OF

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

An inquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful. -Since it is the Understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them, it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The Understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves, sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own Understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

B

Design. This therefore being my purpose, to inquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of human Knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent, I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the Mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its Essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our Understandings; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or [not.] These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with; and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our Understandings come to obtain those notions of things we have, and can set down any measures of the certainty of our Knowledge, or the grounds of those Persuasions which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect that either there is no such thing as Truth at all, or that mankind

hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge

of it.

Method. It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our Assent, and moderate our Persuasions. In order whereunto I shall pursue this following method:

First, I shall inquire into the Original of those Ideas, or Notions, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what Knowledge the Understanding hath by those ideas, and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of Faith or Opinion; whereby I mean, that Assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of Assent.

Useful to know the extent of our comprehension.-If, by this inquiry into the nature of the Understanding, I can discover the powers thereof, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy Mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension. We should not then, perhaps, be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal Knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes, about things to which our Understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds

Design. This therefore being my purpose, to inquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of human Knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent, I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the Mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its Essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our Understandings; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or [not.] These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with; and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our Understandings come to obtain those notions of things we have, and can set down any measures of the certainty of our Knowledge, or the grounds of those Persuasions which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect that either there is no such thing as Truth at all, or that mankind