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persons "arriving at or departing from such station by railroad." Bona fide travellers are dealt with in one part of the section, and railway travellers are dealt with in another and separate part of the section, so that they are two distinct classes, and separate considerations apply to each class. It is not necessary that a person should sleep during the previous night three miles from the station in order to entitle himself to be served at the station. If that were necessary, the whole object of having refreshments at railway stations would be defeated, as a person might sleep only a few yards from the refreshment rooms, and if he were departing by the train for a long journey he could not before departing be supplied with refreshments. A similar provision for railway travellers or 66 persons arriving at or departing from such station by railroad" was made in sect. 10 of the Public House Closing Act 1864 (27 & 28 Vict. c. 64), repealed by the Act of 1872. The appellant represented that he was about to depart by train, and he did in fact so depart, and that is sufficient. The words of the section are, persons arriving at or departing from such station." These words are in the disjunctive form, "arriving at" or "departing from," and if a person comes within one or other of these classes he is a traveller and entitled to be served, and the words “departing from" must be read as "about to depart from" the station. The appellant having taken his ticket was a person departing from-that is, about to depart fromthe station, and he was therefore a traveller (Fisher v. Howard, 11 L. T. Rep. 373), and it is wholly immaterial whether he was or was not at the time a bonâ fide traveller or represented himself as such, or whether or not he took his ticket merely for the purpose of having a drink, provided he in fact went by train. The railway company committed no offence in selling the beer (Copley v. Burton, 22 L. T. Rep. 888; L. Rep. 5 C. P. 489), but it is said the appel. lant did commit an offence in buying. The justices were wrong, and the conviction ought to be quashed.
J. E. Bankes for the respondent. If this conviction be set aside this important result will follow, that a person might take a ticket for one penny and he might thereby get one or more glasses of beer at the railway station for the ordinary cost of the beer plus one penny. This place being in Wales, the Welsh Sunday Closing Act applies, and the provisions of the Licensing Acts 1872 and 1874 are made applicable, and sect. 4 of the Act contains the same provision as to railway travellers as is contained in sect. 10 of the Act of 1874. The question is, what is meant by "arriving at or departing from the station "in sect. 10. Those words have to be taken in conjunction with the words in sect. 25 of the Act of 1872, "falsely representing himself to be a traveller "; so that to be entitled to be supplied the person must be a traveller, and he must also be a person who is departing from the station by train. It is not enough that a person should be a person arriving at or departing from the station by train; he must in addition be a "traveller "; and the justices are entitled to consider, and in fact ought to consider, the question whether the person was a traveller, as well as a person arriving at or departing from the station by train. they have to consider whether the person is a
traveller in the ordinary sense; whether he comes to the station in any fair sense as a traveller bond fide intending to depart from the station. Two classes of cases might arise-first, that a person went to the station and bought a ticket but did not intend to go by train; in such case he would not in any sense be a person departing from the station; or, again, he might buy the ticket and go by the train merely for the purpose of getting a drink, as the justices have found in this case, in which case also he would not be a traveller, and would not be a person departing from the station by train. It was a matter for the consideration of the justices whether this man would have gone by the train at all, if the inspector had not come in. The mere fact that a person has travelled three miles does not make him a bonâ fide traveller within the Licensing Laws:
Penn v. Alexander, 68 L. T. Rep. 355; (1893) 1
That case applied to bonâ fide travellers, but the same principle applies to railway travellers. Toe mere fact that a person intends to go by train does not make the person a traveller, and if the sole reason of his going by train is to get drink then he is not a traveller, no matter how many miles he may travel. To bring himself within the clause the person must be in the first place a traveller, and then he must be a traveller bonâ fide intending to depart from the station.
S. T. Evans in reply.
DARLING, J.-In this case the appellant went to a railway station in Wales and during the time the public-houses were closed obtained a ticket which entitled him to travel to a place some two miles off on the railway, and the magistrates have found that he took this ticket and departed by the train; but they have also found that he obtained this ticket and departed by the train for the purpose of obtaining intoxicating liquor before starting. It was said that he had been wrongly convicted because it was provided in sect. 10 of the Licensing Act 1874 that nothing in the Act as to hours of closing should preclude the sale at any time, at a railway station, of intoxicating liquors "to persons arriving at or departing from such station by railroad." This man was charged under sect. 25 of the Licensing Act 1872 with falsely representing himself to be a traveller; and if he had falsely represented himself to be a traveller and had got drink at a railway station at a time when public-houses ought to be closed, I do not think that anything in sect. 10 of the Act of 1874 would have availed to save him. But as a matter of fact he did depart from the station by train, and the section entitled him to be served with liquor if he arrived at or departed from the station by railroad. Those words are equivalent to this-that the person who is to be supplied must be a person who is departing from the station by railroadthat is, a person who is about to depart by trainbecause if he is to be supplied on departing he must be supplied before departing from the station. In this case the appellant certainly travelled by railway, but it was contended that he was not a traveller within the real meaning of the word "traveller." I do not wish to use the term "bona fide traveller" in this case, as that expression applies specially to another branch of the section which goes to exempt bona fide
REG. v. DAVEY AND OTHERS (Justices).
travellers from the operation of the section. Then the point comes to this question-Is the appellant a traveller at all? Is he a person about to depart by train? It was said that he was not, because he did not need to depart by train when he bought the ticket; that when be had obtained his ticket and did depart by train he did so for the purpose of obtaining intoxicating liquors. I find nothing in the Act which says that a traveller must be a traveller for a particular purpose, that be must be a traveller engaged on business, and that he must not be engaged on pleasure, and the only pleasure of some people is to drink. I cannot see that a person ceases to be a traveller because he takes a ticket and makes a journey with the object of baving a drink at the station from which he is starting, and one possibly when he arrives at a station at the end of his journey, and a second drink at the same station before he returns. I cannot say that by reason of doing that a person fraudulently or falsely represents himself to be a traveller because he never was a traveller at all. If what Mr. Bankes had suggested had happened; if he had taken a ticket, never intending to travel, and in fact had never gone at all, then he would not have been a traveller, and he would not have been a person arriving at or departing from a station by railway. The appellant was a person who, whatever his motive may have been for departing, did in fact depart from the station by the railway, and therefore he could not possibly be said to be a person falsely representing himself to be, what in fact he actually was, namely, a traveller. I think, therefore, that the appeal must be allowed and the conviction quashed.
CHANNELL, J.-I also think that the appeal must be allowed and the conviction quashed. The second clause of sect. 10 of the Licensing Act of 1874 says that nothing in the Act as to hours of closing shall preclude the sale at a railway station of intoxicating liquors to persons arriving at or departing from such station by railroad. That section must be read as saying that persons arriving at or departing from a railway station are for the purposes of their being supplied with liquors at that station bonâ fide travellers within the meaning of the Act. If the person was not in fact departing from the station-that is to say, about to depart from the station-at the time he was supplied, then he would not be entitled to be supplied, or be a bonâ fide traveller, or a traveller at all. There would have been very little difficulty if the magistrates had found that, when the appellant was being supplied with liquor he never intended to go by train, and that he only intended to go by train because a police inspector came in afterwards. In those circumstances I should think that the conviction would have been right; but I cannot see that the magistrates have found that, and I do not think that there is anything in their findings consistent with their having intended that. The appellant was therefore, in fact, a person departing from the station by railway, and was therefore a person entitled to be served. The latter part of the same sectionsect. 10-is easy to construe under the circumstances, because if the proprietor of the refreshment rooms at the station had been prosecuted for serving the appellant, and had proved that the appellant had represented himself to be departing by the train, when in fact he was not,
and if the proprietor had taken all reasonable precautions to ascertain whether or not the appellant was so departing by train and believed that he was so departing, then I think that the licenceholder would come within the protection of the provision in the latter part of the section, and the proper course to take would be to prosecute the person supplied, under sect. 25 of the Licensing Act of 1872, for falsely representing himself or pretending that he was a person departing from the station by the train. With that reading I
think the whole section becomes consistent and leaves no defect. It is quite true that it leaves it open to a person to travel to a station a mile or two miles or any other distance off, when his real motive is to get a drink; but nobody could so draw an Act of Parliament that it would not be possible for some person or other to evade it, or keep himself outside it, and that is what this man seems to have succeeded in doing. On the findings of the magistrates in this case, I think that the conviction must be quashed.
Appeal allowed. Conviction quashed. Solicitors for the appellant, Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, for Cuthbertson and Powell, Neath.
Solicitors for the respondent, Norris, Allens, and Chapman, for Tennant and Jones, Aberavon.
Tuesday, May 2, 1899.
(Before DARLING and CHANNELL, JJ.) REG. v. DAVEY AND OTHERS (Justices). (a) Public health-Infectious diseases-Order of removal to hospital-Obstruction of execution of order-Proceedings for-Power of justices to inquire into validity of order-Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 124.
On the hearing of an information against a person for obstructing the execution of an order made under sect. 124 of the Public Health Act 1875 for the removal to a hospital of a person suffering from a dangerous infectious disease, it is not open to the justices to go behind the order or inquire into its validity or the circumstances under which it was made, and the justices are bound to convict if in fact there has been an obstruction of the order.
RULE for a mandamus to certain justices of the peace for the county of Glamorgan to state and sign a case for the opinion of the court.
An information was preferred by William Bishop, inspector of nuisances to the Margam Urban District Council, against one Mrs. Skyrme for having, on the 30th Dec. 1898, obstructed the execution of an order of one of Her Majesty's justices of the peace, based on the certificate of a duly qualified medical practitioner, for the removal of a child of Mrs. Skyrme then suffering from a dangerous infectious disorder, to wit, scarlet fever, and being then without proper lodging or accom modation, to a suitable hospital within the district of the council.
The summons was heard on the 9th Jan. 1899 by three justices sitting at Aberavon, and the following facts were proved or admitted during the hearing of the case :
On the 6th Dec. 1898 the defendant Mrs. Skyrme, who was the wife of a working man, at (a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
REG. v. DAVEY AND OTHERS (Justices).
the suggestion of the medical officer of health for the district, allowed her child to be removed to the Infectious Diseases Hospital of the Margam Urban District Council, and the child remained there until the 28th of the same month, and on the latter date the defendant went to the hospital and carried her child home. The caretaker of the hospital had been seen by the defendant's husband going home drunk on the preceding night or the night before, and the matron had admitted to the district council that this was true.
It was proved to the satisfaction of the court that the child while in the hospital was seen by the defendant ruaning across a wet room in bare fe-t, and that, after the return of the child home, the medical practitioner who signed the certificate for her removal to the hospital said that if the child was kept warm for two or three days she would be well, and had told the defendant, the mother of the child, that there was proper lodging and accommodation for the child in the defendant's house; that the child was kept in a room at the end of a long passage apart from the other part of the house, and that this room was properly disinfected according to the instructions of the medical officer; that there was a fire in the room and the child properly attended to, and that disinfectants were used.
On the 30th Dec. 1898, upon the certificate of a medical practitioner that the child was suffering from a dangerous infectious disorder and was without proper lodging and accommodation and ought to be forthwith removed to the Margam hospital or sanatorium, a justice of the peace made an order under sect. 124 of the Public Health Act 1875 for the removal of the child forthwith to the hospital.
It was proved that the defendant had no notice of the intended application for the order for the removal of the child to the hospital, and that after the receipt of the order she called in the services of an independent medical man, who certified that there was no danger of infection if the child were properly anointed.
In support of the summons evidence was given of the making of the order for removal, and of disobedience and obstruction of the execution of the order by the defendant.
On behalf of the defendant it was not denied that the order was made, or that the defendant had disobeyed and obstructed the execution of the order; but the solicitor for the defendant disputed the validity of the order, and by crossexamination of the inspector, who was called as a witness, sought to show that the accommodation provided at the house of the defendant, the mother of the child, was sufficient, and that the hospital mentioned in the order was not properly conducted, and upon these grounds the solicitor for the defendant sought to justify the defendant's disobedience and obstruction of the execution of the order.
The solicitor for the complainant objected to the cross-examination of the inspector, and contended that it was not open to the court on the hearing of the summons to go behind or inquire into the validity of the order of the magistrate made under sect. 124 of the Public Health Act 1875 for the removal of the child, or to inquire whether there was a proper hospital or not.
Two of the three justices overruled these objections, and found as a fact that there was no
suitable hospital for the reception of the child provided within the district, and that the defendant had provided proper lodging and accommodation for the child, and upon this evidence they dismissed the summons. The chairman (Mr. Davey), however, was of opinion that the validity of the order could not be gone into or contested, and that the defendant ought to have been convicted, having regard to the decision in the case of Booker v. Taylor, reported in the Times, the 21st Nov. 1882, but, the majority of the court being of opinion that the information should be dismissed, the information was dismissed accordingly.
The solicitor for the complainant subsequently applied to the court to state and sign a case upon the point of law as to whether the court could enter into the question as to the validity of the order of the justices, or could inquire whether there was a suitable hospital.
The majority of the justices declined to state a case, because they thought from the decision in Diss Urban Sanitary Authority v. Aldrich (36 L. T. Rep. 663; 2 Q. B. Div. 179) that they had no power to state a case, and that Ex parte Schofield (64 L. T. Rep. 780; (1891) 2 Q. B. 428) also showed that it was not proper to grant a case upon the refusal of the justices to convict under the Public Health Act 1875, and they were of opinion that, as they had found as a fact that there was no proper hospital for the reception of patients within the meaning of the Act and that the patient was provided with proper lodging and accommodation, the court would not interfere with such a finding. They also stated in their affidavit that they were reluctant to put the defendant and her husband, who is a working man, to further expense in litigation as if proper care were taken of the hospital in future there would be no need for similar proceedings, and they suggested that the matter could be finally decided upon the hearing of the rule for a mandamus without the necessity of stating a case.
The above rule for a mandamus was then applied for at the instance of the complainant.
The Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55) enacts:
Sect. 124. Where any suitable hospital or place for the reception of the sick is provided within the district of a local authority, or within a convenient distance of such district, any person who is suffering from any dangerous infectious disorder, and is without proper lodging or accommodation, or lodged in a room occupied by more than one family,
may, on a certificate signed by a legally qualified medical practitioner, and with the consent of the superintending body of such hospital or place, be removed, by order of any justice, to such hospital or place at the cost of the local authority. An order under this section may be addressed to such constable or officer of the local authority as the justice or local authority making the same may think expedient; and any person who wilfully disobeys or obstructs the execution of such order shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds.
S. T. Evans showed cause. The proceedings here were under sect. 124 of the Public Health Act 1875, and under that section an order was made for the removal of the child to the hospital. That order was made ex parte, and without any notice to the mother of the child. The mother disobeyed and obstructed the execution of that order, and proceedings were then taken against
REG. v. DAVEY AND OTHERS (Justices).
her before the justices for such disobedience to and obstruction of the order of removal. The question therefore is whether or not upon the hearing of such a summons for obstructing the execution of the order, the justices can go behind the order and enter into its validity, or inquire into the circumstances of the case under which the order was made. The justices were right in deciding that they had power to go behind the order and inquire into the facts and to say upon those facts whether an order ought to be made. The case of Booker v. Taylor (reported in the Times of the 21st Nov. 1882, and referred to in Lumley's Public Health, 5th edit., p. 144, note (i), and in Glen's Public Health, 12th edit., p. 238) was cited before the justices. In that case there had been an order for the removal of a child under this section. The mother of the child resisted the removal, and was summoned for so doing. At the hearing the magistrates entered into the validity of the order and declined to convict, but the court held they were wrong in so doing; that they had no right to go behind the order and enter into its validity, and that they were bound upon the evidence to convict if there had been an obstruction. If that case be rightly decided, it is tantamount to saying that a person can be convicted of a criminal offence without having committed an offence at all, and without being heard at all. The section lays down certain preliminary conditions that have to be fulfilled, as that a suitable hospital has been provided and that proper accommodation has not been provided for the child, and it is a very strong thing to say that an order may be made under the section-an order which is to be made ex parte and without notice to the person interested-without hearing the facts so as to ascertain whether the conditions of the section have been complied with. [CHANNELL, J—A similar thing takes place in reference to cases as to unsound meat; there is a power to seize it. In such cases it is necessary to act promptly, and in the cases of infectious diseases it is equally necessary to act promptly.] There is no appeal in these cases, and therefore the court is not bound by the decision in Booker v. Taylor (ubi sup.), which is merely the decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. That case is very shortly reported; it is not in any of the recognised law reports, and it is very hard that this woman should be condemned in a penalty without being heard. He referred to
Waye v. Thompson, 53 L. T. Rep. 358; 15 Q. B.
W. C. Ryde in support of the rule.-The sole question is whether the justices can go behind the order. There is the express decision of Booker v. Taylor (ubi sup.) that the justices cannot go behind the order. That was cited to the justices, but they refused to follow it. A similar point recently arose under sect. 305 of the Act in the case of Robinson v. Corporation of Sunderland (80 L. T. Rep. 262; (1899) 1 Q. B. 751), and it was held that the justices had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the local authority under that section. That case is in pari materia with the present. [CHANNELL, J. referred to White v. Redfern (41 L. T. Rep. 524; 5 Q. B. Div. 15).] The section itself provides all possible safeguards, and the hospital is to be one managed by local control where there are sufficient means of correcting
abuses. Urgency is necessary in such cases, as the safety of many lives may be concerned, and the object of the section is to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, and on this ground of urgency the order may be made ex parte. If the section bad stood alone, it would have been right to place that construction upon it; but, in addition, there is the express decision in Booker v. Taylor (ubi sup.) so long ago as the year 1882. That construction has been placed upon the statute, and Parliament has not interfered with it, or corrected it. A similar provision was contained in sect. 42 of the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 101); this section has been amended by sect. 1 of 53 & 54 Vict. c. 20, but it has not been altered in this respect. The Legislature has also inserted the same provision in sect. 66 of the Public Health (London) Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 76), and has dealt with the matter in the Infectious Disease (Prevention) Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 34). The Legislature has therefore had several opportunities of correcting the decision in Booker v. Taylor (ubi sup.), and has not done so, but has sanctioned it.
DARLING, J.-In this case it appears that this woman, the mother of a child ill with scarlet fever, had allowed the child to be taken to a hospital. After a time the mother of the child became aware that the hospital was unfit for its detention. The child had not been sent there by virtue of any order, and the mother, on discovering that the hospital was not properly managed and that some of the attendants were drunk, fetched the child away from the hospital and took her to her own house, and made provision to get the house disinfected. Thereupon the local authority got a magistrate to make an order under sect. 124 of the Public Health Act 1875 for the removal of the child and the putting of her back in the hospital. That order having been obtained, the mother prevented its execution, and thereupon proceedings were taken against her under sect. 124 of the Act, which says that " person who wilfully disobeys or obstructs the execution of such order shall be liable to a penalty." On the hearing of this summons objection was taken before the magistrates that they had no power to go behind the order for removal to the hospital, and in support of this objection there was cited to them the report from the Times newspaper of the case of Booker v. Taylor (ubi sup.), which was decided on hearing one side only. That case decides that the justices were not entitled to go behind the order and inquire into its validity, but that they were bound to act upon it. It has been pressed upon us that there would be great hardship in allowing a justice to make such an order as this without giving to the person interested an opportunity of being heard, and undoubtedly that would be so. But what has been alleged here is that the person so interested has a right to obstruct the execution of the order, and at the hearing of the summons against her for so doing raise the whole facts. The intention of the Legislature was to protect the public from infectious diseases, and it is perfectly obvious that if the proceedings for the removal to the hospital were of a dilatory character the whole thing would be useless. I do not think that was intended at all. What was intended was to give a very summary remedy in such cases of infectious diseases for the protection
of the public. I think, therefore, that Booker v. Taylor (ubi sup.) was rightly decided, and that when an order of this kind was made this woman had no right to obstruct the execution of the order, and that the justices had no right to go behind the order. I should say the remedy by writ of habeas corpus might be open to any person who had a right to complain; but I do not think that that question arises here. The question is whether we ought to make absolute a rule for a mandamus to the justices to state a case. Under all the circumstances of this case, if we made such an order as that, the magistrates might say that this woman had no intention to set the law at defiance, and possibly they might impose a nominal fine only. That being so, nothing would be gained by our taking that step, and I think under the circumstances that this rule should be discharged.
CHANNELL, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think we ought to say that Booker v. Taylor (ubi sup.) was rightly decided. Of course it is a general principle of law that a person cannot be convicted of a criminal offence without being heard; but there are exceptions to that rule, and those exceptions are cases where it appears on the words of the statute itself that the thing was intended to be done ex parte and that the parties should act promptly, and one of the instances that was referred to was the case of the destruction of unsound meat, where measures have to be taken promptly, and where it is desirable that the thing should be done and the order acted on at once. The present is one of those cases where it is necessary to act promptly, and the statute evidently meant that the order made under the section for the removal of a person to a hospital should be followed up and acted on at once, and that the person should be removed at once. It seems to me that the offence is committed if the person knowing that the order is made in fact, wilfully disobeys it, and upon the hearing of a summons for such offence the magistrates cannot go behind that order and say that that order ought not to have been made. I think in strictness the magistrate, who makes the order, ought to satisfy himself not only of the existence of the medical certificate, but also that the other conditions of the section have been fulfilled, such as that there should be a suitable hospital within a convenient distance, and that the person suffering from the disease should not have proper lodging or accommodation at home. It was a very doubtful proceeding for the medical officer in this case to go and get an ex parte order to remove the child to the hospital when the mother had previously removed the child owing to the management of the hospital and the statement that the attendant was drunk. There must be some mode of questioning such an order, probably by certiorari or by writ of habeas corpus, but the magistrates could not go behind it. In this case, as the fine at the most could only be a nominal one, it is not worth while to call on the magistrates to state a case, and on this ground I think that the rule should be discharged. Rule discharged.
Solicitors for the applicant in support of the rule, Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, for T. J. Hughes, Bridgend; for the respondents, Sharpe, Parker, Pritchards, and Barham, for Cuthbertson and Powell, Neath.
MAG. CAS.-VOL. XIX.
Tuesday, May 9, 1899.
(Before DARLING and CHANNELL, JJ.) WHITE (app.) v. MORLEY (resp.). (a) Bye-law-Validity-Frequenting street for betting -Inconsistency between bye-law and statuteMetropolitan Streets Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 134), s. 23-Municipal Corporations Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), s. 23.
Under sect. 23 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, which enables a county council to make bye-laws for the "good rule and government" of their district, the London County Council made a bye-law prohibiting under a penalty any person from frequenting or using a street or other public place for the purpose of bookmaking or betting.
It was contended that this bye-law was invalid as being inconsistent with the provisions in sect. 23 of the Metropolitan Streets Act 1867, which enacts that "any three or more persons assembled together in a street within the metropolis for the purpose of betting shall be deemed to be obstructing the street," and shall be liable to a penalty: Held, that there was no inconsistency between the bye-law and the statute, and that the bye-law was not invalid on that ground; that the byelaw was one which could properly be made for the good rule and government of the district, and was therefore valid.
CASE stated by the metropolitan police magistrate sitting at the Clerkenwell police-court.
Upon the hearing on the 26th Jan. 1899, at the Clerkenwell police-court, of a summons upon complaint made by James Morley, inspector of the metropolitan police (the respondent) against the appellant, that the appellant on the 2nd Dec. 1898, at Palmer-place, near the Holloway-road, in the county of London, did unlawfully frequent and use the said place for the purpose of betting, contrary to the bye-laws of the London County Council.
There was another summons charging the appellant with committing the same offence upon the 3rd Dec. 1898.
Certain bye-laws were made by the London County Council in pursuance of the provisions of sect. 23 of the Municipal Corporations Act_1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50) and sect. 16 of the Local Government Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41).
These bye-laws were made in pursuance of a resolution of the county council on the 19th July 1898, and they came into force on the 1st Oct. 1898.
Bye-law No. 4 (as to street betting) provided: No person shall frequent and use any street or other public place on behalf, either of himself or of any other person, for the purpose of bookmaking or betting, or wagering, or agreeing to bet or wager with any person, or paying, or receiving, or settling bets.
No. 5. Any person who shall offend against any of the foregoing bye-laws shall be liable for every such offence to a fine not exceeding forty shillings, except in the case of the bye-law relating to street betting, the fine for the breach of which shall be an amount not exceeding 51.
At the hearing of the summonses the following facts were proved or admitted :
On the 2nd Dec. 1898 the appellant was standing at about 1.45 p.m. on the footway of Palmer-place, which is a street and a public place. He stood
(a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.