for less trivial occasions, and I make no order as to costs.

Solicitors for plaintiffs, Belfrage and Co., agents for Chamberlain and Johnson, Llandudno. Solicitor for defendant, J. Girdlestone.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.
April 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28, 1899.
(Before PHILLIMORE, J.)

TYNE IMPROVEMENT COMMISSIONERS v. IMRIE
AND OTHERS; ATTORNEY GENERAL v. TYNE
IMPROVEMENT COMMISSIONERS (a)

Pier constructed under statutory powers-Right of way-Right to stray on and off pier-Rights of bathing, fishing, and other purposes of recreation Dedication-Lost grant-Evidence of userIntention-Obstructions and interruptions. The plaintiffs, the Improvement Commissioners of the river T., acquired certain lands and constructed a pier under statutory powers, the work being done at intervals between the years 1854 and 1891. The public were in the habit of using the pier as a promenade and for various purposes of pleasure and recreation, and the plaintiff's alleged that they never desired nor intended to prevent the public from so using it as a matter of favour. Finding, however, that a claim as of right was being set up, the plaintiffs on the 21st Dec. 1897 placed barriers across the landward end of the pier, and ordered the pier to be closed for twenty-four hours. Thereupon the mayor and other officers of the adjoining borough of S. S., being refused admission, broke down the barriers and also certain permanent gates across the pier. The plaintiffs now sued them for the trespass. At the same time an action was brought against the commissioners in the name of the Attorney-General alleging that the said pier and the several parts thereof had been from time to time dedicated to the use of and accepted by the public as a common and public highway, and had been and were used by the public for the purposes of boating, bathing, fishing, embarking, disembarking, recreation, and other lawful purposes (with power to stray on and off the sands at the side of the pier), and alleging, in the alternative, a lost grant to the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of S. S. for the benefit of themselves and the inhabitants of S. S., and claiming a declaration that the public and the inhabitants of S. S. were entitled to exercise such right of way and such other rights.

Held, (1) that a right of way could exist over a structure erected under statutory powers, and (2) that an owner might dedicate his land for purposes of recreation; but (3) that a licence to stray on and off a right of way required such a case to prove it that it could practically never be proved; and (4) that the plea of a lost grant could not be maintained.

Held, on the facts, that the various obstructions

(a) Reported by J. ANDREW STRAHAN, Esq, Barrister-at-Law. 2 R

erected from time to time by the plaintiffs with the object of saving their rights had been a sufficient assertion of their rights.

Held also, on the facts, that the plaintiffs must be presumed to have dedicated a simple right of way within certain assigned limits.

THESE two actions, which were tried together, raised substantially the same issue-whether the public were or were not entitled as of right to use the pier on the south side of the mouth of the river Tyne for a promenade and for bathing, fishing, and other purposes of recreation.

The Tyne Improvement Commissioners were first constituted as an unincorporated body by the River Tyne Improvement Act 1850. By the Tyne Improvement Act 1852 the commissioners were empowered to make and maintain the piers, works, and conveniences therein mentioned, and to purchase and use such of the lands referred to in the Act as should be necessary for such purposes. By the Tyne Improvement Act 1857 it was enacted (inter alia) that the commissioners for the time being should be a body corporate, and should continue possessed of all lands and properties acquired under the previous Act. In exercise of the powers conferred on them by the Act of 1852, the commissioners took (among other lands) certain lands, including both foreshore and uninclosed land above the foreshore, in the parish of South Shields, which were conveyed to the commissioners in 1854 by the Dean and Chapter of Durham. In 1854, in pursuance of the same powers, the commissioners commenced and thenceforward proceeded with and in 1895 finally completed the construction of a breakwater for improving and protecting the navigation of the river Tyne, called the "South Pier," which commences near the bottom of a public street called 'Ocean-road," in the borough of South Shields, and runs thence in a north-easterly or easterly direction first upon the uninclosed land above the foreshore, then upon the foreshore, and then beyond the fore-hore into the high sea. shore end of the pier is connected with Ocean-road by a public way called "Pier Parade." The total length of the pier is about one mile, and it is constructed of concrete blocks, and the top is cemented so as to form a level promenade about 21ft. wide.

The

A fuller description of the pier will be found at the beginning of the judgment of Phillimore, J.

In the first action the Tyne Improvement Commissioners alleged that the defendants, the then mayor, town clerk, borough surveyor, and a number of the town council of South Shields, on the 21st Dec. 1897, by themselves or their agents, and purporting to act on behalf of the town council of South Shields, wrongfully broke and entered upon the South Pier, and pulled down certain barriers lawfully erected by the plaintiffs, and broke open gates, and trespassed on the pier, and the plaintiffs claimed damages for the alleged trespass, and a declaration that no public right of way exists on or over the pier or any part thereof.

In the second action, in which the AttorneyGeneral at the relation of the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of South Shields and the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses were plaintiffs and the Tyne Improvement Commissioners were defen

dants, the following were the material paragraphs in the statement of claim:

10. The said commissioners have at various places along the said pier placed steps for communication with the sands above high-water mark and with the foreshore and with the high sea, and at one part of the said pier they have constructed a landing place for ferry boats plying on the said river Tyne. Seats and other conveniences for the use of the public have also from time time been placed on the said pier, some by the said commissioners and others by the plaintiffs, the said mayor, aldermen, and burgesses.

11. The said pier and the several parts thereof have from time to time as and when such several parts have been completed been dedicated to the use of and accepted by the public as and the same were at the time of the defendants' acts hereinafter complained of and are now a common and public highway, and have been and are used by the public for the purposes of boating, bathing, fishing, embarking, disembarking, recreation, and other lawful purposes as a common and public highway for going, returning, passing, and repassing from and to South Shields to and from the sands (both foreshore and uninclosed land above the same), and to and from the high sea and the pier end and the said steps and landing place, and also from and to one part of the sands (both foreshore and uninclosed land) to and from another part thereof and as a public way or place for walking to and fro on the said pier, and such user by the public has existed without interruption as to the greater part of the said pier for more than thirty years, as to a large part thereof for more than forty years, and as to the whole thereof for more than three years last past.

12. The sands (including both foreshore and uninclosed land above the same) have always been and are a common and public ancient highway and have always been and are used by the public for the purposes of boating, bathing, fishing, embarking, disembarking, recreation, and other lawful purposes as such highway for going, returning, passing, and repassing from and to South Shields to and from the high sea and from and to one part of the sands to and from another part thereof without interruption (except so far, if at all, as the placing thereon of the said pier was or is an interruption), and the plaintiffs will contend that whether there has or has not been any such dedication as aforesaid the rights of the public over and in respect of the site of the said pier and particularly so much thereof as forms part of the sands (whether foreshore or uniu closed land) have remained and remain in force, and that the public are entitled to exercise such rights on and over the said pier except so far (f at all) as the same rights may be inconsistent with the purposes for which the said pier was authorised to be constructed.

13. The plaintiffs, the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the borough of South Shields, in the alternative further say that before the acts of the defendants hereinafter complained of by a deed which has been lost or destroyed by accident the defendants granted to the plaintiffs, the said mayor, aldermen, and burgesses, their successors and assigns, for the benefit of themselves and the inhabitants of the said borough for the purposes of boating, bathing, fishing, embarking, disembarking, recreation, and other lawful purposes the right to use the said pier as a way for going, returning, passing, and repassing from and to South Shields to and from the sands (both foreshore and uninclosed land above the same) and to and from the high sea and the pier end and the said steps and landing place and also from and to one part of the sands (both foreshore and uninclosed land) to and from another part thereof and for walking to and fro on the said pier.

14. On the 21st Dec. 1897 the defendants wrongfully obstructed the said public way over the said pier by placing and until the same were removed by the plaintiffs, the said mayor, aldermen, and burgesses,

maintaining on the said pier within the said parish or township of South Shields certain barricades, and the defendants deny that there is any public right of way or other public right over the said pier or any part thereof, and they threaten and intend unless restrained by this honourable court again to place barricades on the said pier and thereby to obstruct the said way. The defendants on the 3rd Nov. 1898, at a meeting of their body, passed a resolution to the effect that barricades should again be placed on the said pier for the purpose of obstructing the said way, and in consequence of such resolution the plaintiffs, the said mayor, aldermen, and burgesses, a-ked the defendants to give an undertaking not to place any barricade on the said pier, but the defendants refused to give any such undertaking.

And the plaintiffs claimed a declaration that there is a public right of way on and over the pier and every part thereof, a declaration (in the alternative) that the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses and the inhabitants of South Shields are entitled to use the pier for the several purposes mentioned in paragraph 13 of the statement of claim, and an injunction to restrain the defendants from obstructing or interfering with the alleged right of way or with the use of the pier for any of the purposes mentioned.

The corporation of South Shields relied upon the following specific acts of dedication : (1) The laying out of the top of the pier as a convenient promenade from time to time in and between the years 1854 to 1895 as and when the several parts of the pier were completed; (2) the laying out and making in conjunction with the corporation of the roadway known as Pier Parade, from Ocean-road to the pier, in or about the year 1863; (3) the providing of seats and conveniences for the public at various places along the pier at various times between 1854 and 1895; (4) the providing of steps on the pier for communication by the public with the sands adjoining the pier between the years 1854 and 1895 s and when the building of the pier advanced to the respective places where the said steps are now situate; (5) the providing of steps, seats, and a platform for public bathing, as to the steps between the years 1854 and 1895, and as to the seats and platform between the years 1860 and 1895; (6) the construction of a landing place for ferry boats plying on the river Tyne in or about the year 1879.

The Tyne Improvement Commissioners, in their defence in the second action, denied that the pier or any part thereof had ever been dedicated to the use of or accepted by the public, and alleged that the user by the public had been permissive only and not as of right, and for purposes of recreation only and not for the purpose of passing from one public place to another. They further alleged that, if prior to the making of the pier the site thereof or any part was a common and public ancient highway over which the public had any rights, such rights was extinguished by the erection of the pier under statutory powers. They also relied upon various acts of interruption and obstruction, the evidence as to which was briefly as follows: In 1872 gates (called the "outer gates ") were erected on the pier at a distance of 3250ft. from the landward end, bearing a notice, "The public not allowed to pass this gate." As the pier advanced, these gates were moved seaward-in 1884 to 3700ft., in 1889 to 4400ft. (always from the land

ward end), where they still remain. In 1896, on the completion of the lighthouse, the commissioners passed a resolution to open these gates from sunrise to sunset, "with the reservation of all the rights of the commissioners, and during their pleasure." In 1886 other gates (known as the "storm gates") were put up, after the life brigade had made representations that their work was impeded by the public. These gates were closed in time of storm, sometimes for a period of two days, at the discretion of the commissioners. In 1862, upon the occasion of Mr. Gladstone visiting the pier, it was closed for some hours. In 1875 Capt. Boyton displayed his diving dress from the pier, and a part was reserved for persons who paid ls. each. In Dec. 1879 the pier was closed for twenty-four hours, xpressly to save the rights of the commissioners, by a barrier placed 1429ft. from the land ward end. In Dec. 1891 and Oct. 1896 this was repeated, the barriers being respectively 1000ft. from the landward end, and at the end itself. On the latter occasion guns were being fired during a part of the day from a battery near the pier. In 1885 the pier was closed for forty-eight hours in order to get a mammoth crane into position. On the 21st Dec. 1897 the commissioners placed barriers across the landward end of the pier, and it was in respect of the breaking down of these that the commissioners brought this action for trespass.

The other material facts sufficiently appear from the judgment of Phillimore, J.

Asquith, Q.C. (Lawson Walton, Q.C., Manisty, and Lawrance with him) for the plaintiffs.-The objects which the erection of the pier was designed to effect-the improvement of navigation, and the providing of better facilities for saving life in case of shipwreck-are inconsistent with the idea of dedication to the public. For the due performance of their duties it was and is essential that the commissioners should retain in their own hands the control of the use

of the pier from time to time. Such use as it is now suggested the public have acquired would be entirely incompatible with the proper performance of those duties. The existence of the storm gates is inconsistent with any such right as is now claimed. They were put up for the express purpose of excluding the public from the pier on the seaward side of the gates, in times of storm, when the lifeboat had to be brought out to assist ships in distress. Moreover, it would have been ultra vires on the part of the commissioners to dedicate the pier as a highway, or for any of the other purposes suggested. The construction of the pier under statutory powers was an authorised interference with the pre-existing right of way across the sands, and must be taken to le an interference with that right by the authority of Parliament:

Corporation of Yarmouth v. Simmons, 38 L. T. Rep. 881; 10 Ch. Div. 518.

As to the alleged acts of dedication, the pier was constructed as a promenade because that was the most convenient form for carrying out the purposes for which it was erected. It was not that the public might have a promenade, but that life-saving operations might be more efficiently performed. The seats and other conveniences