The French closed the campaign by a bombardment of Charleroi, the sole object of which was to furnish matter of triumph to the Paris papers. The mischief done however, especially by destroying great quantities of forage and other stores, exercised considerable influence on the fate of Charleroi in the ensuing campaign.494

494 In addition to the authorities quoted in detail, the following have been

consulted;

London Gazettes.

De Quincy.

De Beaurain.

CHAPTER XV.

THE WAR IN FLANDERS. CAMPAIGN OF 1693. FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN TO THE BATTLE OF NEERWINDEN.

1693. JANY. TO JULY 18/28.

Operations during the winter.-Capture of Furnes and Dixmude by the French.Opening of the campaign.-Plans of the French.-Movements of the Allies.The camp at Parck.-The British Contingent.-Change in the enemy's plans-Movements of the French.-The expedition against the Lines of the Scheldt. -The battle of Dottignies and forcing of the French Lines.

[For Illustrations, see Note on p. xiii.]

OUR attention is again first claimed by the French.

They had made their customary good use of the winter. Not only had large supplies been stored in the depôts between Tournai and the Sambre,495 and an Artillery train amounting to more than two hundred pieces of Ordnance been collected on the Meuse and the Scheldt; but also twelve fresh Foot regiments had been raised,495 promotions and rewards had been dealt out with no niggard hand, and a new military Order had been instituted.496 Every thing had been done that might be calculated to raise the spirits of the troops and to inspire both officers and men with confidence in the result of the coming campaign.

The vigour of the French executive did not limit itself to these preparatory measures. De Boufflers 495 had during the winter been sent to take Furnes. He had swooped down upon the place in his customary sudden manner. Huy was invested at the same time by M. de Guiscard,495 and M. de Villars created a further distraction by feigned movements on the Dender. The weather was at its worst; the roads were thighdeep in mud and slush.497 The Allied regiments marching to

495 De Beaurain.

496 The Order of St. Louis.

497 D'Auvergne.

De Villars.

De Beaurain.

495

the relief of Furnes from Bruges, Ghent, and the coast, could scarcely make a day's march in four days. The Artillery and wagons could barely be got along: every few yards there was a halt 497 while some wagon or gun was being extricated from the slough. In several instances the traces had to be cut, and the animals left to flounder out or actually to sink and die stifled in the mud.

Under such circumstances no relief was possible, and Furnes fell again into the hands of the French, Count d'Horn with the Dutch garrison marching out with honours (see Ill. LXXVIII).

Dixmude followed, being of necessity evacuated upon the loss of Furnes,497 seeing that the French also occupied the Fort of Knocke.

These things had occurred at the beginning of the year, and the rains continued until late in the Spring.498 The consequent impracticability of the roads, and lateness of the forage-harvest, deferred the commencement of the active operations of the season. It was not before the middle of May that the armies took the field.

499

The French assembled two armies; one under de Boufflers at Tournai, the other under de Luxembourg at Givries: the latter numbered about twenty-four thousand cavalry and fortyseven thousand Foot; 495 the former seventeen thousand cavalry and thirty-one thousand infantry. Besides these, a corps of four thousand five hundred men 495 was left with M. de la Valette to guard the Lines: and a body of cavalry under the Marquis d'Harcourt was stationed beyond the Meuse for purposes of observation. 495

The French plan of campaign was to confine the war to the Meuse. To threaten Huy and Liége would be advisable, not alone because these places might possibly be captured, but also because it would have the double effect of removing the war from the vicinity of the Lines of the Scheldt, and of weakening the enemy's main army both by withdrawing from it the Liége and Brandenbourg Contingents (for the defence of their own frontier) and by confining the large garrisons of the Meuse to the walls of the endangered fortresses.

The experience of the previous year suggested the adoption

498 D'Auvergne.
499 De Beaurain.

D'Auvergne.
Berwick.

of the same arrangement as had been found so effective in the case of Namur. De Boufflers was to execute the enterprises that might be resolved upon, while de Luxembourg fended off the Allied army.

On the twenty-third of May de Boufflers marched to Gemblours, 495 which he reached on the twenty-eighth, de Luxembourg moving also, and on that day marching from Bassy to Tourine-les-Ordons (Ill. LXIII). The army had been delayed for a few days, waiting for the King 495 who was prevented by indisposition from joining before the twenty-third. The Allies had rendezvoused between Louvain and Brussels; 498 de Wirtemberg at the same time collecting a force at Ghent, and a small force of cavalry being also retained on the Meuse. As soon as the enemy was well on his route eastwards, 498 King William called in all his forces; and, without waiting for the junction of those most remote, marched at once to Parck in order to cover Brussels and Upper Brabant. Whether the lessons of Mons, Beaumont, and Namur, had made a deep impression, or whether false information had been obtained respecting the enemy's movements, does not appear; but William was at all events so determined not to be late on this occasion 498 that he made the whole march from Dieghem in one day. Those who have been in the neighbourhood of Brussels in summer can testify to the intensity of the heat there. The heat this year was greater than usual,498 and its effect upon the atmosphere was the more oppressive because of the unusual moisture of the earth. Numbers of men in this march fell out and became stragglers, and several fell dead in the ranks.498

The camp at Parck occupied a very inaccessible position. The right of the camp touched the river Dyle 500 about four miles above Louvain, forming an acute angle with the river: the left was thus equally distant from Louvain. In front of the right was an impenetrable forest called generally the Bois de Merdael, and this was bounded by the Louvain-Namur road which passed through the centre of the camp. The extreme left lay on a rising ground and was also covered by woods: in front of the left wing ran a stream with very deep banks, and beyond this stream was the Bois de Bierbeck. The only ways into the position were by a break that existed in the Bois de Bierbeck and by the Namur road. The former was commanded

500 D'Auvergne.

De Beaurain.

by the heights on the left and was rendered still more difficult by the stream; the latter was overlooked by the heights of Bierbeck; and both openings were of the nature of defiles.

On the march to this camp William was joined by the rest of his available forces.498 Nevertheless, the army was weak, for the threatened places on the Meuse absorbed an immense body De Wirtemberg and Lieutenant-General Talmach came in from the West with the English infantry, and Lord Athlone from Tongres with the cavalry.

The British Contingent this year was larger than heretofore, and numbered seventeen thousand men, as shown in the following list:

List of the British Army in Camp at Parck.