not yet all that may be said on the contrary side: and therefore, though I be beaten, it is not necessary I should yield, not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind.' This is a refuge against conviction, so open and so wide, that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it.

What probabilities determine the assent.—But yet there is some end of it; and a man, having carefully inquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikelinessdone his utmost to inform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the sum total on both sides—may in most cases come to acknowledge, upon the whole matter, on which side the probability rests; wherein some proofs in matters of reason-being suppositions upon universal experience are so cogent and clear, and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his assent. So that, I think, we may conclude that, in propositions where, though the proofs in view are of most moment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy in Words, or [that there are] certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the contrary side, there* assent, suspense, or dissent are often voluntary actions: but where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to suspect that there is either [1.] fallacy of Words (which sober and serious consideration may discover), or [2.] equally valid proofs yet undiscovered, latent on the other side (which also the nature of the thing may, in some cases, make plain to a considerate man), there, I think,

The 8vo. edition before alluded to has 'their,' which seems unintelligible.-ED.

K

a man who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent to the side on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often fall into a method and order which should stamp on paper a coherent discourse; or that a blind, fortuitous, concourse of atoms, not guided by an understanding agent, should fre quently constitute the bodies of any species of animals -in these and the like cases, I think nobody that considers them can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all waver in his assent. Lastly, when there can be no supposition (the thing [being] in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testimony of witnesses) that [3.] there is as fair testimony against, as for, the matter of fact attested (which by inquiry is to be learned, v. g.—whether there was, seventeen hundred years ago, such a man at Rome as Julius Cæsar)—in all such cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational man's power to refuse his assent; but that it necessarily follows and closes with such probabilities. In other less clear cases, I think it is in a man's power to suspend his assent, and perhaps content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour the opinion that suits with his inclination or interest, and so stop from farther search. But that a man

should afford his assent to that side on which the less probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as impossible as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time.

Where it is in our power to suspend it.-As Knowledge is no more arbitrary than Perception, so, I think, Assent is no more in our power than Knowledge. When

the agreement of any two ideas appears to our mind, whether immediately, or by the assistance of Reason, we can no more refuse to perceive—no more avoid knowing it-than we can avoid seeing those objects which we turn our eyes to and look on in daylight; and what, upon full examination, we find the most probable, we cannot deny our Assent to. But though we cannot hinder our Knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived, nor our Assent, where the probability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all the measures of it, yet we can hinder both Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth. If it were not so, Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity could not in any case be a fault. Thus, in some cases, we can prevent or suspend our Assent: but can a man, versed in modern or ancient history, doubt whether there be such a place as Rome, or whether there was such a man as Julius Cæsar? Indeed, there are millions of truths that a man is not, or may not think himself, concerned to know; as, whether our King Richard III. was crook-backed or not: but where the mind judges that the proposition has concernment in it; where the assent, or not assenting, is thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and Good or Evil to depend on choosing or refusing the right side, and the mind sets itself seriously to inquire and examine the probability, there, I think, it is not in our choice to take which side we please, if manifest odds appear on either.

If this be so, the foundation of Error will lie in wrong measures of Probability; as the foundation of Vice in wrong measures of Good.

Authority. The Fourth, and last, wrong measure of probability [that] I shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the others together, is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter: I mean-The`giving up our Assent to the common received opinions, either of our friends or party, neighbourhood or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of those of the same profession? as if honest or bookish men could not err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude! A man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than take them up by such measures. This at least is certain-there is not an opinion so absurd which a man may not receive upon this ground. There is no error to be named which has not had its professors; and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow.

Men not in so many errors as is imagined.—But notwithstanding the great noise [that] is made in the world about 'errors' and 'opinions,' I must do mankind that right to say, [that] there are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions, as is commonly supposed. Not that I think they embrace the Truth; but, indeed, because concerning those doctrines [which] they keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechize the greatest part of the partisans of most of the sects in the world, he would not find, concerning those matters [which] they are so zealous for, that they have any opinions of their own: much less

would he have reason to think that they took them upon the examination of arguments, and appearance of probability. They are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has engaged them in; and there, like the common soldiers of an army, show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing, the cause they contend for; and though one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are, yet this is certain-there are fewer [persons] that actually assent to them and mistake them for Truths than is imagined.

CHAPTER XXI.

OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES.

of

Three sorts.-All that can fall within the compass Human Understanding being either, First, The nature of things as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation: or, Secondly, That which man himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially Happiness: or, Thirdly, The ways and means whereby the Knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated: I think SCIENCE may be divided properly into these three sorts:—

Physica. First, The Knowledge of things as they are in their own proper beings-their constitutions, properties, and operations; whereby I mean not only