men was at Celles watching the garrison of Oudenarde, and ready to afford aid to the French Lines in case of need.

The strength of the French forces was about one hundred and forty-five thousand distributed as follows:

On the 13th of May the Elector marched from the Lys through Ghent, crossing the Scheldt the next day at Dendermonde. On the fourteenth de Vaudemont marched from Bois Seigneur Isaac to Halle, where the King joined and took the command. On the 16th both armies united at St. QuintinLenneck. While these movements were taking place General Fagel moved with twelve battalions-from Nieuport as far as Deinse.

All these movements were naturally productive of corresponding re-arrangements on the part of the French. De Créquy left Celles in order to come nearer to the main army, and his place was taken by twenty battalions under the Marquis de Montrevel from the Lines: at the same time de Boufflers approached de Villeroi as far as Ghislenghien.

Thus de Villeroi had under his hand in case of a general action some hundred and twenty thousand men besides the troops engaged in the siege, while King William had in his united army at least fifteen or twenty thousand fewer.

The preponderance of force was so greatly on the side of de Villeroi, and his dispositions for the siege were such, that William regarded it as impracticable to relieve Ath in any way; and on the 22nd, while the Elector returned again to Deinse, he marched to Genappe, re-inforcing Oudenarde as he went. the 28th Ath surrendered with the honours of war.

The French Generals had conceived a very pretty piece of strategy in case of the capture of Ath, and they now proceeded to the execution of their project.

It will be observed that Ath, Brussels, and Namur form the three angles of a triangle.

William could not therefore move from the neighbourhood of his present position until he was sure of the next move of his adversaries: he could not encamp close to Brussels for fear of exposing Namur; he could not summon the Elector to join

him in any undertaking on the Sambre or Meuse for fear of exposing the western fortresses to the whole weight of the French forces; and equally he could not join the Elector in any enterprise against the French Lines for fear of leaving his eastern strongholds uncovered.

Between Genappe and Brussels lay the forest of Soignies, then untraversed by any except the main roads, which here partook of the nature of defiles. The distance from Genappe to Brussels is about the same as from Enghien to Brussels, and ten or twelve miles less than from Lessines to Brussels.

If then the French could start from Enghien before William became aware of it, they were sure to reach Brussels before him; and even if he did hear of their movement before they got as far as Enghien, the French would still have the advantage of clear roads.

The project agreed upon between de Villeroi and de Boufflers was to gain Anderlecht before William could gain it, to possess themselves of the capital and of Vilvorde, and thus to proceed to cut off all communication between the eastern and the western portions of the Allied line of defence.

So soon as the surrender of Ath was assured, de Villerci had crossed the Dender and encamped on the other side. On the 12th of June he marched to Gammerage and de Boufflers to Enghien, and both made ready to march conjointly on Brussels.

But fortunately for the Allies they for once had scouts on the look-out, and these ominous movements were made known to William the same afternoon. William lost not a moment in meeting the situation in the only way possible, marching on Brussels by the one road open to him. Starting three brigades of infantry between four and five o'clock, he dispatched the artillery two hours later, the baggage at ten, and the rest of the infantry at eleven: at midnight the King, who had personally superintended the dispatch of the troops, started himself with four regiments of dragoons and hastened to the front to reconnoitre, and to receive the army on its arrival: the main body of the cavalry left Genappe at daylight and so covered the rear.

Before ten the next morning the Allies had occupied the camp of Anderlecht; and when de Villeroi and de Boufflers appeared presently on the heights of Anderlecht and on the Assche road, they saw the Dutch and English flags waving over the coveted ground, and knew that they were foiled.

The camp of Anderlecht was covered on its right flank and along its front by streams and ponds, and the position was

greatly strengthened by intrenchments and by artificial inundations produced by dams. Besides providing against an attack on the encampment, the Allies placed Brussels in readiness for a siege.

This failure of the design upon the capital was the concluding act of the WAR IN FLANDERS. For many months past negotiations had been going on, and they were shortly conducted to a satisfactory issue.

De Villeroi and De Boufflers retired to between St. QuintinLenneck and Halle; and after this no movements were made except those necessitated by reasons of immediate supply.

The British regiments taking part in the campaign of 1697 were as follows:

(including 4 squads. of the 7th Drs. with the Elector's army)

Foot, 27 battalions at 550

=

3,300
3,300

27

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

On the 11th of September peace was signed at RYSWICK,

and for four years the British Army remained inactive.

ARMS AND ACCOUTREMENTS, DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1660 TO 1700.

1660 to 1700.

The Sword.-The Hanger.-The Pike.--The Matchlock.-The Match.-Bandaleers. -The Ball-bag.-The Priming-flask.-Wadding.-The Rest.-The Firelock or Fusil. The Fusil-Musquet.-The Sling.-The Carbine.-Rifled arms.---Repeating Arms.-Mitrailleuses.--Breech - loading arms.-The Pistol.-Cartridges.— The Cartridge-box.—The Gibecière.—The Bayonet.—The Swedish Feather.— The feathered Rest.-The Plug-Bayonet.-The Ring-Bayonet. -The Chevauxde-frise. The Socket - Bayonet.-The Sword - Bayonet.-The Granade.—The Granade-Pouch.-The Match - box. -Hatchets.-Belts.-Pouch - belts.-Swordbelts.-The Carbine-belt.-The Half-pike.-The Partisan.-The Halberd.-The Pole-axe. -The Spontoon.-Defensive Armour.-Head-Pieces.-The Cuirass.The Gorget.-Mode of supply.-Prices.

[For Illustrations, see Note on p. xiii.]

THE latter half of the seventeenth century was the era of the rise of military science, as a science, in all its branches.

In nothing, however, except perhaps engineering, was there, during this half-century, so marked a change as in the armament of the soldier; for this period witnessed the abolition of the clumsy rest; the substitution of the firelock for the tedious matchlock; the use of cartridges in place of the noisy and dangerous bandaleers; the introduction of granades; and above all the invention of the socket-bayonet.

It is purposed in this chapter to trace these improvements through their several gradations, and to enter, as briefly as may be, into a particular account of each weapon and its appurtenances.627

The SWORD claims precedence of mention by right of seniority, for it is beyond dispute the oldest as well as the most universal of weapons (excepting, perhaps, the spear). From the day that the angel stood sentry to bar the entrance to Eden up to the present moment, we read of the use of the sword in

627 In giving a description of the different arms and accoutrements I shall avoid, as far as possible, the repetition of whatever may be more advantageously stated in the Notes to the illustrations.