each of the chapelries has its own churchwardens: that the tithe rent-charge of Ecchinswell was commuted at £60, and that of Sydmonton at £50, 8s. 6d., and that the fees of both chapelries were £2." These recitals in the Order in Council furnish evidence which the Court is bound to accept so far as they affect the question now before it. Mr. Rugg was in September 1852 instituted as incumbent of Ecchins well-withSydmonton. Mr. Kingsmill, the principal owner of land in the parish, rebuilt the chapel at Sydmonton in 1853. It appears from the pamphlet printed by Mr. Rugg, which has been admitted as evidence in this cause, that for twelve years divine service was performed by him at Sydmonton. That in 1863 he had an unfortunate quarrel with Mr. Kingsmill about sittings in the chapel, and Mr. Rugg says: "I was thereupon put to the necessity of suspending divine service until my wishes were respected." On the 5th of September 1863 he wrote to Mr. Kingsmill, complaining of his conduct "in intimidating, as you have done, the inmates of my house from sitting in the pew which was appropriated to my household at the vestry meeting held prior to the opening of my church. I think indeed,” he adds, "it is high time the church should be closed, when it has come to such a pass as this, coupled with the conduct which has generally been characterised with so much injustice towards your pastor. You cannot, I am sure, spiritually benefit by the services therein performed, nor, as far as your influence is permitted to operate, can it be otherwise than detrimental to the bearing of religion on the hearts of other worshippers." The Court much regrets to discover from this letter that a priest of the Church of England should suppose that he was justified, on account of a dispute about a pew or sitting in church with a particular person, to refuse the administration of spiritual services to a parish, and actually to close his church. It is clear that such an act was illegal as well as wrong. The quarrel seems to have been made up for a short time, for on the 7th of September Mr. Rugg wrote to Mr. Kingsmill: "I hope to resume the duty at Sydmonton next Sunday, and sincerely regretting as I do that any disturbance should have arisen from so trivial a matter, I remain," etc. On the 17th of December the Bishop wrote to Mr. Rugg enclosing a letter from one of the churchwardens of Sydmonton, complaining of Mr. Rugg, that on various Sundays there was no service at Sydmonton; that Mr. Rugg said he was not well or strong enough sometimes to perform service; and the writer adds: "he says he is not compelled to take the service of Sydmonton, because the church was not consecrated when rebuilt." That is in 1853. On the 21st of December Mr. Rugg wrote a long answer to the

Bishop, in which he maintained that as the church was not consecrated, he was not legally bound to perform service in it, and observes that "the portion of the endowment as regards Sydmonton does not amount, after the outgoings, to more than £20 a year." A further correspondence ensued between Mr. Rugg and the Bishop, in which the former maintained that he was not bound to officiate in an unconsecrated church. Early in August 1865, Mr. Rugg received notice that the Bishop intended to consecrate the chapel. Mr. Rugg declared that he would not consent to the consecration, and refused the use of his key for the purpose of opening the door of the church. The Bishop, however, proceeded to perform his duty, and consecrated the church on the 17th of August 1865. Mr. Rugg maintains that this consecration had no legal effect, and admits he has performed no Divine Service at Sydmonton on the days laid in the Articles, and, as I understand him, for a whole year, dating from the present month. There is no difficulty in deciding that this part of Mr. Rugg's defence is untenable and bad. I have no doubt at all that the church was duly and legally consecrated; that Mr. Rugg, by withholding his consent, in no way affected the legal validity of the act. It is not necessary that I should again advert to the Order in Council; but I listened with surprise to Mr. Rugg's assertion that Sydmonton was unendowed, whereas it is plain that he derives nearly as much income from it as from Ecchinswell. However, the question of the validity of this consecration has been determined by the Privy Council, whose decision is binding upon me. It happened that the Consistory of Winchester granted a faculty to Mr. Kingsmill for a vault under the chancel of this chapel. Mr. Rugg opposed this grant, and appealed to the Privy Council from the sentence of the Court of Arches confirming this grant.-(Rugg v. Kingsmill, Law Reports, 1 Adm. and Eccl. 343.) The Privy Council decided not only in express terms, but by their act, so to speak, that this church was consecrated, for they granted the faculty under conditions to Mr. Kingsmill. (See Law Reports, 2 P. C. 59.) Those conditions related to a further consecration of ground adjoining the chapel. It is needless, however, to say to any person acquainted with ecclesiastical law, that a faculty cannot be granted for a vault in an unconsecrated building.

As to the objection raised by Mr. Rugg, that there is no right of way to this chapel, and that therefore he is excused from performing service therein-to pass over the fact that this objection is not sustained by any evidence, but is clearly an after-thought to support Mr. Rugg's resolution, taken upon other grounds, not to perform service in this chapel-the law

seems to me clear that if there is no access to this chapel except through the land of Mr. Kingsmill, that there must be what is called "a way of necessity" over the land of Mr. Kingsmill to this chapel, which is a public building, to which all the parishioners of Sydmonton have a right to resort.

The only question as to which there really can be anything like a serious argument in this case arises out of the second branch of Mr. Rugg's defence, which is briefly stated, that in the case of an incumbent having a parish consisting of two benefices with a chapel or church in each, it is competent to the incumbent to perform service in one of these chapels or churches alone; and that, by so doing, he satisfies the requisitions of the Act of Uniformity and of the general ecclesiastical law; that a discretion as to this matter is vested in the incumbent, and not in the Bishop; that the parishioners of Sydmonton, whatever may be said in the Order of Council, have no right or title to have Divine Service performed at all in this chapel. The consequence, I may observe, of this position would be, that they would be altogether deprived of their strict right to attend Divine Service, for if the accommodation of Ecchinswell be only sufficient for the parishioners of that chapelry, the parishioners of Sydmonton have certainly no legal right to sittings in the church of Ecchinswell. Another consequence would be, that if Mr. Rugg chose to shut up the chapel of Ecchinswell, wherein the majority of the parishioners reside, and perform service in Sydmonton alone, it would be competent to him to do so. It is not denied that by the existing law Mr. Rugg is compellable to perform morning and evening service in his parish, according to the Act of Uniformity, 13 and 14 Charles II. chapter 4, section 2. According to the provisions in the 1st and 2d of Victoria, chapter 106, section 80, the Bishop may order two full services, including a sermon or lecture, to be performed on every Sunday throughout the year, in the church or chapel of every or any benefice within his diocese. But in this case the exercise of his discretion is restrained by the conditions relative to the value of the living, and the number of the population. But no such restriction is imposed upon the authority of the Bishop to compel the performance of two services in each chapel of a parish. The 17 Charles II. chapter 3, section 1, par. 4, was cited by Mr. Rugg. But in the first place, the statute applies only to a very particular class of churches, namely, those in cities and towns corporate; and in the second place, the principle of the Act is directly opposed to Mr. Rugg's argument, for the discretion as to the performance of Divine Service is expressly vested in the Bishop, and not in the minister. There are in this kingdom many parishes which contain united

benefices, with a church in each, and it is, I believe, for the very first time that it has been contended by the incumbent of such a parish that it is competent to him to perform Divine Service in one of those chapels only, and that the inhabitants of the district in which the other church is situated may be deprived of the right, equally recognised by the common and by the ecclesiastical law of this realm, to the performance of Divine Service by their minister in their own church. To whom are these parishioners to look for redress for this wrong done to them? How are they to obtain the performance of Divine Service in their church? Surely, by an appeal to the authority of their Bishop. He has the cura curarum animarum within his diocese. It is his bounden duty to enforce in every church within his diocese the performance of the services prescribed in the Book of Common Prayer; and where the circumstances of the parish are unfortunately such as not to furnish the means of performing full Divine Service in both churches of a united parish, it is, in my opinion, clearly the intendment of the law, ancient and modern, common and ecclesiastical, as well as of the particular Order in Council under which these parishes were united, that a service should be performed every Sunday in each church, so that the inhabitants of both parishes should have access, upon this Holy Day at least, to their respective churches, and receive the benefit of the ministrations of the church, according to such a distribution of the duty of the incumbent as may best secure this object, that is, according to the opinion of the Bishop in this case, by alternate morning and evening services in the two churches. I see no reason to doubt that the general authority of the Ordinary in matters of this kind, recognised by the universal ecclesiastical law as inherent in the nature of his office, and necessary for the performance of the duties which are cast upon him, is properly applied to a case of this kind.

I think that the parishioners of Sydmonton are entitled to the performance of a service by their minister in their church every Sunday; that the Bishop has rightly exercised his discretion in commanding Mr. Rugg to perform this service; and I must formally admonish Mr. Rugg, as I now do, to obey the direction of his Ordinary.

It is right that I should call the serious attention of Mr. Rugg to the order of this Court. I am glad to perceive that he has the assistance of an experienced proctor, from whom he may learn, if not otherwise informed, that a disobedience to the order of this Court will be attended with the grave penal consequences which the law attaches to the offence of contumacy.

I must further, in the execution of my duty, condemn Mr. Rugg in all the costs of these proceedings.

THE OFFICE OF THE JUDGE PROMOTED BY THE BISHOP OF NORWICH v. PEARSE.

In a criminal suit against a clerk in the Ecclesiastical Courts, the clerk himself is now competent to give evidence.

THIS was a proceeding against a clerk for very heinous immorality. During the trial the defendant was tendered by his counsel as a witness, and I admitted his evidence.

In the end I gave judgment, on the 4th of June 1868, finding the charges proved, and sentencing the defendant to deprivation. The defendant appealed to the Privy Council, who affirmed my decision, but expressed no opinion as to the admissibility of the defendant's evidence.

Since then there have been three other proceedings against clerks for immorality, in each of which the defendant was examined before me. They were all appealed to the Privy Council, but I do not find that in any one of them any objection was made to the admissibility of the defendant's evidence.

This case is reported in the Arches Court, in the Law Reports, 2 Admiralty and Ecclesiastical, page 281.

I have given here such passages of the judgment only as decide on the admissibility of the evidence.

JUDGMENT. The hearing of this cause has been attended with one remarkable circumstance. It furnishes, practically speaking, the first instance in which the accused clerk has been allowed to give his own personal evidence as a part of his