rear-guard got across with great loss; and, as de Luxembourg had none but cavalry with him, he could do nothing further. The English Life-Guards were in the thick of the fight: indeed, one private gentleman of this Corps cut his way right through the enemy, galloped into the very midst of de Luxembourg's staff, and was made prisoner barely in time to save the Duc's life. This, however, was the only English regiment engaged, for which reason the action has not been recounted in greater detail. Nevertheless, this is one of the most instructive combats on record. The secrecy with which de Luxembourg executed his scheme; the shrewdness with which he covered it by the march of his infantry to Herinnes; the preparation made by advancing de Villars ostensibly to protect Tournai; the general readiness to take instant advantage of de Waldeck's errors should he commit any, even though there could be no certainty that he would do so; all this contributed to de Luxembourg's success. On the other hand, de Waldeck's remissness in not having scouts beyond Leuze; his inattention to the first appearance of the enemy; and above all his neglect in not posting infantry at the passes on the stream to support and receive the cavalry of the rear-guard on their retirement ;- these are as much warnings as de Luxembourg's measures are examples. The result of the action was a loss to the Allies of fifteenhundred men and many horses and standards: Count de Lippe and several other officers were taken prisoners, and the campaign closed with éclat to the French arms. Both armies retired in a few days into winter quarters. CHAPTER XIII. THE WAR IN FLANDERS. CAMPAIGN OF 1692. FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN TO THE BATTLE OF ESTINKERKE. 1692. MAY TO 23 JULY. Preparations for the Campaign.-Opening of the Campaign.—Investment of Namur by the French.-Movements of the Allies.-Capitulation of Namur.-The attempt of the Allies on Mons.-French plans and movements.-Expectations of the Allies.-Description of the Field of Estinkerke.-Capture of a French spy.— King William's opinion of British troops.-List of the British Contingent. [For Illustrations, see Note on p. xiii.] IN its commencement this campaign resembled the last; the same forethought, decision, activity, union, and promptitude on the part of the French; 441 the same unsettled tardiness and disunion, and the same consequent inactivity, on the side of the Allies. The latter had suffered the winter to pass on the principle that sufficient to the day is the evil thereof; the former had been turning to account the lessons of the campaign of 1691. The French did not forget that, had they enjoyed entire control of the district between the Sambre and Meuse, they would have escaped the anxieties of last August, and that de Luxembourg might have been bombarding Brussels or besieging Ath instead of making forced marches through thick forests for bare safety. The district between the Meuse and the Sambre comprises a triangle of which the base is formed by the line of French fortresses Maubeuge, Philippeville, and Charlemont, while at the apex and at the confluence of the rivers stands the fortress of Namur: on the rivers which formed the sides of the triangle the French possessed Dinant on the Meuse, and the Allies Charleroi on the Sambre. The city and fortress of Namur were also in the hands of 441 D'Auvergne. Besides the quotations in the notes of this chapter many other general authorities have been consulted, such as the London Gazette; De Quincy; Saint Simon. the Allies who thus held a complete frontier in the Sambre, a frontier whose value had however been greatly deteriorated by the loss of Mons. The castle and fortifications of Namur were situate on heights in the angle of the two rivers: the town was on lower ground on the left bank of the Meuse, the Sambre running between the castle and the town. To the acquisition of this stronghold the French government had directed its attention during the winter. With Mons and Namur in the hands of the French Charleroi must follow, and the French frontier would be advanced to the Sambre. Into Maubeuge, Philippeville, Dinant, and the other towns about the rivers, supplies had been pouring throughout the winter; and the Intendants in Hainault had received instructions to assist M. de Vauban, the French Engineer, in every preparation for a long and difficult siege. An immense siege and field train 4 had been quietly collected on the Meuse and the Scheldt. On the seventh of May the French King arrived in the camp of a large army assembled on the Haisne, near Givey, and three days after his arrival he held a grand review for the delectation of his Court. The troops were drawn up in four lines,443 the two front lines being of greater extent than the others on account of the ground: there were one hundred and fifteen thousand men present and the front covered nine miles of country. 443 While de Luxembourg had thus got together the main army near Mons, de Boufflers, with a force of ten thousand infantry and eight thousand Horse,448 had encamped beyond the Meuse at Rochefort on the river Lesse. De Joyeuse with another corps was on the Moselle to distract the Hesse and Brandenburg contingents. The lines of the Scheldt were left defended by three battalions and about four thousand cavalry: and in order not to render the line of operations too extensive for the number of troops, orders were given for the evacuation of Courtrai, Furnes, and Dixmude in case of attack.443 All was thus matured for the projected siege. The siege train consisted of one hundred and ninety-six guns and sixtyseven mortars and pierriers or patteraras. The Commissariat 442 I do not here describe Namur further because its siege did not concern the British troops of whom there were none in the garrison, besides that in a future chapter it will become necessary to give a detailed account of the defences of the place. 443 De Beaurain, Hist. Mil. du duc de Luxembourg. was prepared with huge depôts,448 and a transport train of six thousand wagons. Nothing was left to be desired. On the thirteenth of May the French army marched on. Namur,443 the King camping always to the right so as to keep de Luxembourg betwixt him and the enemy: the major portion of the Commissariat and Artillery trains marched direct towards Namur by way of Philippeville (Ill. LVII): the main body of the army marched the first day to the Piéton, the next day to Sombref, and thence to the Orneau. De Luxembourg lay along the Orneau with Gemblours 443 in rear of his centre, and the King's corps encamped at Le Masy on the Namur side of the river and across the Brussels and Namur high road. At the same time a body of four thousand cavalry was detached to the Upper Mehaigne to observe and retard any advance of the Allies from the side of Brussels; and another detachment was made towards Chatelet 443 to prevent any annoyance from the garrison of Charleroi, and to ensure communication with the depôt at Maubeuge. The next day Namur was invested on all sides. The King's corps d'armée undertook the investment of the North side; M. de Ximenes, who had escorted the trains by the Philippeville route, formed the link between the rivers; and de Boufflers came up to complete the chain. M. de Vauban directed the siege operations. Bridges were laid over the rivers; the passes around the place were occupied; field ovens were erected at Flauven; and the Artillery parks were established at Bouge and between the rivers (See Ill. LXXX). The King of England had striven to impress upon his allies the advantages that would accrue from taking the lead in the campaign" and thus reducing the French to the defensive: he urged upon them the warning afforded by the loss of Mons in the previous spring. But selfishness, arrogance, avarice, diversity of opinions and of interests, were all at work to hinder William and to favour Louis Quatorze. The French King had merely to signify his pleasure that an enterprise should be entered upon, and in a few hours an army marched to its performance: William had to enter into negotiations and correspondence before he could undertake any operation of importance; politics and generalship had to make mutual concessions, and valuable time was wasted in adjusting their respective claims. 444 D'Auvergne. De Beaurain. It was, however, imperative on William to act without waiting for the arrival of all the expected Contingents, for it became daily more manifest that the French were nourishing designs on Charleroi or Namur. Hastily assembling a force of thirty thousand men at Anderlecht, William sent orders 443 to Generals Cerclaes and Fleming to hasten up with the Brandenbourg and Liége troops; and in order to be nearer to them, and at the same time en route to the expected seat of war,445 he marched eastwards by Bethlehem and Parck to Meldert, where he halted on the twenty-fifth of May after sending back the heavy baggage to Arschot. The manifestation of the grand design of the French had the effect of startling the sluggish Dutch and Germans and the lazy Spaniards into life and a now futile activity. The Contingents came in fast. The Dutch from the western garrisons had joined on the nineteenth 445 bringing with them sixteen thousand British troops that had wintered about Bruges and Ghent. The Danes 445 under Prince Wirtemberg also came in about six thousand strong. Both because the French had destroyed all the Spring forage about Gemblours, and because there was reason to fear that the expected Brandenburgers might be cut off en route, William did not march direct towards de Luxembourg but kept away to his left to Elixen (or Heylissem), where Baron Fleming and Count Cerclaes de Tilly with fourteen thousand Brandenburgers and Liégeois safely effected a junction.* 444 The siege of Namur was all this time proceeding apace. Twenty thousand peasant navvies 443 had been set to work at the trenches. De Boufflers had possessed himself of the Faubourg de Jambe, and a lodgment 443 having been also effected on the Bouge side, the town had capitulated on condition that no firing should take place from the town446 on the Castle or from the Castle on the town. The surrender of the town by contracting the lines of investment released a number of troops to swell the covering army under de Luxembourg.444 The river Mehaigne (rising north of Namur and only four or five miles from the Sambre) by its course to enter the Meuse 445 D'Auvergne. De la Colonie. |